People v. Woodley CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Woodley CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E087978 v. (Super.Ct.No. FERI2505737)

AHKEEL TYWON WOODLEY, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gary Polk, Judge.

Affirmed with directions.

William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christine Levingston Bergman and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 In October 2025, the People filed a felony complaint charging Ahkeel Tywon Woodley with one count of first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling while a person other than an accomplice was present (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21); unlabeled statutory references are to this code) and four counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)).

In March 2026, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Woodley pled guilty to first degree burglary (§ 459), and he admitted that another person, not an accomplice, was present during the commission of the burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). The trial court dismissed the remaining charges, suspended imposition of his sentence, ordered that Woodley serve 90 days in custody, which were to be satisfied by work release, and placed him on formal probation for 36 months subject to various terms and conditions. One of the terms was that he “[p]articipate and complete at [his] expense any counseling, rehabilitation treatment, program deemed appropriate by probation officer; and authorize release of information relative to progress” (the “treatment condition”).

On appeal, Woodley argues that the treatment condition improperly delegates judicial authority to the probation officer because it “does not specify the kind of program [Woodley] might be required to complete.” The People concede the point and argue that remand is necessary so that the trial court can correct the error. We agree.

Article III, section 3 of the California Constitution states that “[t]he powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this 2 Constitution.” Penal Code section 1203.1 “gives trial courts broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.” (People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26.) But “no statutory provision sanction[s] a delegation of unlimited discretion to a probation officer” to implement or interpret probationary terms. (People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353, 358.) “[T]hese determinations are essentially judicial functions.” (Ibid.) “While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902.)

Woodley’s treatment condition delegates unlimited discretion to his probation officer to determine and implement the nature and amount of treatment that Woodley may be required to complete, including whether a program is residential or outpatient.

Because the treatment condition does not identify the type of counseling or treatment that he is required to complete, the trial court’s imposition of the condition is an improper delegation of authority.

3 DISPOSITION

The trial court is directed to modify the treatment condition by either specifically identifying the type of treatment program(s) or striking the condition altogether. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

FIELDS J.