Raju v. Superior Court CA1/4

Opinion

Filed 9/15/26 Raju v. Superior Court CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MANOHAR RAJU et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, A164736 v. (Contra Costa County THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE Super. Ct. No. MSRA210005) CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Appellants.

In our prior opinion in this matter, filed in June 2023, we reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing this taxpayer action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. (Raju v. Superior Court (June 8, 2023, A164736) (Raju I), review granted Sept. 13, 2023, S281001, transferred and opn. ordered depublished, Feb. 11, 2026.) In the underlying complaint, plaintiffs Manohar Raju, Donna Doyle, John Dunbar, and Rose Marie Sims sought declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (defendant court) and two individuals (defendant court’s presiding judge and chief executive officer), based on a large backlog of criminal cases pending in defendant court. (Raju I, supra, A164736.) In reversing the trial court’s dismissal, we concluded plaintiffs had 1 sufficiently alleged a taxpayer standing claim under the common law and under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.1 (Raju I, supra, A164736.) The California Supreme Court granted review and, in February 2026, transferred the case to this court with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Taking Offense v. State of California (2025) 18 Cal.5th 891 (Taking Offense), a case that addressed the scope of taxpayer standing under section 526a. (Raju v. Superior Court, S281001, Supreme Ct. Mins., Sept. 13, 2023; id., Feb. 11, 2026.) In their supplemental briefing in this court following the Supreme Court’s transfer, plaintiffs state that, as a result of this court’s decision in Mendoza v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 865 (Mendoza), the backlog of cases in defendant court has been dismissed, so declaratory and injunctive relief are no longer needed, and this case is moot. Plaintiffs nonetheless urge this court to decide the present appeal and address whether they have taxpayer standing. Plaintiffs argue this court should issue such a decision because in their view the Supreme Court’s transfer order requires it, and because the issues presented are of broad public interest and likely to recur. We agree the appeal is moot. As we explain below, we disagree with plaintiffs’ position that we should nevertheless address whether they have standing in this matter. We will vacate our prior decision and dismiss this appeal as moot.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 I. BACKGROUND In Raju I, we noted plaintiffs’ taxpayer cause of action was based on both section 526a and “the common law doctrine of taxpayer standing identified in Silver v. Los Angeles (1961) 57 Cal.2d 39 . . . .” (Raju I, supra, A164736.) In the taxpayer cause of action, plaintiffs alleged defendants violated Penal Code sections 1050 and 1049.5 (statutes that require the expediting of criminal proceedings), as well as constitutional provisions conferring a right to a speedy trial. (Raju I, supra, A164736.) We concluded plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged taxpayer standing under both the common law and section 526a, and we therefore reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. (Raju I, supra, A164736.) As to one aspect of the parties’ arguments about statutory standing, we noted section 526a had been construed to allow taxpayer suits against both state and local officials. (Raju I, supra, A164736.) We therefore found immaterial the contention by defendants “that a superior court is ‘part of the state judicial branch,’ not a subagency of a county . . . .” (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court granted defendants’ petition for review in September 2023. (Raju v. Superior Court, S281001, Supreme Ct. Mins., Sept. 13, 2023.) The petition for review had argued the Supreme Court should address (1) whether a taxpayer has standing to bring a civil action against a superior court based on its alleged failure to expedite and prioritize criminal cases, and (2) whether such an action (if permissible at all) may be based on Penal Code section 1049.5 or 1050. In November 2025, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Taking Offense, a case involving a taxpayer claim brought against the State of California. (Taking Offense, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 904–905, 908–909.)

