People v. Hernandez CA2/8

Opinion

Filed 9/15/26 P. v. Hernandez CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B339683

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PA098713) v.

LUIS ENRIQUE HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Hilleri G. Merritt, Judge. Affirmed. Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________ A jury found defendant and appellant Luis Enrique Hernandez guilty of one count of first degree murder, five counts of assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant was sentenced to 35 years to life, plus 12 years. Defendant challenges his conviction, contending the trial court committed prejudicial evidentiary and instructional error that violated his constitutional right to present a defense. He argues the court wrongfully excluded evidence related to a prior violent act by the murder victim, and refused his requested instructions on the character of the victim (CALCRIM No. 352), provocation (CALCRIM No. 522), and imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571). Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY In May 2024, defendant was charged by amended information with one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);1 count 1), five counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 2–5, 12), and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 11). Personal firearm use and great bodily injury allegations (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a)), as well as four aggravating factors were also alleged. Five counts of attempted murder (counts 6–10) and the great bodily injury allegations on counts 3 and 7 were dismissed by the prosecution at the start of trial. The charges arose from a shooting incident that occurred on the afternoon of August 3, 2022, near the intersection of 1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Tobias Avenue and Parthenia Street in Panorama City. Sometime around 1:30 p.m., a traffic accident occurred at the intersection. Defendant and the homicide victim in this case, Jonathan Santillano, were both involved in the business of soliciting and providing towing and auto repair services to victims of traffic accidents, sometimes referred to as “runners.” Shortly after the accident occurred, defendant, Santillano, and several other individuals arrived on the scene. Three of those individuals also worked as runners: Gerardo Pacheco, Victor Murillo Campos, and Jorge Eliezer Gongora. Video footage captured defendant running across the four lanes of traffic toward Santillano and firing multiple shots. Santillano, whose back was to defendant, was fatally wounded (count 1). Campos and Gongora (the victims in counts 2 and 12, respectively) were standing next to Santillano when the shots were fired. Mariano Ramirez, one of the drivers involved in the accident, and two other bystanders, Lucio Arista Garzon and Jose Raymundo Rivera (the victims in counts 3, 4 & 5, respectively) were also standing nearby. Campos, Gongora, Ramirez, Rivera and Garzon received nonfatal gunshot wounds. We summarize the testimony and evidence relevant to our discussion. 1. Percipient witness testimony Pacheco worked as a runner so he knew both defendant and Santillano. Pacheco worked with Santillano and would sometimes see defendant at accident sites. When he arrived at the scene of the accident on August 3, 2022, there were already about five or six people there. A man wearing red shorts, potentially another runner that Pacheco did not know, would not 3 let Pacheco talk to the individuals involved in the accident so he called Santillano. At some point thereafter, Pacheco saw defendant arrive in a blue BMW. After defendant parked, he walked over to Pacheco, and they greeted each other. At some point, Pacheco called Santillano back and told him not to bother to come because the runners who had arrived first had already spoken to the accident victims and there was no work to be had. Santillano said he was going to come anyway. Pacheco left before Santillano arrived. Pacheco testified the video footage taken from the security cameras at nearby businesses accurately depicted what he recalled of defendant’s BMW arriving on the scene and his brief interaction with defendant. Pacheco was not aware of any problems between defendant and Santillano. He said there was enough work and referrals for everybody. Pacheco identified Campos and Gongora from photographs as two other runners at the scene that afternoon. Gongora, who was wearing pink shorts and a black shirt that afternoon, arrived on the scene around 1:30 p.m. after receiving a call from a friend involved in the accident. Santillano, who was wearing black, was already there, along with several other individuals. Gongora testified he got into a verbal argument with Santillano. They were facing each other as they argued. Gongora then saw defendant running toward them with his gun drawn. Gongora testified that defendant came across the street from behind Santillano, at an angle behind Santillano’s right shoulder, and shot at Santillano from behind. According to Gongora, defendant and Santillano did not talk or interact before the shooting and were not facing each other. Gongora never saw 4 Santillano with a gun. Gongora said the video footage accurately depicted his memory of how the shooting occurred. Campos testified he saw the accident occur and stopped his car. At some point shortly thereafter, he was standing next to Santillano and another individual wearing pink shorts and a black shirt (Gongora), when he heard someone yell something like “watch out” and then gunshots rang out. Campos ducked behind a car. He saw the shooter with his arm straight out firing a gun. Campos never saw Santillano with a gun. Campos suffered gunshot wounds to both legs. Ramirez testified he lost consciousness from the collision. When he awoke, he noticed several people he did not know had arrived on the scene and were standing around. Ramirez called his friend Rivera to come help him. While Ramirez was talking with the other driver involved in the accident and exchanging insurance information, he heard seven to eight gunshots. A bullet grazed his buttocks. Rivera testified that just before the shooting occurred he was trying to assist Ramirez get information from the other driver involved in the crash. A group of men standing nearby were arguing. Gunshots rang out and he dropped to the ground. Rivera was struck but the bullet hit his cellphone in his pocket so he did not suffer any serious injury. Rivera said the shooter ran from the scene towards a supermarket. Garzon also went to the scene because he knew someone involved in the accident. One of the drivers was a client of the taxi company he worked for, so he went to check on him. Shortly after arriving, Garzon saw