Regan v. California Highway Patrol CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/16/26 Regan v. California Highway Patrol CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

RUSSELL REGAN, 2d Civ. No. B343808 (Super. Ct. No. 56-2022- Plaintiff and Respondent, 00564391-CU-WT-VTA) (Ventura County) v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL,

Defendant and Appellant;

JAMES FROST et al., Defendants;

ROB BONTA, as Attorney General, etc., Objector and Appellant.

Russell Regan filed an employment lawsuit against his former employer the California Highway Patrol (CHP). Regan served discovery requests and the Attorney General, representing the CHP, objected to producing certain documents contending they were confidential police officer personnel records1 requiring an in camera review before disclosure under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. (Pen. Code, §§ 832.7, 832.8; Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045.) After several motions and hearings, including two motions to compel in favor of Regan, the trial court imposed $11,250 in monetary sanctions against the CHP and its attorneys of record (collectively Appellants). Appellants contend this discovery sanctions order should be reversed. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2 Regan was employed by the CHP from 1994 until his retirement in November 2021. Regan alleged he reported two officers stealing ammunition in 2019. In 2020, when Captain James Frost transferred to the Ventura area, Regan alleged he immediately “expressed hostility” towards him. Regan perceived 1 Personnel records are defined in Penal Code section 832.8 as “any file maintained under that individual’s name by his or her employing agency and containing records relating to any of the following: [¶] (1) Personal data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar information. [¶] (2) Medical history. [¶] (3) Election of employee benefits. [¶] (4) Employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline. [¶] (5) Complaints or investigations of complaints concerning an event or transaction in which he or she participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties. [¶] (6) Any other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” (See Zanone v. City of Whittier (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 174, 188.) 2 We grant Regan’s motion to augment the record filed December 5, 2025.

