Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 L.B., by and through his Guardians Ad Case No.: 23-cv-00528-AJB-DDL Litem Eric Baumgardner and Robin 13 Morrisey, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 14 MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE Plaintiff, ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 15 v. 16 (Doc. No. 73) SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 17 DISTRICT, 18 Defendant. 19 20 Before the Court is a motion to supplement the Administrative Record, filed by 21 Minor Plaintiff L.B. (“Plaintiff”), by and through his guardians ad litem, Eric Baumgardner 22 and Robin Morrisey. (Doc. No. 73.) Defendant San Diego Unified School District (“the 23 District”) opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 74.) The Court deems the matter suitable for 24 determination on the papers. See CivLR 7.1.d.1. For the reasons discussed below, the 25 motion is GRANTED. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiff initiated the instant action, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities 28 Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., seeking reversal of the Administrative 1 Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision in the District’s favor. (See generally Doc. No. 1, 2 Complaint.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks inter alia reimbursement and associated costs of 3 Plaintiff’s attendance at two out-of-state residential programs. (Id.) 4 The Court initially denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, affirmed the 5 ALJ’s decision, and denied Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement and attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 6 No. 56.) On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded that action to this Court for 7 further proceedings regarding whether the Individualized Education Plan that the District 8 offered Plaintiff during his private placement from October 9, 2020 to December 2, 2021, 9 met the requirements of a free appropriate public education and, if not, “whether tuition 10 reimbursement, attorneys’ fees, compensatory education, or other remedies may be 11 appropriate.” L.B. By & Through Morrisey v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 168 F.4th 1150, 12 1163 (9th Cir. 2026). As a part of that inquiry, the Court “may hold further proceedings 13 regarding [Plaintiff’s] right to reimbursement” and “may hear additional evidence at the 14 request of a party[.]” Id. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 When reviewing an administrative hearing decision under IDEA, statutory 17 guidelines provide that the court: 18 (i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and 19 (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall 20 grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. 21 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). “‘[A]dditional’ [is construed] in the ordinary sense of the word 22 to mean supplemental.” Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson (“Ojai”), 4 F.3d 1467, 1472–73 23 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Under Ninth Circuit “precedent, evidence that is non- 24 cumulative, relevant, and otherwise admissible constitutes ‘additional evidence’ that the 25 district court ‘shall’ consider pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii).” E.M. ex rel. E.M. 26 v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Off. of Admin. Hearings (“Pajaro Valley”), 652 F.3d 27 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2011). “The determination of what is ‘additional’ evidence must be left 28 to the discretion of the trial court which must be careful not to allow such evidence to 1 change the character of the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo.” Ojai, 4 F.3d at 2 1473 (citation omitted). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Plaintiff seeks to supplement the Administrative Record with payment information 5 from Mr. Baumgardner and Ms. Morrisey relating to payments made in interest of the 6 principal amount for L.B.’s private placement in the programs at Whetstone and Trails. 7 (Doc. No. 73 at 2.) Plaintiff argues the financial records reflect the accrual of interest on 8 the tuition payments which are relevant to Plaintiff’s requested remedy, occurred 9 subsequent to the administrative hearing, are not cumulative to this appeal, and are 10 otherwise admissible. (See generally Doc. No. 73-1 at 11–18.) 11 The District opposes, arguing that (1) Plaintiff provides no evidence loan interest 12 reimbursement is an available remedy for IDEA cases and (2) the proffered evidence lacks 13 relevancy because it is vague and poorly explained. (See generally Doc. No. 74.) 14 First, the District argues that “[n]o case in the Ninth Circuit has included an award 15 of reimbursement for interest payments on loans taken by parents to pay for private 16 services” because “[l]oan payments are not an educational placement, a related service, or 17 the cost of a placement” which would be “appropriate relief” within the meaning of the 18 IDEA and there is “no evidence that loan interest reimbursement is an available [equitable] 19 remedy that this Court can grant[.]” (Id. at 8–9.) Plaintiff points to the language of the 20 IDEA statute “as conferring broad equitable discretion to courts” to support the request for 21 reimbursement of interest paid and accrued on the loan taken out by Plaintiff’s parents to 22 pay for the underlying private placement. (Doc. No. 73-1 at 10.) Additionally, Plaintiff 23 states that “[s]ome courts have awarded interest on the reimbursement amount calculated 24 from when parents paid expenses as equitable relief based on the broad discretion in 25 awarding relief granted by the IDEA.” (Id. at 11 (citing first JP ex rel. Peterson v. Cnty. 26 Sch. Bd. of Hanover Cnty., Va., 641 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009); then Streck v. Bd. of 27 Educ. of E. Greenbush Cent. Sch. Dist., 408 F. App’x 411 (2d Cir. 2010)).) 