Gongora, who also had worked for the taxi company. Gongora was arguing with another man dressed in black (Santillano). At some point, Santillano turned to Garzon 5 and started asking him questions. While Garzon was trying to answer Santillano, he saw someone running across the street at them. The man pulled a gun from his waistband and started shooting at them. Garzon turned and tried to cover his head. Garzon never saw Santillano draw a gun before the shooting started. Garzon was shot three times, in his stomach, leg and buttocks. Garzon identified defendant as the shooter. On cross- examination, Garzon said that after the shooting, he saw Santillano lying on the ground with a handgun in his waistband. Miguel Angel Ramirez Rivas testified that one of the drivers involved in the accident was a friend of his. When he arrived on the scene, he was about to call 911 when he heard gunshots. He turned and saw someone running across the street with his arm out shooting a gun. Rivas identified defendant as the person he saw with the gun. Rivas was cross-examined about his then-pending application for a U visa based on being a witness in this case. He denied that it influenced his description of the incident. 2. Other evidence Detective Fernando Avila, a 24-year veteran of the Los Angeles Police Department, investigated the shooting. Among other evidence, Detective Avila recovered video footage from security cameras at businesses located near the scene of the shooting. The video footage, shown to the jury, captured defendant arriving on the scene in his car, parking and getting out, returning to his car and reparking it, getting out of the car again, running across the street, getting into “a shooting stance,” firing his weapon at Santillano while Santillano’s back was turned, running back to his car, and fleeing the scene. Additional footage played for the jury captured the traffic accident that 6 preceded the shooting. Detective Avila also testified he attended the autopsy of Santillano, and he authenticated photographs taken during the autopsy of the multiple gunshot wounds to Santillano’s lower back and buttocks. Detective Avila also testified Santillano suffered a gunshot wound to his upper right arm. The photographs of the injuries were shown to the jury. 3. Defendant’s testimony Defendant testified he owned a towing company, and his brother Albert (sometimes referred to in the record as Rene or Beto) had worked with him until his death in June 2022, just two months before the shooting incident. Defendant said that when he arrived on the scene of the traffic accident on August 3, 2022, he had no intent to kill Santillano and had no idea he would even be there. Defendant admitted he was carrying a gun but said he carried it for protection. Defendant “was very afraid and scared” for his life and started carrying the gun after Albert was killed. Defendant said he knew Santillano and his brother Michael also worked as runners. He would sometimes see them at accident scenes as it was common for multiple runners to show up at the same accident. At some point, problems developed between them, mainly due to conflicts over customers. A few months before the shooting, defendant showed up at an accident, and both Santillano and Michael were there. Michael walked over and took a swing at defendant and they started to scuffle. While defendant and Michael were fighting, Santillano hit defendant from behind. Another time, about one month before Albert was killed, defendant went to pick up his brother’s car near a 7-Eleven store because Albert had been in an accident. Defendant saw 7 Santillano and Michael leaving the store just as he arrived. When defendant saw Albert, he had scratches and bruises on his face that he did not have earlier in the day. Defendant described another incident that occurred before the shooting. Defendant’s cousin was with him. They were in defendant’s tow truck heading to an accident on Devonshire in the “valley.” As he pulled up to park, defendant saw Santillano and Michael “working” the accident scene. As soon as he saw them, defendant did not bother to stop, but turned his truck around and got back on the freeway. Once on the freeway, he saw a car following him that he knew belonged to Santillano. The car pulled up alongside defendant’s truck and shots were fired from the passenger window. Defendant was not hit, and he did not see who fired the shots. Defendant said he feared for his life. He was scared of Santillano because he had “jumped” him and beaten him up, and he had also jumped his brother at the 7-Eleven. After Albert’s death, he was told by other runners, including “Johnny” and “Lucille,” that Santillano said defendant “would be next.” Johnny and Lucille told defendant he needed to be careful. Defendant was anxious, had nightmares, and started carrying a gun. On August 3, 2022, defendant said he received a radio call about the accident and drove there looking for work. When he arrived, he saw Pacheco and briefly stopped to greet him. Defendant said he walked inside the supermarket to get some food, but then decided to “work the accident” first. Defendant crossed the street toward the accident site. He denied having his gun drawn. Defendant said he did not draw his gun until he saw Santillano “reaching for his gun.” Defendant pulled his gun only to defend himself. Defendant believed Santillano was going to 8 shoot him, so he fired first and then fled. He said everything happened very quickly but he knew how to handle a gun because he previously worked as a security officer. On cross-examination, defendant said that at the time he fired at Santillano, they were face to face and he shot Santillano in the chest. Defendant’s cousin testified and confirmed that he was in the truck with defendant when shots were fired at them on the freeway. He did not see who fired the shots. 4. Verdict and sentence The jury found defendant guilty on all counts (counts 1–5, 11 & 12), and found true the personal firearm use and great bodily injury allegations. The court sentenced defendant to 35 years to life, plus 12 years calculated as follows: 25 years to life on count 1, plus a consecutive 10-year term for the firearm-use enhancement, plus a consecutive upper term of nine years on count 2, and a consecutive three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court imposed concurrent middle terms on the remaining counts and awarded defendant 794 total days of presentence custody credits. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION 1. The evidentiary rulings Defendant contends the court abused its discretion by excluding testimony regarding Santillano’s violent character based on his conduct during the incident at 7-Eleven involving defendant’s brother. We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.

