Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARRIE CALCAGNO and PRAVEEN Case No.: 3:25-cv-02661-GPC-DEB PATHANGI, individually and on behalf 12 of all others similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiffs, 14 v. [ECF No. 12] 15 THE SCOTTS COMPANY LLC and 16 DOES 1-20, 17 Defendants. 18 19 INTRODUCTION 20 In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant The Scotts Company, LLC (“Scotts”), 21 engaged in false advertising by representing certain soil and fertilizer products as “organic” 22 when the products were allegedly not organic because they contained “forever chemicals.” 23 ECF No. 8 ¶ 1. Before the Court is Defendant Scotts’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First 24 Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 25 ECF No. 12 at 2. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Rule 26 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. 27 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. Factual Background 3 This case concerns Defendant’s advertising of its Miracle-Gro organic soil and 4 fertilizer products (“the Products”). ECF No. 8, ¶ 1. 5 On March 20, 2025, Plaintiff Carrie Calcagno purchased Scotts’ Miracle-Gro 6 Organic Raised Bed & Garden Soil and Miracle-Gro Organic Outdoor Potting Mix from a 7 Target store in La Mesa, California. Id. ¶ 5. In February or March of 2025, Plaintiff Praveen 8 Pathangi purchased Scotts’ Miracle-Gro Organic Raised Bed & Garden Soil from a Home 9 Depot store in San Diego, California. Id. ¶ 7. Both named Plaintiffs reviewed the Product 10 labels and relied on the representation that the Products were organic when deciding to 11 purchase the Products. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. 12 The named Plaintiffs conducted laboratory tests of various Miracle-Gro organic soil 13 and fertilizer Products (“the Products”) with the assistance of qualified expert technicians 14 and consultants. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiffs tested the actual Products that they individually 15 purchased as well as several other Miracle-Gro organic Products, which were obtained 16 from different locations in Northern and Southern California, New York, New Jersey, and 17 Oregon in 2024 and 2025. Id. The investigation revealed that all the tested Products 18 contained numerous perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”)—highly 19 resistant synthetic chemicals. Id. ¶¶ 23, 33. These chemicals are also referred to as “forever 20 chemicals.” Id. ¶ 1. 21 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that each of the tested Products contained one or both 22 of the two most studied types of PFAS—perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and 23 perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)—both of which have been declared dangerous 24 substances by the EPA. Id. ¶ 23; ¶¶ 34–35, 37–38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48. Further, Plaintiffs 25 allege that each tested product contained PFAS in amounts that exceeded certain thresholds 26 identified by the EPA. Id. 27 1 Plaintiffs allege that PFAS persist and accumulate in the food chain when released 2 into the environment and build up in the body when humans consume PFAS-contaminated 3 food. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs further allege that exposure to PFAS—even at low levels—can 4 accumulate in the human body over time and cause severe adverse health effects. Id. ¶ 24. 5 Thus, even a small amount of PFAS exposure can negatively impact health. Id. Plaintiffs 6 assert that PFAS do not fall into any definition of organic, which Plaintiffs define using 7 Merriam-Webster’s definition: “of, relating to, or derived from living organisms.” Id. ¶¶ 8 22, 28. Thus, Plaintiffs assert that the Products—which contain PFAS—are misleadingly 9 labeled as organic. Id. ¶¶ 1, 33. 10 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant refers to the products as organic to induce consumers 11 into believing that they contain “only naturally occurring, non-synthetic ingredients.” Id. ¶ 12 2. They further allege that Defendant fails to disclose the presence of PFAS in its Products 13 because it knows that such information would impact consumers’ purchasing decisions. Id. 14 Finally, Plaintiffs allege that they would not have purchased, or would have paid less 15 money for, Defendant’s organic products had they known the products contain PFAS. Id. 16 ¶ 3. In sum, Plaintiffs allege that Scotts’ marketing, advertisement, and representations 17 regarding the Products are false, misleading, and deceptive. Id. ¶ 58. 18 II. Procedural Background 19 Plaintiffs brought this class action lawsuit on behalf of all persons who purchased 20 any Miracle-Gro organic soil and fertilizer Products in California for their personal use 21 within the applicable statute of limitations period. Id. ¶ 59. They allege violations of 22 California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), False Advertising Law (“FAL”), and 23 Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). Id. ¶¶ 65-107. The complaint also includes 24 causes of action for breach of express and implied warranty, as well as unjust enrichment. 25 Id. ¶ 108-129. 26 27 1 On February 5, 2026, Defendant filed the present motion to dismiss the operative 2 complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 12. 3 Plaintiffs have opposed the motion, ECF No. 17, and Defendant has filed a reply in support. 4 ECF No. 20. 5 LEGAL STANDARD 6 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint under both Federal Rule of Civil 7 Procedure (“Rules”) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).1 8 I. Rule 12(b)(6) 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a 10 claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 11 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint fails to state or allege sufficient facts to 12 support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 13 (9th Cir. 1990). 14 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 15 accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 16 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 17 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 18 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 19 alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 20 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 21 When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all facts alleged in the 22 complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 23 Chubb Custom Inc. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013). 24 25 1 “Rule” or “Rules” refer to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted. 26 27 1 “Where a motion to dismiss is granted, ‘leave to amend should be granted unless 2 the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 3 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” Corbett v. Pharmacare U.S., Inc., 544 4 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1003 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 5 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992)). 6 A. Rule 9(b) 7 Because Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the allegedly misleading misrepresentations 8 and omissions on Defendant’s Product labels sound in fraud, the claims in their complaint 9 must meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See 10 Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009); Castillo v. Prime 11 Hydration LLC, 748 F. Supp. 3d 757, 768 (N.D. Cal. 2024). Rule 9(b) requires that claims 12 alleging fraud must “state with particularity” the circumstances constituting fraud. Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 9(b). “A pleading is sufficient under rule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances 14 constituting fraud so that a defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the 15 allegations.” Moore v. Kavport Package Express, Inc., 995 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 This generally means that claims sounding in fraud must “identify the who, what, when, 17 where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about 18 the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false.” Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 19 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 20 II. Rule 12(b)(1) 21 Federal Rule of Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) allows defendants to seek dismissal of 22 a claim or action for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including a lack of Article III 23 standing. Culture of Life Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Bonta, 789 F. Supp. 3d 902, 917 (S.D. Cal. 24 2025). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate if the complaint, considered in its 25 entirety, fails to allege facts on its face that are sufficient to establish subject matter 26 jurisdiction. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, 546 27 1 F.3d 981, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2008). Although the defendant is the moving party in a motion 2 to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff is the party invoking the court's 3 jurisdiction. As a result, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the case is properly 4 in federal court. McCauley v. Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 5 McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). 6 Here, Defendant raises a facial attack on jurisdiction. ECF No. 12, at 15. “In a facial 7 attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient 8 on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 9 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to 10 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true and drawing all 11 reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the court determines whether the allegations 12 are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court's jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 13 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 14 2013)). 15 DISUCSSION 16 I. Request for Judicial Notice 17 Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of several exhibits, including (1) 18 the full labels of each Product at issue bearing stamps of approval from the California 19 Department of Food & Agriculture (“CDFA”); (2) the CDFA’s list of registered “organic 20 input material” products, updated on both October 16, 2018, and June 27, 2025; (3) an 21 EPA publication titled “Soil Screening Guidance: Technical Background Document, Part 22 1: Introduction”; (4) an EPA publication titled “Regional Screening Levels (RSLs) – 23 Frequent Questions”; (5) an EPA publication titled “Regional Screening Level Summary 24 Table”; and (6) a United States Department of Agriculture publication titled “Labeling 25 Organic Products.” ECF No. 12-2. Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendant’s request as to the 26 27 1 EPA publication on soil screening guidance or the EPA RSL summary table. ECF 18, at 2 2. Plaintiffs oppose the rest of Defendant’s request for judicial notice. Id. 3 A. Legal Standard 4 “When considering a motion to dismiss, a court typically does not look beyond the 5 complaint in order to avoid converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 6 judgment.” Spy Optic, Inc. v. Alibaba.Com, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 3d 755, 761 (C.D. Cal. 7 2015). Even so, “a court may properly take judicial notice of (1) material which is included 8 as part of the complaint or relied upon by the complaint, and (2) matters in the public 9 record.” Id. at 762. 10 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a court “may judicially notice a fact that 11 is not subject to reasonable dispute,” either because it is (1) “generally known within the 12 trial court's territorial jurisdiction” or (2) “can be accurately and readily determined from 13 sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A court 14 can therefore “take judicial notice of matters of public record,” but “cannot take judicial 15 notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 16 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 17 999 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Hagan v. Khoja, 139 S. Ct. 2615 (2019). 18 “Just because [a] document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that 19 every assertion of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.” Khoja, 20 399 F.3d at 999. To the extent a party asks that a court take judicial notice of an exhibit for 21 its truth, the requesting party should accordingly identify what facts within the document 22 it seeks to have judicially noticed. See Capaci v. Sports Research Corp., 445 F. Supp. 3d 23 607, 617 (C.D. Cal. 2020). 24 The court may take notice of such facts on its own, and “must take judicial notice if 25 a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 26 201(c). 27 1 B. Product Labels with Appended CDFA Approvals 2 Defendant seeks judicial notice of the full labels of each Product at issue. ECF No. 3 12-1, at 5-53. Specifically, Defendant asks the Court to judicially notice the provided 4 images of the labels, many of which display an appended stamp or label indicating CDFA 5 approval.2 Id. The exhibit in question also includes emails from the CDFA to Defendant 6 regarding the label approval. ECF No. 12-1, at 25. 7 The Court takes judicial notice of the full product labels themselves, as they form 8 the basis of Plaintiffs’ complaint. Welk v. Beam Suntory Imp. Co., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 9 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2015). Further, Plaintiffs have already included the front Product labels in 10 their own complaint. See ECF No. 8-1, at 2-4. However, the Court does not take judicial 11 notice of the CDFA approval stamps adhered to each image of the Product labels, nor the 12 emails between the CDFA and Defendant. As presented to the Court, neither the images of 13 the Product labels bearing the CDFA approval stamp nor the emails between Defendant 14 and the CDFA are matters of public record, and it is not clear that either the altered Product 15 labels or emails are from a source “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 16 Hsieh v. FCA US LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2020). Thus, the Court does 17 not take judicial notice of the CDFA stamps on the labels or the CDFA emails. 18 C. Registered OIM Products Lists 19 Defendant next seeks judicial notice of the CDFA’s list of “Registered OIM 20 Products,” as updated on both October 16, 2018, and June 27, 2025. ECF No. 12-1, at 55- 21 138, 199-291. This list of Registered Organic Input Material is issued by the California 22 23 24 2 Each stamp reads “Label Reviewed California Department of Food and Agriculture. CDFA makes no representation as to product value, safety, or use for intended purpose. 25 Labeling is in accordance with the requirements of Section 14631 of the Food and 26 Agriculture Code and Sections 2300 through 2326 of the California Code of Regulations.” Each stamp also bears a date and handwritten initials. See, e.g., 12-1, at 7. 27 1 Department of Food and Agriculture and is a matter of public record. Plaintiffs initially 2 opposed judicial notice of the Registered OIM Products lists, ECF No. 18, at 3, though 3 they did not question their authenticity. However, at oral argument, Plaintiffs conceded to 4 judicial notice of the fact that the Products are listed on the Registered OIM Products lists. 5 Thus, the official CDFA lists of Registered Organic Input Material are appropriate subjects 6 for judicial notice. See Welk, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 1042. 7 D. Other EPA and USDA Publications 8 Defendants next seek judicial notice of various publications from the EPA and 9 USDA’s websites. “Courts may take judicial notice of the fact that an internet article is 10 available to the public, but it may not take judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted 11 in the article.” Spy Optic, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 3d at 762. However, while the Court may take 12 judicial notice of the fact that the relevant publications are available to the public, the Court 13 finds that the existence of these publications is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis regarding 14 whether the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint are sufficient to withstand a motion to 15 dismiss. Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 16 2015) (denying judicial notice of information in press releases and publicly available news 17 articles because it was irrelevant for purposes of the motion to dismiss). Rather, the 18 publications relate to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and not the sufficiency of the 19 complaint. See Kanan v. Thinx Inc., No. CV 20-10341 JVS (JRPX), 2021 WL 4464200, at 20 *5 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2021). Thus, the Court declines Defendant’s request for judicial 21 notice as to the EPA’s Soil Screening Guidance publication, Regional Screening Levels 22 FAQ publication, and the Regional Screening Level summary table publication; as well as 23 the USDA’s Labeling Organic Products publication. 