People v. Robles CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 9/11/26 P. v. Robles CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B351807

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VA097961) v.

RAMON ROBLES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed. James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ Ramon Robles was 16 when he shot two people. A jury convicted him of two counts of premeditated attempted murder. In 2009, the court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole plus 25 years to life. In 2024, Robles petitioned to recall that sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (section 1170(d)(1)), and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard), arguing his sentence is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole.1 The superior court found it is not and denied the petition. Appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Robles filed a supplemental letter. We find no error and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Robles was born in October 1988. The charged offenses occurred on March 13 and May 15, 2005. Robles was 16 years old on both dates. The information alleged as to both counts of attempted murder that the offenses were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. A jury convicted Robles of both counts (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and found true as to each that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Two counts of assault with a firearm were dismissed. In January 2009, the court imposed life with the possibility of parole on each attempted murder count, to run concurrently, and 25 years to life on each firearm enhancement, consecutive to the life terms and concurrent with one another. An inmate serving a life sentence must serve at least seven calendar years before parole eligibility. (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1).)

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Under the sentence as imposed, the minimum term before parole eligibility was therefore 32 years. In December 2024, Robles petitioned in propria persona for recall and resentencing. He alleged he was 16 at the time of his crimes, that he had been incarcerated for at least 15 years, that he had no disqualifying juvenile adjudication, and that he had shown rehabilitation. The court appointed counsel. Counsel filed a supplemental brief arguing that a 32-year minimum term is the functional equivalent of life without parole because Robles would be 48 years old before any potential release. At the hearing on January 12, 2026, counsel acknowledged a split of authority and asked the court to find the sentence functionally equivalent. The People responded that Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation records show a parole eligibility date of November 2028. The court found the sentence is not the equivalent of life without the possibility of parole and denied the petition. Robles filed a timely notice of appeal. Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief on June 23, 2026, stating he found no arguable issues. On June 24, 2026, the clerk notified Robles of his right to file a supplemental brief or letter. Robles filed a letter on July 17, 2026. DISCUSSION I. The Order Denying the Petition Is Appealable Counsel asks us to decide whether the order is appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b). It is. Section 1170(d)(1) authorizes a defendant to petition the sentencing court, and an order denying that petition forecloses a reduced sentence. That is an order made after judgment affecting substantial rights, and its appealability turns on the nature of the claim and the court’s 3 ruling on it rather than on whether the claim has merit. (Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 600–601.) II. We Decline to Conduct an Independent Review of the Record Because this appeal is from an order denying postconviction relief, Robles has no constitutional right to appointed counsel, and we are not required to review the record independently. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226–227, 231–232.) Robles filed a supplemental letter. We therefore evaluate the arguments it presents and issue this opinion. (Id. at p. 232.) We do not undertake an independent review of the record. III. Robles is Not Entitled to Relief Under Section 1170(d)(1) Section 1170(d)(1) permits a petition for recall and resentencing by a defendant “who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole” and who “has been incarcerated for at least 15 years.” Robles was not sentenced to life without parole. Nevertheless, Robles contends he is eligible for relief pursuant to section 1170(d)(1) because his sentence of 32 years to life is the functional equivalent of life without parole. Robles relies on Heard and People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 (Sorto), to support his argument. In Heard, the court concluded that an aggregate sentence of 103 years to life imposed on a juvenile offender was the functional equivalent of life without parole. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 614.) The Heard court held the defendant was therefore similarly situated to juvenile offenders sentenced to life 4 without parole who are eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1). (Heard, at pp. 628–631.) The court concluded that denying the defendant the opportunity to petition for relief under section 1170(d)(1) violated his equal protection rights. (Heard, at pp. 633–634; see also Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440 [sentence of 10 years plus 130 years to life].) There is now a split of authority in the Courts of Appeal as to whether denying eligibility for section 1170(d)(1) relief to a juvenile offender sentenced to a term that is lengthy but does not exceed the offender’s natural life expectancy violates equal protection guarantees, and whether a juvenile offender serving a lengthy sentence who is eligible for youth offender parole is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of life without parole within the meaning of section 1170(d)(1). The California Supreme Court will have the final say on these issues. (See, e.g., People v. Garner (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 779, petn. for review pending, petn. filed Aug. 10, 2026; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860; People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540; People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070; People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828; People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650.) Yet, no court has concluded that a juvenile offender serving a sentence of 32 years to life, or any sentence of similar length, is eligible for section 1170(d)(1) relief, under any theory. (See People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583 [33 years to life is not the functional equivalent of life without parole for § 1170(d)(1) purposes].) While in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras), the California Supreme Court concluded 5 that a sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of life without parole when imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender for Eighth Amendment purposes, no California court has reached that conclusion as to a sentence similar to Robles’s, which is far shorter. (Olmos, at p. 583 [33-years-to-life sentence not the functional equivalent of life without parole]; People v. Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, 51, 58 [30-years-to-life sentence and eligibility for parole at age 47 not the functional equivalent of life without parole].) The reasoning of Contreras, and the United States Supreme Court authority on which it relies, does not apply to a defendant whose sentence affords him the opportunity for release at 48 years old, at the latest. The Contreras court reasoned that, to be consistent with Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, a sentence imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender must provide a “sufficient period to achieve reintegration as a productive and respected member of the citizenry”; give an incentive for the juvenile offender to become a responsible individual; and provide a realistic hope of release. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 368; see id. at pp. 369, 373.) Parole eligibility after 32 years provides these things. The trial court did not err in rejecting Robles’s petition for recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). IV. Robles’s Remaining Contentions Do Not Establish Error Robles argues that because he has been incarcerated since he was 16, denying him the benefit of section 1170(d)(1), together with Proposition 57 and section 3051, denies him the opportunities available to similarly charged individuals. He relies on Sorto. But Heard and Sorto extended section 1170(d)(1)

