People v. Robbins CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/14/26 P. v. Robbins CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B345927

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. PA099501)

DEMETRIUS FREDERICK ROBBINS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed. Karyn H. Bucur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Megan A. Donovan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________ Demetrius Frederick Robbins appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for pretrial mental health diversion. (Pen. Code,1 § 1001.36.) Robbins contends the court abused its discretion by finding that he presented an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community because there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s public safety finding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Preliminary Hearing 1. S.G.’s Testimony At a preliminary hearing held on January 9, 2024, S.G. testified that Robbins is the father of her three minor children. In December 2022, S.G. had custody of the children. Robbins was permitted to have day-to-day involvement in the children’s activities and could come to S.G.’s house to visit the children. S.G.’s father L.G. had stage four cancer that had metastasized to his spine and bones. L.G. moved in with S.G. and the children in 2018, when Robbins moved out. S.G. was his caretaker. On December 8, 2022, Robbins was in Las Vegas and said that he planned to come to Los Angeles to see the children in a Christmas concert, but he did not show up. Robbins called S.G. Robbins sounded like he was high. S.G. told him he lost his 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 chance to see the kids and said, “ ‘Don’t even show your face around here.’ ” Later she texted Robbins that the kids had been looking out the window all day for him. S.G. said Robbins was horrible. At about 2:00 a.m. on December 9, 2022, S.G.’s daughter woke her up to get her a glass of water. S.G. was half-asleep. She reached for her cell phone, which she had put in the charger next to her bed, but it was not there. She did not think much of it at the time. S.G. went downstairs to the kitchen to get the water. When she got downstairs, she saw Robbins’s carry-on bag and a pair of shoes. There were a bunch of beer bottles, and there were more beer bottles on the kitchen counter. S.G. got the cup of water for her daughter and went back upstairs to use the bathroom. When she opened the bathroom door, Robbins was on the toilet watching pornography on her phone and masturbating. S.G. asked what he was doing and told Robbins to leave her house. S.G. then grabbed her phone from Robbins and walked away. Robbins ran after S.G. He screamed and attacked her. Robbins punched S.G. in the back of the head repeatedly. He punched her so hard that the phone flew out of her hands. S.G. screamed for help. S.G.’s father, L.G., woke up and came to help her. L.G. said, “ ‘Whoa. Whoa. Whoa. What is going on? Get off of her.’ ” Robbins began attacking L.G. S.G. screamed for Robbins to stop. The kids came out and began screaming. Robbins hit L.G. in the face repeatedly. S.G. tried to stop Robbins, but he would not stop hitting L.G. S.G.’s son yelled for Robbins to stop. L.G. crouched down and tried to protect himself, but Robbins just continued punching him and refused to stop.

