In re Olivia C. CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 9/15/26 In re Olivia C. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re OLIVIA C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E087627 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1700643)

Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION v. L.S., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter Kubelun, Judge.

Affirmed.

Cecilia E. Rutherford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamilia T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 L.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order regarding her four children. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional findings against her. She also argues that (1) the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the order removing the children from her custody, and (2)

the court failed to “state the facts on which the decision to remove” the children was based. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (e); unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Prior dependency proceedings One of Mother’s children, Olivia C., was the subject of a prior dependency case in Los Angeles County. The September 2016 referral alleged that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine at Olivia’s birth. The court sustained the allegations of the petition, declared Olivia a dependent, removed the newborn infant from Mother, and ordered reunification services. Mother complied with her case plan, and the court returned Olivia to Mother’s custody and terminated jurisdiction in January 2018. Olivia’s father was unknown.

II. Detention in the present case In August 2025, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) received a referral concerning Mother, Alan C. (Father), and their three children:

2 seven-year-old L.C., five-year-old M.C., and 11-month-old B.C.1 Mother and Father have been together since 2012, and they married in 2017.

Riverside Public Utilities had recently shut off electricity to the family’s home because the account had an overdue balance. Several days later, a city utility worker went to the home to investigate possible “power theft.” The utility worker discovered that the parents had been “stealing electricity” by “using vehicle jumper cables placed onto the roof to pull power.”2 The adult male who answered the door stated that he was stealing electricity because there were children in the home. The man was shaking and unable to complete his sentences, and he appeared to be under the influence of drugs.

The social worker went to the home to investigate that same day. There was a generator outside the home. Mother reported that the parents and their three children had been living there for roughly two months. The home was cluttered and dirty. The floor in the children’s room was not visible, because it was covered with piles of clothing and toys. There were also piles of clothing throughout the home. The kitchen counters were covered with food, dishes, and trash, and the sink was piled with dirty dishes.

Mother’s fourth child, Olivia, lived with the maternal great-aunt, but Olivia visited Mother’s home. Olivia was then eight years old and had lived with the maternal great- aunt since birth. After Mother reunified with Olivia in the prior dependency case, Mother allowed Olivia to live with the maternal great-aunt, because the child had bonded with 1 Father is not a party to this appeal. 2 The detention report included a photograph of the jumper cables placed on the roof. They appeared to be hooked up to utility equipment.

3 the relative. The living arrangement with the maternal great-aunt was informal; there were no court orders or “legal paperwork” giving her custody or legal guardianship.

Olivia’s father was still unknown.

Mother initially denied having a history of substance abuse. But when the social worker mentioned Olivia’s prior dependency case, Mother acknowledged that she began using methamphetamine in 2013. She denied any recent use and said that she last used when she was pregnant with Olivia. She also said that she and Father used methamphetamine together before Olivia’s birth. She had used marijuana recently when B.C. was with the maternal great-aunt and the older children were at school.

Mother had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder in 2013, and she thought she had also been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and depression. She could not remember the names of the three medications that she was supposed to be taking, and she was not receiving any psychiatric care, counseling, or therapy.

Mother denied stealing electricity and said that they were using the generator to power the home. She acknowledged that she and Father owed a substantial overdue balance on the utility account, and they still owed their landlord a deposit. They did not have jobs and were unsure how they were going to pay the bills. The landlord confirmed that the parents owed a deposit, and he intended to begin the eviction process. The parents had given him a fraudulent check for their rent.

Father stated that he previously used cocaine and alcohol, but he had been clean since 2015. When the social worker pressed him on his “most recent drug use,” he got flustered and said that he did not understand why it mattered. The worker asked if he had 4 used methamphetamine and if he and Mother had ever used together, and he denied both.

After the worker explained that Mother reported otherwise, he said that he had used methamphetamine three to four times many years ago. He estimated that he and Mother last used methamphetamine in 2013. Father knew that Mother had some mental health diagnoses, and he said that she had not been taking her medications.

