In re J.O. CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 9/11/26 In re J.O. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re J.O., a Person Coming B349951 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 25CCJP02460B) AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.O., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed. Owen P. Martikan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, Courtney Fisher, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________ Father challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and order declaring his son J.O. a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1),1 due to his domestic violence against mother and alcohol abuse, and the dispositional order removing the child from his custody. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Father and mother are the parents of J.O. (born April 2022). J.O. has a half-sibling, S.A (born August 2012). Mother and Dan A. share custody of S.A. Before these proceedings, father, mother, and J.O. were living together. S.A. was staying in their home on Sundays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays. Mother, S.A., and Dan A. are not part of this appeal. 1. Events Leading to Jurisdiction Over the Minors The incident that brought the parties to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for the instant dependency petition occurred on July 13, 2025. On this date, Sheriff’s deputies responded to a call that father, who was apparently intoxicated, had attacked mother. Yelling could be heard in the background during the call. According to the incident report, mother was home with J.O. and S.A. when father arrived home around 10:50 p.m.; he appeared drunk, was stumbling and having trouble walking straight. Father became upset with mother because she had not prepared food for him. They argued and mother took the children to their bedroom to put them to bed. She told father “to go to 1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless noted otherwise.

2 bed.” Father went to the breaker box and turned off the electricity to half of the house. Father then followed mother to the children’s room and pushed mother into the room. Mother tried to close the door on father, but he “punched the door” open and mother pushed him away. The children left their bedroom and went into the living room. Father entered the living room, saw J.O. on the couch, said he was going to take him, and picked him up. Mother walked up to father and told him to give her J.O. When she grabbed J.O. by the arm, father pulled away from her, and J.O. “call[ed] out for his mommy” and cried in pain. J.O. ended up on the floor and was taken out of the house by S.A. Mother said she went back to the kitchen, and father followed and attacked her. While mother was standing, father pushed her head down and wrapped his arm around her neck “in an attempt to choke her.” Mother then walked to her bedroom. Father followed her and pushed her into the room. Mother tried to get up, but father pushed her into the wall. The back of mother’s head hit the wall, causing her pain. Mother said she tried to defend herself and struck father’s body several times with her fists. When she called out for her son to call 911, father punched her, striking her in the stomach. When officers arrived, they observed an approximately 3-inch scratch on mother’s right arm, and the report noted that there had been “a history of domestic violence in the home [with] the last reported case . . . reported in 2023.” Deputies also spoke to S.A. and J.O. According to the report, S.A. said father had come home “drunk and stumbling,” and had followed mother into the children’s room, pushing her into it. S.A. said father punched the door twice when it closed on him, and pushed mother around the house. S.A. said that, 3 during the altercation, he took J.O. into the living room. S.A. saw his mother pulling J.O.’s arm while father held J.O. around his body. Father “was not releasing [J.O.] as he kept pulling him away from [mother].” S.A. feared J.O’s “arm would be dislocated.” J.O., who was only three years old, told officers his “arm had gotten stuck on his mommy’s arm and that his mommy had grabbed his right arm.” J.O. did not complain of pain to the deputies. The deputies arrested father for domestic violence and willful cruelty to a child. 2. DCFS’s investigation DCFS received the referral the day after the incident. A social worker interviewed the family in July and August, as reflected in the Detention Report dated September 3, 2025. A Dependency Investigator (DI) interviewed the family in September, with their statements reflected in the Jurisdiction/ Disposition report dated October 16, 2025. The interviews examined the July 13, 2025 incident, two prior domestic violence incidents that occurred in 2023, allegations that father abused alcohol, and the impact of mother’s medical conditions. Father did not speak to the DCFS investigators regarding the July 13, 2025 incident, upon advice of his attorney, due to his pending criminal case. At the request of father’s counsel, the dependency court also ordered DCFS not to interview father about the petition’s domestic violence allegations. a. July 13, 2025 incident In mother’s interviews, she admitted to difficulty with her memory and her recollection of specific details due to ongoing medical issues, including having undergone two brain surgeries and endured six weeks of radiation treatment.