3 There was a baby gate at the top of the stairs that was latched shut, which made it difficult to escape from Robbins. As soon as she was able, S.G. opened the gate and ran to her neighbor’s house. She banged on the door and screamed “ ‘Help. Help. Call the police.’ ” Robbins ran outside after S.G. and told the neighbors that S.G. was a liar and that she hit him first. He told the neighbors no one was hurt and not to call the police. S.G. ran back inside her house and bolted the door. Robbins pounded on the door and yelled for S.G. to let him in. He said his keys were inside the house. S.G. and her children were screaming for Robbins to leave. Robbins said that he would leave, but that he needed his keys. S.G. left the top latch closed, but unbolted the door and opened it a few inches. She was going to ask Robbins where his keys were. Robbins broke the door down, breaking the top latch. Robbins began punching S.G. repeatedly in the face again. S.G. immediately had a lump on the left side of her face from the punches, and her ears started ringing. She started to black out and fell onto the stairs. When S.G. regained consciousness, she saw Robbins punching L.G. again. L.G. was holding a cloth to his face to stop the bleeding from the earlier punches. Robbins continued punching L.G. L.G.’s whole face was bleeding—his eyes, nose, and mouth. Both of L.G.’s eye sockets were fractured. Robbins said to L.G., “ ‘Who’s weak now? Who is weak now? You think I’m still weak?’ ” Robbins grabbed his things and left. Paramedics transported L.G. to the hospital by ambulance. S.G. had to care for the children, so she was not able to go to the hospital until the next day. When she went to the hospital, S.G. was diagnosed with a concussion. She had severe bruising and abrasions all over her body and a blood vessel in her eye had 4 burst. S.G.’s teeth had been cracked and chipped and she lost a crown in one tooth. S.G.’s eye did not improve after four to six weeks, so she returned to the hospital in February 2023. S.G. had to see a dentist and a neurologist. She had a bruise that persisted for almost a year, and she had difficulty remembering words and names due to her head injuries. The dentist removed the tooth that had been crowned because it was too small to repair. The dentist also bonded several cracked teeth and prepared them for implants. S.G. saw a neurologist because the attacks affected her memory. S.G. was not able to work for most of 2023. S.G. testified that Robbins called S.G. on January 14, 2023, in violation of a protective order.2 S.G. hung up the phone right after Robbins identified himself. A friend of Robbins’s named Mickey called around the same time and asked S.G. to get on a three-way call with him and Robbins. S.G. refused. S.G. told Mickey that there was a restraining order in place and that Mickey should not have called. Mickey tried to persuade S.G. to accept the call and record it, but she again refused. S.G. reported the contacts to the police. Robbins called her a few other times from a blocked phone number. Robbins also called from a phone number that S.G. did not recognize on Father’s Day. S.G. told Robbins never to call again and said that he was dead to her. She hung up on Robbins. On cross-examination, S.G. testified that several domestic violence charges had been filed against Robbins in the past, but that S.G. had agreed to drop a restraining order against Robbins 2 The court took judicial notice of a protective order issued on January 6, 2023, that prohibited Robbins from contact with S.G.

5 during child custody proceedings and mediate the matters instead. S.G. had not given Robbins a key to her house. After the attack occurred, she realized that he had taken her spare key. S.G. testified that she grabbed Robbins’s scrotum when he was punching her father, but that Robbins did not stop attacking L.G. When L.G. came to help, S.G. had fallen to the floor and was in the fetal position. Robbins was punching her. Robbins stepped over S.G. to attack L.G. L.G. told Robbins to stop attacking S.G. L.G. did not punch Robbins; he was too weak. Robbins knew that L.G. had cancer. Robbins had watched the children when S.G. took L.G. to chemotherapy.

2. L.G.’s Testimony At the preliminary hearing, L.G. testified that in December 2022, he was living with his daughter S.G., who was his caretaker. His activity was limited by his illness and he rarely left his room. S.G. had to help him put on his socks and shoes. Robbins knew that L.G. had prostate cancer. On December 9, 2022, L.G. woke up to a commotion. He heard the children screaming. When L.G. came out of his room, Robbins was beating S.G. and screaming. L.G. told Robbins to stop and tried to intervene by attempting to pull Robbins off of S.G. L.G. did not hit Robbins. Robbins hit L.G. in the nose and continued to punch him seven or eight times. L.G. testified, “I was bleeding all over [the] place. There was blood all over the place.” S.G. escaped and told the neighbor to call the police. Robbins followed her outside. S.G. was able to get back inside the house and lock the door. Robbins kept saying he needed his keys. S.G. opened the deadbolt but kept the latch on the door to 6 give Robbins’s keys to him. Robbins kicked the door in and started punching S.G. again. Robbins came in and punched L.G. again, too. L.G. was bleeding heavily, but Robbins hit him in the face three more times. L.G. thought Robbins realized he was in trouble, because he ran out of the house, got into his car, and drove away. An ambulance arrived and transported L.G. to the hospital. L.G. was hospitalized for three or four days. The doctors prepped him for immediate surgery. His skull was crushed in and his nose was broken. The doctors put six plates in his face to repair the damage. They were unable to put a plate in the bridge of his nose. “[W]hen they tried to put the screw there, there was just dust. There was nothing there.” L.G. spent the next couple of days in the hospital before he was released under his doctor’s care. L.G. was still suffering from pain caused by the attack at the time of the hearing. He had a hard time speaking. Robbins dislocated L.G.’s jaw and damaged his teeth. His eyes were constantly watery and tearing.

