People v. Jones CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/15/26 P. v. Jones CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B342997 (Super. Ct. No. TA160483) Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

TEDERO JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

Tedero Jones appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant (count 3) and abuse of a dependent adult (count 4). (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 368, subd. (b)(1).)1 The jury acquitted him of mayhem (count 1, § 203) and an additional charge of inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant (count 2). The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed appellant on 1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code. formal probation for five years. As a condition of probation, he was required to serve one year in county jail. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. He contends, “The trial court erred by allowing Officer Valdez to testify about intimate partner battering and its effects when she was not a qualified expert as required under Evidence Code section 1107.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.) The testimony in question mainly concerned the tendency of domestic violence victims to delay reporting the violence. The People concede that the trial court erred “in admitting Officer Valdez’s testimony on the behavior of domestic violence victims.” We accept the People’s concession. We agree with the People that “the error here was harmless.” Accordingly, we affirm. Facts Brenda R. (Brenda) was living in a nursing home because she could not stand up or walk and had to use a wheelchair. Brenda and appellant developed a romantic relationship. In 2021 or 2022, Brenda rented a room in appellant’s home, and the state paid appellant to be her care provider under the In-Home Supportive Services program. Brenda and appellant had verbal arguments. About one year after Brenda moved into appellant’s home, the arguments “became physical.” One time appellant “flipped” Brenda out of her wheelchair. He physically attacked her about twice a week. Brenda did not report the abuse. On July 5, 2023, Brenda phoned her son “because [she] needed help.” She told him that she “was burned . . . really bad.”

2 Brenda’s son called the police. Officer Ana Valdez and paramedics came to appellant’s home. The paramedics used a gurney to move Brenda into an ambulance. Count 3 (inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant) was based on bruising to Brenda’s left arm and face that paramedics and Officer Valdez observed on July 5, 2023. Brenda told the police that, during the previous week, appellant had “socked [her] in [her] arm like three times” while she was sitting on the toilet. He had also punched her in the face. In addition, “[a] couple weeks ago” appellant kicked her in the face while she was on the toilet. Count 4 (abuse of a dependent adult) was primarily based on appellant’s failure to seek medical care for severe burns that Brenda had suffered approximately six days before July 5, 2023. Brenda told the police that she was cooking eggs in grease on a skillet. Appellant “slid the . . . skillet and it fell off the stove” onto Brenda, burning her stomach and thigh. Brenda said appellant did “it on purpose.” Counts 1 (mayhem) and 2 (inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant) were based on appellant’s allegedly intentional act of causing Brenda’s burns. The jury acquitted him on both counts. When Brenda’s son arrived at appellant’s home on July 5, 2023, he saw that the “whole side of [Brenda’s] body was burned terribly.” A paramedic who treated Brenda reported that she had “ ‘third-degree burns to . . . [a]pproximately 20 percent [of her] total body surface area.’ ” Her “ ‘[i]nitial pain [upon the paramedic’s arrival was] 10 out of 10.’ ” The paramedic’s report noted that Brenda was 56 years old. The paramedic testified, “Third degree is when there's a full thickness burn, meaning it’s burned all the way through the 3 skin, sometimes even deeper.” A third degree burn is “the most serious” type of burn. The paramedic opined that it appeared the burn was “starting to become infected in some parts.” Appellant did not testify. Testimony of Officer Valdez When she testified, Officer Valdez had been a Los Angeles police officer for three years. She had been assigned to patrol duty the entire time. Before she became a police officer, she received six months of training at the Los Angeles Police Academy. She had “specific training in domestic violence investigations.” During her time on patrol duty, she had “taken reports in domestic violence cases.” Appellant objected to Valdez’s proposed testimony about the behavior of domestic violence victims because she was not an expert in domestic violence. The trial court replied: “I haven't said she is an expert in domestic violence. I have said that she can testify to her experience responding to domestic violence calls. You can cross[-examine] her on that.” The court later confirmed that Officer Valdez “is not being offered as a domestic violence expert, just . . . to testify as a patrol officer and her experience taking reports, if any, from domestic violence victims.” Valdez testified that she had investigated “[a]pproximately a hundred” domestic violence cases. The trial court interrupted her testimony to inform the jury, “[S]he’s speaking generally based on her experience of contacting a hundred domestic violence victims as a patrol officer. So her general experience[] is not specific to this particular case.” Valdez continued: domestic violence victims “usually don’t immediately report” the violence to law enforcement because they fear retaliation from their abuser. They often are living with the 4 abuser or are financially dependent upon him. It is “common” “for these women to return to their abusers.” “[S]ometimes the victims will tell us that there had been prior abuse and [they had] not reported it.” When the police interview a domestic violence victim, they always separate the victim from her abuser. “[T]he victim is usually in fear of the abuser listening if they are gonna be truthful and come forward with the abuse that has been happening. That's when they fear the retaliation, even if we are present.” Domestic violence victims “feel comfortable” to discuss the violence when they are provided with “resources, whether it’s shelters, hotlines, any type of financial [aid] that the state can give them so they don’t feel alone in the process.” The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Officer Valdez’s Testimony over Appellant’s Objection “Battered woman's syndrome [(BWS, now referred to as ‘intimate partner battering’)] ‘has been defined as “a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives.” . . .’ ”2 (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1083-1084.) “[E]xpert BWS testimony is relevant to explain that it is common for people who have been physically and mentally abused to act in ways that may be difficult for a layperson to understand. [Citation.] The 2 “Although often referred to as ‘battered women’s syndrome,’ ‘intimate partner battering and its effects’ is the more accurate and now preferred term. (See, e.g., Stats.2004, ch. 609, §§ 1, 2 [changing references in Evid.Code, § 1107 and Pen.Code, § 1473.5 from ‘battered women’s syndrome’ to ‘intimate partner battering and its effects’] . . . .” (In re Walker (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 533, 537, fn. 1, brackets in original.)

