People v. Flowers CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/11/26 P. v. Flowers CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B347475

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. XCNBA156760) v.

RUBEN ALLEN FLOWERS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Reversed and remanded. William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Nancy Lii Ladner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Ruben Allen Flowers appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), for a hearing to preserve youth-related evidence for use in a future parole hearing. Flowers contends that the trial court abused its discretion and asks that this court remand the matter and instruct the trial court to grant a Franklin hearing. The People agree that Flowers’s motion was sufficient to initiate Franklin proceedings and that Flowers was entitled to describe to the court the evidence he sought to introduce at a Franklin hearing. Contrary to Flowers, however, the People assert that a limited remand for the court to reconsider Flowers’s motion is the appropriate course, rather than an instruction to the trial court to grant the motion. We agree with the People. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying Flowers’s motion and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1999, a jury found Flowers guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a) & 664, count 1) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count 2). The jury found that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c).) The jury further found that, as to both counts, Flowers personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Flowers was 23 years old when he committed the crimes.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 The trial court sentenced Flowers to life in prison with the possibility of parole on the murder count, plus three years for the personal firearm use enhancement and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court imposed and stayed the sentence in the assault with a firearm count. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and remittitur issued in 2000.2 On June 17, 2025, Flowers in pro se filed a motion for a Franklin hearing to preserve youth-related evidence for consideration at future parole hearings. Flowers specifically requested a Franklin hearing pursuant to sections 1203.1 and 4801, subdivision (c). Flowers stated in the motion that he was 25 years of age or younger at the time he committed the offenses. Flowers cited In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452 (Cook) and section 1203.1 as extending the opportunity to preserve youth- related evidence to defendants after final judgment, and Flowers noted that the proper procedure was to file the motion under the original caption and case number and cite to Cook and section 1203.1 as he had done. The court denied Flowers’s motion in a minute order on the same day. The court recounted that Flowers committed the offenses on September 20, 1997, and the remittitur issued on September 1, 2000. Flowers became parole eligible in June 2019 and had had at least four parole hearings at which parole was 2 The People request in a footnote in their respondent’s brief that this court take judicial notice of the opinion on direct appeal. The request is denied: the footnote request does not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.252. In particular, the People do not provide this court with a copy of the prior opinion, and this court does not have ready access to a copy in court records, given that the opinion issued 26 years ago.

3 denied since that time. Flowers’s next scheduled parole hearing was August 28, 2025. The court ruled that Flowers failed to include in the motion the date of his future parole hearing and also failed to state that he had already had parole hearings, as Cook requires. The court noted that the purpose of a Franklin hearing was to allow the defendant to assemble evidence at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated or passed away. Pursuant to Cook, a court could consider whether a Franklin proceeding was likely to produce fruitful evidence or whether the defendant has had parole hearings, or whether there has been a significant passage of time.3 The court cited In re Brownlee (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 720 (Brownlee), which held that a defendant was not entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing or a Franklin hearing where the defendant already had two parole hearings and had a third parole hearing scheduled in the near future. The court likened Flowers’s situation to that of the defendant in Brownlee because, like Brownlee, Flowers was already parole eligible. The court ruled that Flowers had not shown he was entitled to a Franklin hearing and denied the motion. Flowers timely appealed.

3 Although the court made this statement it did not explicitly find that a Franklin hearing was unlikely to produce fruitful evidence.

4 DISCUSSION

A. Franklin Proceedings Section 3051, subdivision (a)(1), provides for a “youth offender parole hearing” by the Board of Parole Hearings “for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of [his or her] controlling offense.” Where, as here, the defendant is convicted of a controlling offense “when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of less than 25 years to life[, the defendant] shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 20th year of incarceration. The youth parole eligible date for a person eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under this paragraph shall be the first day of the person’s 20th year of incarceration.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) “In assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments, if used by the board, shall be administered by licensed psychologists employed by the board and shall take into consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the individual.” (Id., subd. (f)(1).) In addition, “[f]amily members, friends, school personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from community- based organizations with knowledge about the individual before the crime or the individual’s growth and maturity since the time of the crime may submit statements for review by the board.” (Id., subd. (f)(2).)

5 Section 4801, subdivision (c), provides, “When a prisoner committed his or her controlling offense, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 3051, when he or she was 25 years of age or younger, the board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 283 to 284, the Supreme Court held a defendant who did not have an opportunity to make a record of mitigating “youth-related factors” relevant to a later youth offender parole hearing should have an opportunity to make a record on remand. The court explained that sections 3051 and 4801 “contemplate that information regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the Board’s consideration. . . . Assembling such statements ‘about the individual before the crime’ is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated or passed away.” (Id., at pp. 283–284.) In Franklin, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to determine whether the defendant “was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing[,]” and if not, to allow the defendant to “place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at 6 his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Three years after Franklin, the Supreme Court in Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at page 458, held that a juvenile offender with a final judgment could move for a postjudgment proceeding under section 1203.01,4 to present evidence of youth-related factors. The Cook court reasoned that “recognizing the court’s authority under section 1203.01 to gather youth offender evidence effectuates sections 3051 and 4801.” (Cook, at p. 453.) The court continued, “For inmates like Cook who seek to preserve evidence following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision,” that “establish[es] the inmate’s entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing” and “indicate[s] when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred.”

4 Section 1203.01, subdivision (a), provides in part, “Immediately after judgment has been pronounced, the judge and the district attorney, respectively, may cause to be filed with the clerk of the court a brief statement of their views respecting the person convicted or sentenced and the crime committed, together with any reports the probation officer may have filed relative to the prisoner. The judge and district attorney shall cause those statements to be filed if no probation officer’s report has been filed. The attorney for the defendant and the law enforcement agency that investigated the case may likewise file with the clerk of the court statements of their views respecting the defendant and the crime of which they were convicted.”

