Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AJAYA RANA, Case No.: 26-cv-4873-RSH-AHG 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

14 WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION

CENTER, et al., 15 Respondent. 16 17 On August 26, 2026, petitioner Ajaya Rana, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for 18 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. For the 19 reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Petition. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 This is Petitioner’s fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 22 detention. See Rana v. LaRose, Case No. 3:26-cv-00285-RSH-DDL (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 23 2026) (“First Petition”); Rana v. LaRose, Case No. 3:26-cv-02563-RSH-DDL (S.D. Cal. 24 Apr. 22, 2026) (“Second Petition”); Rana v. LaRose, Case No. 3:26-cv-03829-RSH-DDL 25 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2026) (“Third Petition”). This Court granted Petitioner’s First Petition 26 and ordered the Government to hold a bond hearing. See 3:26-cv-00285, at Dkt. No. 5. 27 After the Government held a bond hearing and an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied bond, 28 1 Petitioner filed a motion to enforce judgement in this Court. Id. at Dkt. No. 7. This Court 2 denied that motion on the ground that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative 3 remedies by failing to appeal the IJ’s adverse bond determination to the Board of 4 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 5 This Court dismissed Petitioner’s Second Petition summarily because it raised nearly 6 identical arguments to his First Petition. See 3:26-cv-02563, at Dkt. No. 3. This Court also 7 denied Petitioner’s motion to reconsider that dismissal. Id. at Dkt. No. 9. This Court 8 dismissed Petitioner’s Third Petition as well, see 3:26-cv-03829, at Dkt. No. 7, which 9 raised substantially similar arguments to the First Petition and Second Petition, because 10 Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and nonetheless failed to meet his 11 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 12 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 15 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 16 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the 17 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 18 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 19 III. ANALYSIS 20 The instant Petition raises substantially similar arguments to the First, Second, and 21 Third Petitions. As before, the Court declines to reach the merits of Petitioner’s 22 unexhausted legal challenges to the IJ’s adverse bond determination. 23 The Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 24 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro 25 Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by 26 Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A court may require prudential 27 exhaustion when: 28 1 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement 2 would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) 3 administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 4 5 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 6 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative 7 remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or 8 stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is 9 excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, “a 10 court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are 11 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, 12 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’” 13 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 14 2004)). 15 The Ninth Circuit has applied the exhaustion doctrine to circumstances similar to 16 those presented here—where a noncitizen seeks review, through a habeas proceeding, of 17 an immigration judge’s denial of bond without first appealing that denial to the BIA. See 18 Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s 19 adverse bond determination before appealing to the BIA. This short cut was improper. 20 [The petitioner] should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA 21 before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s decision. . . . When a petitioner 22 does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss 23 the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted 24 remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.”). 25 Consistent with Leonardo, the Court declines to consider this challenge before the 26 BIA has had an opportunity to address it. To the extent that Petitioner chose not to appeal 27 the adverse bond determination to the BIA, the Court declines act as a parallel appellate 28 administrative tribunal in addressing the merits of the claimed errors here, where doing so 1 || would effectively encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative review process— 2 ||a process that is designed to allow the agency to correct its own errors. The Court declines 3 || to waive the prudential exhaustion requirement. 4 The Court lacks habeas jurisdiction over Petitioner’s challenges to the conditions of 5 ||his confinement.! See Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1069, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2023). 6 CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed 8 close the case. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 14, 2026 Jehut ¢ [ores Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ' Petitioner’s second cause of action is labeled “health problems” and describes problems that Petitioner has had with his left eye during confinement. See ECF No. 1, at 6. The 26 || Petition does not allege that Petitioner has been denied access to medical care or any other 27 || discernible violation of law. See generally id. Nonetheless, to the extent that this cause of action was intended to challenge the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement, the Court lacks 28 || habeas jurisdiction over this claim for the same reasons stated.