24 II. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Assert Their Claims 25 Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case 26 because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims. Defendant challenges Plaintiffs’ 27 1 standing on multiple grounds. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not suffered an 2 injury because the Products offer a money-back guarantee. Next, Defendant argues that 3 Plaintiffs lack standing to seek equitable monetary or injunctive relief. Lastly, Defendant 4 argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to raise claims relating to Products they did not 5 purchase and did not test. ECF No. 12, at 30-34. 6 Because standing is a threshold issue, the Court addresses Defendant’s standing 7 arguments before reaching the arguments regarding the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims. 8 A. Defendant’s Money-Back Guarantee Does Not Defeat Standing 9 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not suffered an injury in fact—and therefore 10 lack Article III standing—because the Products offer a money-back guarantee. ECF No. 11 12, at 21. In support of its claim, Defendant cites cases exclusively from the Southern and 12 Middle Districts of Florida. Id. Defendant has offered no authority from this Circuit 13 adopting Defendant’s reasoning that a money-back guarantee precludes a Plaintiff from 14 asserting an injury in fact for Article III standing. 15 Plaintiffs, however, have shown that courts in this Circuit “regularly reject this 16 argument,” as it “conflates injury with remedy.” Gamino v. Thinx Inc., No. ED-CV-23- 17 2067-JGB-SHKX, 2024 WL 2429307, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2024) (quoting Chowning 18 v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc., CV-15-08673 RGK-SPx, 2016 WL 1072129, at *4 19 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016)). See also Dotson v. Europharma, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-09651-AB- 20 AGR, 2021 WL 4826611, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2021) (rejecting a defendant's 21 argument that their moneyback guarantee defeated Plaintiff's claim for damages because 22 “both Plaintiff's interest in this lawsuit and the Court's ability to grant relief 23 remains”); Perea v. Walgreen Co., 939 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he 24 Court finds unavailing and unsupported by any legal precedent Defendant's argument that 25 Walgreens's ‘money-back guarantee’ deprives Plaintiff of the ability to allege that she 26 suffered economic injury.”). This Court agrees with others in this Circuit in finding that a 27 1 plaintiff suffers an injury when she allegedly relies on a deceptive practice and parts with 2 more money than she otherwise would, and that such an injury is not eliminated by the 3 presence of a money-back guarantee. Gamino, 2024 WL 2429307, at *6; Chowning, 2016 4 WL 1072129, at *4. Thus, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the Products’ 5 money-back guarantee defeats standing. 6 B. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Seek Equitable Monetary Relief 7 Plaintiffs seek restitution and injunctive relief under the UCL, ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 79, 8 81; restitution and injunctive relief under the FAL, id. ¶ 90, and restitution, disgorgement, 9 injunctive relief, and damages under the CLRA, id. ¶ 105, 107. Defendant moves to 10 dismiss the equitable monetary claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, arguing that 11 Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, and therefore dismissal of the equitable claims is 12 required by Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020). ECF No. 12, 13 at 31-32. Plaintiffs counter that courts in this Circuit regularly allow plaintiffs to plead 14 both equitable and legal remedies at the pleadings stage. 15 Under “traditional principles governing equitable remedies in federal court,” a 16 plaintiff must “establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing 17 equitable restitution for past harm[.]” Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844. “This means that a plaintiff 18 ‘must, at a minimum, plead that she lacks adequate remedies at law if she seeks equitable 19 relief.’” Wysocki v. Chobani, LLC, 828 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2026) (quoting 20 Takahashi-Mendoza v. Coop. Regions of Organic Producer Pools, 673 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 21 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2023)). 22 There is currently an “intra-circuit split” on (1) whether courts may allow UCL or 23 FAL claims to proceed past pleading when other adequate remedies exist and (2) how 24 “exacting of a standard Sonner imposes on plaintiffs who plead claims for equitable and 25 legal remedies at the pleading stage.” Jeong v. Nexo Fin. LLC, No. 21-cv-02392-BLF, 26 2022 WL 174236, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2022) (citing Byton N. Am. Co. v. Breitfeld, 27 1 No. CV-19-10563-DMG-JEMx, 2020 WL 3802700, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020)). A 2 number of district courts have concluded that Sonner does not preclude a plaintiff, at this 3 stage, from pleading equitable remedies in the alternative. See, e.g., Nacarino v. Chobani, 4 LLC, 668 F. Supp. 3d 881, 895-97 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (denying dismissal of restitution 5 claim, even if it “may be revisited at a later stage”); Yeomans v. World Fin. Grp. Ins. 6 Agency, Inc., No. 19-cv-00792-EMC, 2022 WL 844152, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2022); 7 Lopez v. Abbott Lab’ys, No. 3:22-CV-00421-L-RBB, 2023 WL 2657627, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 8 Mar. 27, 2023) (“Because the instant case is at the pleading stage . . . Plaintiff can allege 9 legal and equitable claims in the alternative.”). Further, because Sonner was decided at a 10 later posture, it does not directly address what exactly a plaintiff must allege at the 11 pleading stage. See Sonner, 971 F.3d 834. Allowing claims to move forward is also 12 consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which allows for pleading in the 13 alternative. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) (a claim for relief must contain “a demand for relief 14 sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief”); see also 15 Byton, 2020 WL 3802700, at *9 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit's general rule is that plaintiffs may 16 plead alternative claims, even if those claims are inconsistent.”). 17 Plaintiffs allege that they lack an adequate remedy at law because: (1) discovery— 18 through obtaining a damages expert—may demonstrate that legal remedies are inadequate, 19 ECF No. 8, ¶ 12; (2) the equitable relief claims under the UCL apply to a broader scope 20 of injuries than those for damages under the CLRA, ECF No. 8, ¶ 13; and (3) the statutes 21 of limitations vary, id. ¶ 14. Thus, Plaintiffs have pled the inadequacy of their legal 22 remedies beyond conclusory statements, which is sufficient at the pleading stage. See 23 Barton v. Procter & Gamble Co., 766 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1067 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“At 24 minimum, Plaintiffs must plead inadequate legal remedies in the operative pleading to 25 allege claims for equitable relief under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA.”); Wadeea v. 26 Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 758 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (allowing 27 1 alternative pleading of legal and equitable claims where “legal remedies may later prove 2 to be inadequate after the benefit of discovery.”); Eason v. Roman Cath. Bishop of San 3 Diego, 414 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1282 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (allowing pleading of alternative 4 equitable remedy because, in part, “[d]iscovery may reveal that [the plaintiff's] claims 5 providing legal remedies are inadequate for any number of reasons, despite the fact that 6 their allegations appear adequate.