In re Jonathan R. CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 9/15/26 In re Jonathan R. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re JONATHAN R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, D085819

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J245385)

v. JONATHAN R., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert J. Trentacosta, Judge. Affirmed.

Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Cobi S. Furdek, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appellant Jonathan R. was with O.C. and E.A. on a college campus when E.A. fired a gun at two other minors, striking one victim twice. The juvenile court found true the allegations that Jonathan aided and abetted two attempted murders with a firearm, unlawfully possessed ammunition and firearms on a school campus, and was a minor in possession of a firearm and ammunition. In a bifurcated hearing, the court found true a gang enhancement. At disposition, Jonathan was committed to the secure track for 39 years to life plus 25 years, four months, with a baseline of 3 years. Jonathan contends that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings. He further contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting gang evidence during the substantive phase of the bifurcated hearing, and in committing him to the secure track Youth Development Academy (YDA) rather than the less restrictive HOPE (Healing Opportunities for Personal Empowerment) program. We reject these contentions and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Shooting The juvenile court received evidence that 17-year-old Jonathan, 16- year-old E.A. and 14-year-old O.C. were members of a gang called East Side San Diego (ESD). In May 2024, Jonathan posted videos on social media of himself in the territories of multiple rival gangs, taunting the rival gang for allowing him onto their turf without challenge. The rivals depicted in his videos included the North Park Locos.

2 On the afternoon of on October 31, 2024, Jonathan, E.A., and O.C. were in group totaling six or eight young people near a bus stop on the campus of a San Diego college. O.C. pointed out two other minors who emerged from MTS elevators and headed to another bus stop. The minors were later identified as D.I. and J.L., members of North Park Locos, a rival gang to ESD. After O.C. pointed them out, the group conferred together. Jonathan walked in the direction of the two North Park minors, followed by E.A. and O.C. At some point Jonathan made a gesture to the rest of the group near the bus stop. The other members of the group, who had started following, turned back toward the bus stop and remained there. A female from the group got behind a pole and some bushes and looked in the direction where Jonathan and the others were heading. As they walked, Jonathan kept looking around. E.A. and O.C. followed behind. Jonathan led the group towards the elevators near the North Park minors. D.I. and J.L. appeared to notice that Jonathan and the two others were approaching. J.L. moved his backpack around to the front of his body, and took a step backward, away from Jonathan. D.I. took a step toward Jonathan and threw his hands out as if communicating something to Jonathan and his group. D.I. and J.L. began to make dodging motions and moved backwards. J.L. got behind a metal container that was on the ground and pulled a silver revolver from his backpack. D.I. moved backwards out of view of the surveillance camera. Jonathan and E.A. passed the MTS elevators then retreated back behind the elevators. O.C., who had been a little behind the other two, appeared to lift up his shirt as he joined them behind the elevators. E.A.

3 turned towards O.C. and reached out with his hand. Jonathan, E.A., and O.C. then gathered together momentarily. Jonathan started slowly walking away from the group. O.C. walked away next, at some point reaching out his arm toward E.A. E.A. pointed a firearm in the direction of J.L. and D.I. Jonathan turned his head and looked at E.A. E.A. made motions consistent with firing a gun towards the victims. E.A. appeared to rack the weapon, fire it, clear a jam, then fire again. A police witness estimated from viewing the video that the shooter and the victims were about 10 to 15 feet apart during the shooting. Jonathan and O.C. began to run in opposite directions. Jonathan ran to the group from the bus stop. E.A. joined them. The group walked away with Jonathan in the lead. Police found three expended .38-caliber casings and two unexpended casings at the scene. D.I. was hit in the abdomen and the right forearm. D.I. told officers he did not want to say anything, and said words to the effect of, “You know how the gang goes.” On the stand, D.I. testified that he was not going to say anything about what happened. He acknowledged that he got shot but claimed he had no recollection of how it occurred. He said he had no idea what the North Park Locos were. On the stand, J.L. refused to answer any questions about the incident. A few days after the shooting, O.C. complained to Jonathan that a member of the North Park gang was disrespecting ESD. Jonathan said he did not care about the insults, “we up right now,” and told O.C. to stay home because North Park could be trying to retaliate. He told O.C. “don’t do anything stupid,” “stay inside and listen,” and “delete messages.”

