In re M.P. CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/10/26 In re M.P. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re M.P. et al., Persons B351955 Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County Court Law. Super. Ct. Nos. _____________________________ 23PSJP00086B-C) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff, v. JEANETTE Z. and JOSE P., Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed. William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Jose P. Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Jeanette Z. Megan Turkat-Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent minors M.P. et al. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff.

****** In this juvenile dependency proceeding, both parents appeal from orders (1) denying their petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 to modify prior orders and grant additional reunification services for their young twin children, and (2) terminating their parental rights. The juvenile court found the mother had demonstrated changed circumstances but had not shown additional reunification services would serve the children’s best interests, and that the father’s circumstances were changing rather than changed and additional services would not serve the children’s best interests. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying either parent’s section 388 petition. We affirm the orders.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Facts A. The family Jeanette Z. (mother) and Jose P. (father) have three children together: twins M.P., and J.P., (born in 2023) and Mia P., (born in 2025) during the pendency of these proceedings. Mother also has a daughter, Audrey G., born in 2020, whose father is deceased. Only M.P. and J.P. are the subjects of this appeal. B. Circumstances giving rise to jurisdiction M.P. and J.P. were born at 29 weeks’ gestation, each weighing about three pounds. Because they were medically fragile, they remained in the neonatal intensive care unit after birth. Mother and both children tested positive for amphetamine; Mother and J.P. also tested positive for marijuana. Mother admitted she had used marijuana daily and amphetamine about three times per week during her pregnancy. She had received no prenatal care. At that time, mother and father were homeless and living in a tent. Mother had an extensive history of substance abuse, including six years of daily methamphetamine use. She also acknowledged incidents of domestic violence in her relationship with father. Father had a 29-year history of substance abuse, beginning with marijuana at age 13 and methamphetamine at age 14. Father had a prior dependency case and had not seen his older children since 2018 because he had been “lost to the streets and drugs.” He had served approximately one and one-half years in jail following a conviction for willful cruelty to a child. Father additionally admitted to an incident of domestic violence against mother.

3 II. Procedural Background A. Jurisdiction and disposition On September 1, 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over M.P. and J.P. The petition alleged: (1) mother and father had “histor[ies] of substance abuse including marijuana, amphetamine, and methamphetamine,” and were current substance abusers; (2) M.P. and J.P. were born suffering from “detrimental condition[s],” as reflected in their positive toxicology screens for marijuana and amphetamine; and (3) father has a history of physically abusing M.P. and J.P.’s half siblings, as well as an unrelated child. The petition further alleged that the parents’ conduct “endanger[ed] [M.P. and J.P.’s ] physical health and safety and place[d] [M.P. and J.P.] at risk of serious physical harm [and] damage,” warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). At the November 2023 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations regarding mother’s substance abuse and M.P. and J.P.’s positive toxicology screens. The court also sustained allegations concerning father’s long-term substance abuse and the risk posed by his prior physical abuse of children.2 The juvenile court declared M.P. and J.P. dependents of the court, removed them from parental custody, and ordered reunification services.

2 The petition also alleged that father’s physical abuse of the half siblings and the unrelated child supported jurisdiction under subdivisions (a) and (b). The juvenile court dismissed those allegations.

4 Mother’s case plan required drug testing, a full drug-and- alcohol program, a 12-step program with a sponsor, parenting education, and individual counseling. Father received a substantially similar plan. The court ordered monitored visitation for both parents.3 B. Reunification period Mother completed residential substance-abuse treatment in January 2024, but had not enrolled in aftercare services. She was then living in a vehicle with father. In February 2024, mother tested positive for cocaine. She stated father had given her a vape pen that was laced with cocaine. Mother’s visits were generally affectionate, but concerns persisted regarding her ability to simultaneously supervise and care for each twin. At times, mother focused on one child while leaving the other insufficiently supervised, requiring the caregivers to intervene for the children’s safety Mother rarely inquired about the twins’ medical care, development, routines, or needs. After several initial visits, father stopped visiting M.P. and J.P., did not drug test, and did not make himself available to the Department. In March 2024, mother and father were arrested following a road-rage incident in which father pulled a gun on another driver. Father was incarcerated and did not participate in services or visitation. At the six-month review hearing in May 2024, the juvenile court found mother had made partial progress and father had made “unsubstantial” progress. The court continued mother’s 3 M.P. and J.P. remained hospitalized after their birth and were released in late September 2023. At that time, they were placed with their current caregivers.