2 the hostility stemmed from him reporting the stolen ammunition. Regan also alleged Captain Frost targeted sergeants, like Regan, who were over 50 years old. Regan filed an internal complaint with the CHP, alleging Captain Frost harassed and discriminated against him because of his age. The CHP conducted an internal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) investigation of Captain Frost. The investigation encompassed 15 witness interviews. After the EEO investigation, Regan alleged that Lieutenant Patrick Etchebarne began retaliating against him. In 2022, Regan filed an employment lawsuit against the CHP and his former supervisors Captain Frost and Lieutenant Etchebarne. He alleged violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code for age discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. In March 2023, Regan served a request for production of documents seeking, among other things, Regan’s personnel file and performance evaluations and documents related to complaints involving Captain Frost. Most relevant here, demand for production Nos. 21 and 22 sought all documents related to the “[CHP]’s investigation into Sergeant Regan’s EEO complaint” and “any and all DOCUMENTS RELATED TO all interviews [the CHP] conducted as part of its investigation into Sergeant Regan’s EEO complaint.” In July 2023, the CHP served a response in which it objected to several requests on the ground that they “violate[d] privacy rights” and sought documents protected from disclosure. The CHP also included a privilege log identifying confidential documents that it withheld, including the EEO investigation documents, and indicated that a Pitchess hearing was required 3 for disclosure. It produced “non-privileged” documents responsive to the requests. In October 2023, after the parties met and conferred, the CHP served a “Further Response to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents” and produced additional “non-privileged” documents. The CHP again refused to produce the EEO investigation documents, asserting that “[a]ll documents found are confidential information that require a Pitchess motion to determine access.” In November 2023, Regan moved to compel further responses to his document production requests and sought $11,070 in monetary sanctions. Regan asserted he had not received the EEO investigation documents despite several meet and confer attempts. Regan also filed a Pitchess motion seeking 20 “items of information from [his own] police personnel file.” The items included the release of all “[d]ocuments related to the EEO [i]nvestigation into Sergeant Regan’s [c]omplaint against Captain Frost,” the investigator’s notes in the EEO investigation, the names of the investigators, investigative reports excluding “ ‘conclusions,’ ” and statements of officers obtained during the EEO investigation (item Nos. 3, 5–7, 9). The trial court took the Pitchess motion and motion to compel under submission. It ruled that because the CHP “have claimed that the documents being requested are subject to a legal privilege, the only approach to this that makes any sense, is to order their production in the context of a Pitchess review where the Court can evaluate their relevance, and whatever restrictions to their production may exist by virtue of Pitchess.” The court ordered the CHP to appear and bring documents responsive to 4 the 20 items enumerated in Regan’s Pitchess motion for an in camera review. In February 2024, the CHP brought all documents responsive to Regan’s Pitchess motion, including the EEO investigation file, to the in camera review. Following its review, the trial court ordered the production of the following documents: the transcripts of 11 witness interviews in the EEO investigation, a “Report of Inquiry” in the EEO investigation, the “[p]erformance [a]ppraisal” of Captain Frost in 2019, and summaries of Regan’s interview related to an ammunition shortage investigation (titled the “M Investigation” and “C Investigation”). The court also ordered the CHP to provide all the names of the 15 people interviewed in the investigation of Regan’s complaint and the names of the investigators. The court scheduled Regan’s motion to compel on a future date. In mid-April 2024, Regan appeared at the motion to compel hearing. The Attorney General did not appear. Regan acknowledged that the CHP produced documents the court ordered disclosed after the in camera hearing, including a “thousand pages.” But Regan asserted there were 19 requested categories of documents the CHP still had not produced. Regan stated he did not receive all the documents related to the EEO investigation or his entire personnel file including his monthly evaluations. The court granted the motion and ordered the CHP to produce additional documents, including those responsive to demand Nos. 21 and 22 (i.e., documents and interviews related to the EEO investigation). Per the court’s order, Regan wrote a demand letter to the Attorney General which stated that the trial court ordered “all of the items in Plaintiff’s motion to compel were to be produced.” Regan listed the specific documents the court 5 ordered produced, including audio and digital recordings from the EEO investigation interviews, interview summaries, and exhibits from the EEO investigation. Regan also filed two additional Pitchess motions seeking information in Captain Frost and Lieutenant Etchebarne’s personnel files. As to Captain Frost, Regan sought “all documents in the personnel records of Captain James Frost that record any complaint, including but not limited to . . . EEO Complaint filed by Russell Regan.” In late April 2024, the court conducted an in camera review of the personnel files. The court ordered the CHP to produce Captain Frost’s performance reviews and a discrimination complaint that was filed by another sergeant. After the in camera portion of the hearing concluded, the trial court ordered production of the audio recording of the EEO investigation interviews. At the same hearing, the parties discussed Regan’s discovery requests and the April 2024 order on the motion to compel. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court stated, “But just in sitting here listening to it, [Regan]’s asked for a lot which would not normally be included in a Pitchess motion, and that I’m inclined to think he’s entitled to get and [the CHP is] entitled to produce.” The court compared Regan’s discovery requests to those sought in “generic employment litigation” and observed, “ ‘It shouldn’t be terribly different from a government agency except you get the protection of Pitchess.’ ” The Attorney General replied, “Well, the only thing that makes it not, Your Honor, is that the entire EEO investigation is regarding Frost as a peace officer, and that’s what put that entire thing into Pitchess.” The court replied, “I can understand that, but there is material that he’s asked for that exists beyond the boundaries of 6 Pitchess.” The Attorney General responded, “Correct.” The court replied, “That, I would like to get narrowed down before you come back.” The trial court cautioned the parties that it did not want to get into “something where the fight ends up being over discovery sanctions.” It stated, “I hate making those orders because in a lot of cases, it means somebody is sitting at the kitchen table at 10 o’clock at night writing a check to pay off discovery sanctions. . . . [¶] If necessary, I make those orders, but my inclination is to try and find ways to get counsel to agree to things that avoid tabling that issue.” On May 23, 2024, the CHP served verified augmented responses to Regan’s demand for production of documents and produced additional documents. But, as to demand for production Nos. 21 and 22 (the EEO investigation documents and interviews), the CHP stated that it “has produced all such documents in its custody or control deemed responsive and material by the court after the Pitchess in camera review.” After meeting and conferring, in July 2024 the parties sent a joint letter to the trial court requesting clarification regarding the ruling on Regan’s motion to compel. The letter explained that Regan believed he was entitled to four additional interviews and exhibits in the EEO investigation file that were not produced. The CHP contended that the court reviewed these materials in camera during the February 2024 Pitchess hearing and did not order them to be produced. The CHP maintained that “[a]ll of the EEO Investigation file not ordered to be produced is still considered confidential unless the CHP and officer waive that confidentiality.”

