People v. Tuvalu CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 9/15/26 P. v. Tuvalu CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064204 v. (Super. Ct. No. C-56992)

TUTUILA FAUSIA TUVALU, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed. James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Tutuila Fausia Tuvalu appeals from the postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing after an evidentiary hearing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 He argues substantial evidence does not support his first degree murder conviction pursuant to a felony murder theory because insufficient evidence showed he was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. He also argues the trial court failed to adequately consider his youthfulness (22 years old at the time of the murder) in determining his eligibility for resentencing. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 I. THE MURDER “In January 1985, [R.D.] was staying with [S.F.] in [S.F.]’s apartment. [R.D.] had been in a relationship with codefendant Lisa Mondragon, and she visited him at the apartment twice. On both occasions, [S.F.], who sold marijuana and cocaine to his friends, had drugs [lying] around the apartment. At the end of January, [R.D.] moved out of the apartment and [M.M.] moved in at the beginning of February 1985.” (Tuvalu, supra, G060774.) At some point, Mondragon brought the idea of robbing S.F. to codefendant Clement Brown and then the idea was brought to Tuvalu. “In 1 All further statutory references are to this code.

2 Quoted material in sections I, II, III, and IV are taken from the prior opinion in this case. (People v. Tuvalu (May 31, 2023, G060774) [nonpub. opn.] (Tuvalu).)

2 the early evening hours of February 6, 1985, [R.D.] saw Tuvalu riding in a car driven by . . . Brown. Tuvalu was holding a shotgun. [¶] . . . [¶] “Around 8:00 p.m., [S.F.] and [M.M.] were joined at their apartment by [B.A.] and neighbors [M.K.] and William Cody[3] to watch a movie. [M.M.], [B.A.], and [M.K.] were sitting on the living room couch waiting for the movie to start. [S.F.] and Cody were talking near [S.F.]’s bedroom when there was a knock on the apartment door. [M.M.] and [M.K.] said, ‘Come in’ or something similar. [S.F.] walked to the living room to see who it was. “Mondragon entered the apartment, followed by Tuvalu and Brown.” (Tuvalu, supra, G060774.) The parties stipulated Brown was carrying a shotgun and Tuvalu was carrying a black club as they entered the apartment. Brown ordered everyone to get on the floor, pointed the shotgun at them, threatened to shoot them if they moved, and dragged them across the floor. Brown dragged B.A. by his hair, kicked him, took his wallet, stood on his back, kicked him in the ribs, and hit him in the back and the side of his head. “[B.A.] felt the gun in his back several times.” (Tuvalu, supra, G060774.) “[S.F.], [M.M.], and [M.K.] laid face down on the floor and put their hands out as instructed.” (Ibid.) “Brown and Tuvalu demanded to know, ‘“Where’s the shit?”’ [S.F.] responded they had nothing. [S.F.] got up and walked to his bedroom with [Tuvalu]. [Tuvalu] ransacked [S.F.]’s bedroom, asking where is ‘the shit.’

3 “During the trial, the victim was referred to as William Cody and William Gowan. For consistency, we will use Cody throughout this opinion.”

