People v. Gracida CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Gracida CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B348853 (Super. Ct. No. Plaintiff and Respondent, 24VWCF00869) (Los Angeles County) v.

ALBERTO RAFAEL GRACIDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Alberto Rafael Gracida appeals after he pleaded no contest to first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code,1 § 459; count 1), fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 3), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5).2 The trial court 1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Counts 2 and 4 were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. sentenced him to six years and eight months in prison. Gracida contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In April 2024, police officers responded to a residential burglary that occurred while the homeowner was away. The bedrooms had been ransacked, and the homeowner reported missing items. There was one live round of firearm ammunition on the bedroom floor; the homeowner did not own firearms. The homeowner’s vehicle was missing from the garage. Two days later, police officers located the stolen vehicle and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. When the police activated their vehicle’s lights and sirens, the driver of the stolen vehicle, later identified as Gracida, did not stop and began traveling at speeds exceeding 90 miles per hour on residential streets. Gracida also drove in opposite lanes of traffic, made an unsafe turn, and did not stop at a stop sign. Gracida eventually stopped at a dead-end alley. The police apprehended the passenger, Lorrie Rodriguez. Gracida attempted to flee on foot but was apprehended shortly thereafter. Officers recovered a machete, narcotics, several computer tablets, ammunition, and other items belonging to the homeowner after a search of Gracida and the vehicle. The police also found a firearm in the bush next to the vehicle. During his police interview, Gracida said he fled from the police because he was “scared” due to prior police contacts. The police interviewed Rodriguez, who said Gracida was her ex-boyfriend. When the police initiated the traffic stop, Gracida told her that he burglarized someone two or three days before and that he was not stopping the car.

2 Criminal and social history Gracida was 32 years old at the time of his arrest. His criminal history includes a 2010 misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)) and numerous felony convictions, including convictions in 2016 and 2020 for evading police officers (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). In the 2016 offense, Gracida was involved in a vehicle pursuit in which his vehicle drove at high rates of speed, ran red lights, drove on the wrong side of the road, and ended in a collision with two other vehicles. He was sentenced to a total of two years. In the 2020 offense, Gracida was driving the vehicle that hit a peace officer on a motorcycle, almost knocking the officer off. Gracida then sped away through heavy traffic, attempting to evade the officer. He was sentenced to a total of four years in prison, including a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. In addition to several narcotics related convictions, Gracida also has a long history of substance abuse issues. He reported using methamphetamine on a “daily basis” and phencyclidine (PCP) on a “fairly regular basis.” Gracida also reported that he was homeless prior to his arrest and was released from prison less than a year prior. He has been “more or less” homeless for over 15 years. Gracida began taking psychotropic medication at 12 years old. He was diagnosed with bipolar disorder when he was detained in juvenile hall. He reported that he had been psychiatrically hospitalized on two occasions while in the community, but “eloped” from both hospitalizations. He also reported receiving outpatient mental health treatment in the community before his current arrest and was prescribed medication. Gracida received treatment for about two weeks 3 before he stopped going to the clinic and stopped taking his medication. He relapsed on drugs. Motion for mental health diversion Gracida filed a motion for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. He attached a report prepared by psychologist Dr. Aram Keshishyan, who had evaluated him. Dr. Keshishyan opined that Gracida suffered from a mood disorder (likely depressive disorder), various substance abuse disorders, and a history of alcohol and opioid use. He also opined that Gracida’s mental disorders appeared to play a significant role in the commission of the charged offenses. Dr. Keshishyan opined that his mental disorders would respond to mental health treatment and that an intensive inpatient program followed by placement in a structured residential setting would be most appropriate to address his needs. Dr. Keshishyan further opined that Gracida would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if he received, and “remain[ed] adherent,” with mental health treatment. The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among other things, that Gracida was not suitable for mental health diversion because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Based on Gracida’s current offenses and his criminal history, including two prior convictions for evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), the prosecution asserted Gracida was “poised to commit the super strike of murder.” The court held a hearing in which it denied the motion. The court found Gracida was eligible for diversion (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)), but found he was unsuitable for diversion (id., subd. (c)). In considering Gracida’s risk of danger to public safety, the court stated: “So this is the issue of whether or not . . . defendant 4 poses an unreasonable risk of basically committing a superstrike, as I understand it.” The court summarized the prosecution’s argument that Gracida posed an “unreasonable risk of committing a superstrike in terms of the driving and killing someone, or harming someone.” Following further argument, the trial court found that Gracida “pose[d] an unreasonable risk of danger to the public.” The court stated that it was “extremely concerned about the fact that he has two prior convictions for evading police, both as felonies. The same conduct is repeated in this case.” The court considered Gracida’s “history of violence as it relates to assault on a peace officer, . . . his prior history . . . of driving under the influence, and the current evidence that he remains addicted to drugs and suffers from that substance abuse disorder.” The court also did not find “that the entirety of [Gracida’s] reason of fleeing police, which he’s done now on three occasions, is related to substance abuse disorder or even to his depressive disorder.” It found that Gracida posed an unreasonable risk to public safety “in that if he flees police, it is—the danger that’s recognized in [People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson)] and other decisions regarding not only alcohol-related—or . . . drug-influenced driving, but also simply reckless driving in terms of even being sober, and . . . fleeing the police, that these car chases . . . that happen regularly, he is at—in my view, he’s an unreasonable risk of repeating that behavior.”