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 7 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims that they lack an adequate remedy at law 8 cannot succeed because the conduct challenged under each statute is the same. ECF No. 9 12, at 31-32. However, though Plaintiffs’ injuries are by their nature economic and the 10 conduct and theory underlying the CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims “appear to be essentially 11 the same,” Shuman v. SquareTrade Inc., No. 20-cv-02725-JCS, 2021 WL 5113182, at *11 12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2021), courts in this Circuit have allowed plaintiffs to plead both 13 equitable and legal claims in the same or similar circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. 14 Mondelez Int'l Inc., 554 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2021); Jeong, 2022 WL 15 174236, at *27; Krause-Pettai v. Unilever United States, Inc., No. 20cv1672-DMS-BLM, 16 2021 WL 1597931, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2021). 17 Defendant’s “contention that equitable [monetary] relief is precluded here is better 18 suited on a motion for summary judgment, when the Court and the parties will have the 19 benefit of discovery.” Wadeea, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 1229. Thus, the Court denies 20 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ equitable claims on the grounds that Plaintiffs 21 have an adequate remedy at law. 22 C. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief 23 Next, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief 24 because their “allegations of future injury are implausible.” ECF No. 12, at 32. 25 To establish standing for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must plead a “threat of injury” 26 that is “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Davidson v. Kimberly- 27 1 Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 2 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). A wronged plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief only if they 3 can show a “real or immediate threat that [they] will again be wronged in a similar way.” 4 Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal 5 punctuation omitted). “‘[A] previously deceived customer may have standing to seek an 6 injunction against false advertising or labeling’ based on ‘inability to rely on the 7 advertising in the future,’ ‘even though the consumer now knows or suspects that the 8 advertising was false at the time of the original purchase, because the consumer may suffer 9 an actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical threat of future harm.’” Hamman 10 v. Cava Grp., Inc., No. 22-CV-593-MMA (MSB), 2023 WL 3450654, at *6 (S.D. Cal. 11 Feb. 8, 2023) (quoting Davidson, 889 F.3d at 967, 969). In sum, “[k]nowledge that the 12 advertisement or label was false in the past does not equate to knowledge that it will 13 remain false in the future.” Davidson, 889 F.3d at 969. 14 Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that they continue to desire to purchase the Products 15 and would purchase them if they did not contain PFAS, but they are “unable to rely on the 16 advertising and packaging” when making future purchasing decisions. ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 6, 17 8. They further allege that they will “be harmed if, in the future, [they are] left to guess 18 whether [Defendant’s] Products contain ingredients like PFAS and whether the Products 19 are worth the prices charged.” Id. 20 “An actionable cognizable injury exists where a plaintiff alleges that they cannot 21 rely on defendant's labeling when deciding whether to purchase products in the future.” 22 Roper v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 3d 903, 916 (E.D. Cal. 2020). Courts 23 in this Circuit have found that allegations like those made by Plaintiffs are sufficient for a 24 claim for injunctive relief to survive a motion to dismiss. See Roper, 510 F. Supp. 3d at 25 916; Hamman, 2023 WL 3450654, at *6 (finding plaintiff plausibly pled threat of future 26 injury where plaintiffs “alleged that they would like to purchase Defendant’s Products in 27 1 the future, but are unable to determine if the Products are actually healthy, safe, and 2 sustainable because they cannot rely on the representations in Defendant’s current 3 advertise and marketing scheme that omit any reference to PFAS.” (internal quotation 4 marks omitted)). This Court agrees. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to 5 seek injunctive to relief. 6 D. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring Claims Regarding Products They Did Not Purchase or Test 7 There is no controlling authority in the Ninth Circuit on whether plaintiffs in a class 8 action lawsuit have standing to assert claims based on products they did not purchase. 9 Anderberg v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1240 (S.D. Cal. 2023); Renn 10 v. Otay Lakes Brewery, LLC, 23-cv-01139-GPC(BLM), 2023 WL 6050582, at *3 (S.D. 11 Cal. Sept. 14, 2023). Some courts have held that plaintiffs lack such standing. See, e.g., 12 Lorentzen v. Kroger Co., 532 F. Supp. 3d 901, 909 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (finding no standing 13 to bring claims for products plaintiff did not purchase); Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., No. 14 C 11-05403 JW, 2012 WL 2847575, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012) (same); Ringler v. 15 J.M. Smucker Co., 783 F. Supp. 3d 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“[T]he ‘substantial similarity’ 16 analysis appears to be inconsistent with the basic concept of standing.” (internal quotation 17 marks and citation omitted)). However, “[t]he prevailing view in the Ninth Circuit is to 18 allow class action plaintiffs to bring claims for products they did not purchase as long as 19 the products and alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar.” Corbett v. 20 Pharmacare U.S., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1011 (S.D. Cal. 2021); Renn, 2023 WL 21 6050582, at *3 (applying “substantially similar” test); Brown v. Food for Life Baking Co., 22 Inc., 658 F. Supp. 3d 732 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (same); Roffman v. Rebbl, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 23 3d 723, 728–29 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (same). This Court has applied the substantially similar 24 test in the past, see, e.g., Corbett, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1011; Renn, 2023 WL 6050582, at 25 *3, and sees no reason to stray from this approach here. 26 27 1 Here, at the pleading stage, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Products at 2 issue—Miracle-Gro soil and fertilizer products with packaging that represents they are 3 organic—are substantially similar. Plaintiffs allege that all Products (1) are Miracle-Gro 4 soil and fertilizer products ECF No. 8, ¶ 1; (2) are labeled as organic, ECF No. 8, ¶ 1, 29; 5 (3) are marketed as organic and safe to use on edible plants; ECF No. 8, at ¶¶ 50, 52; (4) 6 contain PFAS, id. ¶¶ 1-2, ¶ 58; and (5) fail to disclose the presence of PFAS, id. ¶ 58. In 7 support of their allegations that the Products contain PFAS, Plaintiffs conducted 8 independent testing of a subset of seven different Miracle-Gro Products labeled as organic. 9 Id. ¶¶ 30-49. The sample subset Products were acquired from Northern and Southern 10 California, New York, New Jersey, and Oregon in 2024 and 2025. Id. ¶ 30. Each sampled 11 Product—including the actual Products purchased by Plaintiffs—contained PFAS in 12 amounts beyond certain identified EPA thresholds. ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 34-35, 37-38, 40, 42, 13 44, 46, 48. Specifically, all seven of the tested Products contained PFOS, and six of the 14 seven contained both PFOS and PFOA. Id. In light of these allegations, the Court finds 15 that Plaintiffs have alleged a “sufficient similarity between the products purchased and not 16 purchased.” Astiana v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C-11-2910 EMC, 2012 WL 17 2990766, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012). 