3 [Tuvalu] found a quarter gram of cocaine on the table in [S.F.]’s bedroom and took it. [¶] . . . [¶] “[Tuvalu] and [S.F.] returned from the bedroom and [S.F.] resumed his position face down on the hallway floor. [Tuvalu] hit [S.F.] [once] in the back [and once in the leg] with the club and again demanded to know where the stuff was. [S.F.] responded he had money in his pocket. [Tuvalu] [or Brown] retrieved $750 from [S.F.]’s pants pocket.” (Tuvalu, supra, G060774.) Brown and Tuvalu then had a conversation after which one of them returned to S.F.’s room. At some point, Tuvalu was holding the gun. While on the floor, S.F. saw Tuvalu point the shotgun at the back of either M.M.’s or M.K.’s head. “[S.F.] made a loud noise to distract Tuvalu. When Tuvalu turned, [S.F.] grabbed him and the shotgun. A struggle ensued as the two men wrestled for control of the shotgun. [M.M.] saw ‘a body fly[] across the room’ and he ran out the apartment door. “When the fighting started, [B.A.] crawled toward the apartment door. Mondragon grabbed him and said, ‘“Stay put, these guys mean serious shit.”’ When [B.A.] expressed he was ‘“afraid to die,”’ Mondragon told him to ‘“stay down”’ and forcibly held him down. [B.A.] pushed Mondragon off of him and ran out of the apartment. “Tuvalu ended up on the floor face down with the shotgun in his hands; [S.F.] was on his back. [S.F.] tried but was unable to pry the shotgun from Tuvalu. [M.K.] got up and joined [S.F.] in his struggle with Tuvalu, trying to pry the shotgun from Tuvalu’s hands. “While the three men battled for control of the shotgun, Cody was fighting Brown. [S.F.] saw Brown hit Cody with the club. At one point, Cody 4 gained the upper hand and was hitting Brown. Mondragon came up behind Cody and punched him [on] the side of the head with clenched fists. “[S.F.] told [M.K.] to hold down Tuvalu while he ([S.F.]) went to help Cody with Brown. As [S.F.] went toward Brown, Brown grabbed a knife off of the kitchen counter and cut [S.F.]’s left arm. “[M.K.] continued to wrestle Tuvalu, who was curled up in a ball and facing the wall with the shotgun in his hands. [M.K.] was on top of Tuvalu, holding him down, and [M.K.] had a hand on the shotgun. Tuvalu tried to get [M.K.] off of him and regain full control of the shotgun. [M.K.] was tiring and losing his grip on the shotgun. He yelled out to Cody and [S.F.] for help. In the melee, [M.K.] saw Cody being struck over the head with a picture frame taken off the wall. “While [S.F.] was engaged with Brown, Cody ran over to help [M.K.] with Tuvalu. Brown ran after Cody. When Cody tried to push Brown away, Brown stabbed him in the chest three times. Cody looked at [S.F.], said ‘“help,”’ and fell to the floor, bleeding. “[S.F.] went to help Cody. He grabbed a pan off the table and struck Brown with it twice, causing him to drop the knife. [S.F.] seized Brown, picked up the knife, and held it to Brown’s ribs. “[M.K.] heard Tuvalu yell, ‘“Help us, help us”’ and ‘“Do something.”’ Mondragon hit [M.K.] in the side of the head with a kitchen pan. Fearing for his life, [M.K.] pushed Mondragon aside and ran for the door. As he was fleeing, he heard Brown tell Tuvalu, ‘“Don’t let him get away. Shoot him.”’ [M.K.] fled to a nearby apartment where he asked them to call the police. “Back in [S.F.]’s apartment, [S.F.] was holding the knife against Brown. Tuvalu hit [S.F.] in the back of the head with the butt of the shotgun.

5 [S.F.] and Brown ‘went flying,’ and [S.F.] ended up on the floor on top of Brown. Tuvalu pointed the shotgun at [S.F.]’s face. [S.F.] threw the knife at Tuvalu. Brown yelled at Tuvalu to shoot and kill [S.F.] and then ran out of the apartment. [S.F.] kicked at Tuvalu and the shotgun. Tuvalu turned the shotgun around and hit [S.F.] with the butt of the gun before running out of the apartment. [S.F.] chased after them but passed out on the lawn. “When [M.M.] returned, he found [S.F.] on the ground with injuries to his arm and head. Cody was on the kitchen floor and appeared to be dead. A broken picture frame and glass were near his body. Cody died from a stab wound where the knife penetrated his left lung and his heart. Cody also had crushing lacerations on the back of his head, multiple, sharp lacerations around his eyes, and a tip of a knife in his skull. “Police responded and investigated the crime scene. They found a shotgun shell under the living room couch and a wallet on the living room floor. The shotgun’s forestock was found in the hallway near the wall; other parts of the shotgun were found near the hallway and in the kitchen. A knife with a broken tip was found near the kitchen. “Brown, Tuvalu, and Mondragon returned to Mondragon’s house about an hour after they left. After picking up Mondragon’s cousin and friend, they went to a motel. “Police subsequently executed search warrants at the homes of Tuvalu and Brown. A shotgun was found in Brown’s bedroom, and shotgun shells were found in Tuvalu’s residence and [in] Brown’s car.” (Tuvalu, supra, G060774.)