4 She stated that the conflict arose when father arrived home late, stumbling and apparently intoxicated, and complained that mother had not prepared him a plate for dinner. Mother was in the boys’ room, and he was behind her. After he made a sarcastic comment, she pushed him to get out of the room. She stated that “ ‘[t]hat’s when the whole pushing and shoving went on.’ ” She also acknowledged that at some point, father pushed her, causing her to hit her head on the wall and fall; she denied that father ever hit her in the head. She also admitted that father had his arm around her head, but said that “everything happened so quickly” she was not able to recall all the details. She also stated that father punched her during this altercation, but recalled that it was in her side, not her stomach as reflected in the incident report, and she showed the social worker a purple bruise on the left side of her “stomach/side area.” Mother generally described the incident as “ ‘a lot of pushing and shoving,’ ” and acknowledged that her shirt was torn during the altercation. With respect to whether this incident occurred in the presence of the children, she said the altercation took place in her bedroom and the kitchen, but mother was not sure where the children were during the altercation due to the darkness in the home. By the time that she and father moved to the kitchen, however, she recalled that S.A. had already picked up J.O., who was crying, and taken him outside. Regarding J.O., mother told the social worker that father picked up J.O. to take him to the bedroom, and she grabbed J.O. and asked father to let him go. She denied that father was trying to leave the home with J.O. Mother said she was pulling J.O.’s arm to try to hold onto him and that she “may have pulled a 5 little too hard.” Mother said that neither child was injured during this incident, but acknowledged that S.A. could have been injured if he had physically intervened. S.A.’s description of the July 13, 2025 incident was consistent with mother’s and with what he previously told to law enforcement. S.A. said that he observed that father appeared drunk when he arrived home, was stumbling and “ ‘was all aggressive’ ” as mother went into the boys’ bedroom to put them to bed. He observed father punch or kick the door, and also push mother; he also observed mother push father. He said in his statement to the social worker that the parents went into the other bedroom, and in his statement to the DI he stated that mother took J.O. into the living room while S.A. followed. In both retellings, S.A. stated that mother, S.A., and J.O were in the living room when father came out of the bedroom and said he “was going to take” J.O. S.A. said father “usually gets [J.O.] and goes to the room with him and locks the door.” That day, however, S.A. said father “ ‘[g]rabbed’ ” J.O.—who was standing on the couch next to mother—“ ‘from like his chest.’ ” Mother “ ‘[t]ried to grab [J.O.] but she was only able to grab his arm.’ ” S.A. said J.O. began crying, and mother and father “then went to the hallway area.” J.O. “somehow . . . ended up on the floor.” S.A. told the DI he did not know if father had dropped J.O. S.A. observed J.O. on the floor crying, and mother and father “ ‘pushing each other’s shoulders. ’ ” S.A. picked up J.O. and went outside. From outside, S.A. heard arguing and pushing, and then heard mother “ ‘hit the wall.’ ” He also stated that he heard the utensil drawer fall. When S.A. took J.O. outside, he called his grandparents, and then—when mother yelled to call 911—he did.

6 Dan A. arrived at S.A.’s home, and took S.A. and J.O.—who was wearing only underwear—into his car to wait for law enforcement. S.A. was afraid his brother “ ‘might be injured.’ ” When asked how he felt about the incident, S.A. said, “ ‘Sad. I wanted to go back and defend my mom, but my main priority was [J.O.].’ ” Dan A. spoke with the social worker and DI regarding his observations of the July 13, 2025 incident. He stated that he was alerted to the incident when he received a call from S.A.’s paternal grandfather, who told Dan A. that S.A. had called him about something going on at S.A.’s home; Dan A. drove straight to S.A.’s house. Dan A. reported that S.A. told him that he saw mother get pushed and that mother and father “had fought over child [J.O.] and one of them pulled on his arm a little too hard.” He also overheard mother talking to law enforcement, stating that father “ ‘[p]unched her on the stomach.’ ” Dan A. observed that “ ‘it looked like she had gotten into a fight. Her shirt looked like it was pulled loose.’ ” The day after this incident, Dan A. went to mother’s home for a conversation. He stated that this was the second incident and he would not continue to allow S.A. to be at mother’s home if father was there. Mother told Dan A. that “she loves [father] and that she wants to try to work it out.” Mother also told Dan A. that he was “ ‘making her choose between her son and the man she loves.’ ” The social worker also spoke to paternal grandfather, who stated that he had seen father the night of the July 13 incident at about 8:00 p.m. at the restaurant where father was with his friends. According to paternal grandfather, father “appeared fine.” Paternal grandfather left and later received 7 a call from paternal grandmother that father had been arrested. After father’s release, paternal grandfather said father told him that he had had a few drinks, but “ ‘was not buzzed.’ ” Father told him the argument started when he “jokingly” asked mother, “ ‘where is my plate of food and why is the house not cleaned.’ ” Apparently from what father described, paternal grandfather thought the incident appeared to have been “more of a ‘[s]hoving match.’ ” b. August 2023 incident Dan A. stated that in August 2023, he and S.A. were celebrating S.A.’s birthday, and visited with mother, who was recuperating from having two brain tumors removed. While he was there, father “ ‘[c]ame home drunk and punched [Dan A.’s] truck.’ ” Dan A. stepped outside. He recognized father was intoxicated because “he was slurring.” Father then began arguing with mother. Dan A. stated that he stepped back inside and heard one of father’s brothers say “ ‘ “[i]f you wanna hit someone, hit me.” ’ ” He saw the brother “ ‘charge in the hallway,’ ” and took both S.A. and J.O. outside. When Dan A. stepped back inside, father and his brother “ ‘were in a lock.’ ” Dan A. stated that, while he was outside, he heard a “ ‘[s]mack’ ” and that mother “ ‘came outside saying that [father] slapped her, and that his brother had attacked [father] for hitting [mother].’ ” Dan A. told mother he would help her leave father. Mother stayed with Dan A.’s parents for “about a week, but then she decided to go back.” S.A. provided statements regarding the August 2023 incident that were consistent with Dan A.’s statements. S.A. stated that, on his birthday, while S.A. and Dan A. were visiting with mother, father came home and started arguing with mother.