Father reported that the home’s power had been shut off for one week, and he was unsure why. The family had been going to the maternal great-aunt’s home to heat food and to charge their devices. The maternal great-aunt recently rented a generator for them for two days. The food in the refrigerator was warm because it had been off before the parents got the generator, but the parents had been keeping the children’s milk at the maternal great-aunt’s home to keep it cold.

Both parents agreed to a saliva drug test but were unable to produce any saliva, so they agreed to a urine drug test by the end of the day. The parents declined the social worker’s offer to refer them to substance abuse treatment. They called the social worker that evening to say that they had arrived at the clinic after it closed, and they agreed to drug test first thing in the morning. The next morning, Father immediately ran to the clinic restroom when they arrived. When it came time for the parents to test, neither one could produce enough urine. They returned at the end of the day to complete the drug test.

Both parents tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. When the social worker called to report the results, Mother claimed that her positive results were “impossible.” Mother insisted that the test was wrong, and she asked to retest. But after 5 several minutes, Mother admitted one recent use of methamphetamine with an acquaintance (not Father). She did not provide any other details about her use. Father stated that the test was wrong and that there must have been a mistake.

Before the family moved into their current home, they had all been living with the maternal great-aunt. Mother still relied heavily on the maternal great-aunt to help transport the children to school and medical appointments. The maternal great-aunt said that “she kicked [the parents] out due to their failure to assist in the home.” She did not know whether the parents were using drugs, and she did not know that they had been stealing electricity. The parents told her that they needed help with the generator because the city had turned off their power to install new power lines.

L.C. reported that she did not eat the day before. The child had dirt all over her body and under her fingernails. M.C. also had dirt all over her body. She reported that there were times when “the lights did not work in their new house and their old apartment.” B.C. similarly was covered in dirt, and he also had redness all over his body.

Mother said that he had eczema but had not been seen by a doctor. She recognized the condition as eczema because the other children had it as infants. DPSS arranged for medical appointments for the children, and B.C. was treated for eczema, rhinovirus, and infections in both ears. M.C. was also treated for eczema.

Olivia reported feeling safe at the maternal great-aunt’s home. The child expressed fear about living in Mother’s home, because she had never lived with Mother and wanted to remain with the maternal great-aunt. Olivia said that she visited the 6 parents’ home for a few hours at a time. She was last there a few days ago, but she could not recall if the utilities were working.

When the social worker visited the next day, the home was cleaner, and much of the clutter had been picked up. The food in the refrigerator was still warm. Mother stated that the refrigerator pulled too much electricity from the generator, so they turned the refrigerator off. Father said that he had purchased a generator and would be getting solar panels.

DPSS filed a petition under subdivision (b) of section 300, alleging that (1) Mother had an unresolved history of substance abuse, limiting her ability to meet the children’s basic needs and keep the children safe (b-1 allegation); (2) Father had an unresolved history of substance abuse, limiting his ability to meet the children’s basic needs and keep the children safe (b-2 allegation); (3) both parents neglected the health and safety of the children by allowing the home to be in “deplorable conditions,” in that it was dirty, cluttered, and lacking electricity (b-3 allegation); (4) both parents neglected the health and safety of L.C., M.C., and B.C., in that all three children were dirty, B.C. had redness all over his body, and L.C. went one day without food (b-4 allegation); and (5) Mother had unresolved mental health issues and failed to follow through with appropriate treatment (b-5 allegation). The petition also alleged that the identity and whereabouts of Olivia’s father were unknown, and he had failed to provide the child with care and support. (§ 300, subd. (g).)

In August 2025, the court detained Olivia from Mother and detained the other three children from both parents. Olivia was placed in the maternal great-aunt’s home, 7 and the other children were placed elsewhere. The court ordered DPSS to provide predisposition services, including referrals for drug testing, substance abuse treatment, parenting education, and counseling.