4 Jonathan asked E.A. to send to him photos E.A. had found on social media of the victims of the shooting. The posts indicated that friends were praying for the victims and sending love. E.A. wrote words to the effect of, “they’re just sending prayers, his homie isn’t dead, just hit,” concerning D.I. Jonathan tried to add D.I. as a “friend.” On social media, E.A., the ESD shooter, and D.I., the North Park Locos victim, exchanged taunts about the shooting. D.I. called East Side cowards. D.I. said he called all three of them out and shouted “Fuck Eastside,” but they were not brave enough to fight and shot him instead. D.I. called E.A. a bad shot and referenced prior shootings of ESD gang members. E.A. responded, “I almost send you to meet my homies,” and “fuck fighting.” The Petition and Trial On November 21, 2024, the District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (Petition) regarding 17-year-old Jonathan under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 602, subdivision (a). The Petition alleged attempted murders of D.I. and J.L. with a firearm for the benefit of a gang (Pen. Code, § 664/187, subds. (a), (e)(1); Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (c)/(e)(1), (d)/(e)(1); Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b); counts 1 and 2); bringing a loaded firearm on campus (Pen. Code, § 626.9, subd. (h); count 3); minor in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610; count 4); misdemeanor minor in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 29650; count 5); and misdemeanor possession of ammunition on school property (Pen. Code, § 30310, subd. (a); count 6).