5 DISCUSSION Gracida contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mental health diversion. We conclude otherwise. Pretrial mental health diversion “allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890.) Section 1001.36 sets forth the eligibility and suitability criteria for diversion. (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn).) “Eligibility entails satisfaction of two prongs: (1) a defendant has been diagnosed with a recognized mental health disorder, and (2) the disorder was ‘a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.’ ” (Ibid.; § 1001.36, subd. (b).) If eligibility is established, “the court must consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) “A defendant is suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental health disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to diversion and agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as defined in section 1170.18 if treated in the community.” (Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134; § 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)–(4).) Only the fourth suitability criterion is at issue here. Under section 1170.18, an “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ” is “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony” within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)—colloquially referred to as “super 6 strikes.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (c); People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149 (Whitmill).) The “violent felony” convictions that are relevant here are “[a]ny homicide offense, including any attempted homicide, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).) In analyzing the fourth criterion, the court “may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health diversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147.) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) Gracida contends the trial court abused its discretion by applying the incorrect standard to determine whether he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public. We disagree. The record reflects the court understood and applied the correct standard to determine that Gracida “poses an unreasonable risk of . . . committing a superstrike.” The court appropriately considered Gracida’s criminal history including the two prior felony convictions for evading police, the current offense for “the same conduct . . . repeated in this case,” and his substance abuse issues and prior history of driving under the influence. Based on these facts, the court found that Gracida posed an unreasonable 7 risk of repeating the same conduct of fleeing police and posed a danger of committing a homicide offense by driving recklessly. A violent felony includes “[a]ny homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).) Homicide caused by driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol or by driving recklessly with implied malice may be sufficient to support a second degree murder conviction. (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 296–297; People v. Fuller (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 628–629 [a defendant who caused a fatal collision after driving at high speeds and running a red light to evade the police may be charged with second degree murder].) Gross vehicle manslaughter while intoxicated can also qualify as a super strike in some circumstances. (§ 191.5, subd. (a); § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).) Here, the trial court correctly applied the legal standards and reasonably determined Gracida posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike offense. Gracida further contends the trial court’s finding of danger is not supported by substantial evidence. We again disagree. On a substantial evidence review, we “ ‘view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ ” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 688.) Here, Gracida had a long criminal history including two prior felony convictions for the same crime he committed in the current case—evading the police while driving recklessly. In the 2016 conviction, he caused a collision, and in the 2020 conviction, he struck a police officer, nearly knocking them off their 8 motorcycle. Despite these two prior convictions, Gracida repeated the same conduct in the current case—he once again led the police in a high-speed chase while committing other traffic violations, endangering the public. Additionally, Gracida had a prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. While it was an older offense, the trial court could reasonably conclude it was relevant given Gracida’s ongoing substance abuse and medication noncompliance in the community. Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s implied finding that Gracida posed this risk of dangerousness even if treated in the community. Gracida has a long history of substance abuse addiction beginning when he was a juvenile. At the time of his arrest, he was using methamphetamine on a “daily basis” and PCP on a “fairly regular basis.” Gracida reported that he had been psychiatrically hospitalized on two occasions in the past, but “eloped” from both hospitalizations. He also reported receiving outpatient treatment before his arrest and was prescribed medication, but stopped treatment and medication and relapsed. Gracida is currently prescribed the same medications he took prior to his relapse and arrest in this case. (See People v. Superior Court (Taylor) (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1153, 1169 [“where there is no evidence of prior compliance with treatment, and on the contrary a history of noncompliance, the trial court must take the possibility of future noncompliance into account”].) Gracida contends the trial court disregarded evidence that his mental health condition was driving his criminal behavior and evidence that treatment would mitigate his behavior. But the trial court was not bound by Dr. Keshishyan’s opinions. The trial court ultimately decides what weight to give such opinions.

9 (In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 823.) Here, the court considered Gracida’s treatment plan and “the mental health professional’s opinions, which he doesn’t seem to take into account in any regard . . . [Gracida’s] prior history of fleeing from the police and analyzing that in terms of the risk to public safety.” We do not reweigh evidence or reassess a witness’s credibility. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 37.) Because substantial evidence supports the finding that Gracida posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if treated in the community, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for mental health diversion.3 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.

3 Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding, we need not address the alternative argument regarding the court’s residual discretion.

10 Andrea C. Thompson and Diego H. Edber, Judges Superior Court County of Los Angeles ______________________________ Omer A. Khan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephen D. Svetich, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.