3 As we discuss further below, in Taking Offense, the court held, as to statutory taxpayer standing, that section 526a, as amended in 2018, authorizes suits against local government agencies and officials, but not state agencies and officials. (Taking Offense, at pp. 911, 918–919.) The Taking Offense court did not address whether the plaintiff there had taxpayer standing under the common law. (Id. at pp. 911, 920.) In February 2026, in this matter, after receiving briefing on the merits and then supplemental briefing on whether the 2025 decision in Taking Offense had an impact on the case, the Supreme Court transferred the matter to this court. (Raju v. Superior Court, S281001, Supreme Ct. Mins., Feb. 11, 2026.) The Supreme Court’s transfer order states in part: “The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of Taking Offense v. State of California (2025) 18 Cal.5th 891. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).)” (Ibid.) After the matter was transferred, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs in this court addressing “all relevant standing issues in this case, whether common law or statutory,” and the parties submitted supplemental briefs. II. DISCUSSION A. The Appeal Is Moot “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements 4 must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) Plaintiffs acknowledge (and defendants agree) that the present appeal is moot. As noted, plaintiffs’ complaint, filed in September 2021, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief based on defendant court’s alleged failure to expedite and prioritize criminal cases, resulting in a substantial backlog of cases. (See Raju I, supra, A164736.) In their supplemental briefing filed in this court in June 2026 following the Supreme Court’s transfer, plaintiffs state this problem no longer exists. Specifically, plaintiffs state that, after this court published its July 2024 decision in Mendoza, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 865 (where we directed the superior court to grant a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial statute, Pen. Code, § 1382) (Mendoza, at p. 867), defendant court “was forced to dismiss a large backlog of cases which it had failed to send out for trial, and to stop using its generic ‘good cause’ script to delay other cases past their last day.” Plaintiffs state that, as a result of these developments, “declaratory and injunctive relief is no longer needed, and this case is moot.” We agree the case is moot. Plaintiffs do not complain of an ongoing harm, and this court cannot grant effective relief. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) B. The Appeal Should Be Dismissed A moot appeal generally will be dismissed. (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 77–78; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 5:22.) But “[e]ven when a case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute. [Citation.] As a rule, courts 5 will generally exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s determination.’ ” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Here, plaintiffs make a brief argument that, although the present case is moot, this court should determine the issues raised on appeal (specifically, whether plaintiffs have taxpayer standing) for two reasons— because the Supreme Court’s transfer order requires such a decision, and because the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur. We are not persuaded. 1. The Supreme Court’s Transfer Order First, plaintiffs assert briefly that the Supreme Court’s transfer order requires this court to decide whether plaintiffs have standing. As noted, the order states the matter is transferred to this court “with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of” Taking Offense. (Raju v. Superior Court, S281001, Supreme Ct. Mins., Feb. 11, 2026.) Plaintiffs state: “Dismissing [this appeal] without considering the standing issue would not comply with that order.” We disagree. Upon a transfer from the Supreme Court, we of course must comply with the instructions in the court’s transfer order. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701 [“The order of the reviewing court is contained in its remittitur, which defines the scope of the jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned.”].) But we do not read the transfer order here as requiring this court to disregard the usual standards of justiciability (such as the rule that a moot appeal generally will be dismissed unless one of the discretionary exceptions applies) and 6 to determine whether plaintiffs have standing to pursue relief they no longer seek. The Supreme Court’s directive in the transfer order requires that this court’s prior decision be vacated, and it is clear that any new decision by this court on the question of plaintiffs’ standing must be informed by the Supreme Court’s guidance in Taking Offense. (Raju v. Superior Court, S281001, Supreme Ct. Mins., Feb. 11, 2026.) But in our view, the transfer order does not preclude this court from concluding that, because the appeal has become moot and none of the usual exceptions applies, no new decision on the standing issue is appropriate. Finally, we note that, in the parties’ supplemental briefs in the Supreme Court in January 2026 addressing the impact of Taking Offense on this case, the parties did not refer to this court’s 2024 decision in Mendoza or state that it had resolved the underlying case backlog, rendering this case moot. (Plaintiffs later noted this development in their posttransfer supplemental briefing in this court in June 2026.) For this reason as well, we do not read the Supreme Court’s transfer order as a directive that, regardless of mootness (an issue not raised in that court), this court is to determine whether plaintiffs have taxpayer standing. 2. The Public Interest Exception to Dismissal for Mootness Plaintiffs next argue this court should decide the taxpayer standing question because this case “involves an ‘issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur.’ ” (Citing In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644; see In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282 [discretionary exceptions allowing a reviewing court to reach the merits of a moot case].) Plaintiffs state that this case, as originally briefed, raised the question “whether taxpayers can sue to enforce a superior court’s statutory duty to prioritize its criminal docket . . . .” Plaintiffs further state that, following the 7 Supreme Court’s transfer of the matter to this court, the case “raises an even more fundamental issue: whether a taxpayer can ever sue any state official for violating any statutory duty.” We are not persuaded the public interest exception provides a basis to address these issues here. First, as to the specific question whether a taxpayer has standing to sue a superior court based on an alleged failure to expedite criminal cases, plaintiffs make no argument that, after Mendoza, the type of severe backlog that led to their filing of the present action (a backlog that was initially precipitated in part by the COVID-19 pandemic) (see Raju I, supra, A164736) is likely to recur. As to the broader question of taxpayer standing to sue a state official (which, as plaintiffs note, is a question that likely will recur), the Supreme Court determined in Taking Offense that section 526a, as amended in 2018, does not authorize such standing. (Taking Offense, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 911, 919.) The Taking Offense court concluded, however, that in light of the unusual posture and circumstances of that case, this interpretation of section 526a did not prevent the court from addressing the merits of the facial constitutional challenge presented there to a state statutory provision. (Taking Offense, at pp. 911, 919– 920.) And, because it was reaching the merits, the court found it unnecessary to address “whether the common law taxpayer standing doctrine continues to exist, and whether, if it does, such standing is satisfied in this case.” (Id. at p. 920; see id. at p. 911.) Instead, the Supreme Court in Taking Offense left this question “for consideration in any potential future litigation” (Taking Offense, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 920), and encouraged the Legislature, “[i]n the meantime,” to address the question whether a taxpayer has standing to 8 sue the state or its officers. (Ibid.; see id. at p. 911.) The court stated: “[W]e encourage the Legislature (possibly working with the Law Revision Commission) to comprehensively review both section 526a and existing common law authority, in order to harmonize and clarify the circumstances under which the state and its officers or entities may be subject to a taxpayer standing suit.” (Id. at p. 911; id. at p. 920 [stating the Legislature “is encouraged to survey the field . . . , and consider whether it is appropriate to limit or eliminate the common law doctrine, or perhaps merge a version of it into a further revised version of section 526a, as it deems warranted”].) In our view, the Supreme Court’s approach to the question of common law taxpayer standing—declining to address the matter in a case where it was not essential to do so, instead leaving the issue for future litigation and possible legislation—is instructive and weighs against our exercising discretion to determine whether plaintiffs have common law taxpayer standing here. The present appeal is moot, and nothing we might say about common law taxpayer standing would affect the resolution of the claims brought by plaintiffs in this case. In this circumstance, and in light of the Supreme Court’s encouragement to the Legislature to address this matter comprehensively, we are not persuaded that we should exercise discretion to address the question of common law taxpayer standing in this appeal. Finally, for the same reasons, we find no basis to address plaintiffs’ secondary argument that, in addition to common law standing, they have standing under section 526a (even post-Taking Offense), because in their view, “the superior court, although a state entity for many purposes, fits the statutory definition of a ‘local agency’ under section 526a.”

9 III. DISPOSITION This court’s decision dated June 8, 2023 is vacated. This appeal is dismissed as moot. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. STREETER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J. SWEET, J.* * Judge of the Marin Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.