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

5 The defense moved to bifurcate the gang allegations under Penal Code section 1109 and the court granted the motion. The defense objected to the introduction of gang evidence during the substantive phase of the trial, both in pretrial motions and throughout trial. The juvenile court agreed gang evidence was admissible to prove motive, intent, identity, and Jonathan’s aiding and abetting of the shooter. The court indicated it would be listening carefully to ensure the gang evidence was relevant to the allegations in the Petition. During the substantive phase, the People introduced the testimony of San Diego Police Department Detective Doru Hansel, who testified that Jonathan was an active member of ESD. Detective Hansel reached this conclusion based on social media posts wherein Jonathan declared “glory to ESD,” expressed his hatred of ESD rivals, showed gang signs, and appeared with other ESD members. Detective Hansel also identified O.C. and E.A. as ESD members. He further explained that D.I. and J.L. belonged to North Park Locos, a rival gang of ESD. Detective Hansel testified that ESD’s primary activities included murder, assault with deadly weapons, robbery, carjacking, car theft, firearms possession, narcotics sales, battery, felony battery, and tagging. He testified that it was common for ESD members to possess weapons, and to share the weapons among gang members. For example, if one gang member were on probation, the gang would pass his gun to another gang member. Hansel testified that gang members would typically know if another gang member among them possesses weapons. He testified that gang members committed crimes together to create loyalty, reduce the likelihood of somebody “snitching,” and demonstrate strength as a gang. When a gang shooting took place, the shooter was shooting to kill. This benefitted the gang by removing 6 a rival and demonstrating that the gang did not tolerate rivals in its territory. Detective Hansel concluded that the shooting here was gang-motivated. He testified it was a case of ESD finding and fighting their North Park rivals. He emphasized that Jonathan and the others left behind the girls and the youth who was on probation, and did not attempt to fight D.I. and J.L. but opened fire directly. As soon as Jonathan and the other ESD members saw D.I. and J.L., he testified, everyone knew what was going to happen. It made no difference that Jonathan backed away when J.L. reached into his backpack, was walking away when the shots were fired, and did not pull the trigger. Detective Hansel admitted that he could not hear in the surveillance video what, if anything, was said, and so he could not determine if Jonathan encouraged the shooting or tried to deescalate the encounter. Detective Hansel also admitted that a gang member can act on his own and did not need to consult with anyone else before acting. The defense called former San Diego gang member Reginald Washington as an expert. He testified juvenile gang members act impulsively and do not always consult each other before acting. A gang member often does not let others know when he is carrying a firearm. But Washington acknowledged that gang members often brought other gang members as “backup” to violent crimes and testified that there is strength in numbers. Washington found significant that the surveillance videos showed that Jonathan left before the shooting happened and that he did not have a gun. Washington noted that Jonathan was not the one who pointed out the North Park gang members, and testified Jonathan might have been in front of the others because he walked faster, not because he was leading and they were 7 following. He viewed the post-shooting text messages as Jonathan’s efforts to deescalate the situation, by telling O.C. to ignore the taunts by North Park and to stay home. Court’s Adjudication The court found that the People had proven the allegations in the Petition. The court stated that the gang evidence “set the stage” for the court to understand “why the events happened.” That evidence explained the relationship between the two gangs, Eastside and North Park Locos, and among the juveniles within the gang. The court found that the gang evidence was relevant to motive and intent. But the court primarily relied on its own review of the video evidence, which it found “compelling.” The court in its review of the videos interpreted Jonathan’s wave towards the group as him “motion[ing] the others to stay back.” The court found that Jonathan and the others crossed the street with a “determination to confront the victims.” The court saw a female previously identified to be Jonathan’s girlfriend step away the group, position herself behind a pole with some bushes, and look in the direction where Jonathan and O.C. and E.A. were walking. The court interpreted the girlfriend’s behavior as “her being aware that some confrontation with the victims is about to occur.” The court interpreted a zoomed-in excerpt of the video footage as depicting Jonathan, O.C. and E.A. “approaching the victims, then backing up, huddling together, and conferring with one another for about three or four seconds approximately.” The court saw Jonathan turn and start to leave, and O.C. followed. The court saw Jonathan look briefly back at E.A., and then the shooting began. “This all happens within a second or two,” and the three juveniles were “within a few feet of each other until after the first shot.” The court found that Jonathan “was very much involved and aided and abetted 8 the actual shooter.” The court disagreed with the defense expert’s interpretation of the behavior depicted in the videos. Turning to the bifurcated hearing on the gang enhancement, the People presented evidence of predicate offenses committed by other ESD gang members, and testimony by the same gang detective expressing the opinion that an attempted murder by a street gang would benefit the entire gang. The detective explained, “It’s one of the most brazen attacks we had in broad daylight, with cameras, with hundreds of people around.” This shows, “when you’re in a gang, you want to be feared. You want everybody to be scared of you. . . . When you do an attack like that, that makes the media. In broad light. That sends a message. Everybody is sending message to every other rival gang, that if you mess with us, if you disrespect us, it doesn’t matter when, but when we catch you, we hurt you.” When presented a hypothetical mirroring the facts in this case, the detective opined that the crime showed “They didn’t go there to fight them. There was no attempt to fight. They went there with a purpose, to shoot them. . . . That, for any ESD rival, that puts a second thought in somebody’s mind to mess with ESD.” This helped ESD control its turf, collect “taxes” on any crime that occurred in its territory, and recruit new members. The court found that the People had substantiated the gang enhancement. DISCUSSION I. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Charges of Attempted Murder and Possession of Firearm and Ammunition A. Standard of Review The standard of review governing sufficiency of the evidence claims in adult criminal cases is the same as in juvenile cases. We review “the whole 9 record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540.) We presume every fact in support of the judgment that could have reasonably been deduced from the evidence. (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820 (Oyler). If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. (Ibid.) B. Attempted Murder, Aiding and Abetting “ ‘Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Richee (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 281, 293; CALCRIM No. 600.) Pursuant to Penal Code section 31, “ ‘[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, . . . are principals in any crime so committed.’ Accordingly, an aider and abettor ‘shares the guilt of the actual perpetrator.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1122 (Mendoza).) A person is guilty of aiding and abetting if they (1) “knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime,” (2) “intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime,” and (3) the person’s “words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” (CALCRIM No. 401.) An aider and abettor must “ ‘act with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of 10 committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) Aiding and abetting a crime includes facilitating, promoting, encouraging, or instigating the perpetrator’s commission of that crime. (CALCRIM No. 401.) Mere presence at the scene of the crime, or knowledge of the crime and failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting. (See People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 493 (Hin); CALCRIM No. 401.) C. Possession of a Firearm Possession of a weapon may be actual or constructive. (People v. Peña (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083.) “A defendant has actual possession when the weapon is in his immediate possession or control. He has constructive possession when the weapon, while not in his actual possession, is nonetheless under his dominion and control, either directly or through others.” (Id. at pp. 1083–1084.) Possession may be established by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Taylor (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 432, 436.) “ ‘Implicit in the crime of possession of a firearm is that a person is aware both that the item is in his or her possession and that it is a firearm.’ ” (People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 958.) Mere proximity to a weapon is not sufficient evidence of possession. (People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 225.) However, “ ‘the necessary additional circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather slight.’ ” (Ibid.) D. Analysis We consider together Jonathan’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as to the attempted murder and the firearm and ammunition charges, because the same underlying body of evidence was presented in support of both sets of charges. We conclude that substantial evidence 11 supported the court’s findings that Jonathan aided and abetted the attempted murders of D.I. and J.L. and constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition that E.A. used to shoot the victims. The evidence consisted in large part of surveillance videos showing various angles of the shooting. Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings, those videos support the court’s interpretations of Jonathan’s actions on the day of the shooting. The videos support the juvenile court’s findings that Jonathan led E.A. and O.C. towards the rivals and waved the rest of the group back. Based on testimony that there was “strength in numbers,” Jonathan’s waving back the rest of the group allowed a factfinder to conclude that Jonathan knew the confrontation ahead would not require a large group, because one of the three was armed. The subsequent exchange between D.I. and E.A. on social media further implied that when a firearm was involved, fighting was unnecessary. A fact finder could also find that later, after O.C. lifted up his shirt, Jonathan “huddled” with O.C. and E.A. After that E.A. held out his hand as if to take something from O.C. A factfinder could conclude that this series of actions reflected O.C. displaying the firearm, Jonathan deciding E.A. would take the shot, and O.C. duly handing the gun to E.A. As Jonathan turned to leave, O.C. followed, then Jonathan looked briefly back at E.A., after which E.A. started shooting. A factfinder could conclude that Jonathan’s glance gave E.A. the encouragement, or direction, to start shooting. On the whole, a factfinder could conclude that Jonathan’s conduct encouraged, instigated, promoted, or facilitated E.A.’s shooting of D.I. and J.L., which occurred seconds later. The court’s assessment of Jonathan’s proximity in location, time, and assistance to the shooting was supported by the video evidence.