B. Charges In an information filed on January 23, 2024, Robbins was charged with two counts of injuring a child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a), counts 1 & 5), two counts of elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(2), counts 2 & 6), two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), counts 3 & 7), one count of first degree residential burglary (§ 459, count 4), and two counts of misdemeanor violation of a domestic relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a), counts 8 & 9). As to counts 1 and 5, it was alleged that Robbins personally inflicted 7 great bodily injury upon S.G. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) As to counts 2 and 6, it was alleged that L.G., who was 61 years old at the time, suffered great bodily injury. (§ 368, subd. (b)(2).) As to counts 2, 3, 6, and 7, it was alleged that Robbins personally inflicted great bodily injury upon L.G. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) As to counts 1 through 7, the information alleged that Robbins had suffered a prior strike conviction for criminal threats. (§ 422.) The information alleged aggravating factors pursuant to Rules of Court rule 4.421, subds. (a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1), and (b)(2). Pursuant to Rules of Court rule 4.425, subd. (a)(2), it was alleged that the offenses involved separate acts of violence and threats of violence.

C. Robbins’s Motion for Mental Health Diversion On December 13, 2024, Robbins filed a motion requesting mental health diversion pursuant to sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. Robbins argued that he was eligible for relief because he was diagnosed with complex post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and cocaine use disorder, which all played a significant role in his commission of the crimes. Dr. Kimberly Smith, who evaluated Robbins, concluded that Robbins’s mental health conditions significantly impacted his actions at the time of the offenses. Dr. Smith opined that Robbins would respond to mental health services and treatment. Robbins consented to diversion, waived his right to a speedy trial, and agreed to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion. Robbins asserted that he did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated because there was not an 8 unreasonable risk that he would commit a “super strike.”3 Robbins had a single strike conviction that was not for a super strike, which he suffered in 2002. His other convictions were drug-related. Dr. Smith opined that Robbins posed a low risk to the safety of the community if he committed to and participated in both mental health and substance abuse treatment. Robbins stated that he had secured a space at Fred Brown Residential Treatment Center that would provide appropriate treatment. Robbins attached to the motion the psychological report of Dr. Smith and a letter of conditional acceptance from the Fred Brown Residential Treatment Center. The psychological evaluation reflects that Robbins reported he was bullied as a child due to a skin condition, and that he was verbally and physically abused by his father. Growing up, Robbins ran drugs for his father. Robbins began using cocaine socially when he was 20 or 21 years old. Robbins reported that he had a decade-long relationship with S.G., who was verbally abusive. He used cocaine to help him cope with S.G. and her family and to combat his feelings of low self-worth. Robbins had 3 “ ‘As used throughout th[e] [Penal] Code, “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of’ section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).’ ” (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351.) Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) enumerates “particularly serious or violent felonies, known colloquially as ‘super strikes.’ ” (Ibid.) Super strikes include “any homicide offense, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machinegun on a police officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892, fn. 4 (Sarmiento).)

9 never been treated for mental illness or substance abuse. He had often tried to stop using cocaine on his own but was unsuccessful. Dr. Smith diagnosed Robbins with three qualifying mental disorders: complex post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and cocaine use disorder. She opined that Robbins’s mental disorders played a significant role in the alleged offenses but that his mental disorders would likely respond to appropriate treatment. Dr. Smith stated that Robbins agreed to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion and that he posed a low risk to public safety if treated in the community. Dr. Smith administered the Historical, Clinical, and Risk Management-20, Version 3 and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide. Both instruments rated Robbins as a low risk for recidivism and violence. Dr. Smith opined that based on the records available, her interviews of Robbins, and Robbins’s testing results, “I do not believe Mr. Robbins is imminently dangerous to commit a super strike.”

