Tarzana Property v. Work CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/9/26 Tarzana Property v. Work CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

TARZANA PROPERTY, LLC, B341346

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 23VECV00647)

VINCENT WORK,

Defendant and Respondent;

RONALD REINSDORF,

Movant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Shirley K. Watkins, Judge. Affirmed.

Ronald Reinsdorf, in pro. per.; Ashley Davis; and The Law Office of Cliff Dean Schneider and Cliff Dean Schneider for Movant and Appellant. Grant Shenon Almaraz, David M. Almaraz and Gabriela Gevorkian for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

****** In this action for breach of a residential lease agreement between a limited liability company who owns a residential property and its tenant, the former owner and managing member of the company filed a motion for leave to intervene under the mandatory intervention provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (d)(1),1 asserting several rationales for why intervention was necessary to protect his interests. The former owner challenges the trial court’s order denying the motion. Because the record is inadequate for a proper review of the ruling and the former owner’s argument for intervention is facially meritless, we affirm the trial court’s order. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Facts Tarzana Property, LLC (the LLC) owns a residential property (the property) in Tarzana, California. The LLC was at one time solely owned and managed by Ronald Reinsdorf, who was married to Sheri Reinsdorf. When Ronald2 and Sheri divorced, they agreed Sheri would become the sole owner of the LLC. It is unclear from the record properly before us when the 1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

2 Because the parties share the same last name, we use first names for clarity.

2 transfer of ownership of the LLC was effectuated (see fns. 2 & 3, post), but the parties agree that by at least January 27, 2024, Ronald no longer had any ownership interest in the LLC. II. Procedural History A. Complaint On February 10, 2023, the LLC filed a complaint against the property’s former tenant, Vincent Work, for breach of a residential lease based on Work’s failure to pay rent and damage he caused to the property. Work answered the complaint on August 21, 2023, claiming among other defenses that the alterations he made to the property were “approved and done by Ronald [] during his ownership and control” of the LLC and that Sheri, the “person responsible for filing this action[,] is not yet the official owner of” the LLC. Work also filed a cross-complaint against the LLC and Sheri individually for wrongful eviction, retaliation, and fraud, which he later dismissed. B. Motion for leave to intervene On July 9, 2024, Ronald filed a motion for leave to intervene in the action, arguing for mandatory intervention under section 387, subdivision (d)(1). Ronald claimed he was the managing member of the LLC, and that he needed to personally intervene to protect himself from liability based on the actions Sheri took in the LLC’s name in filing the action, and his own actions in approving the alterations to the property that formed the basis for the LLC’s property damage claim against Work. Ronald filed a proposed complaint in intervention, asserting (1) a cause of action against both the LLC and Work for declaratory relief that he “is blameless for all acts taken by Sheri in [the LLC]’s name”; and (2) a cause of action against Sheri individually 3 for unfair business practices based on her alleged failure to “officially file her managing member status with the Secretary of State.” In support of his motion, Ronald submitted a request for judicial notice of several documents concerning the transfer of ownership of the LLC from Ronald to Sheri; he did not include that request for judicial notice or the accompanying exhibits in the record on appeal.3 3 Ronald designated the request in his notice designating the record on appeal. However, in preparing the appellate record, the trial court informed Ronald that the request for judicial notice was not in the court’s files and notified him that he had 10 days to provide a conformed copy of the document for inclusion in the clerk’s transcript. Ronald did not do so, instead waiting until July 8, 2026— after the LLC filed its respondent’s brief and 422 days after the record was prepared—to file a motion to augment the record with the request for judicial notice and accompanying exhibits and three other documents from the trial court’s file, including Sheri’s declaration in support of the LLC’s opposition to his motion for leave to intervene. Ronald claims he “recently located” the conformed copy of the request for judicial notice in his files, but provides no explanation for why he was unable to locate it sooner or for the delay in providing the other documents. The LLC filed an opposition to the motion. Because Ronald has not established good cause for the delay, we deny the motion to augment the record and evaluate the appeal only on the record properly before us. (See Advisory Com. com., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155 [court may deny motion to augment the record if not “made within a reasonable time”]; Ct. App., Second Dist., Local Rules, rule 2(b) [request to augment should be made within 40 days of filing the record; motions filed after that deadline “will not be granted except upon a showing of good cause”].)