18 Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ lack standing as to those products not 19 tested. The Court disagrees. Based on the alleged similarity of the Products and the testing 20 conducted—wherein each tested Product contained either PFOS or both PFOS and PFOA 21 in amounts exceeding certain EPA screening thresholds—Plaintiffs have averred 22 sufficient facts from which this Court can make the reasonable inference that the Products, 23 including those not directly tested, contain PFAS. See, e.g., Solis v. Coty, Inc., No. 22- 24 CV-0400-BAS-NLS, 2023 WL 2394640, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2023) (“Thus, to 25 survive Defendants’ facial challenge, Solis need not explicitly allege the unit of Product 26 she purchased actually contained PFAS or that all units of the Product contain PFAS, but 27 1 may simply aver facts from which this Court can make such reasonable inferences.”) 2 (dismissing for lack of standing on other grounds); Krakauer v. Recreational Equip., Inc., 3 No. C22-5830 BHS, 2024 WL 1494489, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2024) (to plausibly 4 allege PFAS contamination, plaintiff must establish that products are substantially similar 5 to those that contain PFAS). 6 However, the Court does take issue with extending Plaintiffs’ standing to claims 7 regarding Products not identified in the complaint. Plaintiffs allege that the Products at 8 issue in this case “consist of all Scotts Miracle-Gro soil and fertilizer products with 9 packaging that represents they are organic.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 29. Plaintiffs go on to state that 10 the challenged Products “include but are not limited to” a list of twelve products. Id. Here, 11 Plaintiffs’ allegations rely not only on Defendant’s assertion that the Products are organic, 12 but also on various labeling representations and similarities, which Plaintiffs demonstrate 13 by attaching images of each Product label to the complaint. ECF No. 8-1. The Court does 14 not find that Plaintiffs can sustain these claims related to various unidentified Products 15 that may or may not share similar packaging. Thus, the Court limits Plaintiffs’ claims to 16 those relating to the Products identified in the Complaint. 17 The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to raise their claims as related to 18 the Products identified in the complaint. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to 19 dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). 20 III. California’s Safe Harbor Doctrine Limits Plaintiffs’ Claims 21 Defendant next argues that California’s safe harbor rule precludes Plaintiffs’ claims, 22 because California regulations permit Defendant’s labeling of its products as organic. ECF 23 No. 12, at 15–20. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the safe harbor 24 doctrine to the extent they challenge Defendant’s use of the term “organic.” 25 // 26 // 27 1 A. The Safe Harbor Doctrine 2 “In California, unfair competition claims are subject to the safe harbor doctrine, 3 which precludes plaintiffs from bringing claims based on ‘actions the Legislature 4 permits.’” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cel-Tech 5 Comms. Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 182 (1999)). The doctrine applies 6 to claims under the UCL, CLRA, and FAL. Id.; see also Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 7 F.3d 925, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2011). 8 The California Supreme Court has outlined the safe harbor doctrine as follows: 9 Although the unfair competition law’s scope is sweeping, it is not unlimited. . . . Specific legislation may limit the judiciary's 10 power to declare conduct unfair. If the Legislature has permitted 11 certain conduct or considered a situation and concluded no action should lie, courts may not override that determination. When 12 specific legislation provides a “safe harbor,” plaintiffs may not 13 use the general unfair competition law to assault that harbor. 14 Cel–Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 182. Thus, under the safe harbor doctrine, “[t]o forestall an action 15 under the unfair competition law, another provision must actually ‘bar’ the action or 16 clearly permit the conduct.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1164 (9th 17 Cir. 2012) (quoting Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 183). The relevant provision may be a statute 18 or a regulation. Id. at 1166. If the provision permits the conduct, a plaintiff may not use 19 general unfair competition law to argue that the permitted conduct is unlawful. Barber v. 20 Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 958 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff'd, 730 F. App'x 464 (9th 21 Cir. 2018). 22 B. California’s Organic Labeling Regulations for Fertilizers 23 Here, the California Department of Food and Agriculture (“CDFA”) must review 24 and approve all fertilizer labels before fertilizers are distributed to the consumer market. 25 Cal. Food & Agri. Code § 14631. Of relevance in this case, “[f]ertilizing material labels 26 . . . displaying the term ‘organic’ . . . shall be registered as an organic input material.” Cal. 27 1 Code Regs. Tit. 3 § 2320.4. “Organic input material,” or “OIM” is defined as “any bulk 2 or packaged commercial fertilizer, agricultural mineral, beneficial substance, or specialty 3 fertilizer, excluding pesticides, that is to be used in organic crop and food production and 4 that complies with the requirements of the National Organic Program standards.” Cal. 5 Food Agri. Code § 14550.5. An entity seeking to register organic input material must pay 6 a registration fee to support the “additional departmental resources and review time” 7 expended to “ensure that nutrient guarantees and claims are scientifically feasible and 8 meet the National Organic Program standards.” Cal. Food. & Agri. Code § 14601. The 9 OIM registration application requests various information about a given product’s 10 ingredients, suppliers, manufacturing processes, and more. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 3 11 § 2320.2. The CDFA may refuse to register any fertilizer or packaged soil “for which any 12 false or misleading claim is made or implied.” Cal. Food & Agri. Code § 14601(h)(1). The 13 CDFA maintains an official list of registered organic input material (“OIM”). Cal. Code 14 Regs. Tit. 3 §§ 2320.4, 2320.5. 15 C. Safe Harbor Bars Plaintiffs’ Unfair Competition Claims Based On Defendant’s Use of the Term “Organic” 16 To the extent Plaintiffs challenge the labeling of the Products as organic, such 17 claims are barred by the safe harbor doctrine, as California regulations affirmatively 18 permit such labeling. See Ebner, 838 F.3d at 963. Defendant has produced—and the Court 19 has properly taken judicial notice of—the CDFA’s list of “Registered OIM Products.” See 20 ECF No. 12-1, at 55–138. Each of the Products at issue in Plaintiffs’ complaint appears 21 on the Registered OIM Products list. See ECF 12-1, at 101-103.3 The Products “Registered 22 23 24 3 Defendant notes that one of the Products—Miracle-Gro Organic Choice Potting Mix—is 25 not on the current Organic Input Materials (“OIM”) list because it was discontinued in 26 2019. ECF No. 12, at 17. However, the Court has taken judicial notice of a prior OIM list that includes Miracle-Gro Organic Choice Potting Mix. ECF No. 12-1, at 256. 27 1 OIM” status demonstrates that (1) Defendant applied for OIM status for each Product, and 2 that (2) the CDFA has determined that each Product meets the definition of organic input 3 materials. Further, the registration allows each Product to bear the term “organic” on its 4 labeling. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 3 § 2320.4 (“Fertilizing material labels . . . displaying the 5 term ‘organic’ . . . shall be registered as an organic input material.”). Thus, Defendant’s 6 use of the term “organic” on its products is expressly permitted by relevant California 7 regulatory scheme, and Plaintiffs cannot use unfair competition law to challenge the 8 permitted conduct. 9 To the extent that Plaintiffs take issue with what the state of California considers 10 when registering products as “organic input material”—and thereby allowing products to 11 display the term “organic”—a suit against Defendant Scotts is not the appropriate avenue 12 to raise such grievances. Indeed, “that is precisely the sort of legislative second-guessing 13 that the safe harbor doctrine guards against.” Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 962. 