In re J.P. CA2/2
- Proceeding
- appeal from orders
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Los Angeles County
- Trial judge
- Marguerite D. Downing
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- dependency
Analysis
No analysis yet. When one exists it is a model's reading of this opinion — the rulings it reviewed, whether it agrees with the court, and the authorities it checked — shown beside the court's own disposition, never in place of it. How analyses are made.
Opinion
Filed 9/10/26 In re J.P. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.P. et al., Persons Coming B347001 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. AND FAMILY SERVICES, 21CCJP05880EF)
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. H.P., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Eliot Lee Grossman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ______________________________ H.P. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating jurisdiction over her sons J.P., Jr. (born Nov. 2013) and N.P. (born Sept. 2017) (collectively, the children), as well as the exit orders granting J.P. (father) sole legal and physical custody and limiting mother to monitored visitation.1 Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND I. Relevant Family History In December 2021, mother was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) with the children in the car. The juvenile court took jurisdiction over the children. In November 2022, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and granted mother and father (collectively, parents) joint legal and physical custody. Parents briefly reconciled and moved in together. They broke up and moved to separate residences after mother’s second arrest for DUI in February 2023.
II. Referral; Investigation; Detention In June 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral that “mother arrive[d] to pick up [the] children from school while 1 The children’s older sister is not part of this appeal.
2 intoxicated” for the second time that school year. Mother was “stumbling[] and unable to walk or talk.” That same day, a DCFS social worker interviewed father and the children. Father said that J.P., Jr. had texted him at 5:30 in the morning, telling him that mother was “ ‘drinking again[.]’ ” When father arrived at mother’s home, he observed “empty beer cans strewn about . . . [her] bedroom.” He dropped the children off at school and, later that day, picked them up after “receiv[ing] an urgent call from school officials, advising him [that] . . . mother was intoxicated and attempt[ing] to take custody of the[] children.” J.P., Jr. told DCFS that he also saw beer cans in mother’s bedroom that morning, and “immediately felt scared and nervous” that “it was ‘going to be a bad day’ since . . . mother was drinking again.” He said that mother “dr[a]nk[] alcohol frequently in or near his presence[,]” and that he “ha[d] seen her become intoxicated ‘a lot of times.’ ” N.P. felt “ ‘scared’ ” when mother arrived to his school intoxicated. N.P. “ ‘could tell [mother] was drinking beers because she could not walk straight. And she could not talk right. That’s how I know when she drinks a lot of beers.’ ” N.P. reported that this was “not an isolated event, because . . . mother ‘sometimes drinks beers a lot.’ ” N.P. also said that “mother has shown up [to] school to pick him up with an opened beer can tucked inside her coat pocket” and that “he can also detect the smell of alcohol emitting from . . . [her] breath.” Mother was not available for an interview until four days later. She admitted to “relaps[ing]” and “consum[ing] several beers” before arriving to pick up the children but denied “having 3 been impaired and[/]or heavily intoxicated” or having any substance abuse issues. In August 2024, the juvenile court detained the children from mother and placed them with father. The court ordered mother to submit to weekly alcohol testing and have monitored visits with the children a minimum of three times per week. III. Jurisdiction; Removal; Disposition In October 2024, the juvenile court sustained an amended jurisdictional petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.)2 In relevant part, the court found that mother “has an unresolved history of alcohol abuse, and is a current abuser of alcohol” and, on prior occasions, had “dr[iven] a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and while the children were passengers in the vehicle” and been “arrested for . . . DUI” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). Father was designated a nonoffending parent. The juvenile court removed the children from mother’s custody, finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. Father would retain physical custody. The court ordered family preservation services for father and enhancement services for mother. The court ordered mother to, among other things, “participate in a full alcohol program with random testing, 12 step program and court card[.]” IV. Mother’s Progress In April 2025, Mother “made active efforts to comply with . . . [c]ourt[-]ordered services and overall . . . ma[de] significant progress in . . . areas of her recovery[,] . . . includ[ing] [by] admitting to DCFS staff that she is in fact, a recovering alcoholic.” She also “show[ed] significant improvement in her 2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
4 ability to openly and calmly discuss case issues[.]” Mother’s visits with the children went well. Mother consistently tested negative for drugs and alcohol, with three exceptions: (1) in September 2024, mother tested presumptively positive for amphetamines; (2) in December 2024, mother tested positive for methamphetamines; and (3) in January 2025, mother tested presumptively positive for a low level of fentanyl. Staff at mother’s substance abuse program deemed the third test negative and the first test a false positive triggered by mother’s use of Fentermina, a prescription appetite suppressant. Per a doctor at the substance abuse program, Fentermina “can cause [mother] to test positive for [a]mphetamines (AMP) on a drug test . . . . [n]o other substances should be found to be positive in her drug screen.” However, staff at the drug testing lab confirmed that Fentermina could not have triggered a positive test for methamphetamines, particularly not at the high concentration shown in mother’s test. Moreover, neither mother nor her substance abuse program could provide evidence of mother’s Fentermina prescription or put DCFS in touch with the prescribing physician. Mother denied any drug use. In February 2025, she obtained an independent hair follicle drug test, which came back negative. That same month, mother texted a social worker photographs of her current prescriptions, which did not include Fentermina.