12 In sum, substantial evidence in the record supported the juvenile court’s findings that Jonathan knew that E.A. intended to shoot at the victims, intended to aid E.A., and that his conduct actually aided E.A.’s attempted murders. (CALCRIM No. 401.) The same substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that Jonathan constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition, through his control and direction over E.A. As our colleague points out in dissenting from our affirmance of the true findings on the firearms charges, the People contend Jonathan constructively possessed the gun E.A. used to shoot at D.A. and J.L. because he exercised “control and leadership over E.A. who had physical possession,” and “because the gun was the shared property of the gang.” There is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that Jonathan exercised constructive possession over the weapon through his control over O.C. and E.A. As discussed above and as our colleague concedes, ample evidence supported the juvenile court’s true findings that Jonathan aided and abetted E.A. in two counts of attempted murder, with the firearm enhancements that E.A., as a principal, personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. Jonathan’s specific intent to aid and abet the attempted murder shows he had knowledge of E.A.’s gun and the intent to aid and abet E.A.’s use. Substantial evidence supports the inference that the manner in which Jonathan aided and abetted E.A. was to lead O.C. and E.A. toward a confrontation with the victims; wave back the rest of the group because he anticipated a shooting, not a fistfight; confer with O.C. and E.A. about how to proceed; and glance his approval to E.A. to start shooting. These are the reasonable inferences the court could make from the evidence to reach its conclusion that Jonathan aided and abetted E.A.’s shooting. These same inferences support the conclusion that Jonathan exercised 13 control over the firearm through his control over both E.A. and O.C., and that the firearm was shared among the gang, as supported by Detective Hansel’s testimony, and by the video of O.C. and E.A. appearing to conduct a handoff before E.A. began shooting. Because the juvenile court was tasked with weighing the evidence and drawing any reasonable inferences, reversal is not appropriate if the circumstances “reasonably justify” the trier of fact’s findings, even though “the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 820.) We therefore affirm both the attempted murder and the firearm and ammunition findings. II. Admission of Gang Evidence During Substantive Hearing Jonathan further contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting gang evidence during the substantive hearing. In particular, he complains that the People used gang evidence to fill in evidentiary gaps in its proof that Jonathan was a principal in the attempted murder and firearm offenses. Because the gang evidence was relevant to prove motive, identity, and intent, and did not improperly prejudice the juvenile court against him, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. Penal Code section 1109 requires separate phases in a case with gang enhancement allegations upon request by the defense. The first phase focuses on the accused’s guilt of the substantive charges, while the second addresses the truth of the enhancement allegations only if the first phase results in a finding that the charges are true. (Pen. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) “The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the charged offense.” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31.) Indeed, “[a]lthough 14 evidence of gang membership carries the potential for prejudice, it ‘ “is often relevant to, and admissible regarding, the charged offense. Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 772 (Holmes).) We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion. (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 476.) Under the abuse of discretion standard, “ ‘a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1004.) Here, the court agreed gang evidence was admissible to prove motive, intent, identity, and Jonathan’s aiding and abetting of the shooter. The court indicated it would be listening carefully to ensure the gang evidence was relevant to the allegations in the Petition. After admitting the evidence, the juvenile court expressly stated that it had used the gang evidence only for permissible purposes, that is, for proof of motive and intent. (Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 772.) The gang evidence was relevant to establish Jonathan’s identity as a gang member, and the identity and affiliation of fellow ESD members O.C. and E.A. The gang evidence was also relevant to identify D.I. and J.L. as North Park Locos gang members, especially since they refused to acknowledge any gang affiliation in their testimony on the witness stand.