D. The People’s Opposition On February 4, 2025, the People filed an opposition to the motion for mental health diversion on the basis that Robbins presented an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The People argued that Robbins attacked his former romantic partner in front of his children and also twice attacked a sick elderly man without provocation. It was sheer luck that neither victim suffered life-threatening brain injuries. Robbins had a history of substance abuse and escalating domestic violence allegations that culminated in a horrific attack. The People urged the court not to permit the pattern to continue.

10 The People further argued that the nature of the crime was sufficient to establish without the need for a hearing that Robbins posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Robbins’s current offenses include a series of strike offenses, which were vicious, violent, largely unprovoked, and left the victims severely injured. The People asserted that the proposed treatment plan was not suitable because Robbins was unlikely to abstain from cocaine use given his past history. The record reflected that, contrary to the statement in the psychological evaluation, Robbins had been placed in drug treatment as a condition of his conviction for possession of controlled substances in 2013. The psychiatric evaluation’s conclusion that the incident was precipitated by PTSD that stemmed from a skin condition and S.G.’s past mistreatment of Robbins was incredible. The facts demonstrated that Robbins broke into S.G.’s home in the middle of the night, stole her phone, and began watching pornography and masturbating in her bathroom. His rage was triggered when S.G. retrieved her phone. The incident would not have occurred absent Robbins’s actions. Finally, the People argued that the court had residual discretion to deny diversion in the interests of justice even if Robbins met all other requirements. In light of the emotional distress and physical violence inflicted on the victims, such an exercise of discretion would be appropriate.

11 E. The Probation Report A probation report4 reflected that there had been prior domestic violence incidents between Robbins and S.G. The probation report’s account of the offenses was consistent with S.G. and L.G.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing. It further stated that after the incident Robbins posted to S.G.’s Facebook account “ ‘You’re an idiot.’ ” and “ ‘See you soon.’ ” Robbins also texted S.G. and referenced the incident in his texts. The probation report included Robbins’s criminal history, and reflected that Robbins had five prior convictions, including a strike conviction for criminal threats. The probation report stated that Robbins was an extremely violent and callous person who caused the victims severe injuries and showed no remorse. Robbins traumatized the victims and his three children, and continued to pose a great threat of danger to them. The report recommended “nothing less than a long term state prison commitment[.]” It listed multiple factors in aggravation and no mitigating factors.

F. Hearing and Ruling on the Motion for Mental Health Diversion On February 13, 2025, the court held a hearing on Robbins’s mental health diversion motion. Defense counsel submitted on her brief, and also provided the court with a mitigation package that she had given to the prosecution, which 4 The probation report was delivered on February 8, 2025, and filed on March 10, 2025.