5 V. Six-Month Review Hearing; Termination of Jurisdiction; Appeal In April 2025, the juvenile court held a contested six-month review hearing pursuant to section 364. DCFS recommended terminating jurisdiction and giving sole custody to father, with monitored visits for mother. Father joined in that recommendation. Mother asked the court “to keep the case open” and “[i]n addition, either return the children to her or liberalize her visitation based on her progress.” The juvenile court “confirm[ed] that alcohol[,]” rather than any other illicit substance, “was really . . . mother’s issue.” However, the court found that the children were “in safe hands” with father and explained that dependency courts “do[] [not] keep cases open for parents to work their way back to their children.” Accordingly, the court terminated jurisdiction over the children, awarded father sole legal and physical custody, and awarded mother a minimum of three monitored visits weekly. The juvenile court stayed termination of jurisdiction pending receipt of the custody order. In May 2025, the custody order was filed. Mother timely appealed. DISCUSSION Mother argues that the trial court failed to comply with section 366 because it did not find (and, on this record, could not have found) that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide mother with services. To the extent that mother’s appeal requires statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 412.) A. Statutory Framework 6 “If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months.” (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 303 (Bridget A.).) “The applicable standards at the six-month review hearing differ depending on the child’s placement.” (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 98 (Maya L.); see also In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265 [“A parent placement poses very different considerations for the juvenile court than does a foster care placement[.]”].) Generally, “when a child is removed from parental custody under the dependency statutes, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services pursuant to section 361.5 to ‘the child and the child’s [parents].’ (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The purpose of these reunification services is ‘to facilitate the return of a dependent child to parental custody.’ [Citation.] Unless an express exemption exists, reunification services provided pursuant to section 361.5 are mandatory . . . and monitored through periodic . . . reviews” pursuant to section 366 et seq. (In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1281–1282.) The law provides alternate paths for a child who remains in parental custody while under court supervision. Section 364 applies when a child is “not removed from the physical custody of his . . . parent[.]” (§ 364, subd. (a); see In re R.F. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 459, 469 (R.F.) [“Section 364 governs review hearings for dependent children who have not been removed from one or both parents.”]; In re Pedro Z., Jr. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 12, 20 (Pedro Z.) [“when the child remains in a parent’s home, the court reviews the status of the case every six months under section 364”].) At the six-month review hearing, “[t]he court shall 7 terminate its jurisdiction unless [DCFS] establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction . . . , or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.” (§ 364, subd. (c).) At a section 364 review hearing, “the [juvenile] court is not concerned with reunification, but in determining ‘whether the dependency should be terminated or whether further supervision is necessary.’ [Citations.]” (Pedro Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 20; see also Maya L., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.) Accordingly, the parent from whom the children have been removed is not entitled to reunification services. (See In re A.L. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 138, 145 [no reunification services are called for when a child is not removed from his or her custodial parent].) Instead, that parent may be awarded enhancement services, i.e. “child welfare services offered to the parent not retaining custody, designed to enhance the child’s relationship with that parent.” (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 212; see § 362, subd. (a).) The parent retaining custody may receive family preservation or maintenance services.3 (See Bridget A., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [when child remains in home of parent, proper form of child 3 Because family preservation services and family maintenance services serve overlapping purposes, the terms are often used interchangeably. (Compare § 16501, subd. (g) [“[F]amily maintenance services are activities designed to provide in-home protective services to prevent or remedy neglect, abuse, or exploitation, for the purposes of preventing separation of children from their families.”] with § 16501, subd. (j) [“[F]amily preservation services include those services . . . [designed] to avoid or limit out-of-home placement of children.”].)
