Concha Martha Beiro Valdez v. Christopher J. Larose, et al.
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- other — S.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a non-citizen who was detained after missing a single check-in appointment due to a family emergency. The court granted the petition, ordering the petitioner's immediate release on her original conditions and the return of her confiscated property.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the Petitioner's release on the same terms and conditions as her initial release.“For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Petition and orders that Petitioner be released on the same terms and conditions as she was previously released.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the due process principles from Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli to the context of immigration parole. The record indicates the petitioner was compliant for three years, missed one appointment due to a documented emergency, and was detained without notice or a hearing. Under the cited authorities, the government must demonstrate materially changed circumstances (danger or flight risk) to revoke liberty. The order notes there is no evidence of such changed circumstances, making the detention a violation of due process. The relief ordered is consistent with the legal standard. |
Ordering ICE to return all property confiscated at the time of detention.“Additionally, ICE is ordered to return all property confiscated at the time of her detention.” | agree with court The petitioner requested the return of confiscated documents in her Traverse. Since the detention was found to be unlawful due to a due process violation, the seizure of property incident to that unlawful detention is also invalid. Ordering the return of property is a standard remedial measure in habeas cases where the underlying custody is deemed illegal. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable due process standards from Supreme Court precedent (Morrissey, Gagnon) and applies them to the specific facts of the case. The court relies on persuasive district court authority (Saravia, Pinchi) to bridge the gap between general parole/probation due process and the specific context of immigration parole. The factual findings (compliance for 3 years, single missed check-in due to emergency, lack of evidence of changed circumstances) support the conclusion that the detention was arbitrary and violated due process. The relief ordered is appropriate and directly addresses the violations found.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 CONCHA MARTHA BEIRO VALDEZ, Case No. 26-cv-04902-BAS-AHG 14 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 15 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) 16 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al., 17 Respondents. 18 19 20 21 Petitioner Concha Martha Beiro Valdez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 22 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming she was improperly detained after she was paroled 23 into the United States. (ECF No. 1.) The Government filed a Return stating that it does not 24 oppose a bond hearing (ECF No. 4.) Petitioner filed a Traverse requesting immediate 25 release, return of all confiscated documents, and an order barring re-detention without a 26 pre-deprivation hearing. (ECF No. 5.) For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS 27 the Petition and orders that Petitioner be released on the same terms and conditions as she 28 was previously released. 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 3 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the writ 4 is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 5 A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or she is in 6 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It applies 7 to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 8 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody and since she is seeking release from custody, she 9 has standing to pursue this Petition. 10 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 11 Petitioner, an Ecuadorian citizen, came to the U.S. border in 2023 seeking asylum. 12 (Pet. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) paroled her into the 13 United States in July 2023 under intensive supervision. (Id.) Specifically, for the past 14 several years, ICE has required her to make three check-ins a month: one at ICE offices, 15 one at the office of the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”), and one at 16 home. (Id. ¶ 19.) Petitioner relied on her daughter to drive her to her check-ins at ICE and 17 ISAP offices. (Id. ¶ 20.) The home check-in required Petitioner to remain at home from 18 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. without notice as to what time an ICE agent would arrive. (Id. ¶ 19.) 19 In addition, Petitioner was subject to random phone-app photo check-ins within a one-hour 20 window. (Id. ¶ 1.) 21 Pending a hearing on her asylum claim, Petitioner was given work authorization and 22 a Social Security number. (Pet. ¶ 18.) She has been employed as a cleaner at Amazon and 23 has paid her taxes. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 18.) She is also helping to raise two of her U.S. citizen 24 grandchildren. (Id. ¶ 1.) She has no criminal record. (Id. ¶ 17.) 25 For the past three years, Petitioner has met all the requirements of her intensive 26 supervision. (Pet. ¶ 1.) In July 2026, Petitioner’s daughter had emergency gallbladder 27 surgery. (Id. ¶ 2.) Her daughter was discharged from the hospital on July 19, 2026, and 28 directed not to drive for two weeks. (Id. ¶ 20.) Petitioner missed her check-in on July 20, 1 2026. (Id. ¶ 2.) She explained the missed appointment to ICE over the telephone, and ICE 2 told her to appear for a check-in at the ICE offices on July 25. (Id.) When she did so, she 3 was detained without bail or a bond hearing. (Id.) 4 Petitioner was given no written notice of the reasons for revoking her parole, was 5 given no opportunity for a hearing, and was given no indication as to what circumstances 6 had changed. (Pet. ¶ 2.) When she asked why she was being detained, she was told “things 7 were different now under President Trump.” (Id. ¶ 20.) 8 III. ANALYSIS 9 Petitioner’s re-detention without notice or an opportunity to be heard, and without 10 noticeably changed circumstances, violates Petitioner’s due process rights. Individuals 11 released from custody, even where such release is conditional, have a liberty interest in 12 continued liberty. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parolees); 13 Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 150 (1997) (pre-parolees); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 14 778, 782 (1973) (probationers). Thus, this Court agrees with those courts that have held: 15 [O]nce a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, 16 the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed 17 circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk, or is now subject to a final order of removal. And if 18 the noncitizen disputes the notion that changed circumstances justify his 19 rearrest, he is entitled to a prompt hearing before an Immigration Judge. 20 Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176–77 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Kamalpreet 21 v. Singh, No. 26-cv-1211-LL-JLB, 2026 WL 622687, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) 22 (“Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 23 government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 24 creates an implicit promise, upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty will be 25 revoked only if they fail to live up to the conditions of release.” (citation modified) (quoting 26 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025))). 27 Because ICE released Petitioner upon finding she was not a flight risk or a danger 28 to the community in July 2023, and because there is no evidence those circumstances have | changed, Petitioner is entitled to remain released on the same conditions as she was initially 2 ||released. If ICE believes circumstances have changed, it must provide notice of these 3 ||changed circumstances to Petitioner and provide Petitioner an opportunity to be heard 4 || promptly before an Immigration Judge. Hence, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 5 CONCLUSION 6 Accordingly, the Court issues the following writ: 7 The Court ORDERS that Concha Martha Beiro Valdez (A#246-8 16-874) be released on the same terms and conditions on which she was previously released in July 2023. She may not be re-detained without notice and a pre- 9 deprivation hearing. Additionally, ICE is ordered to return all property 10 confiscated at the time of her detention. 11 The Clerk of Court shall close the case. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Ue ~ 14 || DATED: September 11, 2026 Duhark 15 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _A_