Abdifatar Muktar Muse v. San Diego Police Department et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
The court considered Plaintiff's motion to appoint pro bono counsel in a civil action against the San Diego Police Department. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances and had shown the ability to litigate pro se.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to appoint counsel denied“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 4).” | agree with court The court correctly applied the two-factor test from Terrell v. Brewer, requiring a showing of exceptional circumstances. The order notes that the plaintiff provided no reasons for the request and failed to allege extraordinary circumstances such as disability or homelessness. Furthermore, the court observed that the plaintiff has been able to articulate claims pro se. This satisfies the requirements for denial under Ninth Circuit precedent. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standard for appointing counsel in civil cases and applies it to the specific facts presented (or rather, the lack thereof). It cites the controlling Ninth Circuit precedent (Terrell) and the Supreme Court precedent regarding voluntary appointment (Mallard). The reasoning is concise but sufficient for a procedural motion where the plaintiff failed to provide any supporting argument or facts.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ABDIFATAR MUKTAR MUSE, Case No. 26-cv-04769-BAS-GC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL (ECF No. 4) 14 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT et al., 15 Defendant. 16 17 In civil cases, counsel should be appointed only in “exceptional circumstances.” Id. 18 To determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court should evaluate two 19 factors: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits of the case, and (2) the ability of the 20 plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of legal issues involved. 21 Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). Neither factor is dispositive, and 22 both must be evaluated together. Id. Further, an attorney cannot be forced to represent an 23 indigent litigant in a civil case—rather, the attorney can only be “appointed” if he or she 24 voluntarily accepts the appointment. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 25 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (holding that the appointment of counsel provision in § 1915, 26 formerly found in subsection (d), does not “authorize[ ] a federal court to require an 27 unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case”). 28 1 Here, Plaintiff Abdifatar Muktar Muse seeks pro bono counsel, but does not list any 2 ||reasons. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff does not allege any “extraordinary circumstances” 3 || warranting appointment of counsel. See Olson v. Smith, 609 Fed. Appx. 370, 373 (9th Cir. 4 ||2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1165 (2016) (disabilities); see also Signorelli v. Hughes, 363 5 ||Fed. Appx. 455, 456 (9th Cir. 2010); (disabilities); Bolton v. Towing, No. 6 ||}523CV0094 1JLSAJIR, 2023 WL 8168951, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2023) (homelessness); 7 |\|Webb v. NaphCare, Inc., 2022 WL 2192977, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 16, 2022) 8 ||(homelessness and indigence). Moreover, Plaintiff has demonstrated that he has been able 9 ||to continue prosecuting his case and articulating his claims without the assistance of 10 || counsel. 11 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for appointment of counsel 12 (ECF No. 4). 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 ||DATED: September 10, 2026 (yi. Duhark 16 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28