9 (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 491.) To the extent there was any error, it was harmless. 1.1 Defendant’s proffered testimony Defendant contends the court erred in excluding his testimony about a statement Albert made to him at the 7-Eleven store. Defendant said he could testify that Albert told him that Santillano and Michael had violently attacked him inside the 7-Eleven store. Defendant argued that Albert was murdered about a month after the 7-Eleven incident. While he did not have evidence that Santillano was responsible for Albert’s murder, he reasonably believed Santillano was responsible based on the threats Santillano made that defendant was “next.” Regarding admissibility, defendant argued Albert’s statement was relevant for the nonhearsay purpose of establishing his state of mind and the reasonableness of his fear of Santillano. He contended it was evidence crucial to his defense. After lengthy argument, the court deferred a ruling on the admissibility of Albert’s statement until defendant testified, explaining the court would consider the issue “question by question.” When defendant was asked questions on direct about the 7-Eleven incident, he was asked if he saw Santillano and Michael there that afternoon. Defendant confirmed he did see them. Defense counsel then asked, “What did they do?” Defendant began to answer, “[w]ell, my brother was at 7-Eleven trying to get information. Plus it was arguing.” The prosecutor objected, asserting lack of foundation, and the court sustained the objection, explaining that unless defendant “was percipient to what was happening inside the 7-Eleven” he could not attest to it. Defense counsel elicited some additional information from defendant concerning the injuries to Albert’s face but did not 10 otherwise return to asking defendant a question about whether Albert told him anything about how he received his injuries. Later, while defendant was explaining why he feared Santillano, he said Santillano and Michael had “jumped” him before, and his “brother too.” Defense counsel asked, “what do you mean your brother too?” Defendant answered “[w]ell, the incident at 7-Eleven.” There were no objections, nor any further questions about whether Albert told him anything. Defendant is correct that evidence of his state of mind and specifically his fear of the victim, Santillano, was relevant to his self-defense claim. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [a defendant asserting self-defense must show an actual and reasonable belief in the need to defend]; see also CALCRIM No. 3470; Evid. Code, § 1250.) But defendant has not demonstrated the trial court made a specific ruling that denied him the ability to testify about Albert’s statement. While the trial court initially concluded Albert’s statement constituted hearsay and was inadmissible, the court deferred a ruling on its admissibility, explaining it would make appropriate rulings to specific questions asked of defendant during his testimony. Then, during direct examination, when the court sustained the prosecutor’s objection based on lack of foundation, defense counsel did not rephrase the question or attempt to elicit testimony about Albert’s statement. When defendant later referenced the 7-Eleven incident, saying that Santillano had attacked Albert, defense counsel did not ask defendant whether Albert told him anything about what happened. Defendant has not shown the court abused its discretion in making rulings with respect to this evidence.

