Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE MANUAL ALVARADO MONTES, Case No.: 26-cv-4660-RSH-JAC 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 13 v. FOR HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 On August 14, 2026, petitioner Jose Manuel Alvarado Montes, proceeding pro se, 19 filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. For the 20 reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. ECF No. 1 at 10. On or about December 23 21, 2017, Petitioner was admitted to the United States on an H-2B visa. ECF Nos. 1-2 at 2; 24 1-7 at 2. The record indicates he remained in the United States beyond the period authorized 25 by his visa. ECF No. 1-7 at 2. 26 On or around April 5, 2026, police officers detained Petitioner in Orlando, Florida. 27 ECF Nos. 1 at 11; 4-2 at 3. He was subsequently taken into custody by U.S. Immigration 28 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). ECF No. 1-7 at 2. 1 On May 5, 2026, an immigration judge held a bond hearing and denied Petitioner’s 2 request for bond, finding that he posed a flight risk. Id. at 2–5. Petitioner has appealed this 3 decision and it remains pending. ECF No. 1 at 11; 4-5 at 2–4. 4 On July 7, 2026, the immigration judge issued a written decision memorializing its 5 bond ruling. ECF No. 1-7 at 4. In concluding Petitioner posed a flight risk, the immigration 6 judge cited Petitioner’s limited family and financial ties to the United States, his two arrests 7 for driving without a valid license and other traffic citations, and the absence of any 8 pending application for immigration relief. Id The immigration judge therefore was 9 “unpersuaded” that Petitioner had “sufficient incentive to appear for future hearings” and 10 denied bond. Id. On August 14, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. ECF No. 1. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 13 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 14 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A prisoner bears the 15 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 16 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 Petitioner asserts three grounds for habeas relief, arguing: (1) the immigration 19 judge’s denial of bond violated his right to due process; (2) the conditions of his 20 confinement are unconstitutional; and (3) his warrantless arrest on April 4, 2026, violated 21 his right to due process. ECF No. 1 at 12–22. The Court addresses each ground in turn 22 below. 23 A. Prudential Exhaustion 24 Petitioner first contends that the immigration judge violated his due process rights 25 in finding that he posed a flight risk. ECF No. 1 at 12–17. Respondents contend these 26 claims are unexhausted. ECF No. 4 at 3–4. 27 The Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 28 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro- 1 Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by 2 Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A court may require prudential 3 exhaustion when: 4 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate 5 a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 6 administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow 7 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 8 9 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 10 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative 11 remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or 12 stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is 13 excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). A court may excuse 14 prudential exhaustion, however, “if administrative remedies are inadequate or not 15 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury 16 will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 The Ninth Circuit has applied these principles in analogous circumstances, where a 19 noncitizen seeks habeas review of an immigration judge’s adverse bond determination. See 20 Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s 21 adverse bond determination before appealing to the BIA. This short cut was improper. 22 Leonardo should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before 23 asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s decision.”). Here, Petitioner challenges 24 to the immigration judge’s characterization of the record and assessment of the relevant 25 flight-risk factors. These are arguments to be decided in the first instance by the BIA, the 26 administrative tribunal established to review such claims and correct any mistakes, and 27 possessing expertise in such review. 28 /// 1 Petitioner argues that requiring exhaustion would be futile in this case. ECF No. 1 2 at 17–19. But Petitioner’s generalized allegations concerning irregularities in other bond 3 proceedings, drawn from judicial decisions addressing those proceedings, do not establish 4 that the BIA’s review of his own bond determination would be futile. The Court declines 5 to act as a parallel appellate administrative tribunal in addressing the merits of the claimed 6 errors here, where doing so would effectively encourage the deliberate bypass of the 7 administrative review process, designed to allow the agency to correct its own errors. 8 Consistent with Leonardo, the Court declines to consider this challenge before the BIA has 9 had an opportunity to address it. 10 B. Conditions of Confinement 11 Petitioner next contends that the conditions of his confinement are unconstitutional, 12 alleging overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, inadequate food and medical care, and 13 exposure to infectious diseases. ECF No. 1 at 19–22. Petitioner’s allegations concerning 14 the conditions of his confinement do not, however, provide a basis for relief in this habeas 15 proceeding. The Ninth Circuit has “long held that prisoners may not challenge mere 16 conditions of confinement in habeas corpus[.]” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th 17 Cir. 2016) (en banc); see Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2023) 18 (“[W]e have consistently applied the terms of § 2255 and § 2241 to limit claims brought 19 under these statutory provisions to challenges to the actual execution of the sentence itself, 20 rather than ancillary harms resulting from the conditions of confinement.”); Kalayci v. 21 Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-642-BJC-BJW, 2026 WL 2076367, at *2 (S.D. 22 Cal. July 17, 2026) (“Petitioner’s allegations concerning his medical care and conditions 23 of confinement are not proper grounds for relief pursuant to § 2241.”); Dawes v. People, 24 No. 19CV1921-CAB-BGS, 2019 WL 13500211, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2019) (“[G]eneral 25 conditions of confinement claims are not cognizable under § 2241.”). 26 C. Arrest 27 Finally, Petitioner contends that police officers in Orlando violated his right to due 28 process right by detaining him without an arrest warrant. ECF No. 1 at 11. Respondents 1 || have filed a report showing that Petitioner was arrested by police from the City of Winter 2 || Garden, Florida, for a motor vehicle offense on April 5, 2026. See ECF No. 4-2 at 3. The 3 |}same day, DHS issued an administrative arrest warrant for Petitioner’s immigration 4 ||detention. See ECF No. 4-3. It is unclear precisely when Petitioner was transferred to 5 ||immigration custody, but the administrative arrest warrant reflects that it was served on 6 || Petitioner on April 10, 2025. See id. Delay associated with serving the administrative 7 || warrant on Petitioner may warrant a bond hearing—which Petitioner has already □□□□□□□□ 8 does not entitle him to immediate release in the circumstances presented here. See 9 || Valdiviezo v. Mullin, No. 26-CV-4371 JLS (DEB), 2026 WL 2620977, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 10 3, 2026) (concluding that a bond hearing was the appropriate remedy where the 11 || petitioner’s arrest warrant was served four days after his arrest); Marcelino v. LaRose, No. 12 3:26-cv-04098-RBM-SBC, 2026 WL 2210910, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. July 30, 2026) 13 ||(declining to order immediate release and instead ordering a bond hearing even after 14 assuming respondents had failed to comply with warrant requirement); Gonzalez-Ramos v. 15 || Mullin, No. 26-CV-3159 JLS (GC), 2026 WL 1865899, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2026) 16 ||(concluding that a bond hearing was the appropriate remedy for the petitioner’s asserted 17 || warrantless detention). 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed 20 || to close the case. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: September 10, 2026 ‘ 23 Jekut ¢ Howe Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 25 26 27 28