5 reunification services and terminated father’s services. At the 12-month review hearing in December 2024, mother disclosed that she was pregnant with Mia. The court found mother’s progress had not been substantial, but continued her services and advised her that this would likely be her final period of reunification. Father resumed visitation in late 2024. He left early during one visit and missed four of 11 scheduled visits between December 2024 and January 2025. He told the Department he would not change M.P.’s diaper because “it was not appropriate for a man to change a girl.” Father did not ask the caregivers about the twins’ medical needs, routines, or over-all development. At the 18-month review hearing in March 2025, the court found that returning the children to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment. It terminated mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The children remained with the caregivers, to whom they were strongly attached. They referred to the caregivers as “daddy” and “papa,” and the caregivers wished to adopt them. After the termination of reunification services, mother cancelled 11 visits between March and June 2025. She relied on the caregivers to provide food, diapers, clothing, and other supplies, and she needed regular coaching regarding supervision, feeding, diapering, safety, and redirection. Father’s visitation was likewise inconsistent. He did not meaningfully inquire about the children’s well-being or medical care, and he relied on the caregivers to soothe and care for them during visits. After some visits with father, M.P. and J.P. were distressed, clingy, and had difficulty eating and sleeping. In September 2025, mother asked to move her visits to a 6 Department office so that a neutral observer, rather than the caregivers, would monitor them. The court granted the request, while warning mother that the change would likely reduce her visitation because of the office’s limited weekday hours and the caregivers’ distance from it. The court also authorized assessment of maternal grandmother and paternal aunt as monitors for father’s visits. Mother’s visitation decreased: she had no visits in September 2025, one in October, and two in November. Mother and father remained in a relationship and attended visits together with Mia, who was not removed from their care. C. The section 388 petitions and hearing On October 13, 2025, mother and father separately petitioned under section 388 to modify prior orders and grant additional reunification services. Mother relied on her continued participation in aftercare, sobriety, negative drug tests, visitation, and care of Mia. Father relied on his completion of a six-month drug-and-alcohol program, negative drug tests, visitation, and care of Mia. At the December 9, 2025 evidentiary hearing, mother submitted on the Department’s reports. Father testified he had not completed all components of his case plan, had ceased visiting the children for approximately one year because he was “still using [drugs],” and had only recently begun anger-management and parenting education. He did not know the children’s birth dates, sleep schedules, doctors, pediatrician, or the nature of their developmental services. Father had not attended any of the children’s medical appointments. Counsel for the children opposed the petitions, arguing that the parents had not demonstrated circumstances warranting 7 modification and that further reunification would not serve the children’s need for permanence and stability. The juvenile court denied both petitions. As to father, the court found that his circumstances were changing, rather than changed. It noted that father had not completed his case plan during the 27 months since the initiation of dependency proceedings and had only recently commenced key components of it. The court also found that father had not established a bond with the twins and that granting additional reunification services would not serve their best interests. As to mother, the court found she demonstrated changed circumstances. She completed her court-ordered services, remained in aftercare, participated in a 12-step program with a sponsor, and continued to test negative. The court nevertheless found additional reunification services would not be in the children’s best interests. It reasoned that M.P. and J.P. had lived with their caregivers practically their entire lives; mother had never progressed beyond monitored visitation; she had not attended their medical appointments or demonstrated sustained knowledge of their daily needs; and the children had formed a strong parental bond with their caregivers. D. Termination of parental rights The juvenile court conducted the contested section 366.26 hearing over several dates in December 2025 and January 2026. On January 21, 2026, the court found M.P. and J.P. adoptable. It found mother had maintained regular visitation, but neither parent had established a beneficial parental relationship with the children. The court further found that neither the beneficial parental relationship exception nor the sibling-relationship exception to adoption applied. The court terminated the parental 8 rights of mother and father and designated