5 use of BWS evidence in this manner is statutorily authorized by Evidence Code section 1107 [(section 1107)].” (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 293.) The purpose of section 1107 is to prevent “the jury from ultimately finding in its deliberations that the witness was not credible, based on misconceptions that could have been dispelled by BWS evidence.” (Ibid.) Section 1107, subdivision (a), provides, “In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the defense regarding intimate partner battering and its effects, including the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence . . . .” (Italics added.) Section 1107, subdivision (b) provides, “The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert witness.” Section 1107 authorizes the admission of expert testimony on intimate partner battering and its effects. It does not authorize the admission of lay testimony. The trial court expressly found that Officer Valdez was not testifying as an expert in domestic violence. The court did not instruct the jury on expert witness testimony pursuant to CALCRIM No. 332. Instead, it instructed the jury on lay opinion testimony pursuant to CALCRIM No. 333. As given to the jury, CALCRIM No. 333 provided in part: “Witnesses, who were not testifying as experts, gave their opinions during the trial. You may but are not required to accept those opinions as true or correct. You may give the opinions whatever weight you think appropriate.” (Italics added.)

6 Accordingly, we agree with the parties that the trial court erred in permitting Officer Valdez to testify as a layperson concerning intimate partner battering and its effects. The Admission of Valdez’s Testimony Was Not Prejudicial “Ordinarily, the erroneous admission of evidence is reviewed for prejudice under the standard described in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . . . , which requires reversal only if the defense shows it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Roberts (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 565, 576.) Appellant has not carried his burden under Watson. Count 4 (abuse of a dependent adult) was primarily based on appellant’s failure to seek medical care for Brenda’s severe burns. It was undisputed that she had suffered the burns approximately six days earlier and that appellant had not sought medical treatment for them, even though he was her care provider. Officer Valdez’s testimony concerning the behavior of domestic violence victims had nothing to do with count 4. Brenda delayed reporting appellant’s violent acts that had caused the bruises observed by paramedics and Valdez on July 5, 2023. Thus, Valdez’s testimony was relevant as to count 3, which charged appellant with inflicting the bruises. But it is not reasonably probable that, but for Valdez’s testimony, the jury would have reached a more favorable result on count 3. Her testimony was a minor part of the People’s case. It was not emphasized during the prosecutor’s closing argument. It is undisputed that Valdez sustained the bruises in question. That appellant inflicted them is shown by his obviously false explanation as to how they had occurred. Brenda’s son 7 testified that when he saw the bruises, he asked appellant what had happened. Appellant replied, “[S]he fell out the bed.” Brenda’s son did not believe appellant “because the mattress was on the floor and it was on a carpet floor. So it . . . wouldn’t have left a bruise that size.” The “bruise on her eye on the side of her face . . . was a dark bruise, like . . . she been hit.” Furthermore, the jury’s acquittal of appellant on counts 1 and 2 indicates that Officer Valdez’s testimony did not have a prejudicial effect on the jury. Finally, Officer Valdez’s testimony was cumulative of Brenda’s explanation why she had delayed reporting appellant’s abuse. Brenda testified that she had delayed reporting the burns because she was afraid of appellant “getting arrested for neglect or not taking care of me or burning me . . . ‘[c]ause I didn’t have any place to go. I was in love with him and I stayed with him.” Disposition The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

8 Laura R. Walton, Judge Superior Court County of Los Angeles ______________________________ Sanger, Hanley, Sanger & Avila and Sarah S. Sanger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez, Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.