8 S.A. said Dan A. took him, and eventually J.O., outside. While outside, S.A. “heard someone get slapped.” He believed it was father’s brother, but he did not see anything. S.A. told the DI he heard father’s brother—who was inside the house—say, “ ‘ “You can’t slap me while I’m holding [J.O.],” ’ ” and he then heard “ ‘a thud, and [J.O.] was crying.’ ” S.A. also said father had been drinking at a bar before he came home that day. When asked how he knew, S.A. said he had overheard the background noise when mother had called father earlier. S.A. could also tell father had been drinking that day because “he was stumbling.” The DI asked mother about father slapping either her or his brother on S.A.’s birthday in 2023. Mother stated that she did not recall this incident, and said that she had gone to the hospital that day so it “ ‘was pretty blurry . . . [and] “[n]one of that sounds familiar at all.” ’ ” That said, the social worker also located police call logs, indicating that mother had gone to the police station on the day after S.A.’s birthday and “reported that ‘Boyfriend’ pushed her while holding one year old son.” c. March 2023 incident DCFS previously had contact with the family after an incident that occurred in March 2023.2 It received a report that law enforcement had gone to the family’s home after father had come home under the influence of alcohol, “ ‘threw’ ” then-one- year-old J.O. onto mother—who was lying on her bed with J.O.— and then straddled mother, punched her on the forehead, and 2 The March 2023 incident is referenced in the DCFS reports related to the court’s current jurisdiction over the minors, but the original reports from that incident, if any, were not included as part of the record.

9 choked her. Paternal grandfather told father to get off mother, but he refused. Mother fought back. Paternal grandfather “grabbed” J.O. and took him into the living room. DCFS investigated this incident and determined the children did not have any signs of physical abuse or general neglect. The parents voluntarily agreed to participate in “DCFS[-]sponsored service intervention programs to strengthen family dynamics, increase parenting skills, and assist mother in developing self[-]sufficiency.” DCFS advised the parents that, if it received another referral based on the same allegations, it would “look into more intensive services for the family.” DCFS also counseled both mother and father “at length” on the “risks/ dangers associated with exposing their children to any domestic violence.” Because there was no immediate child safety threat, and the incident did not “meet [the] criteria for emotional abuse or general neglect,” DCFS deemed the referral “[i]nconclusive.” d. Father’s alcohol use In addition to the above statements regarding father’s drinking prior to each incident, the interviewees also provided information about their assessment of father’s alcohol use. S.A. reported that father came home after “being at a bar” on most of the days S.A. was at the home. S.A. further stated that while he was only at mother’s house three days a week, father was “usually intoxicated one of those days weekly.” S.A. told the social worker he knew when father had been to a bar, as he could smell alcohol on father’s breath and clothes. S.A. said father “ ‘normally’ ” was “ ‘not super aggressive’ ” when he came home. Father would get food, “ ‘argue a little’ ” with mother, and go to his room, and that mother and father usually argued when father came home “ ‘really late.’ ” S.A. stated that 10 he could hear cursing and father arguing and yelling. S.A. believed father became “more aggressive” when he drank, and that he “consume[d] alcohol prior to 80% of their arguments.” Mother stated that she did not believe father had a drinking problem “[a]t this point.” She said she had not seen him intoxicated like he was on July 13 “since the first reported incident.” She denied that father ever would drive the children after drinking. Mother said father drank “ ‘[m]aybe once a week’ ” when he was out with friends, and then came home and slept. The DI told mother that S.A. had reported that father was “constantly drinking alcohol” and would come home “stumbling and acting aggressive.” Mother said she was unaware of father constantly drinking, and, if that was accurate, “she was blinded to it.” Mother said father “has an obnoxious personality, and that he is just loud,” and claimed that this observed behavior was not a result of being intoxicated. The DI spoke to paternal grandmother on October 1, 2025.3 Paternal grandmother said father called her when he got home on July 13, 2025. He and paternal grandfather had been having food and drinks and watching the game at a restaurant. She said he didn’t “ ‘sound drunk.’ ” Paternal grandmother said father attended a year of “ ‘rehab’ ” ordered by the court after he “ ‘got a DUI,’ ” and then “ ‘went cold turkey for a few years with no alcohol.’ ” She did not view father’s current alcohol use as a problem. She denied that mother ever had mentioned any concerns about it.

