People v. Aramburo CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 9/11/26 P. v. Aramburo CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E079469 v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV025155)

CARLOS ARAMBURO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Jon D. Ferguson, Judge. Reversed with directions.

Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Amann, Susan E.

Miller, and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2023, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of Carlos Aramburo’s petition for 1 resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Our Supreme Court granted review, vacated our prior opinion, and transferred the matter back to us with directions to reconsider the matter in light of People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 (Emanuel).

After having received supplemental briefing from the parties, we have done so. We now reverse the trial court’s denial of Aramburo’s section 1172.6 petition, which moots Aramburo’s remaining claims of error.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Carlos Yuman owned a used car dealership located in El Monte, in Los Angeles County. On April 22, 2002, Yuman was meeting with two customers, Allen and Kathleen Salas, in an office at the dealership. Juan Mingucha, an employee, was waiting 2 outside. Defendants [Aramburo and Jorge D. Ituarte ] approached the office, pushed Mingucha into the office, and entered. Aramburo pulled a semiautomatic gun from his waistband, cocked it, and pointed it at Mingucha. While Ituarte rummaged through a desk and knocked things over, Aramburo demanded money from the Salases and told Ituarte to get Yuman’s wallet, which he did. Yuman and the Salases each turned over 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Ituarte is not a party to this appeal.

2 money to [Aramburo and Ituarte]. Aramburo demanded money from Mingucha, but he had no money. [Aramburo and Ituarte] also took two briefcases from the office and a watch from Yuman.

Two days later, [Aramburo and Ituarte] approached Maria Ester Espinoza DeMoreno and Enrique Orosco in the parking lot of a Smart & Final store in Ontario, in San Bernardino County. DeMoreno and Orosco were placing groceries into their Dodge Durango. Aramburo demanded the keys to the Durango. When Orosco did not turn over the keys immediately, Aramburo pulled a semiautomatic gun from his waistband and told Orosco, ‘I’m going to shoot you.’ DeMoreno gave the keys to Aramburo, who passed them to Ituarte. Ituarte got into the driver’s seat and began to drive away. Aramburo caught up with Ituarte in the parking lot and got into the passenger seat. Ituarte then drove away. The incident was promptly reported to a 911 operator.

Shortly afterward, Ontario Police Officer James Trousas, who was driving in a marked police car, spotted the Durango and a chase ensued. Ituarte drove the Durango through a red light onto a freeway, where he reached speeds up to 100 miles per hour while swerving through traffic. Leaving the freeway, he entered an intersection against a red light and collided with a red pickup truck [about 2 minutes and 45 seconds after the pursuit began]. Lindy Garcia, a passenger in the truck, died approximately 17 hours later as a result of injuries from the collision.

3 Aramburo was apprehended and taken into custody at the scene of the collision.

Ituarte ran from the scene but was apprehended a short distance away by a police officer.

While handcuffed, Ituarte resisted efforts by officers to place him in a police car.

During a search of the Durango, police found a semiautomatic gun and some of DeMoreno’s jewelry in the seat of the car. Prior to defendants’ taking of the Durango, the jewelry had been inside two bags in the glove compartment. Other jewelry belonging to DeMoreno, which had been in the car, was found in each of the defendants’ pockets.

Yuman’s watch and a traffic citation that had been in one of Yuman’s briefcases were also found on Aramburo after his arrest. Aramburo admitted the carjacking, possession of the gun, taking the jewelry, stealing the traffic citation, and being in the Durango.

A jury convicted Aramburo of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), carjacking (§ 215, subd.

(a)), robbery (§ 211), two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd.

(b)), making a criminal threat (§ 422), and evading a police officer causing death (Veh.

Code, § 2800.3). Aramburo was sentenced to 25 years to life, plus 37 years and 10 months, and we affirmed his convictions and sentence in 2006.

In 2019, Aramburo petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.95, which is now section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Senate Bill No.

1437, which enacted section 1170.95, was unconstitutional. (People v. Aramburo (June 30, 2020, E073366) [nonpub. opn.].) We reversed and remanded with directions to consider the petition on the merits. (Ibid.)

4 On remand, the trial court issued an order to show cause and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. After holding the hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that Aramburo was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference for human life during the commission of the offenses.

Aramburo appealed, and we affirmed. Our Supreme Court granted review, vacated our opinion, and remanded with instructions to reconsider the cause in light of Emanuel.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6 Petition Aramburo contends the trial court erroneously denied his petition because (1) he played a “limited and attenuated role” in the car chase and resulting accident, and (2) the court failed to consider his youth in determining whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life.

We conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Aramburo acted with reckless indifference to human life. For that reason alone, he is entitled to resentencing relief under section 1172.6. (See People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 117 (Guiffreda).)

1. Governing Law Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 “‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to 5 murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846-847 (Gentile); see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189.

Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 189 so that “[d]efendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were ‘major participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life[.]’” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong), citing § 189, subd. (e)(3).) The Legislature amended section 188 to provide that, when the felony- murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of murder can only be convicted where he acted “with malice aforethought,” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); see Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 842-843.)

Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of murder under the new law.

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “[T]he process begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met [citations], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or 6 attempted murder because of changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019’ . . . .” (Strong, supra, at p. 708.) “When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid., citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether relief should be granted. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).)

At the evidentiary hearing, the court may consider evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,” including witness testimony. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the People may also offer new or additional evidence. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853- 854.) “‘A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.’” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 709; accord, People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) Section 1172.6 “relief is unavailable if the defendant was either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in the 7 underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life . . . .’” (Strong, supra, at p. 710.)

Under the amended felony-murder rule, a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not act with the intent to kill can only be liable for murder if he or she was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, citing § 189, subd. (e)(3).) Because “‘[t]he standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2[, subdivision] (d),’” “death penalty cases interpreting section 190.2, subdivision (d), including People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016)

63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), are controlling here.” (Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p.

123.)

To determine whether a defendant exhibited reckless indifference to human life under section 190.2, subdivision (d), courts consider a “‘list of considerations . . .

including use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.’” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)

This list of factors is “‘nonexhaustive.’” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)

None of them “is necessary, nor is anyone one of them necessarily sufficient.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Instead, “the ‘totality 8 of the circumstances’ must be analyzed to determine whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference.” (Emanuel, supra, at p. 885.)

“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element.

[Citation.] As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’

[Citations.] As to the objective element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”’”

(In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)

2. Standard of Review On appeal from an order denying a petition under section 1172.6, we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Richardson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1090.) We “‘“examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.”’ [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is 9 to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298; see Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 124-125.)

“‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)

3. Analysis In our prior opinion, we first addressed Aramburo’s suggestion that the carjacking and subsequent car chase that resulted in a fatal crash are distinct events for which he bears different liability. Aramburo emphasized that it was Ituarte’s reckless driving that killed Garcia and that, as a passenger, his ability to control Ituarte’s behavior was “quite limited if not non-existent under the circumstances.” Aramburo thus argued his culpability for Garcia’s death is “sharply attenuated.” We rejected the argument based largely on the fact that “the robbery/carjacking, car chase, and fatal car crash were all part of one continuous transaction,” which led us to conclude that the reckless indifference analysis had to consider Aramburo’s actions throughout the whole chain of events. Our analysis thus focused heavily on his conduct before and during the robbery/carjacking and, in particular, how he acted toward the carjacking victims.

On remand, Aramburo again strenuously argues that he should not face murder liability for Garcia’s death because his conduct was “divorc[ed] and attenuat[ed]” from Ituarte’s conduct that caused Garcia’s death given that he had little, if any, control over Ituarte’s driving. After Emanuel, we agree.

10 Critically for this case, Emanuel confirmed that the reckless indifference analysis asks whether the defendant acted “with reckless indifference to the life of the [murder]

victim,” not just whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life in general when committing the underlying felony. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891 fn. 8, italics added.) That analysis requires courts to assess whether the defendant’s conduct toward the murder victim shows that the defendant was aware of and willingly involved in the violent way that victim was killed. (See id. at p. 884; see also People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1116 [“The fact Brousseau knew Lopez had a gun shows that she acted with reckless indifference to the life of the man she lured into the alley.”], disapproved of on other grounds by Banks, supra, 61 Cal. 4th 788.) To do so, we look to the Clark factors and the totality of circumstances while mindful that the Clark factors are “nonexhaustive,” and none of them is necessary nor sufficient.

(Emanuel, supra, at pp. 884-885.) This test inherently presupposes that it applies only to the murder victim(s).

Here, there were several victims, but only Garcia died. Our reckless indifference analysis therefore must focus on Aramburo’s conduct and state of mind as it relates to her. Aramburo remains liable for her death only if he “‘“knowingly created a ‘grave risk of death’”’” to her. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.)