28 /// 1 Although Plaintiff does not identify any Ninth Circuit authority awarding interest, 2 neither party has identified authority prohibiting the award of interest1 and other courts 3 beyond this circuit have awarded pre-judgment interest as a part of tuition reimbursement. 4 See, e.g., B.P. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. 3:06CV445, 2010 WL 5 1418334, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 2, 2010) (“The Court finds and concludes that an award of 6 prejudgment interest as to the award for reimbursement of tuition and related expenses is 7 required to fully compensate the Petruks in this case.”); Streck, 408 F. App’x at 414–15 8 (holding that “[t]he Strecks are entitled to interest on the tuition, laptop, and 9 neuropsychological evaluation expenses they incurred almost a decade ago,” computed 10 “using the standard federal interest calculation methodology in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)” 11 running “not from the date of the district court’s first decision (as generally prescribed by 12 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)), but from the date on which the Strecks actually paid each expense”). 13 Considering the stage of these proceedings and the motion currently before the Court, 14 Plaintiff has made a sufficient argument that the award of interest may be within this 15 Court’s equitable discretion when directly incurred on loans withdrawn to pay private 16 tuition. 17 Second, with regard to relevancy, the District argues that “[t]he amounts claimed in 18 direct payment for private services, the amount claimed by Ms. Morrisey as being paid for 19 out of her first HELOC for those private services, and the balance(s) on Ms. Morrisey’s 20 second HELOC both literally and figuratively do not add up.” (Doc. No. 74 at 10.) As such, 21 the District asserts that, “[w]ithout evidence of withdrawals from the first HELOC aligned 22 23 24 1 Pursuant to the IDEA, plaintiffs “can pursue injunctive or other prospective relief, including 25 reimbursement for the cost of private education, but not ordinarily monetary damages.” McIntyre v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 976 F.3d 902, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2020). “[I]t is an open question whether pre- 26 judgment interest may be obtained in an IDEA case.” T.B. v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 293 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1207 (S.D. Cal. 2018). The District’s stance is that interest on loans taken out to pay private 27 tuition would constitute monetary damages not reimbursement for the cost of private education. The merits of that issue are not fully before the Court on a motion to supplement the record. As such, the Court finds 28 1 to payments for private services” and “[w]ithout a final HELOC account statement for the 2 first HELOC,” the documents provided “do not tend to prove that Ms. Morrisey used her 3 HELOC account to fund L.B.’s private services” or “that the second HELOC was used 4 only to pay off the first HELOC.” (Id.) The District further asserts that “the request for 5 reimbursement lacks other necessary context, such as the interest and repayment length 6 terms of the original HELOC, or why it was deemed necessary to take a second HELOC 7 to pay the first HELOC.” (Id.) 8 The District’s arguments go to the weight the supplemental evidence should be 9 afforded, not to the evidence’s relevance. See, e.g., A.V. v. Panama-Buena Vista Union 10 Sch. Dist., No. 115CV00246MCEJLT, 2017 WL 11490410, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 11 2017). “The proper inquiry [i]s whether the [supplemental evidence] [i]s relevant, non- 12 cumulative, and otherwise admissible.” Pajaro Valley, 652 F.3d at 1006. Here, as argued 13 by Plaintiff, the financial documents are relevant to Plaintiff’s request for interest incurred 14 and paid which are a part of his request for reimbursement of the tuition paid. Whether the 15 evidence is sufficient to carry Plaintiff’s burden of proof is not a consideration in 16 determining relevancy. Additionally, the supplemental evidence is non-cumulative 17 considering that no evidence regarding interest incurred and paid has been previously 18 submitted. (See generally Doc. No. 32 (Administrative Record).) In fact, as noted by 19 Plaintiff, the accumulating interest reflected in this supplemental evidence was incurred 20 after the administrative hearing. (Doc. No. 73-1 at 12.) See also Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473 (“[T]he 21 district court has discretion to admit additional evidence concerning relevant events 22 occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing.”). Finally, the District makes no 23 arguments against the admissibility of the supplemental evidence, which is supported by a 24 declaration from Ms. Morrisey averring to her personal knowledge of the origin, accuracy, 25 and unaltered nature of the exhibits. (Compare Doc. No. 74 with Doc. No. 73-2, 26 Declaration of Robin Morrisey.) Accordingly, the Court finds the supplemental evidence 27 in Exhibits 2 through 11 to be relevant, non-cumulative, and otherwise admissible. See, 28 e.g., E.C.D. by & through Chery v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., No. 3:23-CV-00303- | || BEN-MSB, 2024 WL 3094631, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 21, 2024). 2 CONCLUSION 3 The Court finds that the proposed evidence is relevant, non-cumulative, and 4 || otherwise admissible. However, as briefing on the merits of this litigation is not yet before 5 Court, the Court makes no finding as to the weight of Plaintiff's evidence or whether 6 || the Ninth Circuit permits the award of interest on loans incurred to pay private tuition as a 7 of rermbursement for payment of such tuition. Instead, the Court simply holds only 8 ||that the supplemental evidence is relevant, non-cumulative, and otherwise admissible. 9 || Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to supplement the Administrative 10 || Record with Exhibits 2 through 11. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: September 11, 2026 © ¢ 13 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28