the caregivers as the children’s prospective adoptive parents. On January 26, 2026, mother and father each filed notices of appeal from the orders denying their section 388 petitions and terminating their parental rights. DISCUSSION A. Principles governing modification of a dependency order A juvenile court dependency order may be changed, modified, or set aside at any time. (§ 385.) A parent may petition the court for such a modification on the grounds of a change of circumstance or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) To obtain the requested modification, the parent must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both a change of circumstance/new evidence and that the proposed change of order is in the child’s best interests. (§ 388; In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478 (Alayah J.); In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) “This is a difficult burden to meet in many cases, and particularly so when . . . reunification services have been terminated . . . .” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.) At that point, the parent’s interest in reunification is no longer paramount; the child’s need for permanence and stability becomes the court’s central concern. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307, 309–310.) Thus, the question is not whether a parent’s efforts are commendable. It is whether the requested order would promote the child’s interests in permanence and stability. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526–527.) We review an order denying a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Alayah J., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.) The order is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the 9 burden of demonstrating reversible error. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) B. Father’s petition The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding father’s circumstances were changing, rather than changed. Nor did it abuse its discretion in alternatively finding that further reunification services would not serve the children’s best interests. Father’s sustained problems were substance abuse as well as his prior physical abuse of his older children and an unrelated child. Father used marijuana and methamphetamine from an early age, had a prior dependency case arising from substance abuse and child abuse, and was convicted of willful cruelty to a child. He tested positive for methamphetamine shortly after these proceedings began and, in March 2024, mother reported he was again using methamphetamine. Father’s services were terminated in May 2024. By the December 2025 hearing—some 19 months later—he had completed an outpatient substance-abuse program and was testing negative. Those were positive developments. But the court could reasonably find they did not establish a durable change in circumstances. Father did not enroll in aftercare until December 4, 2025, five days before the hearing. He had attended only three Alcoholics Anonymous meetings in the preceding weeks and had no sponsor. He reenrolled in anger management only eight days before the hearing. Although he began parenting education in September 2025, he had not completed it. The court also reasonably found, based on father’s own testimony, he failed to participate in any individual counseling. Father had not meaningfully addressed the prior child-abuse findings: he denied 10 or minimized the conduct and declined to discuss it with the social worker. The timing of father’s participation in the lives of the children was also significant. After M.P. and J.P. were detained, father visited them only three times in October and November 2023. He then had no contact with them for approximately 13 months, until December 2024. Father attributed that lapse to his drug use. On this record, the court could reasonably characterize father’s efforts as a recent beginning in anticipation of the section 388 hearing, not a completed and sustained resolution of the problems that led to dependency. Even if father’s recent progress established changed circumstances, he did not show that additional reunification services would promote the children’s best interests. Although paternal aunt described him as affectionate and increasingly engaged during recent visits, the court was entitled to give that testimony limited weight in light of father’s lengthy absence and his limited knowledge of the children’s daily lives. Father was unaware of basics such as the children’s sleep schedules, the name of their pediatrician, or the nature of their developmental services. He did not even know their birth dates and, despite their medical issues, he had never attended a child’s medical appointment. The court could reasonably distinguish father’s ability to play with, feed, or diaper the children during monitored visits from a parental relationship reflecting knowledge of and interest in their daily needs. M.P. and J.P., meanwhile, had lived with their caregivers for virtually their entire lives. The caregivers attended to the children’s routines, medical care, and developmental services. Father did not establish further delay of the children’s permanent plan was warranted.