15 The gang evidence provided context for the videos Jonathan posted of himself, taunting and expressing violent hatred of rival gangs in their territories, including North Park. These videos suggested Jonathan’s motive when O.C. pointed to the North Park minors and Jonathan subsequently led O.C. and E.A. to confront them. Jonathan’s post-shooting communication saying “we are up” was evidence that he attributed the shooting to the gang. The exchange between O.C. and D.I., in which D.I. said he would have fought all three ESD members and criticized them for shooting instead of fighting, and O.C.’s response—“fuck fighting”—illuminated the modus operandi and specific intent of the gang, that is, that ESD preferred to shoot instead of fight the North Park members when they had a firearm. Moreover, the court primarily relied not on the gang evidence, but its interpretation of Jonathan’s conduct on the surveillance videos. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence during the substantive hearing. III. Court’s Commitment of Jonathan to the Secure Track Jonathan finally contends that the court failed to find that a less restrictive placement could not offer the programming, treatment, and education necessary before committing Jonathan to the secure track (also known as Youth Development Academy (YDA)). A. Legal Principles When sentencing issues arise, the defendant must bring the issues to the trial court’s attention; otherwise, they generally are forfeited. (See People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 (Stowell) [“ ‘ “ ‘ “The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them.” ’ ” ’ ”].) As our Supreme Court has explained, “complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises 16 its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,” as these issues are “easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353, 356 (Scott), overruled on another ground in People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229.) “ ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.’ ” (Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 1114.) The forfeiture rule applies to juvenile court proceedings as well. (See In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754 [“The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the juvenile court so that they may be corrected”]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502 [collecting numerous dependency cases in “wide variety of contexts” in which appellate courts applied the waiver/forfeiture doctrine].) We review a juvenile court’s placement decision for abuse of discretion. (In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 908.) The court abuses its discretion if the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence. (Ibid.) We therefore consider whether substantial evidence— meaning evidence reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value— supports the juvenile court’s commitment order in light of the purpose of the juvenile court law. (Ibid.) We indulge all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court’s decision. (In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1080.) The purpose of the juvenile delinquency laws is twofold: (1) to serve the best interests of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and enable him to be a law-abiding and productive member of his family and the community, and (2) to provide for the protection and safety of the public. (In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615; § 202, subds. (a), (b), and (d).)

17 If a minor is adjudged a ward under section 602, “the court may make any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor.” (§ 727, subd. (a)(1).) The court has the discretion to place the ward at home, on probation, with or without electronic monitoring, or to order various forms of commitment. (§§ 727, subds. (a)(2)-(3); 730, subd. (a).) The court also has the discretion to order a juvenile who is 14 years of age or older to be committed to a secure youth treatment facility for a period of confinement if certain criteria are met, including a finding on the record that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the minor is unsuitable. (§ 875, subd. (a).) The court must base its determination for a less restrictive alternative disposition on the following criteria: “(A) The severity of the offense or offenses for which the ward has been most recently adjudicated, including the ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and harm done to victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including the adequacy and success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward. [¶] (C) Whether the programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in a secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning the ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is available to the court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age, developmental maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing the ward to a term of confinement in a secure youth treatment facility.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)

18 B. Additional Background The probation department (probation) conducted a social study and submitted a recommendation to the court. Probation’s study contained Jonathan’s statement about the shooting. Jonathan acknowledged that he was an ESD gang member, but denied that he was the leader of the group or that he initiated the confrontation. He felt he was blamed for the shooting because he was the oldest person in the group. Jonathan said he did not know E.A. had a gun or that E.A. would fire the weapon at the two victims. He explained that just because a rival gang member was an “enemy,” this did not mean Jonathan wanted to kill them. He would not disrespect someone just because they were from a different gang. Jonathan said he wanted to leave the gang but did not know how to tell his “homies.” Probation reported Jonathan’s three previous encounters with law enforcement. In the first instance, he got into a verbal argument with his father and spraypainted a line across his father’s truck. His vandalism case was referred to the Juvenile Diversion Initiative Program. Next, Jonathan and his girlfriend were found in possession of a stolen truck. Jonathan had taken it from an elderly victim and left the victim on the side of the road. A section 602 petition was filed, and upon a true finding of vehicle theft, Jonathan was put on GPS monitoring, given a stayed 130-day commitment to Urban Camp, and was referred to Substance Use Disorder Services. In the final incident, Jonathan threatened to kill his father during an argument at home. His father sustained a minor injury near his left eye from the encounter. Jonathan’s stayed 130-day Urban Camp commitment was subsequently lifted and imposed. He completed all assigned programs and tested negative while on probation. He was on probation at the time of the shooting.