3 Paternal grandparents were not in a relationship.

11 Dan A. had no personal knowledge about father abusing alcohol. He told the DI, however, that after the birthday incident, “mother told him that she was angry with . . . father and mentioned ‘all this damn drinking.’ ” On September 26, the DI interviewed father at a DCFS office about the alcohol abuse allegations only. Father generally denied that his alcohol use was a problem. He described himself as a social drinker and said he did not drink at home—only with friends or in a social environment—and he did not drink “to the point where he is incoherent or not able to respond to his family’s needs.” He told the DI he “monitors what he drinks” and “will usually have one or two drinks when he eats.” Father said he would “request assistance from rideshare or family,” if he felt he could not drive. Father said he drank alcohol two to three times a week, but was not drinking at that specific time due to work, lack of financial resources, and because he was caring for paternal grandfather. Father was arrested six times for DUIs between September 2007 and March 2014, and was convicted of DUI in 2007, 2008, and twice in 2013. After his last DUI conviction—when he was 26—he completed a court-ordered inpatient substance abuse treatment program, and participated in AA for a year. As he was on probation and had to test for drugs/alcohol, he did not drink again until he was 29. The DI asked father if he believed “he previously had a problem with alcohol, due to the fact that he has multiple DUI arrests and convictions, and he stated that he does not.” Father said he “was just ‘young and irresponsible.’ ” Father admitted he had been drinking before the July 2025, March 2023, and August 2023 incidents.

12 On September 3, 2025, the court held an initial hearing, at which father was provided with a referral for weekly testing for drugs and alcohol. When the DI interviewed father on September 26, 2025, father had not submitted to the court- ordered drug/alcohol testing. He said he did not have time “due to his work schedule and the location of the testing si[t]e.” He also thought he “shouldn’t have to drug test again,” as he had tested for DCFS in the past. On October 1, 2025, the DI gave father a list of all testing locations in Los Angeles County. e. Mother’s health Throughout the interviews, mother acknowledged that she had health issues, including “extremely painful” migraines, that affected her memory and temperament, and that she took medication for ongoing conditions that she also believed had behavioral side effects. Mother expressed to the social worker that “usually during her menstrual cycle her emotions are heightened . . . [and had] brought up her concerns regarding her emotions and the possible side effects of her current medication with her treating doctor.” Mother’s health issues were also confirmed by other interviewees. However, Dan A., father, paternal grandfather, and paternal grandmother all denied that mother’s health impaired her ability to take care of the children. Father identified mother’s health as a possible cause of the parents’ conflict. Father stated, “ ‘[W]e had the incident in 2023 where it was kinda like a trigger mood-swing when I got home. Then when we found out . . . that those mood swings can be caused by a tumor pressure on the brain, we came up with a care plan to identify what the side effects would be. . . . I had to monitor whatever medication they gave her, because of side 13 effects. Unfortunately, after the first surgery, she had mood swings.’ ” Father also said that after mother’s brain surgery in July 2023 her medical condition and medication caused her “to have a bad memory, mood swings, and aggressiveness,” and she has times “where she ‘[c]ould have irritability, doesn’t want to talk, or small things can trigger her to get upset.’ ” Father also stated his belief that these conditions fluctuate with mother’s menstrual cycle and said, in reference to the July 13, 2025 incident, “ ‘I saw on Thursday that she was starting her monthly cycle. Saturday . . . I understand that there was a sense of irritation. Sunday [July 13], I left to go hang out with friends,’ ” and because mother was “ ‘acting weird,’ ” he “had to get out of the house.” 3. Criminal and family court proceedings On July 15, 2025, the criminal court issued a domestic violence criminal protective order protecting mother, S.A., and J.O. from father. The order specified that father was allowed to have “peaceful contact” for “the safe exchange of children and court-ordered visitation” provided in any family, juvenile, or court order issued after that date. On July 21, 2025, father was charged with misdemeanor spousal abuse and child abuse/ endangerment. On August 13, 2025, the criminal court set father’s pretrial hearing for September 12, 2025. On August 14, 2025, father filed a request in family court for joint legal and physical custody of J.O., and unmonitored “[o]nsite visitations.” Father alleged mother had “been experiencing mood swings . . . following her two brain surgeries, the most recent of which took place in August 2023.” Father said he was mother’s “primary caregiver.” He stated that, due to the protective order, “[t]he only way” he could see his child was to 14 file “a motion in family court to request visitation.” The hearing on father’s request was set for September 29, 2025.4 4. Jurisdiction/disposition report In its Jurisdiction/Disposition report dated October 16, 2025, DCFS reported it was “evident that the children’s safety and wellbeing can’t be ensured without continued supervision of DCFS and Dependency Court. Mother and . . . father have a history of engaging in physical altercations in the presence of the children, that have resulted in 2 DCFS investigations, . . . father’s arrest and a restraining order.” DCFS noted the altercations had “even physically involved [J.O.].” DCFS stated it appeared father was trying to “put blame of the domestic violence incident on mother’s medical condition and medication side effects. Although it is true that these can cause mother to act out more aggressively and become more easily irritable, it does not mitigate . . . father’s actions of striking mother with his fists, wrapping his arm around mother’s neck and pushing mother into a wall.” DCFS also was concerned about father’s alcohol abuse. DCFS noted father had “a history of multiple DUI arrests/ convictions,” and had completed an inpatient substance abuse program, yet he “continued to consume alcohol despite the fact that it appears to be a factor in multiple altercations that have occurred between him and mother.” DCFS also noted that father said he continued “to consume alcohol,” but was not at the moment because he didn’t “have the means.” DCFS 4 There is nothing in the record to reflect whether this hearing took place.