11 Father’s care of Mia did not compel a different result. The fact that Mia remained in the parents’ custody did not establish that father’s circumstances had changed or that delaying M.P. and J.P.’s permanent plan would promote their best interests. Moreover, the Department had expressed concerns about father’s anger-management progress and incomplete case plan. C. Mother’s petition Mother’s sobriety and completion of her case plan supported the court’s changed-circumstances finding. They did not, however, compel a finding that six additional months of services would promote the children’s best interests. M.P. and J.P. had lived with their caregivers since their discharge from the neonatal intensive care unit in September 2023 and had never lived with mother. The caregivers consistently met the children’s daily, medical, developmental, and emotional needs. M.P. and J.P. were affectionate and comfortable with the caregivers, whom they called “daddy” and “papa.” By contrast, mother had not progressed beyond monitored visitation during approximately 27 months of dependency proceedings. The court could reasonably find that she continued to need substantial assistance in caring for both children at once. The caregivers supplied food, diapers, clothing, and other necessities during visits and regularly coached mother regarding supervision, feeding, diapering, safety, and redirection. At times, mother focused on one child while the other was insufficiently supervised; at other times, she froze when confronted with a safety issue. Mother also had not attended, or asked to attend, the children’s medical appointments. This evidence supported the court’s conclusion that further services were not likely to 12 advance the children toward a stable reunification within a timeframe consistent with their need for permanence. Mother argues that the court improperly relied on her continuing relationship with father. It did not. The court did not treat mother’s relationship with father as independently dispositive. Rather, it properly considered that relationship, together with mother’s knowledge of father’s child-abuse history, domestic violence, substance use during the proceedings, and incomplete participation in services, in evaluating whether mother had demonstrated the protective capacity necessary to promote the children’s best interests. The court’s concern regarding mother’s ability to protect the children was supported by more than her continued relationship with father. Mother had previously disregarded court-ordered visitation restrictions by allowing Audrey unauthorized unmonitored overnight visits with mother, which resulted in Audrey’s removal from the maternal grandparent’s care. The court could reasonably find that mother’s continued relationship with father, considered with her prior disregard of visitation/safety restrictions, bore on her ability to prioritize the welfare of the children. Mother correctly notes she sought additional services rather than immediate return of the children. But the court did not conflate those requests. The court evaluated whether mother’s progress and parenting capacity made it likely that an additional period of services would advance the children toward stable reunification. Due to mother’s continuing need for intensive assistance during monitored visits it was reasonable to find additional services would not produce the desired result. In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109 does not compel a 13 different result. There, the juvenile court effectively treated a request for additional services as a request for immediate return of seven children—a materially different inquiry. (Id. at pp. 1124–1128.) Here, by contrast, the court considered the relief mother actually requested—an extension of reunification services—and did not deny her petition merely because she could not immediately assume custody. Mother also argues the court impermissibly compared her relationship with M.P. and J.P. to the caregivers’ relationship with them. The court did not require mother to establish a relationship equal or superior to that of the caregivers. It properly considered the children’s established attachment to the caregivers, their need for continuity, and the evidence that the caregivers consistently met their daily, medical, developmental, and emotional needs. At the post-reunification stage, those were appropriate considerations in assessing the best interests of the children. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Mother isolates the court’s observation that addiction is a lifelong issue. Read in context, however, the court did not impose a categorical rule barring reunification for a parent with a history of substance abuse. It expressly found that mother had changed her circumstances. The court denied mother’s petition because it found further services would not serve the children’s best interests in light of their established placement, mother’s continuing monitored visitation, concerns regarding her protective capacity, and her regular difficulty meeting the children’s needs. The court’s observation regarding the ongoing nature of recovery does not establish an abuse of discretion.

14 D. The Department’s recommendation does not compel reversal The Department recommended granting the parents’ section 388 petitions, principally because of their progress in sobriety and services. County counsel submitted on that recommendation at the hearing, while acknowledging the accuracy of the factual representations made by minors’ counsel. The juvenile court considered that recommendation, but it was not bound by it. Nor did the recommendation relieve mother and father of their burden to establish that the requested modification would promote the children’s best interests. For the reasons discussed above, the court could reasonably find that further delaying permanence would not do so. 4 E. Termination orders Mother and father also appeal from the orders terminating parental rights. Neither, however, presents a separate challenge to the juvenile court’s adoptability finding or its determination that no exception to adoption applied. We therefore do not address those orders further. (See In re Adrian L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342, 344, fn. 1, overruled on other grounds in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18; Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529 [a party “effectively concedes” an issue by failing to address it in briefing].)

4 The Department did not file an appellate brief. We need not resolve whether the Department correctly characterizes its appellate role. Counsel for M.P. and J.P. has filed a respondent’s brief urging affirmance. The Department’s decision not to file a brief does not alter the parent’s burden to demonstrate reversible error.

15 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

KUMAR, J.* We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

* Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.