7 The CHP sent the documents at issue to the trial court for another in camera review. After reviewing the materials, the trial court observed that the four additional “interviews do not appear to reflect on anybody’s prior conduct. They are more percipient witness recollections.” The court also stated, “Frost’s service record is probably subject to protection, but there are a lot of CHP manuals and training materials that seem pretty innocuous.” The court urged the parties “to meet and confer to see if you can reach a resolution on [w]hat the CHP will produce. If [n]o such agreement, I can sua sponte revisit the issues and determine which documents on further consideration are not subject to Pitchess protection.” Between July 2024 and August 2024, the original deputy attorney general assigned to the case retired, a supervising deputy attorney general took over the case for about a month, and then another deputy attorney general was reassigned. The new deputy attorney general contacted Regan and indicated he would need additional time to “sort things out and to confer with the CHP regarding the additional documents” that were requested. Thereafter, the Attorney General produced some exhibits from the EEO investigation file, but not the entire file. On August 26, 2024, Regan filed a second motion to compel responses to his prior requests for document production and sought $50,000 in sanctions. Regan again sought documents responsive to demand Nos. 21 and 22 and referenced the court’s April 2024 order to produce those documents. The CHP opposed the second motion to compel on the ground that it was untimely. It also maintained that it produced all documents responsive to document demand Nos. 21 and 22 the court ordered it to produce after the Pitchess hearings. It 8 requested a supplemental in camera hearing to resolve the remaining discovery dispute concerning the materials in the EEO investigation file. In September 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Regan’s second motion to compel. After reviewing the disputed interview transcripts and exhibits in camera, the court ordered the production of interview transcripts of four additional witnesses and four additional exhibits to the EEO investigation file. The court also gave the parties time to prepare papers in support of, and in opposition to, the sanctions request. In October 2024, the Attorney General produced the witness transcripts and exhibits as ordered by the court. Regan filed a declaration in support of sanctions and included billing records reflecting the time and fees incurred on the discovery issues. The CHP opposed sanctions, arguing the motion to compel and the related request for sanctions were untimely. It also argued it did not misuse the discovery process. In December 2024, the parties appeared before the trial court to further discuss the disclosure of an additional 13 pages of the EEO investigation report that were redacted. After reviewing the 13 unredacted pages, the court ordered them to be produced unredacted. Later that same month, the trial court awarded Regan $11,250 in monetary sanctions against the CHP and its counsel. It made no express findings regarding its reasons for imposing sanctions. DISCUSSION 1. Timeliness of the motion to compel Appellants contend the trial court lacked authority to impose sanctions because Regan’s second motion to compel was 9 untimely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (c)3 because it was filed more than 45 days after service of the May 23, 2024, augmented responses. Appellants contend such untimeliness prohibits an award of sanctions. We are not persuaded. Because of Appellants’ purported “stall tactics” and “refusal” to produce all documents responsive to his first motion to compel, Regan sought sanctions pursuant to sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2030.300, 2031.310 and 2031.320. But Appellants’ contentions only discuss a court’s authority to impose sanctions under section 2031.310. Assuming the second motion was untimely under section 2031.310, subdivision (c), the trial court was not without authority to impose sanctions under the other statutory provisions. Unlike section 2031.310 pertaining to requests for production of documents, section 2023.030 does not contain a 45-day notice period. Section 2031.320 likewise contains no 45-day deadline and provides for monetary sanctions where a party agrees to comply with a demand but “thereafter fails to permit” inspection. A court is empowered to “impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process . . . pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).) With section 2023.030, the “Legislature gave trial courts a statutory basis for exercising authority to address egregious forms of misconduct not addressed elsewhere in the [Civil Discovery] Act.” (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 74 3 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