6 II. TUVALU, BROWN, AND MONDRAGON ARE PROSECUTED “The district attorney charged Tuvalu, Brown, and Mondragon with murder (§ 187), robbery (§ 211), and burglary (§ 459). The information alleged Brown personally used a knife in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)). “All three defendants were tried before a single jury, which was instructed on felony murder. The jury convicted Tuvalu and Brown of all counts and found true the personal use allegation as to Brown. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the charges against Mondragon, and the court declared a mistrial as to her. In November 1985, the court sentenced Tuvalu to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.”4 (Tuvalu, supra, G060774.) III. TUVALU PETITIONS FOR RESENTENCING “In May 2019, Tuvalu filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95[, now section 1172.6]. The court found Tuvalu had made a prima facie case of entitlement to relief and issued an order to show cause. “At the evidentiary hearing, the parties relied on the transcripts from Tuvalu’s original trial and did not present new or additional evidence. The parties’ briefs and oral arguments identified the disputed and dispositive issue as whether the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Tuvalu was a major participant in the robbery or burglary and acted with a reckless indifference to human life as defined by section 190.2. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court took the matter under submission.

4 As of February 2024, Tuvalu was out of custody and on parole.

7 “The court later issued a detailed written ruling. It denied Tuvalu’s resentencing petition based on its findings Tuvalu was a major participant in the underlying robbery as he ‘abetted, aided, counseled, requested and assisted in the commission of the robbery that resulted in the death of . . . Cody’ and Tuvalu acted with reckless indifference to Cody’s life. “Tuvalu timely appealed the court’s order.” (Tuvalu, supra, G060774.) IV. A PANEL OF THIS COURT VACATED THE ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR RESENTENCING AND REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR RECONSIDERATION On appeal, Tuvalu argued the trial court’s finding Tuvalu was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life was not supported by substantial evidence and therefore the order denying his petition should be reversed. A panel of this court vacated the order denying Tuvalu’s petition for resentencing and remanded the matter for further consideration. In its opinion, the panel explained the evidentiary hearing occurred before then recent caselaw made clear a defendant’s youth is “‘“a relevant factor” [to be considered] in deciding whether a defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life’ ([People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1079]) and the record [did] not show the trial court considered Tuvalu’s age and maturity level, ‘particularly to the extent now required by cases issued after [Tuvalu]’s hearing [(id. at p. 1092)].’” (Tuvalu, supra, G060774.) V. FOLLOWING REMAND, THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE PETITION Following a second evidentiary hearing at which the court accepted additional evidence and the parties’ stipulations regarding certain 8 facts, the trial court again denied the petition, concluding Tuvalu was ineligible for resentencing because he was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court expressly addressed its consideration of Tuvalu’s youth, finding, inter alia, “[t]he robbery and the murder were not the outcome of a youthful whim, but instead a planned event to obtain money to meet his adult obligations.” Tuvalu appealed. DISCUSSION I. SECTION 1172.6 Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) “significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule.” (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 875 (Emanuel).) “A felony- murder conviction may no longer rest on the mere commission of and intent to commit an underlying felony. If a defendant was not the actual killer or an aider and abettor acting with intent to kill, the statute now requires that the defendant be a major participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Citation.] With the enactment of Senate Bill . . . 1437, the Legislature also created a vehicle for defendants previously convicted of murder under the broader and now invalidated felony-murder rule to petition for resentencing.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) At the resentencing hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under the amended law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Both parties may present “new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.) “[T]he court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including 9 witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (Ibid.) II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES: MAJOR PARTICIPANT AND RECKLESS INDIFFERENCE “Section 190.2, subdivision (d), by its text, imposes an actus reus requirement, i.e., major participation in the enumerated felony, and a mens rea requirement, i.e., reckless indifference to human life.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 882.) In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), the California Supreme Court “endeavored to elucidate the contours of the major participant and reckless indifference standards.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 882.) “Banks elucidated what it means to be a major participant and, to a lesser extent, what it means to act with reckless indifference to human life.