III. Jurisdiction and disposition When interviewed for the jurisdiction/disposition report, Mother stated that she completed an outpatient substance abuse treatment program in 2018 as part of the prior case concerning Olivia. She recently used methamphetamine with her friends when B.C.

was with his aunt and the other children were at school, and that was why she tested positive. Father did not use with her, and she believed that someone tampered with his test results. Before her recent use, Mother last used methamphetamine in 2016. She denied that her mental health issues were unresolved. She last took her medication before becoming pregnant with B.C. When she was taking it, she would often stay in bed all day, and she was not motivated to do anything.

Mother said that the parents used the generator when the children were home and turned it off when they were at school. The parents kept things that could spoil at the maternal great-aunt’s home. There was never spoiled food in the home. The internet service did not work at times, so the children could not use their tablets. They must have believed that there was no electricity for that reason. The electricity was working when the social worker visited, and the clutter had been cleaned up. Mother said that she was willing to participate in any services recommended by DPSS.

Olivia reported that although she lived with the maternal great-aunt, she “sometimes stay[ed]” at the parents’ home. The family would often eat the same thing 8 for days at the parents’ home, and they would “not have a lot of food.” The lights at the home did not work when the family first moved in. Father had an “engine” that helped them have electricity. They typically had electricity for six hours at night, and then it turned off. There were times when Olivia found the refrigerator to be warm. She thought that was because her sister played with the button that controlled the temperature. The family stored their food at the maternal great-aunt’s home if the refrigerator was not cold.

L.C. reported that there had been no electricity or internet service at her parents’

home since “last year.” There had also been times when she tried to brush her teeth, but the water did not run. The television often did not work when she tried to turn it on, and their food would often “go bad” because the refrigerator was warm. M.C. similarly reported that the lights in the home did not work “a lot.” She also said that she did not have enough food because the refrigerator was small and did not work. Both M.C. and L.C. said that the family needed more food.

The maternal great-aunt stated that she used to give the parents money, but she stopped after becoming concerned about “what the money would be used for.” The children often came to her home to eat, and she often bought supplies for the family. The parents asked her to buy them a generator, but she rented one instead. The maternal grandfather then paid the parents’ electricity bill. The maternal great-aunt became aware that Mother was using drugs when Mother tested positive at Olivia’s birth. The maternal great-aunt thought that Mother was “good” before she got involved with Father.

Father recently appeared unannounced at the maternal great-aunt’s home and caused a disturbance. She was putting Olivia to bed when Father barged into the home 9 and started yelling. The maternal great-aunt agreed to go outside and talk to Father, as she did not want to scare Olivia. Once outside, Father blamed the maternal great-aunt for DPSS’s involvement, and he said that he was “going to take Olivia.” Around the same time, Father became upset with the maternal great-aunt when she took Mother to the store to purchase dog food. He sent the maternal great-aunt a text message asking her to “stop taking” Mother, stating that the maternal great-aunt was doing “a little bit to[o] much”

and accusing her of “fucking with” him. He also said that he would take Olivia if the maternal great-aunt did not stop.

The parents’ supervised visits with the children went well and were “appropriate.”

The parents submitted to saliva drug tests before their visits with the children in September and October 2025. At one visit, both parents tested negative. Father tested negative at the next visit, and Mother was unable to produce enough saliva to test.

Both parents tested positive for methamphetamine at another visit. On that occasion, Father tested twice, and both results were positive. Mother tested three times.

The first two tests were inconclusive because she was unable to produce sufficient saliva.

The third test was positive.

At the next visit, Mother’s test was again inconclusive because she could not produce sufficient saliva. Father tested positive for methamphetamine and attributed the result to ibuprofen that he took the night before. The social worker asked the parents if they had been calling the number to report for random drug testing. They said that they did not trust the drug testing clinic and had not been calling. The social worker told them that she was submitting a referral for them to test in four days. The parents failed to 10 appear for that test. They appeared for two more visits and took saliva drug tests. In both instances, Father tested negative, and Mother’s tests were inconclusive because of insufficient saliva.

