J.G. v. Superior Court CA1/1

Opinion

Filed 9/10/26 J.G. v. Superior Court CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

J.G., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A176808 ALAMEDA COUNTY, (Alameda County Respondent; Super. Ct. No. JD-041179-01) ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.

J.G. (mother) petitions this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order setting a selection-and-implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 for five-month-old E.G. (daughter). Mother claims the court (1) failed to conduct an adequate analysis to support its finding that daughter’s removal from her custody was necessary and (2) incorrectly relied on In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55 (Ethan N.) in denying reunification services based on the death of one of mother’s other children. We deny the petition.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Daughter’s Detention Daughter was born in mid-April 2026. Two days after her birth, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) detained her and removed her from mother’s care. The detention was based mostly on the death of mother’s 19-month-old son while under mother’s supervision eight months earlier, as well as mother’s initial refusal to give the Agency details about daughter’s birth and medical care. The Agency filed a petition alleging that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over daughter under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect), (f) (causing another child’s death through abuse or neglect), (g) (no provision for support), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The petition alleged that mother had “historical and ongoing significant mental health needs” that put daughter at substantial risk of harm. A contested detention hearing was held in late April. Daughter, who was placed with mother’s father (grandfather), was ordered detained. Mother was ordered to have supervised visitation, and she had consistent and successful visits with daughter over the next couple months.2 B. Mother’s Child Welfare History Mother has a significant child welfare history involving her other three children, born in February 2023 (oldest son), January 2024 (middle son), and May 2025 (youngest son). When middle son was 18 days old, he was 2 At the contested hearing, mother identified daughter’s biological father as J.B., who had been incarcerated in a different county since the beginning of the year. J.B. remains an alleged father, and we do not discuss him further.

2 admitted to the hospital with injuries including “traumatic brain injury with tears on both of the frontal lobes of his brain; fractured skull with a left broken temporal bone; broken right radius (forearm) close to his wrist; broken left femur in the section closest to the knee; a caustic burn inside of his mouth, his tongue, and at the entrance of his throat; and a grade 4 liver laceration.” These injuries occurred while middle son was in mother’s care and were not accidental. A dependency proceeding was initiated in Solano County, where the family then lived, and middle son and oldest son were removed from mother. The sustained petition included findings that both boys were at substantial risk of harm or neglect due to mother’s “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Bipolar Disorder,” which she was not properly medicating and which had resulted in previous psychiatric holds. Mother completed her case plan, and the boys were returned to her care in March 2025 with family maintenance services. The following month, the case was transferred to Alameda County after the family moved there. Four months later, in August 2025, middle son drowned in the bathtub after mother left him unsupervised for over 30 minutes because she fell asleep nursing then three-month-old youngest son. Mother called 911 when she discovered middle son, who was transported to the hospital but died a few days later after being removed from life support. The Agency detained oldest and youngest son, and they were placed with grandfather. At the time daughter was detained, the surviving sons’ dependency cases were still pending with a permanent plan of adoption by grandfather. C. Jurisdiction and Disposition Proceedings In May 2026, the Agency filed a jurisdiction/disposition report recommending the juvenile court sustain the petition’s allegations and 3 bypass reunification services to mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4), which applies when a parent “has caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect.” Mother did not contest jurisdiction, but she did contest the recommended disposition. A combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held on June 17, 2026. Mother called as her only witness the social worker, who testified that the Agency’s primary concerns about mother’s ability to care for daughter were based on mother’s “past history” with her other children. Mother was taking her psychotropic medications as of the previous month, but the social worker felt she had insufficient information about mother’s current mental health status. After hearing argument from the parties, the juvenile court found the petition’s jurisdictional allegations true. The court then found clear and convincing evidence to deny mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4). It also found that mother failed to prove that services were nonetheless in the child’s best interest under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2). The juvenile court adopted many of the jurisdiction/disposition report’s other recommended findings. These included a finding under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), that there was clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to daughter’s safety if daughter was returned to mother and no reasonable means existed to protect daughter without removing her from mother’s care. A section 366.26 hearing was set for October 13, 2026.3 3 In requesting a stay of the section 366.26 hearing, mother states that the hearing date is December 8, 2026. Our record does not show a continuance to that date.