7 (Id. at p. 458.) Further, “consistent with Franklin and the court’s inherent authority, the offender shall have the opportunity to ‘place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 458–459.) The Cook court observed: “Some offenders who file these postjudgment motions in the trial court may have spent a decade or more in prison. Some may have even come before the Board for a youth offender parole hearing. The court may consider whether a Franklin proceeding is likely to produce fruitful evidence considering such factors as the passage of time and whether the offender has already benefitted from the factfinding procedures set forth in section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) and (2) with the assistance of appointed counsel (§ 3041.7; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2256, subd. (c)). Additionally, some offenders may choose not to present certain forms of evidence, such as live testimony, or to forgo a Franklin proceeding altogether.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.) We review the trial court’s denial of a Franklin proceeding for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 749 (Benzler).) “[I]n deciding whether the trial court has abused its discretion we are required to ‘ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious. [Citation.] Critical to the resolution of this case, we 8 note that when a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

B. Analysis We agree with the parties that Flowers’s motion contained sufficient information. In People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150, the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three observed that “[n]othing in Cook indicates the motion must describe with precision the evidence the offender seeks to introduce. Moreover, as this court recently explained, ‘[t]he court’s commentary [in Cook] about what a motion should include is not the same as creating mandatory pleading requirements.’ ([People v.] Lipptrapp [(2021)] 59 Cal.App.5th [886,] 896 (Lipptrapp).) [Courts have] found there are no mandatory pleading requirements for a Franklin motion, and the required showing to initiate the process for a Franklin proceeding is minimal: ‘[d]ue to the limited resources generally available to inmates, the Cook court reasonably envisioned a simple pleading mechanism to get the process started.’ (Ibid., italics added.)” In Lipptrapp, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at page 889, the defendant filed a motion for Franklin proceedings nearly 25 years after committing the offenses at issue. The Court of Appeal held that the defendant’s motion was sufficient to initiate a Franklin proceeding because it (1) “include[d] the relevant criminal case information and pertinent legal authority. . . [and therefore] clearly notified about the basis for the motion as well as the cases giving the trial court authority to conduct evidence preservation proceedings[;]” (2) established the defendant’s eligibility for a section 3051 youth offender parole hearing by including his age 9 at the time of the offense and the sentence imposed; and (3) “discussed legal principles concerning youthful offenders, the nature and purpose of youth offender parole hearings, the goal of section 3051, and what evidence was relevant for a Franklin proceeding.” (Id. at pp. 893–894.) Flowers’s motion contained these same elements. Flowers filed the motion in superior court under the original caption and case number. He cited to the relevant authority, including Franklin, Cook, and sections 3051, 4801, and 1203.01. Flowers established that he was under the age of 25 at the time he committed the offenses and would have been eligible for a youth offender parole hearing at the time of his conviction if youth offender parole hearings had been available. Flowers discussed the relevance of youthful factors to culpability, and in particular, the impact of the combination of racial and youthful factors on criminal penalties. The trial court faulted Flowers for failing to note that he previously had parole hearings and also had an upcoming parole hearing. The court denied Flowers’s request based on Brownlee, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 720, wherein the appellate court held that the defendant was ineligible for a youth parole hearing because he had already had several parole hearings and had another parole hearing scheduled in the near future. Brownlee is distinguishable. There, the court denied the defendant a youth parole hearing. The Brownlee court did not hold that the defendant had no right to place youth-related evidence on the record for other future parole hearings. To the contrary, Brownlee stated: “Put simply, within this statutory framework, if a prisoner’s first parole hearing is not a youth offender parole hearing, then the prisoner does not receive a 10 youth offender parole hearing. Those prisoners are, however, still entitled to have ‘the board, in reviewing [the] prisoner’s suitability for parole pursuant to [s]ection 3041.5, . . . give great weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.’ (§ 4801, subd. (c).) This is true because section 4801, subdivision (c) is not limited to youth offender parole hearings—it applies to all parole hearings.” (Id. at p. 725.) Cook made clear that neither the passage of significant time, nor the fact that the defendant has had prior parole hearings is a bar to the court granting a Franklin hearing. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 [stating that some defendants who seek a Franklin hearing “may have spent a decade or more in prison. Some may have even come before the Board for a youth offender parole hearing”]; see also Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 751 [“The Legislature intended that the benefits of youth offender parole hearings be available even to those prisoners with decades-old convictions”].) That a defendant has been in prison for a significant period of time and has had prior parole hearings may weigh against granting the defendant a Franklin hearing even if they do not bar granting a hearing altogether. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.) However, here there is no evidence that Flowers has had the opportunity to put youth-related evidence on the record for past or future parole hearings or that the specific evidence he seeks to present is evidence that he has presented at a past parole hearing. (See Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 750–751 [whether a defendant has had the opportunity to present youth-related evidence is relevant to determining whether a Franklin hearing 11 is warranted].) Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Flowers’s motion absent evidence that Flowers had past opportunities to present youth-related evidence and absent information regarding the substance of the evidence that Flowers intended to present. Finally, although the superior court erred in denying Flowers’s motion for the reasons given, the court has discretion to set the parameters of the proceeding going forward. “[T]he trial court may ‘exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.’ [Citation.] The court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence [Flowers] seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record. It may also determine whether testimony is ‘appropriate’ (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284), or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.) We therefore decline to direct the trial court to grant Flowers’s motion. We instead remand the matter to permit the court to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

12 DISPOSITION

We reverse the trial court’s order and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. If, upon remand, the trial court opts to require an offer of proof, the court shall first appoint counsel to assist Flowers. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

BAKER, J.