In late October 2025, Mother appeared at the children’s school and asked the principal to write a letter stating that DPSS unlawfully took the children. She wanted to file an action against DPSS for “falsely detaining” the children; she believed the investigating social worker lied in order to detain the children. She and Father also spoke with a supervisor at DPSS, because they had questions about the “legitimacy” of the protective custody warrants issued earlier in the case.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in November 2025, the court made one change to the allegations in the petition. It struck the allegation that “the home was without electricity” in the portion describing the “deplorable conditions” of the home.

The court reasoned: “I don’t think it is accurate that it was without electricity. It appears there was a generator, and there was some electricity. It wasn’t completely void of electricity. I think the record is clear that it was on and off, but I think that’s an inaccurate statement.” With that one amendment, the court found true all of the allegations in the petition.

Regarding the substance abuse allegations, the court observed: “There is testing of substance abuse. There is a home that is not in good condition, what we call a dirty home, with multiple challenges for children. The children were also disheveled and dirty, and at least one of the children indicated that there were times that they did not have food and could not eat, and the food in the refrigerator was warm. [¶] All those, I believe, are 11 sufficient nexus that could be associated with substance abuse. Where the lack of care of children could be put at risk, and so for those reasons, I believe that the nexus is there, and that the allegations are proper.”3 With respect to disposition, the court declared the children dependents of the court, removed all the children from Mother’s custody, and removed Father’s three children from his custody. The court also ordered reunification services for both parents.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction Mother argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional findings against her. The argument lacks merit.

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides that a child may come within the court’s jurisdiction if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will 3 Father filed pro se section 388 petitions before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, even though he was represented by counsel at the time. (The court later granted his request to represent himself.) The court set a hearing to determine whether Father made the required prima facie showing, and the court ultimately denied the petitions. It reasoned that the petitions were “not quite ripe yet,” because section 388 petitions “are generally for a change in circumstances post jurisdiction.” The court nevertheless concluded that there was no prima facie showing of a change in circumstances or that the requested orders would promote the children’s best interests. The court was correct that Father filed the petitions prematurely. Generally, a petition under “section 388 lies to change or set aside any order of the juvenile court in the action from the time the child is made a dependent child of the juvenile court.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; § 388, subd. (a)(1).) Father’s children had not yet been declared dependents of the juvenile court when he filed the petitions, so the court could have summarily denied the petitions on that basis. In addition, Father had no right to file the pro se petitions when he was represented, so the court could have returned the documents unfiled or stricken the filed documents. (In re P.C. (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 628, 636-637.)

12 suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of” a parent’s failure or inability “to adequately supervise or protect the child” or the parent’s inability “to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s … substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A), (D).)

A jurisdictional finding under subdivision (b)(1) of section 300 requires that DPSS prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following elements: “(1) neglectful conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.) “[T]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citation.]

The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216, disapproved on another ground by In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18.)

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jurisdictional finding requires us to determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports it. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the finding and review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determination. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment but merely determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the finding.

(Ibid.)

13 The record contains substantial evidence supporting the b-1 allegation concerning Mother’s substance abuse. Mother had a dependency history because she tested positive for methamphetamine at Olivia’s birth. In the present case, Mother initially denied any recent methamphetamine use and said that she last used when she was pregnant with Olivia, who was eight years old when the current petition was filed. Mother did not produce sufficient saliva for a drug test and agreed to take a urine test by the end of the day. She arrived at the clinic after it closed and said that she would return the next morning. But the next morning, she did not produce enough urine. When she finally took the urine test at the end of that day, she tested positive for methamphetamine. She again denied any use, claiming that the result was impossible. She eventually admitted that she used with a friend but declined to provide further details. Much later, when the social worker interviewed her for the jurisdiction and disposition report, Mother said that she tested positive because she used with her friends when B.C. was with his aunt and the other children were at school. She declined to participate in further urine drug tests because she claimed not to trust the testing clinic, and she declined DPSS’s offer of substance abuse treatment. She also regularly failed to produce sufficient saliva for the drug tests before visits, and she tested positive for methamphetamine on one of the few occasions when she did produce enough saliva. The court could reasonably infer from all of the foregoing evidence that Mother was attempting to evade testing, was being dishonest about her use, and was under the influence while the children were in her care.