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706–707 (Strong).) It identified a series of factors to help guide the major participant inquiry: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.) The Supreme Court “explained that none of these considerations is dispositive. Rather, ‘[a]ll may be weighed in determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation “in criminal activities known 10 to carry a grave risk of death” [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered “major.”’” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706.) “Clark further refined the reckless indifference inquiry.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 707.) So have other California Supreme Court cases, such as In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 and recently Emanuel. “‘[R]eckless indifference to human life is “implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.”’ [Citation.] ‘Examples include “the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s property.” [Citation.] Although the high court’s examples describe actual killers, not accomplices to felony murder, we explained they nonetheless ‘provide some indication of the high court’s view of “reckless indifference”. . . .’ [Citation.] Namely, reckless indifference to human life ‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 883.) “[R]eckless indifference encompasses both subjective and objective elements. [Citation.] ‘As to the subjective element, “[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,” and he or she must consciously disregard “the significant risk of death his or her actions create.”’ [Citations.] ‘As to the objective element, “‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation 11 from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’”’” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.) “‘“Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of death’” satisfies the statutory requirement.’” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.) “[K]nowing participation in an armed robbery, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a defendant’s reckless indifference to human life.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706.) “The degree of risk to human life is crucial to the analysis.” (In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 682.) “To aid in distinguishing those who knowingly engage in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death from other felony perpetrators, Clark ‘set out a nonexhaustive list of considerations relevant to this determination, including use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.’ [Citation.] ‘“[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.”’ [Citation.] The ‘totality of the circumstances’ must be analyzed to determine whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 884–885.) In Emanuel, the Supreme Court further acknowledged “Courts of Appeal have recognized that ‘a defendant’s youth is [also] a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885, fn. 6.)

12 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th p. 885.) “Under this standard, we review the record ‘“‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value— such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) “Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) “‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”’ [Citation.] It is well settled that ‘“[a] reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the [trier of fact’s finding].”’” (People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233–234.) IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING The record shows the trial court found Tuvalu was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life 13 after conducting the fact intensive individualized inquiry with respect to the relevant factors. Noting the factors for determining major participant overlap with those relevant to determining reckless indifference to human life (see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614–615), the trial court issued a detailed ruling regarding its consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including those facts regarding Tuvalu’s subjective awareness. In an addendum to its ruling, the trial court also addressed its consideration of Tuvalu’s youthfulness in ruling on the petition as follows: “[Tuvalu] was 22 at the time of the offense, one week shy of his 23rd birthday, had been married for [two] years with a child. He lived on his own with his wife and family and had been working full time. He committed the offense with his brother-in-law [Brown] who was having an affair with the [third] codefendant [Mondragon]. When asked why he committed the crime, [Tuvalu] stated in his own words in his March 26, 2002 parole hearing that he had just been laid off and his wife was pregnant with their 2nd child, and in a later parole hearing he reiterated this and said it was due to the stress of his responsibilities of his family. The factors involved in this case were not those we look for as youthful factors. The robbery and murder were not the outcome of a youthful whim, but instead a planned event to obtain money to meet his adult obligations.” The trial court concluded: “[Tuvalu’s] youth d[id] not appear to have impacted his ability to act with a reckless disregard for safety of victim Cody. Instead, before this event he appeared to be a responsible married man with one child and another on the way, who lived independently with his wife and child, both working full time until he lost his job and chose this crime as an easy way to meet his adult obligations. Under this factual scenario, his youth d[id] not mitigate his actions or reduce his culpability.”