11 1.2 Pacheco’s proffered testimony Defendant also contends the court erred in precluding testimony from Pacheco about the 7-Eleven incident. When Pacheco was interviewed by the detectives, he told them that Santillano showed him a video on his cellphone, purportedly of the fight inside the 7-Eleven store, and that Santillano bragged about it. Defendant argued he should be able to present this evidence because it demonstrated Santillano’s propensity for violence and was admissible under Evidence Code section 1103. Defendant asserted that Santillano’s admission of a criminal assault on Albert at the 7-Eleven store was a declaration against penal interest and therefore not inadmissible hearsay. The trial court disagreed, explaining the circumstances under which the statement was made did not support a finding the statement was trustworthy, nor was it sufficiently against Santillano’s penal interest. Even if we assume it was error for the trial court to exclude this evidence, it was harmless. Absent fundamental unfairness, a violation of state evidentiary rules is reviewed under the traditional test for state law error: “The reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 (Partida); accord, People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 700.) Here, the testimony of the percipient witnesses overwhelmingly established that defendant arrived on the scene before Santillano, walked around appearing to look for someone, returned to his car as if to leave, and then parked his car again after Santillano arrived. Defendant, according to the witnesses, then got out of his car and ran across the street directly toward 12 Santillano with his gun already drawn, took a “shooter’s stance” and fired multiple shots. The witnesses said Santillano had his back to defendant as defendant approached. No witness testified that Santillano was facing defendant as he approached or even knew he was approaching. No witness saw Santillano have any interaction with defendant before the shots were fired, nor did any witness see Santillano pull a gun or brandish a weapon at any time. Only one witness, Garzon, testified that after the shooting was over, he saw that Santillano, lying on the ground fatally wounded, had a gun tucked in his waistband. This version of the shooting was corroborated by the video footage that captured the incident, as well as the physical evidence of the wounds Santillano received to the lower backside of his body. Moreover, defendant was allowed to present a fair amount of testimony regarding the 7-Eleven incident. The jury was aware of the incident and Santillano’s connection to it. The jury heard that Santillano and his brother were seen by defendant leaving the store just as defendant arrived, and that Albert had fresh, visible injuries on his face that he did not have earlier in the day. Defendant testified he feared Santillano because he had “jumped” Albert at the 7-Eleven store and had also previously assaulted defendant at another traffic accident. In addition, defendant testified that two other runners told him that Santillano had made threats against him. Given this evidence, it is not reasonably probable that a reasonable jury would have returned a more favorable verdict had it also heard that Santillano had bragged to Pacheco about getting into a fist fight with Albert at the 7-Eleven store. (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.)

13 Finding no state law error, we also conclude the exclusion of this evidence did not impair defendant’s federal constitutional right to present a defense. Generally, “the application of the ordinary rules of evidence under state law does not violate a criminal defendant’s federal constitutional right to present a defense.” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503.) Only in those “extraordinary and unusual circumstances” where the evidentiary ruling results in a trial that is fundamentally unfair will federal constitutional error be found. (Ibid.) The exclusion of this relatively minor additional evidence did not result in a trial that was fundamentally unfair under federal due process standards. 2. The jury instructions Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 352 and 522. Defendant also contends it was error for the court to fail to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense as a lesser included offense to murder. We address each claim in turn. 2.1 CALCRIM No. 352 Defendant contends the court’s instructions to the jury were incomplete because the court refused to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 352 regarding Santillano’s violent character. Defendant contends it was crucial for the jury to be told it could consider the evidence of Santillano’s prior acts as proof that he acted in conformity with his violent character at the time of the shooting. While defendant acknowledges the court instructed the jury on his self-defense claim by giving CALCRIM No. 505, he says the omission of CALCRIM No. 352 was prejudicial to the jury’s full and fair consideration of his self-defense claim.