6 to juvenile offenders serving the functional equivalent of life without parole. Robles is not serving such a sentence, so those decisions do not entitle him to relief. He argues in the same vein that the Legislature cannot have meant to extend relief only to juvenile offenders who would otherwise certainly die in prison, while withholding it from those who will have no realistic opportunity to reintegrate after serving most of their lives in custody. That is the argument Heard accepted, and it fails here for the same reason. His request that his case be certified to juvenile court under Proposition 57 depends on recall of his sentence, which has not occurred. Robles next argues the court failed to consider People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, before ruling. Franklin held that section 3051 gave the juvenile offender there a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, and that his sentence was accordingly “neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.” (Franklin, at p. 280.) Franklin does not create eligibility under section 1170(d)(1). To the extent Robles seeks a proceeding to preserve evidence of youth-related factors for a future parole hearing, the proper procedure is to file a motion in the superior court under section 1203.01, not this appeal. (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 451.) Robles also invokes Graham and Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, and says no court weighed mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest available penalty on him. Graham forbids life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses; Miller forbids mandatory life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses. Robles received neither sentence. He was sentenced to a parole-eligible 7 term, and the record reflects a parole eligibility date within his lifetime. Robles states the sentencing court “threw out counts 2 & 4 due to plea bargain which I didn’t even know is a thing.” The minute order does recite that those counts were dismissed due to plea negotiation. The record otherwise does not support that recital: the same minute order states that Robles was found guilty by a jury, and the sentencing transcript reflects no plea agreement. In any event, the dismissal of two counts did not increase his sentence, and a challenge to the 2009 judgment is outside the scope of an appeal from the order denying his 2024 petition. Finally, Robles argues that recall and resentencing would entitle him to the benefit of later ameliorative changes in the law, citing People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, and he asks for relief in the interest of justice given childhood trauma, trauma he says he has experienced in custody, and his mental health. Padilla held that a judgment becomes nonfinal when the sentence is vacated, and that ameliorative changes then apply at resentencing. Robles’s sentence has not been vacated, so Padilla does not assist him. His remaining allegations concern matters outside the record and do not establish error in the order before us.

8 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ADAMS, P. J.

We concur:

HANASONO, J.

ASHWORTH, J.* * Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.