8 welfare services is family maintenance services, not family reunification services].) Alternatively, if a child is removed from his custodial parent, the juvenile court may place the child with “a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child[.]” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) If the court places a child with a noncustodial parent, it may, among other options, “[o]rder that the parent assume custody subject to [court] supervision[.]” (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).) If it does, status review hearings are held pursuant to section 366 et seq. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).) B. The Trial Court Did Not Err Mother’s arguments stem from the premise that the juvenile court “erroneously refer[red]” to the six-month review hearing as a section 364 hearing. Mother contends that because “the case law makes it abundantly clear that it was actually a [s]ection 366 hearing[,]” the court erred by failing to make a reasonable services finding. She also claims that, on this record, DCFS could not have satisfied its burden to show that it made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services. As an initial matter, mother forfeited the contention that the juvenile court failed to comply with section 366 by failing to raise the issue below. (See In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 605 [“Failure to object to [statutory] noncompliance . . . in the lower court results in forfeiture”].) Mother’s premise also fails on the merits. Section 364 applies when children are not removed from a custodial parent. (§ 364, subd. (a); see also R.F., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 469, Pedro Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) When this case 9 originated in June 2024, parents had joint custody of the children. While the children were removed from mother’s custody, they were never removed from father’s custody. Therefore, section 364 applies to the six-month hearing. Consistent with section 364, the juvenile court granted father family preservation services and mother family enhancement services.4 At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court determined that continued court supervision was unnecessary and terminated jurisdiction. (§ 364, subds. (a) & (c).) The court thus complied with the applicable dependency statute. Mother’s arguments that it failed to comply with the requirements of a different statute (namely, § 366) are beside the point. Notably, mother does not argue that continued court supervision was necessary; that she is entitled to reunification services under section 364; or that section 364 required the juvenile court to make a reasonable efforts finding with respect to mother’s discretionary enhancement services. Instead, mother conclusorily asserts that since father was a noncustodial parent, the six-month review hearing was necessarily held pursuant to section 366. (See § 361.2, subds. (a), (b)(3).) Mother does not explain why we should deem father, who had been awarded joint custody of the children in November 2022, a noncustodial parent under section 361.2. (See In re A.T. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 722, 733 [in the context of section 361.2, the term “custody” “describes the right of a parent to have physical possession of and/or the right to make decisions about 4 Mother’s request on appeal for “six additional months of [r]eunification [s]ervices” (italics added) is puzzling, as she never received any reunification services.
10 the child”]; In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 [“ ‘ “ ‘When an appellant . . . asserts [a point] but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’ ” ’ [Citation.]”].) Lastly, mother argues that if we reverse the challenged orders, we should also instruct the juvenile court to grant mother unmonitored visitation. As we affirm the orders, we decline to issue the requested instruction. DISPOSITION The orders are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J. GOORVITCH We concur:
________________________, Acting P. J. CHAVEZ ________________________, J. RICHARDSON
Cites, in this corpus
- Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Ashley L. B254628 · 2014-12-08
- San Mateo County Human Services Agency v. Kia E. No. A139117 · 2014-09-19
- Riverside County Department of Public Social Services v. A.B. No. E053775 · 2012-02-14
- Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Pedro Z. No. B223478 · 2010-11-16
- Orange County Social Services Agency v. B.L. No. G043221 · 2010-08-11
- Bridget A. v. Superior Court No. B195282 · 2007-03-05
- In Re Nicholas H. A100434 · 2003-09-26