14 V. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOWS TUVALU WAS A MAJOR PARTICIPANT IN THE ROBBERY WHO ACTED WITH RECKLESS INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE Tuvalu does not argue the trial court failed to consider and weigh the relevant Banks factors in determining whether Tuvalu was a major participant in the robbery. He does not argue the court failed to consider and weigh the Clark factors in finding Tuvalu acted with reckless indifference to human life, except with respect to its consideration of Tuvalu’s youth at the time of the robbery which we discuss post in section VI. Instead, he argues insufficient evidence supports the court’s ultimate finding Tuvalu was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. We disagree. A. Major Participant Tuvalu does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the following facts: (1) Mondragon recruited Tuvalu in the robbery plan, albeit after she recruited Brown; (2) Tuvalu arrived at S.F.’s apartment with Mondragon and Brown to commit the robbery; (3) Tuvalu came armed with a club while Brown was armed with a shotgun; (4) Tuvalu used the club, striking S.F. with it once in the back and once in the leg; (5) Tuvalu later assumed control of the shotgun which he held to M.M.’s head; (6) Tuvalu struggled with S.F. for control of the shotgun; (7) Tuvalu was present in the same general vicinity of the apartment where Brown fatally stabbed Cody (while engaged with Tuvalu, S.F. saw Brown stab Cody); (8) after regaining control of the shotgun, Tuvalu pointed it in S.F.’s face; (9) Tuvalu hit S.F. with the butt of the shotgun; and (10) Tuvalu thereafter fled the apartment with Mondragon and Brown and ultimately went to a motel. Such evidence is 15 sufficient to support the court’s finding Tuvalu was a major participant in the robbery. In his opening brief, Tuvalu challenges the trial court’s major participant finding, citing evidence his involvement in the planning of the robbery was at most limited; the murder weapon was neither the shotgun nor the club he wielded, but a knife Brown obtained in the kitchen independent of Tuvalu; nothing suggested Tuvalu was aware of Brown and Mondragon’s past conduct; Tuvalu was not in the immediate proximity of Brown and Cody at the time of the stabbing; and Tuvalu did not follow Brown’s direction to kill S.F. As discussed ante, however, it is the trial court’s role to review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, and our role to then determine whether any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt as a rational fact finder. Reversal of the court’s order is not warranted “‘“simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”’” (People v. Sifuentes, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 233.) Substantial evidence shows Tuvalu was involved in planning the robbery, as he arrived at the apartment armed and ready to execute the plan. Although Tuvalu did not use the actual murder weapon, he came armed with a club that he used in the course of the robbery. He later assumed control of the shotgun which he brandished and used to strike S.F. The record shows Tuvalu was inside the apartment and a relatively short distance from Brown when he fatally stabbed Cody. The record does not establish Tuvalu refused to shoot M.K. as directed by Brown as M.K. attempted to flee the apartment. It is of no moment there is no evidence Tuvalu was aware of his co- 16 defendants’ past experiences or conduct that would have further supported the finding he was a major participant because no Banks factor is dispositive. Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the trial court’s ultimate finding, after applying the Banks factors, Tuvalu was a major participant in the robbery. B. Reckless Indifference to Human Life Tuvalu demonstrated his awareness of and willing involvement in, the violent manner in which the robbery was committed. He personally entered the apartment wielding a club, accompanied by Brown who was brandishing the shotgun. Far from making “some effort to minimize the risk of violence” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 622) or “attempt[ing] to act as a restraining influence” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891), Tuvalu personally struck S.F. with the club, once in the back and once in the leg, held the shotgun to M.M.’s head, and later engaged in a violent struggle for control of the shotgun. After Brown stabbed Cody in Tuvalu’s general vicinity, Tuvalu did not attempt to render aid or call for help. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 622 [“[A] defendant’s apparent efforts to minimize the risk of violence can be relevant to the reckless indifference to human life analysis”].) Instead, he regained control of the shotgun, held it to S.F.’s face, and struck S.F. with the butt of the shotgun before leaving the apartment and ultimately spending the night in a motel with Mondragon and Brown. Tuvalu’s failure to shoot M.K. when directed by Brown, as M.K. attempted to flee, did not necessarily reflect restraint on Tuvalu’s part. The record does not establish the particular duration of the crime or Tuvalu’s knowledge of any other threat his codefendants might have represented in the commission of the robbery. Consequently, the Clark 17 factors pertaining to duration of the crime and Tuvalu’s knowledge of his codefendants’ propensity for violence do not weigh in favor of a finding of reckless indifference. Given the totality of the circumstances established by the evidence supporting the other Clark factors, however, the dearth of such evidence did not preclude the trial court from finding Tuvalu acted with reckless indifference to human life. VI. TUVALU’S YOUTHFULNESS WAS ADEQUATELY ASSESSED In his opening brief, Tuvalu argues the trial court failed to adequately assess Tuvalu’s youth in determining he acted with reckless indifference to human life. A defendant’s youth is a factor in determining reckless indifference to human life “because the ‘“hallmark features” of youth,’ including ‘“immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,”’ bear upon a youthful offender’s culpability. [Citation.] Case law ‘stress[es] two areas of divergence’ between youthful offenders and adults: (1) youthful offenders’ ‘relative impulsivity’; and (2) ‘their vulnerability to peer pressure.’” (People v. Diaz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 545, 559.) Following remand, the trial court issued an addendum to its ruling denying the petition, in which it acknowledged it had been “tasked with addressing the age and maturity level in the Banks and Clark analysis.” (Italics added.) The court concluded that in this case, “the youthful factors [did] not overwhelm all of the other factors.” Tuvalu argues the trial court failed to mention certain expert witness testimony explaining how the brain is not fully developed until the age of 25 years. He also suggests the court should have given greater consideration and weight to that evidence.