14 Consequently, given the regulatory scheme in place, Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant 15 misrepresented the Products as organic are barred by the safe harbor doctrine. 16 Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ UCL, 17 CLRA, and FAL claims to the extent they allege that Defendant misrepresented its 18 Products as organic. Because no amendment would enable Plaintiffs’ organic-based 19 misrepresentation claims to evade the safe harbor doctrine, the dismissal is without leave 20 to amend. Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 964. 21 1. Dismissal On Safe Harbor Grounds Is Not Premature 22 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s safe harbor argument is premature, as it is an 23 affirmative defense not properly addressed at the motion to dismiss stage. ECF No. 17, at 24 12-13. However, consumer protection safe harbor claims are routinely addressed at the 25 motion to dismiss stage by the Ninth Circuit and district courts within it. See, e.g., Ebner 26 v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2016); Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925 (9th 27 1 Cir. 2011); Davis, 691 F.3d at 1167; Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 2 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Alaei v. Rockstar, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 992 (S.D. Cal. 2016); 3 Angiano v. Anheuser-Busch InBev Worldwide, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 3d 911 (C.D. Cal. 2021). 4 Further, the applicable California regulations and the Products’ judicially-noticed status as 5 registered organic input materials clearly indicate to the Court that Defendant’s use of the 6 term organic is permitted by law. Thus, this Court joins others in dismissing the claims on 7 safe harbor grounds at this juncture. 8 D. The Safe Harbor Extends to Plaintiffs’ Common Law Claims 9 The Court finds that the safe harbor applies to Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims 10 under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL as well as Plaintiffs’ common law claims based on the 11 same conduct. The Court acknowledges that there is a split in authority as to whether the 12 safe harbor spans beyond consumer protection statutes. Compare Hood v. Handi-Foil 13 Corp., 2024 WL 4008711, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2024) (where safe harbor applied, 14 dismissing all state law claims arising from same conduct) and McCoy v. McCormick & 15 Co., Inc., 2025 WL 1918546, at *10–11 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025), report and 16 recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2315457 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2025) (same), with 17 Samberg v. Whitestone Home Furnishings, LLC, No. 25-CV-10767-JSC, 2026 WL 18 1283386, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2026) (limiting safe harbor to only consumer protection 19 claims), and Daldalian v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-01491-WLH-E, 2025 WL 2778326, 20 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (same). However, to the extent that the safe harbor doctrine 21 functions to “preclude[] plaintiffs from bringing claims based on ‘actions the legislature 22 permits,’” Ebner, 838 F.3d at 963 (quoting Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 183), the doctrine’s 23 purpose is only well-served if it applies to all such claims, not only those under the 24 consumer protection statutes. Finding otherwise would enable plaintiffs to simply 25 circumvent the doctrine entirely by framing consumer protection claims within common 26 law causes of action. 27 1 Thus, the Court will not limit the safe harbor’s application to Plaintiffs’ UCL, 2 CLRA, and FAL claims. Because the safe harbor precludes liability for Defendant’s use of 3 the term organic, “it follows that no state law claim will lie to the extent it arises out of the 4 same conduct.” Flodin v. Cent. Garden & Pet Co., No. 21-CV-01631-JST, 2023 WL 5 3607278, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2023) (Baum v. J-B Weld Co., LLC, No. 19-cv-01718- 6 EMC, 2020 WL 4923624, at *3–*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020)). Plaintiff’s breach of 7 express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and unjust enrichment claims are all 8 premised on Defendant’s representation that the Products are organic. ECF No. 8, ¶ 110 9 (“Scotts has expressly warranted on the packaging of the Products that they are organic.”; 10 id. ¶ 119 (“Scotts made an implied promise that the Products were organic.”); id. ¶ 125 11 (“It is inequitable and unjust for Scotts to retain these revenues because Scotts falsely 12 represented that the Products were organic.”). Because this conduct was permitted by 13 California regulations, Plaintiff’s common law claims are also barred by the safe harbor 14 doctrine. The Court therefore grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of 15 express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and unjust enrichment claims. To the extent 16 that these claims concern Defendant’s use of the term “organic,” the dismissal is without 17 leave to amend. 18 E. Safe Harbor Does Not Bar Plaintiffs’ Omissions Claims or Alternate Misrepresentation Claims 19 Plaintiffs’ complaint also challenges Defendant’s failure to disclose the presence of 20 PFAS in the Products. See ECF No. 17, at 11 (“Even if Defendant was permitted to label 21 its products as Organic, Defendant’s packaging omits the material fact that it contains 22 PFAS[.]”); ECF No. 8, ¶ 98 (“Scotts knew or should have known that . . . by omitting the 23 presence of PFAS in its products, it was omitting a material fact.”); id. ¶ 2 (“Scotts fails 24 to disclose that PFAS are present in its Products because it knows that this likely would 25 influence [consumers’] purchasing decisions[.]”). Unlike Plaintiffs’ claims regarding 26 Defendant’s use of the term organic, “this claim does not fall within the safe harbor 27 1 because there is no law expressly permitting the omission of supplemental statements.” 2 Ebner, 838 F.3d at 964. Thus, “because the omission of supplemental statements is not 3 expressly and affirmatively permitted by law, Plaintiff’s claim that the [labeling] is 4 nonetheless deceptive due to the lack of a supplemental statement [disclosing PFAS] is 5 not precluded by the safe harbor doctrine.” Id. See also, Hadley, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 6 (“[C]ompliance with FDA labeling requirements does not create a safe harbor for all 7 omissions.”). 8 At this juncture, the safe harbor doctrine also does not bar Plaintiffs’ 9 misrepresentation claims that do not stem from Defendant’s labeling of the product as 10 organic. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “advertises to consumers that the 11 Products are . . . safe to use on edible plants and residential gardening,” and that “[t]hese 12 representations for each Product are false.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 50. Such a claim is not grounded 13 in Defendant’s labeling of the products as organic and is therefore not barred by the safe 14 harbor doctrine. 15 IV. UCL, FAL, and CLRA Claims 16 California’s three main consumer protection statutes are summarized as follows: 17 The UCL [proscribes] business practices that are ‘unlawful, unfair or fraudulent,’ Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200[;] 18 the FAL prohibits the dissemination of any advertising ‘which is 19 untrue or misleading,’ Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500[;] and the CLRA declares specific acts and practices in the sale of 20 goods or services to be unlawful, including making affirmative 21 misrepresentations or omissions regarding the ‘standard, quality, or grade’ of a particular good or service, Cal. Civ. Code § 22 1770(a). 