People v. Hart CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 9/15/26 P. v. Hart CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B342987

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA055750 v.

GIRARD ROBERT HART,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed. John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Charles Chung, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ A jury convicted appellant Girard Robert Hart of multiple crimes related to a kidnapping for robbery in 2002. Pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75,1 the superior court recalled Hart’s sentence and imposed a new sentence, striking the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) and a prior serious felony conviction enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). On appeal, Hart argues that the superior court abused its discretion by declining to further reduce his sentence. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Facts2 On January 19, 2002, at about 10:30 p.m., Sonny Huynh and Eric Nguyen were working at CMT Computers in La Verne, California. They went outside to obtain equipment from Nguyen’s car. Hart and Samuel Johnson drove up. Johnson got out of their car, pointed a gun at Huynh’s chest, and ordered him back into the store. Huynh complied. Nguyen ran. Inside the store, Johnson searched Huynh for money. Huynh gave him $300. Johnson forced him to sit 10 to 15 feet away from the front of the store. Johnson pointed a gun at his head and threatened to shoot him unless he remained quiet. After Hart got out of the car, he ran after Nguyen. Hart caught up to Nguyen and beat him with his fists, attempted to 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 We refer to the factual background from the opinion in People v. Hart (May 29, 2003, B158784) (nonpub. opn.), which affirmed the judgment of conviction.

2 strangle him, and demanded his money. Hart displayed a gun and threatened to kill him. Nguyen gave Hart about $500. Hart left Nguyen and ran inside the store where Johnson was holding Huynh. Johnson placed multiple laptop computers on a sofa inside the store. He and Hart carried some computers to their car. Huynh attempted to escape, but Johnson forced him back into the store. Hart unwittingly dropped his car keys in the store. When they realized they would not be able to drive away, Johnson ran toward Foothill Boulevard and Hart approached a white truck at a nearby restaurant. Carmen Berry, an employee from the restaurant, was walking to her car. When Berry saw Hart, she ran to her car, got inside, and backed up. Hart approached her and said, “Help me, help me, I am in trouble.” Berry called 911 and told Hart that she was calling the police. Hart ran away. Marc Serra was loading groceries into his car at a nearby supermarket. Johnson and Hart approached Serra’s car. Hart entered the passenger’s side while Johnson displayed his gun and ordered Serra to get into the car. Serra refused. Johnson demanded Serra’s keys. Serra ran back into the market without giving the keys to Johnson. Hart and Johnson fled on foot. II. Procedure On April 26, 2002, a jury convicted Hart of one count of kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1), two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 2 & 3), and two counts of attempted carjacking (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664; counts 4 & 5). The jury found true allegations that Hart personally used a firearm during the commission of the robbery in count 3 (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b)), and that a principal 3 was armed with a firearm during the commission of the attempted carjacking in count 4 (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found not true the allegations that Hart personally used a firearm during the commission of the offenses in count 1, count 2, and count 4. The trial court found true allegations that Hart sustained a prior felony conviction under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On May 15, 2002, the trial court sentenced Hart to an indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole on count 1. On count 3, the court imposed 20 additional years. On count 4, the court imposed a consecutive two years and eight months. On count 5, the court imposed a consecutive one year and eight months. The court imposed six additional years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement and the prior prison term enhancement. On count 2, the court imposed and stayed five years under section 654. The total sentence was an indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of 30 years and four months. On May 29, 2003, the Court of Appeal modified the original sentence and reduced the prison term by eight months based on a sentencing error on the principal armed enhancement but otherwise affirmed the conviction.3 3 People v. Hart, supra, B158784.