Moreover, the record supports the reasonable inference that Mother’s methamphetamine use was causing her to neglect the children’s health and safety, putting 14 them at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. She asserts that the children were “cared for and healthy,” but there was substantial evidence otherwise. The electricity in the home did not always work, and L.C. reported that the food would often spoil because the refrigerator was warm. L.C. and M.C. reported that the family needed more food, and L.C. said that she went one day without eating at all. Before the maternal great-aunt rented a generator on a short-term basis, the parents were stealing electricity with jumper cables attached to equipment on the roof. The children were dirty, M.C. had untreated eczema, and B.C. had untreated eczema and infections in both ears. The maternal great-aunt previously supported the family, but she stopped giving the parents money because she had concerns about “what the money would be used for.”

The court could reasonably conclude from all of that evidence that Mother’s methamphetamine use was impairing her ability to provide a safe home and care for the children. The lack of sufficient food, the presence of spoiled food in the home, the hazardous jumper-cable system on the roof, and the children’s untreated medical conditions showed that the children were at risk of serious physical harm or illness. And even if the parents had cleaned up the home and obtained a generator by the time of the jurisdiction hearing, Mother was resisting treatment and monitoring of her drug use. The court could reasonably conclude that the unsafe conditions in the home and the lack of care would continue to occur in the absence of juvenile court jurisdiction.

Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient especially as to Olivia, because the child did not live in the family home, and there is no evidence that the child was at risk in the maternal great-aunt’s home. But Olivia reported that she stayed at Mother’s home for 15 visits, the family did “not have a lot of food,” and there were times when the home did not have electricity and she found the refrigerator to be warm. Olivia’s visits thus placed her at risk from the unsafe conditions in the home experienced by the other children. In addition, although Father apparently had no parental rights to Olivia, he twice threatened to take Olivia from the maternal great-aunt. The court could reasonably conclude that Mother would not stop him from bringing Olivia back to the parents’ home.

Mother also challenges the b-3, b-4, and b-5 allegations against her, concerning the “deplorable conditions” of the home, the dirty state of the children and other aspects of their physical condition, and her mental health issues. She argues that there was no evidence of a nexus between those issues and harm to the children and that some of those conditions had improved by the time of the jurisdiction hearing.

The conditions of the home and the children were evidence that Mother’s substance abuse put the children at substantial risk of harm, regardless of whether they provided independent grounds for jurisdiction. And as already explained, the court could reasonably infer that the conditions were likely to recur in the absence of juvenile court jurisdiction, because Mother was resisting treatment and monitoring of her drug use. We need not address Mother’s challenge any further. That is because “‘[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory 16 grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773; accord, In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 284 [if there are multiple jurisdictional findings against a parent, “the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others”].)

In sum, Mother’s jurisdictional challenge is meritless. The record contains substantial evidence that Mother’s substance abuse placed the children at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.

II. Disposition Mother also challenges the dispositional order removing the children from her custody. She argues that (1) the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the removal order, and (2) the court prejudicially erred by failing to state the facts on which the removal order was based. Both arguments lack merit.

To order a child removed from a parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there “would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child in the parent’s home, and (2) “there are no reasonable means by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected without” removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) In addition to making those factual findings, the “court shall state the facts on which the decision to remove the [child] is based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) The child “‘need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.’”

(In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 170.)

17 If the court fails to state the facts on which a removal order is based, we do not reverse unless the error prejudiced the appellant. (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1068.) Accordingly, the appellant must show a reasonable probability that they would have achieved a more favorable result if the court had stated the pertinent facts.

(In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 159.)

We review the findings underlying the court’s removal order for substantial evidence (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633), taking into account the level of confidence that the clear and convincing evidence standard demands (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995). The question before us “is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at pp. 995-996.) We “view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at. p. 996.)

