Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ADRIANAS JONATHAN JONES, Case No.: 26-cv-4000-RSH-GC 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER LaROSE, 15 Respondent. 16 17 On July 10, 2026, petitioner Adrianas Jonathan Jones, proceeding pro se, filed a 18 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 19 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Petition. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, was detained on March 29, 22 2026, in Florida following his second arrest for driving under the influence. ECF No. 7 23 (Gov’t’s Return), at 1; ECF No. 7-5 (Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) June 1, 2026 Order 24 Denying Bond), at 1. Petitioner had previously been detained and released on his own 25 recognizance following his first arrest for driving under the influence. ECF No. 7, at 1. In 26 denying bond, the IJ noted the Petitioner’s first DUI arrest and concluded that the second 27 arrest for the same offense established that Petitioner is a “[d]anger to [the] community.” 28 1 ECF No. 7-5, at 1. Petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s denial of bond to the BIA. See ECF 2 No. 1, at 6; ECF No. 7, at 1. After he filed the instant Petition, an IJ denied Petitioner’s 3 application for adjustment of status and ordered him removed to Trinidad and Tobago. See 4 ECF No. 3 (Pet’r’s Notice of Updated Circumstances and Change in Custody), at 1; ECF 5 No. 7, at 1–2. Petitioner’s appeal of that decision is currently pending before the BIA. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 8 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 9 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the 10 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 11 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 12 III. ANALYSIS 13 The Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 14 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro 15 Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by 16 Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A court may require prudential 17 exhaustion when: 18 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement 19 would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) 20 administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 21 22 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 23 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative 24 remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or 25 stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is 26 excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, “a 27 court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are 28 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, | |}irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’” 2 || Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 3 |}2004)). 4 The Ninth Circuit has applied the exhaustion doctrine to circumstances similar to 5 those presented here—where a noncitizen seeks review, through a habeas proceeding, of 6 ||an immigration judge’s denial of bond without first appealing that denial to the BIA. See 7 || Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s 8 ||adverse bond determination before appealing to the BIA. This short cut was improper. 9 petitioner] should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA 10 before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s decision. ... When a petitioner 11 || does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss 12 petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted 13 ||remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.”). 14 Consistent with Leonardo, the Court declines to consider this challenge before the 15 || BIA has had an opportunity to address it. To the extent that Petitioner chose not to appeal 16 || the adverse bond determination to the BIA, the Court declines act as a parallel appellate 17 || administrative tribunal in addressing the merits of the claimed errors here, where doing so 18 || would effectively encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative review process— 19 || a process that is designed to allow the agency to correct its own errors. The Court declines 20 ||to waive the prudential exhaustion requirement. 21 CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed 23 close the case. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 || Dated: September 10, 2026 ed: Sep er 10, J2hut ¢ [oes 17 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 28