Because Ituarte’s reckless driving killed Garcia, our focus must be directed at Aramburo’s state of mind and conduct while in the car. As a result, his use of a gun 11 during the hijacking has little weight here. The first Clark factor (knowledge of weapons used) therefore weighs in his favor.

Other Clark factors weigh in his favor. First, Aramburo’s knowledge of Ituarte’s propensity for violence or the likelihood Ituarte would use lethal force supports Aramburo. Although he and Ituarte committed an armed robbery two days before the armed carjacking, nothing in the record shows that either of them “had ever participated in shootings, murder, or attempted murder.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 810-811.)

Nor is there evidence that Aramburo knew Ituarte might use lethal force during either offense. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621.) “The paucity of evidence that [Ituarte] had a propensity to commit violent acts, as well as the lack of evidence that [Aramburo] was aware of any such propensity, undermines the notion that [Aramburo] acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 561.) Nor is there any evidence that Aramburo knew or should have known that the carjacking would lead to a high-speed, dangerous car chase.

Another factor, the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims, weighs in Aramburo’s favor given that the carjacking and chase lasted only a few minutes. (See People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1015- 1016 [“[C]rimes of longer duration present greater risk of violence and therefore evince more reckless indifference.”]; In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 681 [no reckless indifference when “entire interaction lasted between a few seconds and three to five minutes”].) The very brief nature of the offense “significantly reduces [Aramburo]’s 12 culpability.” (People v. Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 560.)

The fact that the pursuit after the carjacking lasted only a few minutes supports a finding in Aramburo’s favor on another Clark factor (presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates). “[W]here a crime unfolds quickly, this factor—the failure to restrain a cohort—cannot be said to weigh in favor of a finding of reckless indifference without some evidence in the record indicating that the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to do so. [Citation.] This requires some awareness of the risk of impending lethal violence and time to react.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 892.)

Aramburo only had, at most, three minutes to stop Ituarte. Aramburo told an investigating officer that he did not tell Ituarte to slow down because, “I was with him man, but what I’m supposed to do.” This does not suggest that he was acting with reckless indifference, but that he thought that he had no real control over Ituarte’s driving, and there is no record evidence that suggests otherwise. Under these circumstances, Aramburo had no meaningful opportunity to restrain Ituarte. (See In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [defendant did not act with reckless indifference in part because he “lacked control over [his accomplices’] actions once they arrived on the crime scene, especially given how quickly the shooting occurred[]”].)

Regardless, “so long as [Aramburo] did not act with reckless indifference to the life of [Garcia], he need not have acted with the purpose of protecting [her].” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891, fn. 8.) At worst, Aramburo consciously decided not to try to stop Ituarte’s reckless driving. But given that the car chase was minutes-long and it is 13 uncertain whether he could have even persuaded Ituare to stop driving recklessly, Aramburo’s failure to try to do so does not suggest that he was “‘“knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of death.’”’” (Id. at p. 884.) There is no evidence that Aramburo did not try to restrain Ituarte because he was consciously disregarding the risk to human life that Ituarte’s driving posed, but there is evidence suggesting that Aramburo believed he had no control over the situation (Aramburo’s statement to an investigator, “I was with him man, but what I’m supposed to do.”). In any event, “[e]fforts at restraint serve as only one of several factors that should be assessed in deciding whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id.

at p. 891.)

Considering the Clark factors and the totality of the circumstances, we conclude there is insufficient evidence that Aramburo “‘“knowingly create[ed] a ‘grave risk’”’” to Garcia’s life. Instead, the record shows that Aramburo was, at worst, a passive passenger as Ituarte drove recklessly, which is insufficient to support a finding that Aramburo acted with reckless indifference to Garcia’s life. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 896 [focusing too much “on unsuccessful or inadequate efforts at restraint risks imposing murder liability based solely on a defendant’s participation in an underlying felony in which a death occurs,” which is “precisely what Senate Bill No. 1437 and our case law prohibit”].) We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying Aramburo’s section 1172.6 petition.

14 IV.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Aramburo’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed and the matter is remanded with instructions to grant the petition, vacate Aramburo’s murder 3 conviction, and resentence him accordingly.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON J. We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

RAPHAEL J.

3 Given this disposition, we need not address Aramburo’s argument that the trial court erroneously failed to consider his age when denying his petition. We also need not address his argument that we should remand the matter for resentencing on the determinate terms imposed on other convictions under newly enacted law. Aramburo may raise the issue at resentencing in the trial court. (See People v. Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 564-565; People v. Trent (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 251, 262 [defendant entitled to full resentencing after section 1172.6 petition granted].)