15 recommended mother receive family maintenance services and father receive family reunification services. It believed continued jurisdiction was “necessary to help ensure that the mother and . . . father appropriately address the underlying issues that have [led] to their multiple incidents of domestic violence, and has caused . . . father to continue to consume alcohol, so that they no longer place the children at risk of harm.” 5. Adjudication The dependency court held a combined jurisdiction/ disposition hearing on October 16, 2025. The petition included three counts: a-1, b-1, and b-2. The a-1 count was filed pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a) and was only against father. It alleged that mother and father “have a history of engaging in violent altercations in the children’s presence and in the children’s home.” The count included facts from the July 13, 2025 incident and referenced a domestic violence incident on “a prior occasion in 2023” in support of the allegations. The a-1 count alleged that “[s]uch violent conduct on the part of . . . father endangers the children’s physical health and safety, . . . and places the children at risk of serious physical harm.” The b-1 count, filed against both parents pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), included the same factual recitations as the a-1 count, and alleged that “[s]uch violent conduct on the part of . . . father and the mother’s failure to protect the children endangers the children’s physical health and safety, . . . and places the children at risk of serious physical harm.” The b-2 count, which was also filed against both parents pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), stated that father “has a history of substance abuse including alcohol and is a current abuser of alcohol, which renders [him] incapable 16 of providing regular care for [J.O.] . . . [and mother] knew, or reasonably should have known of the . . . father’s substance abuse and failed to protect the children by allowing [him] to reside in the children’s home and have unlimited access to the children. Such substance abuse by . . . father and the mother’s failure to protect the children endangers the children’s physical health and safety and places the children at risk of serious physical harm.” At the hearing, mother pleaded no contest to the allegations against her. The children’s counsel asked the court to sustain the petition as pled against father. Counsel noted father was under the influence of alcohol during all of the reported altercations, and that two of the incidents involved father choking mother and J.O. being thrown or pulled. Father’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the petition. The juvenile court sustained the petition as pleaded. To the extent that mother’s statements to DCFS minimized father’s conduct, the court noted mother’s statements changed from what she told law enforcement and the social worker. The court noted that was “a common phenomenon where the victim of the domestic violence admits the domestic violence and then later, to protect the perpetrator, changes the statement.” The court found mother’s statements to law enforcement were “the more reliable statements” because she made them “right after the domestic violence ha[d] occurred.” The court noted mother told law enforcement: father pushed her; he turned off the electricity to the house; she tried to close the door, and he punched it; he followed her; and he pushed her head down and wrapped his arm around her neck “in an attempt to choke her.” The court noted S.A. described the incident similarly. The court 17 also noted that, in 2023, mother had described domestic violence to DCFS, and parents went through services to address that referral. The court found “[t]he ongoing risk is that [father] denies the domestic violence. Mother has changed her statements, which is part of the domestic violence psychology, and she has told [Dan A.] that she loves [father] and essentially wants to be with him, and it shows that both parents need some work on understanding the psychology of domestic violence, why it occurs and is a cycle.” The court found “there is an abundance of evidence” as to father’s alcohol use. The court noted father was drunk for the July 2025 incident, and S.A. “is now skilled at identifying when . . . father is drunk.” The court noted father also was drunk during the 2023 incident.5 The court stated, “[t]he alcohol leads to the domestic violence.” The court further found that, “[a]though the DUI convictions for [father] were from 2008 through 2013, he again has a problem with alcohol and it feeds into the domestic violence.” The court declared J.O. a dependent of the court and ordered him placed in mother’s home under DCFS’s supervision. The court removed J.O. from father, finding “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that there is or would be a substantial risk to [J.O.] if released” to father’s home “and no reasonable means by which to protect [J.O.] . . . from [father].” The court found father’s denial of the domestic violence and of an alcohol problem, 5 The court did not specify which incident it was referring to that occurred in 2023, but the record includes evidence that he was intoxicated during both the March and August incidents.

18 and the fact that he had “not fully addressed these issues in services,” demonstrated an ongoing risk to J.O. The court found father’s alcohol problem “is a chronic one.” The court ordered father to complete a full drug/alcohol program with aftercare, submit to random and on-demand drug/alcohol testing, and participate in a domestic violence program for perpetrators, conjoint counseling, parenting classes, and individual counseling to address case issues, anger management, domestic violence and its effect on children, substance abuse, relapse prevention, and child protection. The court ordered father to have monitored visits with J.O. and gave DCFS discretion to liberalize the visits. Father appealed. DISCUSSION 1. Applicable law and standard of review “ ‘Dependency proceedings span up to four stages: jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency. [Citations.] At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court determines whether to declare a child a dependent of the court because the child is suffering, or at risk of suffering, significant harm.’ [Citation] ‘ “A dependency adjudication is a preliminary step that allows the juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over the endangered child’s care.” [Citation.] After the juvenile court takes that preliminary step, the court may impose limitations on parental authority as necessary to protect the child. [Citations.] It may also order that the child be removed from a parent’s physical custody if there is clear and convincing evidence that removal is necessary to protect the child from a substantial risk of harm. [Citations.]’ ” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 537 (N.R.).)