4 II. DISCUSSION A. Mother’s Challenge to the Dispositional Removal Finding Fails. Mother first claims that the juvenile court did not engage in the required analysis under section 361, subdivision (c), before determining that removal of daughter from her custody at the time of the disposition hearing was necessary. We are not persuaded. At the disposition hearing, “there is a statutory presumption that [a] child will be returned to parental custody.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308; In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 965.) A child welfare agency has the burden “to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that removal of the child from the parent’s custody is necessary.” (Marilyn H., at p. 308; § 361, subd. (c).) Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), the provision on which the juvenile court relied, a child may be removed from the physical custody of a parent if “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) To determine if a child will be in substantial danger in a parent’s custody, a court must consider “not only the parent’s past conduct, but also current circumstances, and the parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) Although we generally review findings removing a child from a parent’s custody for substantial evidence (In re I.R., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 520), mother does not challenge the finding at issue on this ground. Instead, she claims the juvenile court “never really considered whether the[re] was a 5 substantial danger in returning the baby to [her].” But the court explained at length why it believed daughter would be in danger under mother’s care. Mother not only caused middle brother’s death, she did so after he suffered “horrific injuries” soon after birth that she never explained or took responsibility for—a history that should have made her even more vigilant about protecting him. In light of these circumstances, the court could not “think of a more vulnerable situation” than the one daughter would be in if under mother’s care. It is true that the juvenile court made these comments when addressing its denial of reunification services, not its removal finding. But the comments equally support the court’s express finding that daughter would be at substantial danger of harm if returned to mother’s custody, and mother offers no authority suggesting the court had to justify that finding further. Mother fails to demonstrate any error. B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Relying on Ethan N. To Deny Mother Reunification Services. Mother also claims, in a single paragraph, that the denial of reunification services must be reversed because the juvenile court “fail[ed] to properly distinguish” Ethan N. We reject this claim. To begin with, mother’s explanation of why Ethan N. is distinguishable from this case is simply incorrect.4 According to mother, Ethan N. “involved three children who came to the attention of the [social services agency] at the same time when father negligently caused the death of one of the siblings. This case, however, involves a child born after the [juvenile c]ourt concluded 4 Mother mistakenly identifies the case the juvenile court relied on as In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, not Ethan N. To the extent mother’s claim is actually based on Ethan C., it obviously fails because the juvenile court did not mention that decision when ruling.

6 its proceeding in the siblings’ case,” a “passage of time [that] is relevant to the analysis.” In fact, the sole child who was the subject of the proceedings in Ethan N. was born over two-and-a-half years after the sibling’s death, whereas here daughter was born less than a year after middle son’s death. (Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 59, 61.) Thus, if anything, the passage of time makes the basis for denying reunification services here stronger than it was in Ethan N. In any case, the juvenile court explicitly stated that it found Ethan N. important to its ruling “not so much factually” as analytically. Specifically, the court said Ethan N. “provide[d] very specific analysis of how [it] should consider the interplay between” section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(4) (the provision authorizing bypass) and (c)(2) (the best-interest exception to bypass). (See Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.) In light of these comments, mother utterly fails to show that the court erred by not delving further into Ethan N.’s facts. III. DISPOSITION The petition for extraordinary writ relief is denied on the merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h)(1); see § 366.26, subd. (l).) The request for a stay of the selection-and-implementation hearing under section 366.26 is denied as moot. This decision shall be final immediately in the interests of justice. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

7 _________________________ Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Banke, J.

_________________________ Langhorne Wilson, J.

J.G. v. Superior Court A176808