10 (PricewaterhouseCoopers.) “A court may invoke its independent authority to impose sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 only when confronted with an unusual form of discovery abuse, or a pattern of abuse, not already addressed by a relevant sanctions provision.” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court was authorized to impose sanctions for conduct that had been ongoing throughout the litigation. Regan originally propounded discovery in March 2023; the court granted his first motion to compel in April 2024; and Regan did not receive all responsive documents until October and December 2024. In his second motion to compel, Regan claimed, “Seventeen months later, Plaintiff has still not received the documents to which he is entitled, and which the Court ordered be produced.” Regan’s declaration in support of sanctions includes fees and costs incurred in 2023 and prior to the service of Appellants’ May 2024 augmented discovery responses. Thus, the sanctionable conduct was not limited to conduct related to those responses. The record supports an implied finding of a pattern of abuse based on Appellants’ delay in producing documents beyond the augmented May 23 responses. (PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 74.) 2. Award of sanctions Appellants contend the sanctions award should be reversed because they acted with substantial justification in withholding discovery. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions. Under the Civil Discovery Act (§ 2016.010 et seq.), a misuse of the discovery process includes, but is not limited to “[f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery,” “[m]aking, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious 11 objection to discovery,” “[m]aking an evasive response to discovery,” “[d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery,” or “[m]aking or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or to limit discovery.” (§ 2023.010.) A trial court “shall impose” monetary sanctions “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).) “Substantial justification means clearly reasonable justification that is well grounded in both law and fact.” (Padron v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1246, 1269.) We review the trial court’s order for discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422.) “The abuse of discretion standard affords considerable deference to the trial court, provided that the court acted in accordance with the governing rules of law.” (Ibid.) A trial court has broad discretion in imposing discovery sanctions, and its order will not be reversed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion that exceeds the bounds of reason. (Pratt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 165, 183.) Here, the trial court was not required to make an explicit finding before imposing discovery sanctions. (California Shellfish, Inc. v. United Shellfish Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 16, 26.) Rather, “the court was only required to make an express finding if it did not impose monetary sanctions because it found appellant acted with ‘substantial justification’ ” or that imposing sanctions was unjust. (Ibid.) Thus, we “review the trial court’s exercise of discretion based on implied findings that are 12 supported by substantial evidence.” (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. La Conchita Ranch Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 856, 860, italics added.) In doing so, we review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the court’s exercise of discretion. (Ibid.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded $11,250 in monetary sanctions against the CHP. Notably, Regan’s request for discovery spanned almost two years, entailed multiple meet and confers and hearings, and necessitated two orders compelling Appellants to produce documents. According to Regan’s billing records, counsel incurred approximately 165 hours in attempting to obtain responsive documents, totaling approximately $96,000 in fees. During the course of the proceedings, the trial court made statements regarding Appellants’ conduct. For instance, in April 2024, the court commented that it was “inclined to think [Regan was] entitled” to documents “not normally . . . included in a Pitchess motion” and raised the possibility of sanctions. And, at the December 2024 hearing, the court commented that it believed the Attorney General’s office “has played a little fast and loose with producing the documents” and that Regan had been “fighting tooth and nail to get what he thinks he is entitled to.” We do not suggest that Appellants lacked substantial justification for initially invoking the protections afforded to police officer personnel records. But the trial court could reasonably conclude that the justification did not extend to the ensuing pattern of delayed production after its discovery rulings. Substantial evidence supports an implied finding of misuse of the discovery process. Appellants have not carried their heavy 13 burden to show reversal is warranted. (Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1448–1449.)4 DISPOSITION The sanctions order is affirmed. Regan shall recover costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

4 We decline Regan’s request to impose sanctions on appeal.

14 Henry J. Walsh, Judge Superior Court County of Ventura ______________________________ Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Jones and Kenneth K. Wang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants. Pachowicz Goldenring, Mark Pachowicz and Christopher G. Correa for Plaintiff and Respondent.