19 At the jurisdictional stage, section 300, subdivision (a) authorizes dependency jurisdiction where a child has suffered or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by a parent. (§ 300, subd. (a).) “[U]nder section 300, subdivision (b), a child may be subject to dependency jurisdiction if the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of a parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise the child, or as a result of a parent’s inability to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (D).)” (In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315, 324 (B.D.).) “Although section 300 generally requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citation.] The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’ ” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383–1384 (Kadence P.), disapproved on another ground in N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 560, fn. 18; see also In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) Exposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis for jurisdiction under either section 300, subdivision (a) or subdivision (b). (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602– 603.) “[T]he application of section 300, subdivision (a), is appropriate when, through exposure to a parent’s domestic violence, a child suffers, or is at substantial risk of suffering, 20 serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by the parent.” (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598–599 (Giovanni F.).) If acts of domestic violence “occur in the child’s immediate presence,” such as “if a father strikes an infant’s mother while she is holding the child or an older child intervenes during a fight to protect her mother from her father’s abuse, the risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as nonaccidental.” (Cole L., at p. 603.) Section 300, subdivision (b) encompasses the “somewhat more common potential for accidental injury during parents’ physically violent fights in the presence of bystander children . . . [and] constitutes a failure or inability to protect the child, creating the potential for dependency jurisdiction.” (Cole L., at p. 603; see also In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 (R.C.).) A separate basis for a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D) exists where “substance abuse . . . make[s] a parent unable to provide regular care, which in turn . . . create[s] a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 557.) To establish jurisdiction under this provision DCFS must prove: “(1) substance abuse (2) makes a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child and (3) this inability has caused the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk of such harm or illness.” (Id. at p. 558.) Once the dependency court properly establishes jurisdiction over a child, section 361, subdivision (c) provides authority to remove the child from the home if the statutory criteria are satisfied. (§ 361, subd. (c).) The juvenile court may remove a child from the physical custody of a parent with whom the child was residing if it “finds clear and convincing evidence” that the 21 child would be at substantial risk of physical or emotional harm if returned to the parent’s custody, and “there are no reasonable means” to protect the child without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 (T.V.).) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (T.V., at pp. 135–136.) On an appeal of the dependency court’s order, the reviewing court examines “ ‘the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, [and] we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 (R.T.); I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) We neither reweigh the evidence nor exercise independent judgment but only determine if sufficient facts support the juvenile court’s findings. (I.J., at p. 773.) Inferences that are the result of speculation or conjecture, however, are insufficient to support a jurisdictional finding. (B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 324.) “ ‘The parent has the burden on appeal of showing there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 412.) “ ‘[A] reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (I.J., at p. 773.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and 22 convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) 2. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment, sufficient evidence supported its finding that father’s domestic violence against mother created a substantial risk that J.O. would suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally to establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a). Further, we conclude substantial evidence in the record supported the court’s finding that J.O.’s exposure to parents’ domestic violence put him at substantial risk of serious physical harm under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194 (Heather A.) [“domestic violence in the same household where children are living is neglect; it is a failure to protect [the children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it”], disapproved on another ground in R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 628–629.) The evidence shows the July 2025 incident was not simply a shoving match due to a misunderstanding, or mother being irritable, as father suggested. Father punched the boys’ bedroom door—while they were inside—and followed mother from room to room. He purposefully turned off the electricity before assaulting mother, plunging the house into darkness—again, while J.O. and S.A. were inside. He pushed mother so hard that her head slammed into the wall—S.A. could hear mother 23 hit the wall—and then put mother into a head lock in an attempt to choke her. The children may not have seen father choke mother, but they saw father and mother push each other, and father violently punch their bedroom door. Mother even yelled out for S.A. to call 911 as he held J.O. outside. Also, in the midst of the parents’ conflict, father picked up J.O. and attempted to take him out of the room, and the parents fought over possession of J.O., hurting his arm and resulting in him ending up on the floor. J.O. had to be removed from the middle of the fray by S.A., and the parents continued to engage with each other physically after the children exited the home. There was therefore substantial evidence that mother and father engaged in domestic violence in the children’s presence and with which J.O. was directly involved. Father argues he “did not involve J.O. in the domestic violence; he picked him up, in the living room, after the domestic violence incident in the bedroom.” The dependency court had sufficient evidence to reject this argument. The record supports interpreting this incident as a single conflict that started as soon as father got home and continued until police arrived. As discussed, the altercation was ongoing and the children were in the middle of it, even if part of the violence happened in other rooms. As for parents’ tug-of-war over J.O., it is true father was not actively hitting mother as she tried to pull J.O. toward her while he held onto J.O. But the parents had been in a physical altercation before father grabbed J.O., and they continued to push each other after J.O. ended up on the ground, crying. Worried about the three-year-old’s safety, S.A. picked J.O. up, took him outside, and called for help. Thankfully, J.O. was 24 uninjured, but he had cried out in pain. Had his thirteen-year- old brother not been there, J.O. would have been left on the floor unattended as his parents continued their physical altercation. Accordingly, we reject father’s contention that the domestic violence did not take place in J.O.’s presence or involve J.O. The record before the dependency court additionally included the prior March 2023 incident, where the domestic violence incident also directly involved J.O., and the August 2023 incident where both children were present and observed at least the verbal argument between their mother and father which, the dependency court could have found, escalated into violence. The dependency court could also consider father’s record of alcohol abuse, which was intertwined with the domestic violence. As the court found, father’s alcohol use fueled his violent behavior—in all three reported incidents, witnesses observed father was drunk. Even S.A. saw the connection between father’s drinking and his aggression, asserting that father drank “ ‘too much.’ ” Yet father denied that he drank alcohol to the point of intoxication and specifically denied having been drunk on July 13—despite mother’s and S.A.’s accounts. S.A., whom we can infer the court found credible, said father was drunk at least once a week. As the dependency court noted, S.A. had seen father intoxicated enough times to be “skilled at identifying when . . . father is drunk.” Although the DUI convictions were old, as DCFS noted, father did not believe he “ever had a problem with alcohol.” He attributed his past arrests and convictions for DUI to his youth and irresponsibility. He previously participated in a treatment program because it was court-ordered. After he completed his probation, however, he began to drink alcohol again. Indeed, when the DI asked father 25 why he continued to drink “after 4 DUIs, completing a substance abuse program and paying $200,000 in fines,” father said, “ ‘Everything was done and settled with.’ ” Although he admitted he had been drinking before the July 2025, March 2023, and August 2023 incidents, father “denied that alcohol causes him problems.” (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision.’ ”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].) This record amply supports the dependency court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (a). J.O.’s involvement in his parents’ domestic violence presented a similar risk of nonaccidental harm to J.O. as found in prior cases affirming jurisdiction under this provision. For instance, in In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, the court upheld jurisdiction on this ground where there were multiple domestic violence incidents in which the child was present—in one incident he was “ ‘at their feet’ ” while the parents physically fought and in another he was held by father while the parents hit, choked, and kicked each other. (Id. at p. 706.) And in Giovanni F., the court upheld jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a), where father punched and choked mother while driving with the child in the car and, when they arrived home, the parties struggled over the child’s carseat with the child inside. (Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597, 600.) In both cases, the fact that there were multiple incidents of domestic violence during the parents’ relationship also supported the courts’ findings that there was a substantial risk of serious future injury. (Id. at pp. 594, 601; In re M.M., at p. 720.)