12 included certificates that Robbins completed while in custody and letters of support. The People stated that the violence Robbins inflicted on the two victims and the seriousness of the crimes warranted denial of his request for mental health diversion. S.G. made a victim impact statement. S.G. stated that Robbins was not a man suffering from untreated mental health illness who was in need of rehabilitation. Robbins was a violent predator who had nothing to lose and would kill her if given the chance. Robbins had previously claimed in court to be a respected businessman. His current claim of mental illness was disingenuous. Robbins had been to doctors for physical treatment repeatedly and had never been diagnosed with mental illness. S.G. suspected that he was depressed after spending the last two years in jail. Robbins broke into S.G.’s home and brutally attacked her and her father, who was a stage-four cancer patient, in front of their children who were 6, 7, and 8 years old at the time. The trauma Robbins inflicted was permanent and his actions proved Robbins was a danger to everyone around him. Robbins’s attack was violent and relentless. He could have stopped when S.G. locked the door to the house, but he instead kicked down the door while his own children were screaming in fear and begging him to stop. Their six-year-old child was cleaning blood from the floor as Robbins attacked S.G. and L.G. Robbins had every opportunity to walk away, but he chose to continue the attack. If he was willing to inflict this violence in front of his children, S.G. did not know what would stop him in the future. If the court granted mental health diversion it would show her daughters that men can abuse women and the justice system would not protect them. The damage was lasting. L.G. had 32 screws in his face, S.G. still suffered memory loss, and the 13 children had nightmares and wet their beds in fear of their father being released. Robbins had a long history of abusing women and family members. He abused every woman he dated. This was not a mental health crisis. It was a pattern of control and abuse. Robbins was raised to be violent and if released, S.G. believed he would kill her. L.G. also made a victim impact statement. L.G. stated that Robbins’s attack was brutal and that every morning he still felt like he had been punched in the face. L.G. feared for his life, S.G.’s life, and his grandchildren’s lives. At the beginning of the case Robbins claimed innocence but at the hearing he claimed he suffered from mental illness. It was just a means of avoiding trial and accountability. L.G. had to have plastic surgery to insert six plates and 32 screws into his face. He was on his knees bleeding and Robbins continued to hit him ten times directly in his face. Robbins left, but then returned and hit L.G. again. Defense counsel objected to the court considering the victim impact statements. The court overruled the objection because the victim statements were relevant to the court’s public safety findings. The court ruled that Robbins was eligible for mental health diversion, but that the court had grave concerns about public safety. Robbins had a prior strike for criminal threats and his conduct was escalating. The attack in the present case was brutal, prolonged, and could have killed L.G. The offenses involved two separate attacks. Robbins hit L.G. when he was on his knees and had already been punched multiple times, which could have killed him. The probation report noted that Robbins had since made a veiled threat to S.G. on Facebook, stating “ ‘You’re an idiot. C U soon.’ ” The brutality of the crimes, the 14 escalation, and the decision to continue the attack when he had the opportunity to reflect and stop all evidenced that Robbins was likely to commit a super strike in the future—murder. Robbins escalated the attack, kicked in the door, punched L.G. again, and caused severe injuries. The court found that it would not be appropriate to treat Robbins in the community and denied the request for mental health diversion.

G. Robbins’s No Contest Plea and Sentencing On March 10, 2025, pursuant to a plea agreement, Robbins pleaded no contest to injuring a child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a), count 1), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), count 3), and violation of a domestic relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a), count 8). As to count 3, Robbins admitted that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7.) Robbins also admitted that he suffered a prior serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j) & 1170.12, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Robbins to six years in count 3 (the middle term of three years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law), plus three years for the personal infliction of great bodily injury enhancement. In count 1, the court sentenced Robbins to two years (one-third of the middle term of three years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law), and in count 8 the court imposed a concurrent term of one year, for a total of eleven years in prison. The court ordered that Robbins have no contact with the victims or his three children with S.G. for 10 years, and ordered that Robbins pay restitution to the victims. On the 15 prosecutor’s request, the court dismissed the remaining counts pursuant to the continued validity of the plea agreement. Robbins obtained a certificate of probable cause and timely appealed from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework of Mental Health Diversion “Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain mental health disorders.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626.) The statute defines “ ‘pretrial diversion’ ” as “the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment subject to [enumerated conditions].” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).) The maximum period of diversion is two years. (Id., subd. (f)(1)(C)(i).) If the defendant “perform[s] satisfactorily in diversion,” then “at the end of the period of diversion, the court shall dismiss the defendant’s criminal charges that were the subject of the criminal proceedings at the time of the initial diversion,” and “the arrest upon which the diversion was based shall be deemed never to have occurred[.]” (Id., subd. (h).) “Effective January 1, 2023, mental health diversion requires trial court findings that the defendant is both eligible for diversion and suitable for the program. The criteria for each are specified in the statute. (§ 1001.36, subds. (b) & (c).) Defendants are eligible if they have been diagnosed with a recognized mental 16 disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with which they are charged. (Id., subd. (b).) They are suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)” (Sarmiento, supra 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) “[A]n ‘ “unreasonable risk . . . to public safety” ’ means a likelihood that the defendant will commit one of the violent felonies specifically enumerated in [section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), also known as super strikes]. ([People v.] Williams [(2021)] 63 Cal.App.5th [990,] 1001; see People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450 (Moine) [‘risk of danger is narrowly confined to the likelihood the defendant will commit a limited subset of violent felonies’].)” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892, fn. omitted.) In determining whether the defendant poses an unreasonable risk to public safety, “[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) “[B]y requiring the trial court to evaluate the ‘risk’ posed to public safety, the statutory language directs the court to perform a quintessential discretionary function. (See People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 639 [noting that ‘the Legislature left it to trial courts to make fact-specific evaluations of risk under 17 [§] 1001.36, [subd.] (b)(1)(F)’].)” (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.) “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health diversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Moine, supra, at p. 449; People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588.) A trial court has ‘broad discretion to determine whether a given defendant is a good candidate for mental health diversion.’ (People v. Curry (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 314, 324.) ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ (Moine, at p. 449; see People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 848–849 (Bunas).)” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.)