19 Jonathan attended school daily while in custody, and school records showed he maintained passing grades in all classes. While in juvenile hall, the probation study reported, Jonathan was involved in a gang altercation. Probation noted that Jonathan had made no active attempts to remove himself from the gang. His actions demonstrated an unwillingness to remain law abiding and showed his entrenchment in the gang lifestyle. Probation also noted that Jonathan had failed to utilize the opportunities the juvenile justice system had previously afforded him. Probation ultimately recommended a custodial placement, but within the HOPE program, which would offer therapeutic services such as individual, group, and family counseling, behavioral therapy, substance abuse counseling, vocational training and life skills programming, and daily school attendance so Jonathan could complete his high school diploma. The probation study offered no information about what services and programs would be offered in a secure track placement. Jonathan in his disposition brief urged the court to adopt probation’s recommendation and place Jonathan in the HOPE program. The brief acknowledged that the secure track offered “specialized programs for high- risk youth,” but contended that HOPE offered “individual treatment plans that can be as intensive as those in secure facilities.” HOPE offered “evidence-based programming” that was “comparable” to that offered in the secure track, but “in a less restrictive setting,” Jonathan contended. The People in its disposition brief recommended the court commit Jonathan to the secure track for a baseline term of five years. The People provided no information about the services or programs offered in the secure 20 track, but represented that “all of [Jonathan’s] developmental needs can be addressed in the Secure Youth Treatment facility.” At the March 2025 disposition hearing, the court learned of updates to the probation study. In particular, instead of one gang-related incident at juvenile hall, Jonathan had been involved in a total of five gang-related incidents in the five months since he had been in custody. In November 2024, Jonathan participated in a gang-related fight against a Logan Heights gang member. In January 2025, he participated in a “near gang fight” against a San Ysidro Malos gang member. In February he participated in a gang-related fight against City Heights Juniors. In March, he yelled gang- related remarks and displayed hand signs. This incident was reported in the probation study. Finally, 10 days before the disposition hearing, Jonathan participated in a gang fight against Southeast Locos gang members. In addition, a probation officer informed the court that Jonathan’s risk assessment had been miscalculated, and he properly fell into a category representing a high risk of recidivism. The court reviewed probation’s social study and recommendations, the briefs filed by counsel, videos of the shooting, and some of Jonathan’s social media posts. The court ordered Jonathan committed to the secure track. At the hearing, the court cited the seriousness of the offense and Jonathan’s prior history in violating past court orders, and disagreed that a HOPE commitment would be appropriate. In its signed order summarizing the proceedings, the court found that “[a] less restrictive, alternative disposition for the youth was not suitable. In making this determination, the court has considered the criteria listed in . . . section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(A-E).”

21 C. Analysis Jonathan contends a new disposition hearing is required because the juvenile court failed to make specific findings that the secure track offered services to address Jonathan’s specific needs, and that a less restrictive alternative like HOPE would not satisfy the goals of rehabilitation and public safety. First, we must address forfeiture. Jonathan’s counsel did not object that the juvenile court failed to supply adequate reasons on the record for its choice of the secure track rather than HOPE. After sharing its view that a HOPE commitment was inappropriate, the court expressed its intended disposition to commit Jonathan to the secure track for a baseline of three years, then invited comment by both parties. A timely objection that the court’s findings were insufficient would have allowed the court, the People, and the probation office to add to the record, and error, if any, could have easily and efficiently been corrected or prevented. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 353, 356.) Indeed, this seems precisely the type of situation best suited for immediate objection and remedy. Even if the claim were not forfeited, Jonathan has not persuaded us the trial court abused its discretion. First, the record contained sufficient information about the services provided in a secure track commitment for the court to assess whether such a placement would meet the goals of rehabilitation for Jonathan and safety to the public. All parties involved appeared to concede that the YDA would offer the same or similar services as HOPE, just in a more restrictive setting. Defense counsel, for example, indicated that HOPE and the YDA offered “comparable evidence-based programming,” and that HOPE’s therapy options included “individualized treatment plans that can be as intensive as those in 22 secure facilities.” The People contended, without opposition from Jonathan, that “all of [Jonathan’s] developmental needs can be addressed” in a secure facility. The probation study described services available at HOPE, including individual, group, and family counseling, behavioral therapy, high risk substance abuse counseling, skill building, and daily school attendance. With no disagreement that services were “comparable,” or any indication that a secure placement would negatively impact Jonathan’s rehabilitation, the juvenile court’s comments at disposition were directed at why it believed the less restrictive placement was inadequate. (Cf. In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 910 [record supplied insufficient information to support juvenile court’s secure track disposition, where juvenile offered evidence that a secure track commitment would be adverse to his rehabilitation].) The court explained the reasons why it disagreed with the HOPE recommendation, using the enumerated criteria in section 875, subdivision (a)(3). As to the severity of the offense, the court found Jonathan’s attempted murder allegations were among the “most serious” cases in juvenile court, and, having reviewed the videos, found it was clear that Jonathan was “giving some direction to these gang members” in connection with a shooting on a “crowded college campus.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A.) The court addressed Jonathan’s previous delinquent history, noting that he “violated the court’s orders time and time and time again.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(B).) As the probation study noted, this was Jonathan’s fourth referral to probation, and he had been formally supervised on probation for 13 months prior to the shooting. Jonathan received the benefit of participation in a diversion program, had an urban camp commitment imposed but stayed, and had the opportunity to remain home under supervision. He nonetheless engaged in 23 additional, and escalating, misconduct, resulting in the filing of a petition, imposition of the urban camp term, additional probation, and the current Petition. (See In re A.R., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082 [the minor’s continued criminal behavior after less restrictive placements left “little doubt that less restrictive alternatives have been wholly ineffective in rehabilitating the [m]inor”].) As to the goals of rehabilitation and public safety, the court emphasized that Jonathan appeared to be “gang entrenched” and to have “adopted the values of the gang,” which led him to commit risky behaviors that could end up resulting in him being hurt or killed. This reasoning supported a more restrictive option, to remove Jonathan from gang influences and keep him and the public safe from gang-related misdeeds. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(D).) The court expressly stated in its written order that a less restrictive alternative was not suitable, and that it had considered all of the factors at section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(E). We conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s judgment, and its statements at the hearing, combined with its written order, satisfied the requirement that the court make findings on the record.