26 The same is true here. The court reasonably could find father was likely to engage in violent conduct again without court and DCFS intervention. Father already had participated in counseling services after the family was referred to DCFS following the first reported domestic violence incident in March 2023.6 Additionally, after the July 2025 incident, father said he did not think counseling would be beneficial, as he and mother already had completed the earlier counseling. The July 2025 incident was not isolated, nor did father take any significant steps to meaningfully reduce the likelihood of further incidents. Moreover, father took no responsibility for the July 2025 6 Father argues that the court could not consider the March 2023 DCFS referral as evidence because DCFS deemed the referral “inconclusive.” As DCFS notes, the earlier referral was part of DCFS’s jurisdiction/disposition report admitted into evidence at the adjudication hearing without objection. Although a prior inconclusive finding may not provide sufficient evidence of domestic violence in some instances, here the record reflects that multiple witnesses, including both mother and father, acknowledged that there was an incident in 2023, and that mother and father previously accepted services and counseling related to domestic violence from DCFS as a result of that incident. Additionally, while father made statements attributing the incident to mother’s irritability, he never denied that the incident occurred. (Compare with In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 776 [finding insufficient evidence of a past domestic violence incident where the DCFS report found “inconclusive” and there was no record of a restraining order claimed to have been obtained against father].)

27 incident,7 and father repeatedly referenced mother’s irritability due to her health conditions as an underlying reason for both the March 2023 and July 2025 incidents. Father’s frequent use of alcohol, which contributed to his aggressiveness yet was not recognized by him as a problem, also provided evidence from which the dependency court could find that there was a current risk of harm to J.O. Father argues that, because the criminal protective order prevents contact between parents, “the chance of future domestic violence between father and mother is minimal.” Although the protective order was in place at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the court reasonably could find J.O. remained at substantial risk of harm. Father reported that, while he had not contacted mother due to the active restraining order, he did “want[ ] to maintain a relationship.” Mother also admitted she wanted to continue her relationship with father. Indeed, when Dan A. told mother he no longer would allow S.A. to stay at mother’s home if father were there, mother accused him of “ ‘making her choose between her son and the man she loves.’ ” Mother also stated that, as of September 29, 2025, she was unable to “live independently without any financial[ ] support from . . . father.”