23 Grausz v. Hershey Co., 713 F. Supp. 3d 818, 826 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (quoting In re Sony 24 Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 985 (S.D. 25 Cal. 2014)). Each “prong” of the UCL—unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent—“provides a 26 separate and distinct theory of liability.” Hadley, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1089. Plaintiffs raise 27 1 a claim under each. See ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 68-79. The Court will first analyze the FAL, CLRA, 2 and fraudulent prong of the UCL together. It will then address the unlawful and unfair 3 prongs of the UCL. 4 A. FAL, CLRA, and Fraudulent Prong of the UCL 5 “Under the FAL, the CLRA, and the fraudulent prong of the UCL, conduct is 6 considered deceptive or misleading if the conduct is ‘likely to deceive [a] reasonable 7 consumer.’” Burnett v. Walmart, Inc., No. 4:25-CV-00228-YGR, 821 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 8 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th 9 Cir. 2008)). “Because the same standard for fraudulent activity governs all three statutes, 10 courts often analyze the three statutes together.” Id. 11 “To state a fraudulent omission or misrepresentation claim under the CLRA, FAL, 12 or UCL, a plaintiff must plead (1) misrepresentation or omission, (2) reliance, and (3) 13 damages.” Grausz, 713 F. Supp. 3d at 826. 14 1. Misrepresentation Theory 15 Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation theory primarily rests on Defendant’s use of the term 16 organic. The Court has already held that the safe harbor doctrine bars any such claim, as 17 California regulations permit Defendant’s use of the term organic. However, Plaintiff also 18 alleges that Defendant “advertises to consumers that the Products are . . . safe to use on 19 edible plants and residential gardening,” by “providing images of tomatoes, peppers, and 20 strawberries surrounded by soil.” ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 50, 52. Plaintiff further alleges that this 21 “representation[] for each Product [is] false,” id. ¶ 50, because “[e]xposure to PFAS, even 22 at low parts-per-trillion (ppt) can build up in the human body over time and cause severe 23 adverse health effects,” id. ¶ 24. Because this claim does not rely on Defendant’s assertion 24 that the products are organic, it is not barred by the safe harbor doctrine. 25 To state a misrepresentation claim under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL, a plaintiff must 26 plead (1) misrepresentation, (2) reliance, and (3) damages, “all with the particularity 27 1 required by Rule 9(b).” Boyd v. SunButter, LLC, 762 F. Supp. 3d 931, 941 (C.D. Cal. 2 2025), adopted, No. CV 24-7873-GW-BFMX, 2025 WL 84700 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2025). 3 Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claim premised on the imagery of fruits and vegetables in 4 soil on the Product labels fails because Plaintiffs have not pled that they were actually 5 misled by the imagery indicating that the Products were safe to use on edible plants, or 6 that they relied on that imagery. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that “Calcagno and Pathangi 7 purchased the Products for their own personal use in reliance on Scotts’s false 8 representations that the Products contained only organic ingredients.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 67. 9 See also id. ¶¶ 5, 7 (“[Plaintiffs] relied on the representation that the soil was organic when 10 [they] decided to purchase it.”). Because Plaintiffs allege only that they relied on the 11 representation that the soil was organic—not on the imagery implying that the soil was 12 safe for growing edible plants—Plaintiffs alternate misrepresentation claim cannot 13 survive. See Boyd, 762 F. Supp. 3d at 943. 14 The Court also considers whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the 15 imagery indicating that the Products are safe to use on edible plants is false and 16 misleading. Under Rule 9(b), a consumer protection plaintiff must provide “specific 17 factual pleading that indicates why allegedly fraudulent statements are false or 18 misleading.” Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 19 Plaintiff alleges that the imagery indicating that the Products are safe on edible plants is 20 false or misleading because (1) the Products contain PFAS beyond the EPA Regional 21 Screening Levels (RSLs) and Soil Screening Levels (SSLs); (2) “PFAS persist and 22 bioaccumulate in the food chain when released into the environment and build up in the 23 body when humans consume PFAS-contaminated food; and (3) “[e]xposure to PFAS, 24 even at low parts-per-trillion (ppt) can build up in the human body over time and cause 25 severe adverse health effects.” ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 24, 34. 26 27 1 Defendant takes issue with the EPA thresholds identified by Plaintiffs (the RSLs 2 and SSLs). Defendant sought judicial notice of EPA documentation providing additional 3 insight into the EPA’s RSL and SSL determinations and their relevance to the claims now 4 before the Court. See ECF No. 12-2, at 3-4. However, at this juncture, the Court need not 5 consider external evidence regarding the EPA thresholds identified by Plaintiff—these are 6 fact questions concerning the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. It is enough that Plaintiffs have 7 pled that testing revealed a presence of PFAS exceeding certain EPA benchmarks. See 8 Kanan v. Thinx Inc., No. CV 20-10341 JVS-JRP, 2021 WL 4464200, at *4-*5 (C.D. Cal. 9 June 23, 2021) (plaintiff adequately alleged presence of PFAS to support alleged injury 10 where they pled that testing revealed PFAS “above trace amounts.”); Hamman, 2023 WL 11 3450654, at *5 (plaintiffs adequately alleged presence of PFAS to support alleged injury 12 where they pled that the salad bowl products contained “heightened levels of organic 13 fluorine.”). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the imagery 14 on the Products was misleading and why it was misleading. Even so, due to the lack of 15 alleged reliance, Plaintiffs’ alternative misrepresentation claim cannot survive 16 Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 17 2. Omission Theory 18 Because Plaintiffs’ surviving theory of UCL, FAL and CLRA liability is based on 19 Defendant’s omission of the presence of PFAS, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege a 20 fraudulent omission. See Burnett, 821 F. Supp. 3d at 1043; Grausz, 713 F. Supp. 3d at 21 826. “To plausibly allege a fraudulent omission, the omission must either (1) ‘be contrary 22 to a representation actually made by the defendant,’ (a “partial omission”); or (2) ‘an 23 omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose’ (a “pure omission”).” Wysocki 24 v. Chobani, LLC, 828 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1079 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2026) (quoting Hodsdon 25 v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2018)). Here, Plaintiffs make no allegations 26 regarding an alleged duty to disclose. Thus, Plaintiffs pursue a partial omission claim and 27 1 must establish that the omission of PFAS is “contrary to” a representation actually made 2 by Defendant. 3 Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Defendant’s alleged omissions are largely secondary to 4 their claims regarding Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation that the Products are 5 organic. However, Plaintiffs do allege that Defendant (1) “represents that the Products are 6 organic,” ECF No. 8, ¶ 1; (2) “fails to disclose the PFAS are present in the Products,” id. 7 ¶ 2; and (3) PFAS are not organic, id. ¶ 28. Thus, Plaintiffs claim that the omission of a 8 PFAS disclosure is “contrary to” the representation Defendant actually made that the 9 Products are organic. 10 However, “[a] plaintiff cannot allege that a partial omission causes a duty to disclose 11 . . . where they only claim that the defendant's marketing labels are outright false.” 12 Wysocki, 828 F. Supp. 3d at 1079 (citing Hamman v. Cava Grp., Inc., No. 22-CV-593- 13 MMA (MSB), 2023 WL 3450654, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023)); see also Anderson v. 14 Apple Inc., 500 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“Indeed, the entire theory of a 15 case based on partial omissions is that what is disclosed is in some sense true but that the 16 whole truth is missing.”). “This is because all misrepresentations are merely omissions of 17 the facts that make the statement untrue.” Wysocki, 828 F. Supp. 3d at 1080; see also 18 Hamman, 2023 WL 3450654, at *9 (“Plaintiffs’ theory of the case is not altered whether 19 they describe the alleged misconduct as an outright misrepresentation of the Products as 20 ‘healthy’ or as an omission of the PFAS, which makes the ‘healthy’ statements untrue.”). 