Stiglmier v. Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Dept. CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/14/26 Stiglmier v. Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Dept. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

ROBERT STIGLMIER, 2d Civ. No. B339601 (Super. Ct. No. 20CV03501) Plaintiff and Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)

v. SANTA BARBARA COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Robert Stiglmier appeals an order granting summary judgment and a judgment dismissing his action entered in favor of Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department, County of Santa Barbara, Sheriff Bill Brown and deputies Christopher Brady and Dan Caulderon (collectively respondents). He alleged respondents violated his civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) by, among other things, unlawfully arresting and detaining him and using excessive force. We conclude, among other things, that he did not file a proper opposition to respondents’ summary judgment motion. He did not file a separate statement of facts in opposition to respondents’ separate statement of undisputed facts and he has not shown error. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On the evening of October 20, 2019, Santa Barbara County deputy sheriff Christopher Brady saw Stiglmier violating the Vehicle Code by traveling on a bicycle in the wrong direction and the bicycle did not have correct lights and reflectors. (Veh. Code, §§ 21650, 21201, subd. (d).) Stiglmier claimed he borrowed the bicycle from Kit Delmarsh, but the bicycle was registered to Aashka Pandya. Deputy Sheriff Brady believed Stiglmier was guilty of theft. Stiglmier repeatedly refused to cooperate with Deputy Sheriff Brady’s requests to sit on the curb or lean against the patrol car. He began yelling at Deputy Sheriff Brady and became “hostile.” Stiglmier was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car. In 2020, Stiglmier filed an action against respondents for damages for false arrest and other causes of action. On March 28, 2022, Stiglmier filed his fourth amended complaint alleging 12 causes of action for violating the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983). He alleged “he was stopped, detained, harassed, and terrorized” and the officers arrested him “without probable cause and falsely accused him of crimes” and that they failed “to render medical attention” for him. Stiglmier claimed the police department: 1) had policies that allowed the “negligent” hiring of officers who received “inadequate training,” 2) violated his right to substantive due process, and 3) he alleged claims for unlawful detention, 2 retaliation, excessive force, arrest without probable cause, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Respondents answered the complaint. The trial court sanctioned Stiglmier for discovery violations. In 2024, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment supported by a separate statement of 75 undisputed material facts establishing that Stiglmier’s detention and arrest were lawful. Among these, respondents asserted Deputy Brady had reasonable suspicion to stop Stiglmier because he violated the Vehicle Code by traveling the wrong way on a bicycle that did not have the proper lights and reflectors. Stiglmier said he borrowed the bicycle from Kit Demarsh, but the police had probable cause to believe he stole the bicycle because it was registered to another person. Stiglmier was resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) because he repeatedly refused to follow Deputy Sheriff Brady’s instructions, yelled at him, and became hostile. He refused to sit on the curb or lean against the patrol car, even though he was able to do so. Deputy Sheriff Brady declared “Stiglmier’s hostility was a pre-assaultive indicator and he placed [Stiglmier] in handcuffs for officer safety.” He then placed Stiglmier in the patrol car. Stiglmier was provided with medical care. He was “screened by nurses at the Santa Barbara County jail as part of his booking process.” They asked about Stiglmier’s “medications, allergies, medical conditions, recent hospitalizations, past infections, mental health and social health history.” The nurses took his blood pressure and listened to his heart. The “Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office works toward best law enforcement practices and does not endorse unconstitutional 3 practices.” It hires “qualified applicants.” New applicants are sent to an academy for months of field training. The applicants must meet the standards of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission. Stiglmier filed a declaration in opposition to the motion, but he did not file a separate statement of facts to respond to the 75 facts that respondents provided. Stiglmier claimed he was entitled to a continuance. The trial court found his request for a continuance was untimely and not a proper motion. It granted summary judgment and subsequently denied Stiglmier’s motions for reconsideration, new trial, and a motion to set aside the judgment. DISCUSSION Stiglmier contends the trial court erred by granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment. We disagree. We review the record de novo to determine whether the party moving for summary judgment met its burden of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859.) “In order to support summary judgment for a defendant, it must appear from the record either that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more of the elements of the cause of action or that the plaintiff cannot refute an affirmative defense established by the defendant.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 115 (Lewis); Code Civ, Proc. § 437c, subd. (n).) “When a defendant’s motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavits and declarations sufficient to sustain the motion, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Lewis, supra, at pp. 115-116.) “In opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must submit a separate statement setting forth the 4 specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Lewis, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.) “Without a separate statement of undisputed facts with references to supporting evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, it is impossible for the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.” (Ibid.) Where the plaintiff fails to file an opposition separate statement of undisputed facts the trial court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3); California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 16, 22.)1 Actions for compensation under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) “may be brought in either state or federal court.” (Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348.) Their purpose is to provide compensation “ ‘for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.’ ” (Ibid.) Such violations may include police stopping persons without a “reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘ “may be afoot,’’ ’ ” or arresting people without probable cause (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273); use of excessive force (Susag v. City of Lake Forrest (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409); “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” (Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277, 287); a local government policy of failing to 1 Stiglmier’s motion to augment the record is denied. He has failed to show why the evidence he seeks to add was not referenced in a separate statement in response to the respondents’ separate statement of undisputed facts in the trial court. (Lewis, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 115-116.) Further, Stiglmier has not shown grounds to excuse the unreasonable delay in filing this motion. (Russi v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d. 100, 102.)