B. Analysis Relying on the appellate court’s ruling in Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671 (Gomez), Robbins first contends that the victim’s statements cannot support the trial court’s finding that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety because he has no prior super strike convictions and his conduct did not result in charges for a super strike offense. Robbins also cites Dr. Smith’s psychological report in which she opined that he posed a low risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community as proof that he does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger. We reject Robbins’s arguments. First, Gomez is inapposite. There, the defendant was charged with a single count of second degree robbery. (Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 680.) The Court of Appeal found 18 that the trial court’s finding that Gomez posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety was not supported by substantial evidence for the following reasons: “First, Gomez has no criminal history and hence there is no evidence she has a prior super- strike conviction. (People v. Hoffman ([2015]) 241 Cal.App.4th [1304,] 1310 [finding the record did not support a finding of dangerousness under § 1170.18, subd. (c) where the defendant had no prior criminal history].) There is also no evidence that Gomez has previously been charged with a super-strike offense. Second, the pending robbery charge is not a super-strike offense. Although the victim stated he was afraid that Gomez and her codefendants would kill him, there was no evidence (or argument presented) that Gomez ever touched the victim or attempted to commit a super-strike offense during the commission of the robbery. Finally, at the time of the hearing, Gomez had been out in the community for approximately one year and there is no evidence that any new charges had been filed against her for committing another offense. There accordingly is no evidence to support a finding that Gomez was likely to commit a super-strike offense if treated in the community and the trial court abused its discretion.” (Id. at p. 690.) Gomez does not stand for the proposition that a trial court cannot find the defendant is likely to commit a super strike if the defendant has not committed a super strike in the past and is not currently charged with a super strike. There, the Court of Appeal simply relied on the fact that the defendant had not been convicted of or charged with a super strike as two of many facts that undermined the trial court’s finding. Gomez had no prior convictions. Robbins, in contrast, has a prior strike conviction and multiple convictions for drug-related offenses. Although the 19 drug-related offenses were non-violent and less serious than his criminal threats conviction, they evidence that Robbins has not been deterred from drug use despite numerous criminal convictions, which is particularly relevant given that his cocaine use was a significant factor in his commission of the offenses. Moreover, whereas Gomez was charged with a single count of second degree robbery, Robbins was charged with seven felonies—including strike offenses—and two misdemeanors. With respect to the felonies in counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7, it was alleged that Robbins personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. (§ 12022.7, subds. (a) & (e).) In Gomez, the appellate court relied in part on the fact that there was no evidence that the defendant ever touched the victim in the commission of the robbery. Robbins, as we have set forth in detail, brutally and relentlessly beat the mother of his children and her father in front of his three minor children and inflicted very serious injuries that caused lasting harm. Gomez was out in the community for a year following commission of the robbery and no new charges were filed against her. Robbins violated the court’s protective order multiple times after committing the offenses, and threatened S.G. on at least one of those occasions. Two charges were brought against him on that basis. Dr. Smith’s opinion—that Robbins does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety—does not persuade us otherwise. The trial court was permitted to consider other evidence, including witness testimony, victim statements, and the probation report, all of which demonstrated that Robbins caused severe injuries without provocation. As the trial court observed, Robbins’s beating of L.G. in particular is the kind of conduct that can easily result in death. The fact that L.G.

20 survived the vicious attack appears to be a matter of luck. Robbins’s conduct could have easily resulted in a super strike— namely, murder. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robbins’s request for mental health diversion.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

KIM (D.), J.