21 Plaintiff’s allegations “make clear that Plaintiff[s] argue[] that the Products’ 22 labels”—particularly the claims that the Products are organic—“are outright false.” Id. 23 See also ECF No. 8, ¶ 1 (“Scotts falsely represents that the Products are organic even 24 though they contain synthetic, non-organic, and harmful forever chemicals known as 25 [PFAS].”); id. ¶ 72–73 (“Scotts engaged in fraudulent business practice by knowingly 26 representing to consumers that the Products were organic,” when the Products “are not, in 27 1 fact, organic.”); id. ¶ 50 (“Scotts advertises to consumers that the Products are organic soil 2 and/or fertilizers . . . These representations for each Product are false.”). Accordingly, 3 Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under a partial omission theory. See Wysocki, 828 F. Supp. 4 3d at 1079–80; Ringler, 783 F. Supp. 3d at 1242; Hamman, 2023 WL 3450654, at *9. 5 To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to base a partial omission claim on the theory that 6 the presence of PFAS is “contrary to” the imagery indicating that the Products are safe for 7 use on edible plants, the same reasoning applies. Plaintiffs again clearly argue that the 8 suggestion that the Products are safe for use on edible plants is outright false. ECF No. 8, 9 ¶ 50 (“Scotts advertises to consumers that the Products are . . . safe to use on edible plants 10 and residential gardening. These representations for each Product are false.”). Thus, 11 Plaintiffs’ allegations cannot sustain an omissions theory relating to the imagery on the 12 Product packaging. 13 Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ omission 14 claims under the CLRA, FAL, and fraudulent prong of the UCL. However, because 15 Plaintiffs may possibly allege additional facts to cure the identified deficiencies, these 16 claims are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 17 B. UCL – Unlawful Prong 18 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s actions were unlawful per the UCL because they 19 violated the FAL and CLRA. ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 77-78. However, the Court has already found 20 that Plaintiffs’ FAL and CLRA claims are (1) barred insofar as they challenge Defendant’s 21 representation of the Products as organic and (2) insufficiently pled to the extent they 22 allege an alternative misrepresentation or a fraudulent omission. Thus, Plaintif’s UCL 23 claim cannot rely on the Defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct under the FAL or CLRA. 24 Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant’s Products are misbranded under California 25 regulations because they do not comply with California’s Food and Agricultural Code’s 26 definition of “natural organic fertilizer,” which is defined as “materials derived from either 27 1 plant or animal products . . . which shall not be mixed with synthetic materials.” Cal. Food 2 & Agric. Code § 14548. 3 As discussed above, to the extent this claim is based on Defendant’s lawful labeling 4 of the Products as organic, it is barred by the safe harbor doctrine. However, Plaintiff has 5 also failed to demonstrate any statutory violation. California’s regulatory scheme requires 6 only that the Products be registered Organic Input Material to bear the label organic. See 7 Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 3 § 2320.4 (“Fertilizing material labels . . . displaying the term 8 ‘organic’ . . . shall be registered as an organic input material.”). Thus, to the extent 9 California’s definitions of “organic input material” and “natural organic fertilizer,” may 10 differ, compare Cal. Food. Agri. Code § 14550.5 (defining “organic input material”) with 11 id. § 14548 (defining “natural organic fertilizer”), only the former bears on Defendant’s 12 ability to label its Products as organic. Even if the definition of “natural organic fertilizer” 13 did regulate Defendant’s capacity to label its products as organic, Plaintiffs do not allege 14 that Defendant has “mixed” PFAS with the plant or animal products from which the 15 Products are derived such that they fail to meet the “natural organic fertilizer” definition. 16 Defendant’s Products are registered organic input material, see ECF No. 12-1, at 17 101-103, and are therefore permitted to be labeled as organic under California law, see 18 Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 3 § 2320.4. Such a practice is not unlawful under California’s statute 19 defining “natural organic fertilizer.” Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 14548. Accordingly, 20 Plaintiffs’ cause of action under the unlawful prong of the UCL is dismissed. 21 C. UCL - Unfair Prong 22 “The unfair prong of the UCL prohibits a business practice that ‘violates established 23 public policy or if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury 24 to consumers which outweighs its benefits.’” Hadley, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (quoting 25 McKell v. Wash. Mut., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1473). The exact contours of the 26 27 1 “unfair” prong are unsettled within California courts. See id.; Hawkins v. Kroger Co., 512 2 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2021). 3 However, the Court need not assess the exact meaning of “unfair” in this case, 4 because “where the unfair business practices alleged under the unfair prong of the UCL 5 overlap entirely with the business practices addressed in the fraudulent and unlawful 6 prongs of the UCL, the unfair prong of the UCL cannot survive if the claims under the 7 other two prongs of the UCL do not survive.” Hadley, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1104-1105 8 (citing Punian v. Gillette Co., 2016 WL 1029607, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016)); see 9 also Romoff v. Gen. Motors LLC, 574 F. Supp. 3d 782, 790 (S.D. Cal. 2021), aff'd, No. 10 22-55170, 2023 WL 1097258 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2023) (“The factual basis for Plaintiffs’ 11 unfair-prong UCL claim is the same as for Plaintiffs’ other claims. Because the Complaint 12 fails to allege facts to support an inference that [defendant’s] conduct is deceptive or 13 violates any statutory provision, this Court joins numerous other district courts in holding 14 that the unfair-prong claim must also be rejected.”). 15 Plaintiffs’ cause of action under the unfair prong of the UCL is based on the 16 allegations that Scotts “engaged in a false advertising campaign to mislead consumers into 17 believing that by purchasing Scotts’ organic soil and/or fertilizer Products, they were 18 receiving a product that only contained organic ingredients.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 69. Thus, 19 Plaintiffs’ unfair prong UCL cause of action is based on the same contentions discussed 20 above that Defendant (1) misrepresented that the Products were organic, or (2) 21 fraudulently omitted that the products contained PFAS. Having found that Plaintiffs have 22 failed to state a claim under the fraudulent and unlawful prongs of the UCL based on the 23 same conduct, Plaintiffs have also failed to allege a cause of action under the unfair prong 24 of the UCL. 25 26 27 1 Thus, for the same reasons the Court granted the motion to dismiss as to the above 2 ||causes of action, Plaintiffs’ claim under the unfair prong of the UCL is dismissed. See 3 || Hadley, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1105. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss 6 || Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 7 || Procedure 12(b)(1). 8 The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to 9 || state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 10 To the extent that Plaintiffs’ UCL, FAL, CLRA, breach of express warranty, breach 11 || of implied warranty, and unjust enrichment claims are premised on Defendant’s allegedly 12 misleading use of the term “organic,” such claims are barred by the safe harbor doctrine. 13 || Accordingly, such claims are dismissed without leave to amend. 14 However, because Plaintiffs may be able to allege additional facts or theories to 15 ||support an alternative misrepresentation claim or an omissions claim—or common law 16 ||clatms based on such alternative misrepresentations or omissions—those claims are 17 || dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, they 18 should do so within 30 days of the date of this order. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: September 11, 2026 2 sf 21 Hon. athe Ck 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 31 28 3:25-cv-02661-GPC-DEB