7 Father contends there was no evidence that he denied the domestic violence because DCFS could not interview father about the July 13 incident due to his pending criminal case. But the court reasonably could infer from DCFS’s interview of paternal grandfather that father essentially attributed the incident to mother having been unable to take a joke, and had described the altercation to the grandfather as merely involving a shoving match.

28 For similar reasons, we find that there is substantial evidence to support the dependency court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b). “Exposing children to recurring domestic violence may be sufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). . . . Domestic violence impacts children even if they are not the ones being physically abused, ‘because they see and hear the violence and the screaming.’ ” (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 134, quoting Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.) Courts have upheld jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b) where there is evidence of recurrent domestic violence in the home, even if the child was not always present to see it. (See, e.g, T.V., at pp. 134–135 [parents had “lengthy history of domestic violence” and evidence showed child was present during at least one prior incident]; R.C., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 943 [two incidents of domestic violence, one occurred in the presence of one of the children and no child was injured].) Here, there was evidence of more than one domestic violence incident between the parents in which the children saw and heard the violence. Given the totality of the record—including the influence of alcohol, father’s unwillingness to take responsibility, and the parents’ desire to reestablish their romantic relationship—the court could infer that these incidents were likely to continue, and supports the jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b). The juvenile court did not have to wait for J.O. to become injured before exercising its jurisdiction. (Kadence P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1383–1384; I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) With respect to the b-3 count of the petition, alleging father’s inability to care for J.O. due to his alcohol abuse, father 29 argues there is no evidence that he could not care for or supervise J.O. due to his drinking. The record provides substantial evidence to support the dependency court’s conclusion to the contrary. It reflects that father had put J.O. in harmful situations when he was intoxicated. Not until J.O. cried out did father realize he should stop pulling J.O. away from mother. Father also purposefully cut the electricity to the house— something the court could infer father would not have done had he been sober. And father’s own father had to remove J.O. from the situation when father came home intoxicated and assaulted mother, resulting in the March 2023 DCFS referral for domestic violence. The court reasonably could infer father could not appropriately care for, or supervise, J.O.—a vulnerable three-year-old—when he was intoxicated and prone to engage in violence, placing J.O. at substantial risk of serious physical harm. (See N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559 [“a child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the care that the child may require and whether a parent’s . . . substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm”].) Substantial evidence thus supported the court’s jurisdictional finding based on father’s alcohol use under section 300, subdivision (b). 3. Substantial evidence supports the court’s disposition order removing J.O. from father The above also provides substantial evidence for the dependency court’s finding, “by clear and convincing evidence, [J.O.] would be at substantial risk of harm if returned [to father] and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal.” (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) It was reasonable for the court to infer, based on father’s past and continued conduct, including the domestic violence and 30 frequent alcohol use, that no reasonable alternatives to removal would effectively protect J.O. Removal was therefore appropriate under section 361, subdivision (c). Father contends the court’s order that he test for drugs and alcohol weekly, “provided the court with a way to ensure J.O.’s safety.” He also contends the court did not consider that father was living with paternal grandmother or that the criminal protective order addressed the risk of future domestic violence incidents with mother. The dependency court was not required to find that any of these factors sufficiently reduced or eliminated the risk of harm to J.O., given the totality of the record. As of his September 26, 2025 interview with the DI, father had not complied with the dependency court’s September 3, 2025 referral for weekly testing. Father admitted that he was still drinking multiple times a week, although this was dependent on his daily responsibilities and financial resources. Further, father said he did not have time to test due to his work schedule, but he also told the DI he did not think he should have to test. Accordingly, the court reasonably could find the testing order was not sufficient to ensure J.O.’s safety in father’s care. With respect to father currently residing with paternal grandmother, the record reflects that paternal grandmother, although aware of father’s drinking, did not perceive him to have a problem with alcohol. Thus, the court could reasonably infer that she would not provide a meaningful check on his alcohol use or behavior. As already stated, the existence of the criminal protective order is of little significance given the parents’ expressed desire to repair their romantic relationship. Further, the incident that occurred in August 2023, on S.A.’s birthday, involved a physical altercation with father’s brother 31 as well, providing a basis for the dependency court to conclude that father’s unabated use of alcohol would contribute to aggression and violence around J.O., and not solely when father was in the presence of mother. Without father’s willingness to address the underlying cause of these conflicts—his use of alcohol —the record supports the dependency court’s conclusion that anything short of removal would not sufficiently protect J.O. Substantial evidence supports the dependency court’s dispositional order. DISPOSITION We affirm the court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OCHOA, J.* We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.