24 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

I CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

25 Do, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in all parts of the majority opinion but respectfully dissent as to its affirmance of the juvenile court’s true findings on count 3–possession of a loaded firearm on campus (Pen. Code,2 § 626.9, subd. h), count 4–minor in possession of a firearm (§ 29610), count 5–minor in possession of ammunition (§ 30310, subd. (a)), and count 6–possession of ammunition on school property (§ 30310, subd. (a)). I agree with Jonathan R. that the People failed to present sufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the gun used by E.A. to support these counts. A minor is in constructive possession of a firearm if he “knowingly exercises a right to control the firearm, either directly or indirectly through another person.” (In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778 [cleaned up].) “Possession may be shared with others.” (People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417 (Sifuentes), disapproved on another ground in People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 304, fn. 6; accord In re I.A., at p. 778.) “But mere proximity to the weapon, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence of possession.” (Sifuentes, at p. 1417; In re I.A., at p. 778.) “Nor is knowledge of a gun’s presence.” (In re I.A., at p. 779.) To prove constructive possession, the prosecution must show the minor “exercised dominion and control over the gun.” (Ibid.) Two cases, cited by the Attorney General, are instructive here: In re I.A. and Sifuentes. In In re I.A., the minor and five of his friends—all members of a criminal street gang—drove through rival gang territory in two cars. One of them got out of the car ahead of the minor’s car and fatally shot a man 2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. believed to be a rival gang member. (In re I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 771, 772.) Like here, the prosecutor’s theory was that the minor constructively possessed the gun that his accomplice used to shoot the victim. (Id. at p. 778.) The prosecutor’s “only evidence tying [the minor] to that gun was that he: (1) once touched it, (2) was in the [car] following [the car] from which [the shooter] emerged when it was used, and (3) knew that [the shooter] had the gun when [the shooter] used it against [the victim].” (Id. at pp. 778–779.) On this record, the appellate court had no difficulty concluding “[u]pon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that [the minor] possessed a concealable firearm” under a constructive possession theory. (Id. at p. 778 [cleaned up].) Evidence of the minor’s social media account “ ‘replete’ ” with messages he desired and acquired a gun or showing him holding an assault rifle did not change the court’s conclusion, because there still was no proof that the minor exercised dominion and control over the gun that was used in the shooting. (Id. at p. 779.) In Sifuentes, the defendant was found in a motel room with a fellow gang member named Lopez and two other women. (Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1413, 1414.) A loaded gun was under a mattress next to Lopez. (Id. at p. 1414.) The People’s gang expert testified “that weapons, particularly guns, play a prominent role in the gang subculture,” that “a gang gun is ‘accessible to all gang members ‘[a]t most times,’ ” and “[a] gang member possessing a gun will inform other gang members he has a firearm.” (Id. at p. 1415.) In addition to this testimony, the People introduced evidence of prior incidents in which the defendant had a woman hide his loaded gun and ammunition when he was stopped by police in rival gang territory, had weapons recovered at his home, or had been present with other gang 2 members who possessed a weapon. (Id. at p. 1414.) The appellate court concluded all this was not substantial evidence that the defendant “had the right to control [Lopez’s] firearm,” even if the defendant knew a weapon was in the motel room and even assuming Lopez’s gun “fell into the gang gun category.” (Id. at pp. 1417–1418.) Returning to this case, the People contend Jonathan constructively possessed the gun E.A. used to shoot at D.A. and J.L. because he exercised “control and leadership over E.A. who had physical possession,” and “because the gun was the shared property of the gang.” (Italics added.) But as the People’s own authorities make clear, neither assertion is sufficient to establish that Jonathan was in constructive possession of E.A.’s gun. The People argue: Jonathan was “an extremely active member” of the East Side San Diego gang and “the eldest of the group he was with” during the shooting. They assert that “[t]hese facts, in addition to the deference shown to him by E.A. and O.C., as well as [his] own physical displays commanding the members of his group, all show that [Jonathan] exercised authority over the group,” and E.A. specifically. (Italics added.) Perhaps. But “[w]hat is required, and what prosecutors failed to show here, is that [Jonathan] exercised dominion and control over the gun.” (In re I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 779, italics added.) In my view, the People have not pointed us to evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, required under the substantial evidence standard, to show that Jonathan exercised dominion and control over the gun. The evidence tying Jonathan to E.A.’s gun is even thinner than the evidence found insufficient in In re I.A. and Sifuentes. Unlike in In re I.A., there is no evidence he touched E.A.’s gun, at any time. At best, he is also with a group of his fellow gang members from which the shooter emerged 3 when the gun was used and knew the shooter had the gun when he fired upon the victims. (See In re I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 778–779.) Like in Sifuentes, the People rely heavily on the workings of a criminal street gang and its “distinct ‘chain of command’ ” in an attempt to tie Jonathan to E.A.’s gun. They argue, without any citation to the record that, based on his status as the eldest and leader of the group, “Had [Jonathan] wanted to take the shots himself, he could have taken actual possession of the gun. Had [Jonathan] decided a shooting was too public, he could have prevented the shooting entirely by leading his crew away. Had [Jonathan] thought that O.C. needed to prove himself, rather than E.A., he could have instructed O.C. to take the shots.” These claims appear to be based on little more than “speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture or guess work” which does not satisfy the substantial evidence standard. (In re I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 779 [cleaned up].) The claims are also insufficient to demonstrate dominion and control over the gun. As the court held in Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419, “[t]he possibility [the defendant] might have had the right to exercise control over the gun does not by itself provide a basis to infer he had the right to control it.” Lastly, the People argue Jonathan had the right to control the gun “because the gun was the shared property of the gang.” There is no evidence to support this claim. And although the People do not refer us to their gang expert on this point, I note the People’s gang expert did testify that “gangs in general, gang members, like to have weapons on them” and “[a] lot of time they give them to members. If a member is on probation or parole, they are going to give the guns to somebody who is not on probation or parole, but guns get passed around a lot.” (Italics added.) But similar expert testimony was rejected as insufficient by the People’s own authority.