The record contains substantial evidence supporting the removal order. Mother asserts that there was insufficient evidence because she cooperated with DPSS, she indicated her willingness to participate in services, she remedied the circumstances that initiated the referral, and the children did not show any signs of physical harm. The argument ignores all of the contrary evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the removal order. Mother stated that she was willing to participate in services, but her actions demonstrated otherwise. DPSS gave her referrals, and she did not engage in any of the services. In particular, she refused the agency’s offer of substance abuse treatment, 18 and she refused urine drug testing because she claimed not to trust the clinic. She delayed her first and only urine test by appearing after the clinic closed and then failing to produce sufficient urine the next morning. And she often evaded the saliva tests before visits by failing to produce sufficient saliva. Mother also demonstrated a lack of insight into the problems requiring juvenile court supervision. She never acknowledged that she or Father had a substance abuse problem, despite their test results showing that they were using methamphetamine. She attempted to persuade the children’s school principal to write a letter stating that DPSS had unlawfully detained the children, she claimed that the social worker had lied, and she wanted to file an action against the agency. Mother’s lack of insight and unwillingness to address her substance abuse provided ample support for the conclusion that there would be a substantial danger to the children in her home. The court did not need to wait until the children were actually harmed to remove them.

Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that there were no reasonable means to protect the children short of removal. Mother asserts that the children would have been protected from any risk of harm if the court had placed them with her and ordered family maintenance services. But for the children to be safe in her home, she would need to cooperate with DPSS and meaningfully engage in services. Mother again overlooks the ample evidence demonstrating her unwillingness to engage in services and her attempts to evade monitoring of her drug use. In addition, the jurisdictional findings and removal order with respect to Father are unchallenged. The parents are married and live in the same home. Mother did not explain how she would protect the children from the risk of harm posed by Father. The record supports the reasonable inference that she 19 would not sufficiently protect the children from him, given that she would not acknowledge his drug use and claimed that someone tampered with his positive test.

(See In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 105-106 [parent’s “lengthy history of drug abuse, denial of any drug problem, refusal to voluntarily drug test and enter drug treatment, and her reference to her live-in boyfriend as a heroin addict” constituted substantial evidence of no reasonable means to protect absent removal].)

As for Mother’s remaining argument, she is correct that the court failed to state the facts on which it based the removal order.4 However, she fails to show that the error was prejudicial. She contends that if the court had “reviewed the facts in evidence” regarding the condition of the family home and the children’s health and safety, then it would have placed the children with her. But there is no reason to believe that the court failed to review any evidence. Indeed, the record demonstrates that the court was well aware of the evidence. For instance, the court struck the petition’s allegation that the home was without electricity, because the court knew that the parents had a generator by the time of the jurisdiction hearing. And the arguments of Mother’s counsel brought the court’s 4 Mother also asserts that the court failed to make the findings required by subdivision (c)(1) of section 361, namely, that (1) there would be a substantial danger to the children in Mother’s home, and (2) there were no reasonable means to protect them short of removal. She is incorrect. The minute order for the disposition hearing states: “There is clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances stated in WIC § 361 regarding Mother [L.S.]. [¶] The mother, [L.S.], is a person/are persons described in WIC § 361(c)(1).” Similarly, according to the reporter’s transcript, the court stated: “There’s clear and convincing evidence that the circumstances stated in W&IC 361 regarding the persons specified below, Mother 361(c)(1) ....” The court then ordered the children removed from Mother’s custody. It is clear from the court’s reference to the standard of proof and the applicable statutory provision that it made the required findings, even if the court did not use the language of the statute verbatim.

20 attention to evidence that supported her position when counsel asked for the children to be placed in her care with family maintenance services. The court nevertheless determined that DPSS had carried its burden by clear and convincing evidence. We have already concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the removal order, and we need not repeat that discussion here. But that evidence was not just substantial—it was very strong. There is no reasonable probability that if the court had stated the facts supporting removal, it would have come to a different conclusion.

For all these reasons, substantial evidence supports the removal order, and the court did not prejudicially err by failing to state the facts on which removal was based.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

FIELDS J.