18 The trial court was not required to specifically mention such testimony in its ruling. And, as discussed ante, it was the province of the court to determine how much weight such evidence should be afforded. In its ruling, the trial court acknowledged Tuvalu was only 22 years old at the time of the offense. The court, however, found Tuvalu’s age did not mitigate against the other factors favoring a finding of reckless indifference because the record did not show Tuvalu’s conduct was the result of immaturity, impetuosity, peer pressure, or a failure to appreciate risks and consequences. Instead, the court found, largely based on Tuvalu’s “own words in his March 26, 2002 parole hearing,” that he committed the crime because he had been recently laid off and his wife was pregnant with their second child. At a later parole hearing, the court noted Tuvalu reiterated those reasons and added he was also under “the stress of his responsibilities of his family.” Tuvalu does not challenge the court’s cited evidence. Tuvalu argues the trial court’s addendum to the ruling stated the wrong standard by stating he acted “with a reckless disregard for the safety of victim Cody” when the correct standard is reckless disregard for human life. (Italics added.) In its addendum to its ruling, the court expressly acknowledged that it had been directed on remand to consider Tuvalu’s youth with respect to the Banks and Clark factors by which the court was to determine whether Tuvalu was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Also, the court repeatedly stated the correct legal standard throughout its ruling, which it concluded stating: “This Court has conducted an intensive individualized inquiry and determine[d] [Tuvalu] is a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to the human life of . . . Cody.” Consequently, we understand the court’s single reference to the “safety of victim Cody” in its addendum as an inadvertent 19 misstatement that does not reflect a misapprehension on the court’s part of the correct legal standard. DISPOSITION The postjudgment order is affirmed.

MOTOIKE, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

GOODING, J.