4 III. Postconviction hearing on Hart’s petition for resentencing On August 7, 2024, counsel for Hart filed a petition to recall his sentence and resentence under section 1172.75. The District Attorney filed a reply. On October 3, 2024, the superior court held a resentencing hearing. The court dismissed the sole prior prison term enhancement and a prior serious felony enhancement, reducing the sentence to life with the possibility of parole, plus 23 years and 8 months in state prison. DISCUSSION I. Resentencing under section 1172.75 Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison term enhancement to only terms for sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) It invalidated prior prison term enhancements for other offenses. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 379–380 (Burgess).) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) made the changes by Senate Bill No. 136 retroactive and added former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, which provided a mechanism for resentencing defendants sentenced on the legally invalid enhancements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) Under the resentencing procedure, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation would initially identify those people currently serving a term for a judgment that included the invalid enhancement and forward their information to the superior courts. Upon verification of eligibility of relief for 5 those defendants, the superior court recalls their sentences and resentences them. (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.) II. Standard of review We review the superior court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856 (Garcia).) We will only set aside the superior court’s decision if its application of the law to the facts was arbitrary or capricious or its findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 857.) III. Requirement of imposing a lesser sentence Hart argues that the superior court “abused its discretion by implicitly finding” he would endanger public safety and by declining to reduce his sentence by more than dismissing the prior prison term enhancement and prior serious felony conviction enhancement. He asserts that section 1172.75 required that the superior court impose a lesser sentence “by striking the strikes or all or some of the enhancements or by imposing the mid-term on count 3,” unless it found “ ‘by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.’ ” We reject Hart’s argument. Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1) provides: “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” A court satisfies this requirement that the resentencing “results in a lesser sentence” by eliminating the repealed enhancement. (People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1156, italics omitted.) Nothing in the statute requires the 6 superior court to further reduce the sentence in addition to striking the invalid enhancement, even if the court has not found that the defendant posed a risk to public safety. Here, the superior court resentenced Hart to a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed by striking the prior prison term enhancement and the prior serious felony enhancement. Because the trial court imposed a lesser sentence—six years less than the sentence originally imposed—it complied with the mandate of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1). IV. Refusal to further reduce Hart’s sentence At the resentencing, the superior court is required to “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interests of justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) “vests the superior court with broad discretion based on an inherently factual inquiry” in resentencing a defendant. (Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 856–857.) We are satisfied that the superior court fulfilled its statutory obligations under section 1172.75 and that substantial evidence supported its conclusions. In reaching its sentencing 7 decisions, the court meaningfully considered the postconviction factors of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3). The court reviewed evidence of Hart’s rehabilitation.4 The court commended Hart on attaining his G.E.D., which was the basis for dismissing the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. But Hart’s positive efforts were undercut by the 20 Rules Violations Reports he sustained while committed in prison.5 These included conspiracy to commit battery on a prisoner on January 9, 2022, disrespect without potential for violence or disruption on May 17, 2020 and on March 31, 2020, theft of state property on April 19, 2020, use of a controlled substance on May 2, 2019, battery on an inmate on January 2, 2016, possession of alcohol on November 26, 2013, possession of an inmate manufactured weapon on April 12, 2012, battery on an inmate on April 6, 2010, possession of material which incites violence on January 11, 2010, battery on an inmate on May 15, 2009, 4 The superior court considered Hart’s accomplishments which were submitted in his petition for resentencing. Hart completed the Conflict Resolution Curriculum, the Nurturing Parent Curriculum, the CCCMS Lifer’s Group, the CALPIA Standard Occupational Classification proficiency test, the TPC Training Systems courses on hand tools and industrial safety and health, the ServSafe California Food Handler Assessment, and the California State Prison Enhanced Outpatient program courses on interpersonal skills and structured yard activities. 5 In state prison, misconduct is reported on a Rules Violation Report, or an RVR as it is commonly referred, when it “is believed to be a violation of law or not minor in nature.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3312, subd. (a)(3).)

8 behavior which could lead to force and violence on March 6, 2009, disobeying a direct order during an emergency on September 28, 2005, and disrespect towards staff on June 24, 2005.6 The superior court expressed concern with the Rule Violation Reports, especially those involving assaultive conduct or weapons. The court highlighted Hart’s conviction for possession of a weapon while incarcerated. The court did not view such Rules Violation Reports as mere “difficulties during . . . incarceration,” as Hart now characterizes them. We cannot reweigh their significance to the trial court’s determination. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 355.) The superior court declined to dismiss Hart’s prior felony conviction under the Three Strikes law because of its similarity to the offenses he committed in the underlying case. Both involved “take-over” robberies with firearms. The court also declined to strike the firearm enhancement in the underlying case, highlighting the facts surrounding Hart’s use of the firearm. Specifically, Hart displayed the firearm and threatened to kill one of the victims after subduing him when he tried to flee, beating him with his fists, and strangling him. The court stated that Hart used the gun “to terrorize” the victims.7 To further 6 Hart also sustained Rule Violation Reports for possession of a cellular phone, unlawful influence, possession of tobacco. 7 At the time of the resentencing hearing, Hart was 56 years old and had served 22 years in prison. The court acknowledged that Hart would be eligible for elder parole in 2028. From Hart’s age, the court determined that Hart was 34 years old when he committed the underlying crimes and “knew what he was doing.”

9 support its decisions, the court considered Hart’s criminal history, which included convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a weapon while in state prison. Again, we cannot reweigh the significance of these details to those decisions. We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by declining to reduce Hart’s sentence beyond striking the prior prison term enhancement and the prior serious felony conviction enhancement.

10 DISPOSITION We affirm the judgment. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS HANASONO, J.

We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

KARNOW, J.* * Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.