4 In Sifuentes, the court concluded the gang expert’s testimony failed to satisfy the People’s burden of proof on dominion and control because, although he testified to gang guns in general, “the prosecution’s gang expert did not testify any gun possessed by a gang member automatically constitutes a gang gun to be shared with all other gang members,” or that the recovered gun was a gang gun. (Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1417–1418.) Here, too, the gang expert did not testify that any gun possessed by a gang member is a gang gun, let alone that E.A.’s gun was a gang gun. Further still, the court in Sifuentes concluded that “[e]ven assuming the firearm Lopez possessed fell into the gang gun category, no evidence showed [the defendant] had the right to control the weapon.” (Ibid.) We can make the same assumption, too, but the same result obtains here. The majority asserts the surveillance footage of the shooting supports the finding that “O.C. display[ed] the firearm, Jonathan decid[ed] E.A. would take the shot, and O.C. duly hand[ed] the gun to E.A” (maj. opn., p. 13), and this supports the People’s assertion the gun “was shared among the gang” (id., p. 14.) The trial court did not make such a finding (indeed it did not address the evidence on the possession charges at all) and I do not believe it is a reasonable inference that we can draw ourselves. As the People’s detective testified in narrating the surveillance footage, “The group appeared to be huddled behind that pole. I can’t tell what they’re doing at this point.” And because there is “no audio of anything” in the video, the detective conceded he could not say what Jonathan “might have said to other people” or what “might have [been] said to him.” The inference that “Jonathan decid[ed] E.A. would take the shot” is speculation and conjecture. Ample evidence certainly supported the juvenile court’s true findings that Jonathan aided and abetted E.A. in two counts of attempted murder 5 (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), with the firearm enhancements that E.A., as a principal, personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)–(e)(1).) Jonathan’s specific intent to aid and abet the attempted murder shows he had knowledge of E.A.’s gun and the intent to aid and abet E.A.’s use. But constructive possession requires proof of a different set of facts, namely the right to exercise dominion and control or joint possession of the gun. The People’s reliance on Jonathan’s control over his fellow gang members and the unsupported claim of shared gang ownership of E.A.’s gun was speculative and simply did not meet the required quantum of proof in this particular case. Consequently, the juvenile court’s true findings on counts 3 through 6, and the associated enhancements on those counts, should be reversed and the matter should be remanded for a new dispositional hearing.

DO, J.