5 train police officers as a result of “ ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact’ ” (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1016); or violations of substantive due process where the police officer’s conduct “ ‘is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’ ” (Id. at p. 1008.) Respondents’ separate statement of undisputed material facts showed the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Stiglmier and probable cause to arrest him. They provided him with medical care and had a policy of properly training police officers. There was no substantive due process violation because their actions were supported by reasonable suspicion and probable cause. The trial court correctly noted Stiglmier failed to file a separate statement of facts showing he “required more care than he received or that he had any serious medical needs.” Stiglmier alleged excessive force. But the separate statement showed Deputy Sheriff Brady placed handcuffs on him and placed him in the police car. The handcuffs were necessary for “officer safety” because of Stiglmier’s hostile conduct and refusal to comply with Deputy Sheriff Brady’s instructions. The separate statement of 75 undisputed material facts showed the lack of merit of every cause of action in Stiglmier’s fourth amended complaint. Stiglmier filed a response that did not contain a separate statement of oppositional facts. Consequently, the 75 undisputed material facts supported respondents’ motion, and the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment. (Lewis, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.) Denying a continuance Stiglmier contends the trial court erred by not granting a “sua sponte” motion to continue the summary judgment motion.

6 He claimed he needed more time to present additional evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).) “The decision whether to grant such a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court.” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.) “The nonmoving party seeking a continuance ‘MUST SHOW: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.].’ ” (Ibid.) Stiglmier filed a declaration with an attached letter he wrote to opposing counsel on March 19, 2024, wherein he requested a 120-day continuance to present “new evidence of medical damages” based on future medical tests. The trial court found he did not make an adequate showing for a continuance. Stiglmier did not file a motion for continuance with the court. He simply filed the declaration with the attached letter. His declaration containing a request for a continuance was untimely because it was filed one day before the hearing without a showing of good cause. (Code Civ. Proc. §437c, subd. (b)(2).) The court also found “the motion for summary judgment is based on Stiglmier’s inability to prove liability. Any new evidence of damages would have no bearing on the liability issues. Further, Stiglmier fails to show how any new medical evidence is essential to opposing the motion or why additional time would be needed to obtain that evidence more than three years into this case.” He failed to show why he could not have filed a separate statement of facts to respond to respondents’ 75 undisputed facts. Stiglmier has not shown an abuse of discretion.

7 Motions for Reconsideration, New Trial and to Set Aside Stiglmier contends the trial court erred by denying his motions for reconsideration, new trial, and to set aside the judgment. He claimed defense counsel deceived him to obtain a continuance of trial with the hidden motive to be able to file a summary judgment motion that would otherwise be untimely. The trial court found the summary judgment motion was timely and his speculation about counsel’s motives was not proven or credible. We are bound by the trial court’s credibility findings (Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 518) and Stiglmier has not supported his claims by making sufficient cites to the record. Stiglmier claimed he should have been excused for non- compliance with court rules because he represented himself and because he suffers from disability. But mere “self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. . . . [T]he rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Even so, Stiglmier received lenient treatment by being allowed to amend his complaint multiple times and maintain his action for three years. This shows that appellant was given every opportunity to cure pleading defects even though he was self-represented and suffered from disability. Stiglmier also claimed respondents’ counsel concealed arrest video evidence. The trial court rejected that claim as not credible. The court noted “that, despite no proper discovery requests from Stiglmier, they provided the video in October 2022 and even followed-up with Stiglmier to ensure that he was able to access the video.” The court found “Stiglmier has provided stills 8 of the videos to the court. This fact establishes that he was in fact provided copies of the videos.” As respondents note, Stiglmier has not made a proper showing to challenge the court’s findings because he has not provided sufficient cites to the record or legal authorities to support his claims. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 283.) His remaining contentions do not show grounds for a reversal. DISPOSITION The order granting summary judgment and the judgment dismissing Stiglmier’s action are affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to the respondents. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J. We concur:

CODY, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

9 Donna D. Geck, Judge Superior Court County of Santa Barbara ______________________________ Robert Stiglmier, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Heather Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.