Conservatorship of B.P. CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/14/26 Conservatorship of B.P. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Conservatorship of the Person 2d Civ. No. B349940 of B.P. (Super. Ct. No. 22MH-00155) (Santa Barbara County)

PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, as Conservator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. B.P., Objector and Appellant.

B.P. appeals from an order under the Lanterman-Petris- Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code1, § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act) declaring 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. him gravely disabled and reappointing the Santa Barbara Public Guardian (Public Guardian) as his conservator. We will reverse. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The trial court first appointed the Public Guardian as B.P.’s conservator under the LPS Act in September of 2022. The Public Guardian petitioned for reappointment on August 20, 2025. It alleged B.P. had a grave disability based on a mental health disorder. B.P. was personally served with a written citation for conservatorship. B.P. did not attend the trial setting conference. B.P.’s counsel requested the court “set [B.P.]’s matter for a contested Zoom court trial.” Counsel did not state whether she and B.P discussed his right to a jury or the mechanics of a jury trial. She did not indicate whether B.P. lacked capacity to waive a jury. Trial took place in October of 2025. The court did not take a personal jury waiver from B.P. It did not explain the mechanics of a jury trial or explain how a jury trial differed from a court trial. It granted the petition after hearing testimony from a psychiatrist, B.P., and a staff member at B.P.’s mental health rehabilitation center. The court found him gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. It reappointed the Public Guardian as conservator for another year and ordered B.P. placed in an institution for mental diseases. The court prohibited him, among other things, from refusing “treatment specific to remedying or preventing the recurrence” of his grave disability or any unrelated medical treatment. DISCUSSION The LPS Act The LPS Act governs the involuntary treatment of the “gravely disabled” in California so that they may receive 2 individualized treatment, supervision, and placement. (§§ 5350, 5350.1; Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 139.) A person is “‘gravely disabled’” if “as a result of a mental health disorder, a severe substance use disorder, or a co-occurring mental health disorder and a severe substance use disorder, [the person] is unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) A county’s public guardian may petition to establish a conservatorship over a person who “is gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder . . . and is unwilling to accept, or incapable of accepting, treatment voluntarily.” (§ 5352.) A finding of grave disability must be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 (Roulet). “A conservatorship terminates after one year but may be extended for additional one-year terms upon petition.” (Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1096, citing § 5361 (Eric B.).) Right to a Jury Trial in LPS Act Proceedings B.P. contends the trial court committed reversible error because it did not advise him of his right to a jury trial or obtain his personal waiver. We review the contention de novo. (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 904 (C.O.) A “‘civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty . . . .’ [Citations.] ‘In addition to physical restraint, “[t]he gravely disabled person for whom a conservatorship has been established faces the loss of many other liberties . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1103.) “Apart from their possible confinement, conservatees may lose the rights to drive, vote, enter contracts, and make decisions 3 about their treatment.” (Id. at pp. 1103-1104, citing § 5357.) One such right is a conservatee’s right to a unanimous jury verdict on the issue of grave disability. (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235.) “In light of the potential for such a significant loss of liberty, conservatorship cases are governed by many of the same procedural protections that apply in criminal trials.” (Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1104, citing § 5350, subd. (d)(1).) A proposed conservatee is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of grave disability. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1); Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 230.) “[T]he court shall inform the proposed conservatee of . . . the right . . . to have the matter of the establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury.” (Prob. Code, § 1828, subds. (a), (a)(6).) “[T]he trial court must obtain a personal waiver of a jury trial from the conservatee, even when the conservatee expresses no preference for a jury trial. Absent such a waiver, the court must accord the conservatee a jury trial unless the court finds the conservatee lacks the capacity to make such a decision.” (Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 381 (Heather W.).) A trial court’s failure to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial is statutory error. (Id. at p. 384; C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 909; § 5350, subd. (d)(1).) “[A] person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and voluntarily made.” (K.R. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 133, 143 [collecting authority].) The failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver “denies the defendant [or conservatee] his or her statutory right to a jury trial on the entire cause in a civil commitment proceeding.” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1132 [jury trial waivers required in 4 proceedings involving offenders with mental health disorders]; see also People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163 (Tran) [jury trial waivers required in involuntary commitment proceedings where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity)]; Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 (Kevin A.) [LPS Act shares same purposes as commitment schemes for offenders with a mental disorder and those pleading not guilty by reason of insanity].) Failing to obtain a valid jury trial waiver requires reversal because it “defies ordinary harmless error analysis” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134) and is a “‘miscarriage of justice’ within the meaning of California Constitution, article VI, section 13 . . . .” (Id. at pp. 1132-1133; see Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [invalid jury waiver in commitment proceeding “is not susceptible to ordinary harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal”].) In the criminal law context, “‘knowing and intelligent’” means “‘“‘“made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”’”’” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) Trial courts should advise criminal defendants of the “basic mechanics of a jury trial . . . .” (Id. at p. 169.) There is no “specific method for determining whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial.” (Id. at p. 167.) “[W]e examine ‘the totality of the circumstances’ unique to each case.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753.) In Heather W. we concluded the trial court’s failure to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial was not harmless. (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-385.) The trial court “advised Heather W. of her right to testify, but did 5 not advise her that she had a right to a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 381.) We emphasized “the right to a jury trial to contest an LPS conservatorship is a right guaranteed by the California Constitution.” (Id. at p. 383.) We reversed. Here, B.P. did not attend the trial setting conference at which counsel requested a court trial. His attorney did not confirm whether she discussed waiver with him or that he lacked capacity to make the decision. It appears the court implied B.P.’s waiver from counsel’s request for a court trial. At trial, the court did not elicit a waiver from B.P. or advise him pursuant to Sivongxxay. The only notice B.P. appears to have received is on the second page of the citation of conservatorship, which states, “You have the right to a jury trial if you wish.” The Public Guardian nevertheless contends B.P. waived his rights based on the totality of circumstances. It points to the citations served on B.P. and emphasizes that he did not object when the court began a bench trial. The Public Guardian also relies on C.O. to support its contention that reversal is not required. (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) Counsel informed C.O. of the right to a jury trial. (Id. at pp. 901, 908.) C.O. held that a trial court’s failure to personally advise the proposed conservatee of a jury trial right does not, standing alone, warrant automatic reversal. It emphasized such error is harmless “‘if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances,’” that the “‘waiver was knowing and voluntary.’” (Id. at p. 918.) C.O. is distinguishable. The record “affirmatively demonstrate[d]” that C.O. “was informed of his right to a jury trial.” (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) The case concluded that counsel cannot waive this right if circumstances 6 suggest the proposed conservatee was not aware of it. (Id. at p. 911.) These circumstances are present here. Nothing in the record shows counsel or the trial court informed B.P. of his right or explained the mechanics of a jury trial during the 2025 proceedings—or during his prior LPS proceedings in 2022, 2023, and 2024. As such, we cannot conclude B.P. knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. (See Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1170 [“the requirement of an affirmative showing means that no valid waiver may be presumed from a silent record” (italics omitted)].) The trial court’s failure to advise B.P. of his right to a jury trial is reversible error. We do not remand for a capacity determination because the Public Guardian does not contend there was evidence B.P. lacked capacity to waive jury at the time of trial. (Kevin A., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.) DISPOSITION The order granting the LPS conservatorship petition is reversed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

7 Colleen K. Sterne, Judge Superior Court County of Santa Barbara ______________________________ B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Hudson Hornick, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.