14 We conclude that even assuming it was error for the trial court to refuse defendant’s requested instruction, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As defendant concedes, the trial court correctly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 505 regarding justifiable homicide based on self-defense. CALCRIM No. 505 told the jury that in deciding whether defendant’s belief in the need to defend himself was reasonable, it should “consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant. … If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.” CALCRIM No. 505 also told the jury it should consider prior acts and threats by Santillano: “If you find that Jonathan Santillano threatened or harmed the defendant in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable. [¶] Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past is justified in acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures against that person. [¶] A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the danger of death or great bodily injury has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.” These instructions adequately and correctly told the jury to consider Santillano’s past behavior in assessing defendant’s claim of self-defense. Had the trial court instructed with CALCRIM No. 352, the jury would have had to decide whether the evidence presented by defendant showed that Santillano had a propensity for violence. (CALCRIM No. 352 [whether the victim “had a character” for violence “and whether that person acted in 15 conformity with that character trait are matters for you to decide”].) Assuming they did so, the instruction told the jurors they could consider Santillano’s prior acts as proof he acted in conformity therewith at the time of the shooting. Given the record, we are not persuaded this additional instruction was crucial to the jury’s fair consideration of defendant’s self-defense claim. In light of the testimony, video evidence, and physical evidence discussed in part 1.2 above and given the balance of the correct instructions provided to the jury, we conclude the refusal to give CALCRIM No. 352 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2.2 CALCRIM No. 522 Defendant next argues the court should have allowed his requested pinpoint instruction on provocation negating premeditation. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on first and second degree murder, but declined to instruct with CALCRIM No. 522, finding it was not consistent with defendant’s claim of self-defense and would “cloud” the issues. Defendant contends this was error because the jury was not told that provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree. CALCRIM No. 522, which tells the jury that evidence of provocation may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the murder was premeditated, is considered a pinpoint instruction. A defendant is entitled to such an instruction only upon request and where there is evidence to support it. (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 384.) The only evidence to support defendant’s claim of provocation by the victim was his own testimony that he saw Santillano reach for a gun before he fired his own gun in self-defense.

16 Even if we assume this was sufficient to warrant the giving of CALCRIM No. 522, and the court therefore erred in refusing to give it, we conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the testimony, video, and physical evidence discussed in parts 1.2 and 2.1 above. 2.3 Imperfect self-defense Finally, defendant contends the court erred in refusing his request for an instruction on imperfect self-defense. Our independent review of the record reveals no error. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 133 (Simon).) An instruction on a lesser included offense such as voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense is “required when, but only when, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater one.” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 98; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 161.) In assessing whether substantial evidence exists to warrant an instruction in this context, “a court determines only its bare legal sufficiency, not its weight.” (Breverman, at p. 177.) “Speculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included offense.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 132.) But doubts about whether an instruction is warranted should be resolved in favor of the accused. (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 944.) Unlike perfect self-defense which, if proven, results in acquittal, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense operates only to negate malice and mitigate punishment. (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243; People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460–461.) If a defendant unreasonably but in good faith believes he must use lethal force to defend himself, that belief negates 17 what would otherwise be malice and the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. In refusing defendant’s instruction on imperfect self- defense, the trial court explained that if defendant’s version of events was to be believed, then Santillano reached for a gun, and if he did so then defendant was justified in defending himself. The court said it “is either self-defense or it is not.” We conclude there is no substantial evidence in the record supporting an unreasonable but good faith belief to use lethal force. People v. Rodriguez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th1250 involved a similar factual scenario. (Id. at pp 1275–1276.) In rejecting the defendant’s claim the trial court should have instructed with imperfect self-defense, Rodriguez noted if the victim “attacked defendant with a knife … defendant acted justifiably in response. If he did not, no substantial evidence supported the notion defendant had an actual, but mistaken belief, in the need to kill [the victim] in self-defense.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Valenzuela (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1231 [“ ‘just because a trial court instructs a jury on perfect self-defense, this does not necessarily mean it has a sua sponte duty to also instruct on imperfect self- defense’ ”].) Here, as attested to by the percipient witnesses and confirmed by the video footage, defendant ran across four lanes of traffic towards Santillano with his gun and shot him multiple times from behind, which would support his guilt of murder. Defendant attested Santillano was facing him, that he saw Santillano reach for a gun, and justifiably shot Santillano in self- defense. But the video evidence conclusively demonstrates defendant was the initial aggressor, consistent with the testimony of the percipient witnesses, and no evidence addresses 18 what might have caused defendant to have formed a mistaken belief about his safety. There is no evidence of Santillo’s conduct that supported an imperfect self-defense instruction. (See People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1226, 1232 [an initial aggressor cannot rely on unreasonable self-defense].) 3. Cumulative error Defendant also raises a claim of cumulative error. Defendant has failed to show prejudicial cumulative error. Even if the jury had heard from Pacheco that Santillano bragged about beating up Albert at the 7-Eleven store, and the court had instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 352 and 522, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have already explained repeatedly above, the evidence was overwhelming that defendant was the aggressor, who ran to the scene, sought out Santillano and shot him multiple times from behind. The physical evidence and video footage of the shooting corroborated the witness testimony in this regard. There was no corroboration of defendant’s testimony that Santillano precipitated these events by reaching for or brandishing a weapon. DISPOSITION The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J. SCHERB, J.