Marriage of Houghteling CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/14/26 Marriage of Houghteling CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of MARRIANE 2d Civ. No. B348954 and MARK HOUGHTELING. (Super. Ct. No. D401440) (Ventura County)

MARRIANE HOUGHTELING,

Respondent, v.

MARK HOUGHTELING,

Appellant.

Mark Houghteling appeals an attorney fee award of $50,000.00 in favor of Marriane Houghteling in their dissolution of marriage judgment. (Fam. Code,1 §§ 2030, 2032.) We 1 All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise stated. conclude, among other things, that Mark2 has not shown the trial court erred in making the award. We will affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Mark and Marianne were married in 2009. They separated in 2021. Marianne filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in May 2021. The case went to trial on October 3, 2024, October 10, 2024, and November 21, 2024. The trial court filed a judgment of dissolution of marriage (Judicial Council Form FL- 180) which included an attached statement of decision. The trial court’s judgment stated, “An award of attorney’s fees and costs is appropriate because there is a demonstrated disparity between the parties in access to funds to retain or maintain counsel and in the ability to pay for legal representation.” “The party requested to pay attorney’s fees and costs has or is reasonably likely to have the ability to pay for legal representation for both parties.” “The requested attorney’s fees and costs are reasonable and necessary.” The judgment also stated Marianne “incurred over $250,000 in fees and costs.” Mark claimed he incurred approximately $50,000 in attorney fees. The trial court found that some of Marianne’s attorney fees were due to Mark’s improper litigation actions. The judgment awarded $10,000 in fees as section 271 sanctions and $40,000 “equitable allocation of fees.”

2 We use the parties’ first names for clarity.

2 Mark timely appealed the judgment. On appeal, Mark has not produced a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement regarding the trial proceedings.3 DISCUSSION “In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation . . . .” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) It considering a request for fees, “the court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) The court must award fees if there is a disparity in access and an ability to pay. (Ibid.) The court may award fees and costs in an amount that is “just and reasonable” taking into consideration, “the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party’s case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320. The fact that the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs has resources from which the party could pay the party’s own attorney’s fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order that the other party pay part or all of the fees and costs requested. Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative 3 Mark’s opening brief refers to and includes citations for 10 cases, but no citation includes the pin citation to specific portions of the opinion that purportedly support his assertions.

3 circumstances.” (§ 2032, subds. (a) & (b); In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 974–975.) “ ‘ “On appeal, we review an attorney fee award under [Family Code section 2030] for an abuse of discretion.’ . . . [W]e consider de novo any questions of law raised on appeal, but will uphold any findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 394 (Hearn).) Courts have “considerable latitude in fashioning or denying an attorney fees award.” (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1313.) “[N]o particular language is required in an order awarding attorney fees under sections 2030 and 2032, the record (including, but not limited, to the order itself), must reflect an actual exercise of discretion and a consideration of the statutory factors in the exercise of that discretion.” (Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 254.) We will not overturn an attorney fee award, unless “ ‘ “no judge could reasonably make” ’ ” that order. (Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 394.) Mark challenges only the need-based award of fees. He contends the trial court failed to make the required finding on his ability to pay. (In re Marriage of Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 395; § 2030, subd. (a)(2).) We disagree. The trial court made an express finding that Mark “has or is reasonably likely to have the ability to pay for legal representation for both parties.” Mark also argues the judgment includes conflicting findings concerning the parties’ disparity in access to funds. On the one hand the judgment states “there is a demonstrated disparity between the parties in access to funds to retain or maintain counsel” while on the other hand the judgment states 4 “the parties [financial situations] were fairly similarly situated. Wife has more access to liquid funds than Husband.” We agree these findings on their face may seem conflicting. But we need not decide if they can be reconciled because even if the court found no disparity, it had discretion to award fees. Section 2030 mandates an award of fees if it finds “ ‘disparity in access and [the obligor’s] ability to pay.’ ” (§ 2030, subd. (b); In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 112.) Section 2030 does not prohibit an award of fees if the court finds no disparity, where it also finds the award is just and reasonable. The trial court expressly found the requested fees were “reasonable and necessary” and that the award of $40,000 to Marianne was an “equitable allocation of fees.” Here the trial court found Marianne has spent $250,000 in fees while Mark only spent about $50,000, that “some of [Marianne’s] fees were incurred due to [Mark’s] actions, such as his failure to timely respond to Findings and Orders,” and his “delay in submitting documents” and his “request to continue trial on very short notice.” The court also “considered [Mark’s] demeanor at trial” finding his claimed lack of ignorance of most court orders, lack of knowledge of prior court ordered sanctions, denial of his signature on disclosure documents was likely him “simply being obstreperous.” The court concluded Marianne’s “counsel took the ‘laboring oar’ in most aspects of this case.” The trial court properly adjusted the disparity in the litigation expense burden borne by Marianne, which was partly caused by Mark’s litigation actions. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.) Mark has not shown error.

5 DISPOSITION The order awarding Marriane $50,000.00 in attorney’s fees is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

6 JoAnn Johnson, Judge Superior Court County of Ventura ______________________________ Law Offices of Michael Labrum and Michael Labrum for Appellant. Mahdavi & Mahdavi Family Law, Stephanie L. Mahdavi, Stephanie M. McCarthy; Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy C. Lascher, Norry S. Harn for Respondent.