4 The LLC opposed the motion, arguing that Ronald’s “former role as managing member” of the LLC was an insufficient basis for intervening. In support of its opposition, the LLC submitted a declaration from Sheri along with several supporting exhibits. Ronald did not include the declaration or exhibits in the record on appeal. (See fn. 2, ante.) In his reply in support of the motion for leave to intervene, Ronald claimed that “legal documents . . . unequivocally establish that [he] was the sole member and owner of [the] LLC during the relevant periods.” He attached a declaration referencing four exhibits, but did not include those exhibits in the record on appeal. (See fn. 2, ante.) C. The trial court’s ruling On September 3, 2024, the trial court held a hearing and denied Ronald’s motion for leave to intervene.4 The court reasoned that mandatory intervention under section 387, subdivision (d)(1) was inappropriate because Ronald “no longer has any ownership interest or any other interest in” the LLC and therefore has “no interest in the property or the transaction at issue.” At most, the court reasoned, Ronald could establish “that he may be a witness to the transaction at issue,” but having knowledge that could support Work’s defense to the complaint “is insufficient” to support intervention. The trial court noted that because Ronald only sought mandatory intervention under section 387, subdivision (d)(1), it “did not consider any arguments related to permissive intervention.”

4 The court partially granted Ronald’s request for judicial notice “as to the existence” of four documents, but “not as to any hearsay or facts in dispute contained within them.”

5 D. Appeal Ronald filed a notice of appeal on September 30, 2024.5 DISCUSSION6 Section 387 provides that “[t]he court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if . . . [t]he person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.” (§ 387, subd.

5 On September 9, 2024, Ronald moved the trial court to stay the proceedings pending his appeal. That motion is not in the record, but Ronald’s reply in support of the motion is, along with Ronald’s supporting declaration and exhibits, which ostensibly include several of the documents for judicial notice that Ronald referenced in his motion for leave to intervene. Because Ronald did not properly include the exact documents the trial court considered at the time of its ruling on his motion to intervene, we do not consider these ostensibly similar documents submitted to the trial court after the fact. (See Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813 [“It is an elementary rule of appellate procedure that, when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.”].)

6 Because the only issue before us is the propriety of the trial court’s order denying Ronald’s motion for leave to intervene, we do not address Ronald’s arguments concerning whether the LLC is the true plaintiff, whether the suit was brought by Sheri as an alter ego, and whether Sheri lacks standing such that “the case should be dismissed.”

6 (d)(1)(B).) Although the standard of review has not been squarely decided, it has been suggested that an appellate court should conduct a de novo review of an order denying a request for mandatory intervention. (See State Water Bd. Cases (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1043.)7 Appealed orders are presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden of affirmatively showing error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Accordingly, it is the appellant’s burden to provide the court with an adequate record of the proceedings below. (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935.) “Failure to provide an adequate record concerning an issue challenged on appeal requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant[].” (Eureka Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Eureka (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 357, 366.) As an initial matter, Ronald has not satisfied his burden to provide an adequate record because he has failed to include in the record on appeal any of the documentary evidence considered by the trial court in ruling on his motion to interevene. (See fns. 2 & 3, ante.) On the record properly before us, we are unable to review the propriety of the trial court’s evidentiary findings and must presume the court properly found that Ronald “no longer has any ownership interest or any other interest in” the LLC. Based on this finding, the trial court did not err in concluding 7 In State Water Bd. Cases, the court acknowledged that whether an order denying mandatory intervention is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion is unsettled but gave the impression that California should track federal courts and conduct a de novo review. (State Water Bd. Cases, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1043.) We would reach the same result under a review for abuse of discretion.

7 that Ronald does not have an interest sufficient to justify mandatory intervention. This case involves a straightforward breach of a lease agreement between the LLC, as the landlord, and Work, as the tenant. Absent a stake in the LLC or the property, Ronald has no interest in the enforcement of the lease agreement and therefore no “protectable interest in the subject of the action.” (Carlsbad Police Officers Assn. v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 135, 148.) Ronald nonetheless argues that because he, while he was the managing member of the LLC, approved the alterations to the property that form the basis for one of the LLC’s claims against Work, it is “conceivable” that if Work is found to have breached the lease agreement, Work could seek to hold Ronald liable for any damages through an action for contribution or equitable indemnity. However, contribution and equitable indemnity are tools for apportioning damages among joint tortfeasors; they do not apply to damages arising from breach of contract, which is the only issue in this case. (§ 875; Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1040-1042.) Moreover, in the event Work seeks to hold Ronald liable in a tort-based lawsuit for approving the alterations, the determination in this action will not preclude Ronald from adequately defending himself in that separate action. (See Bullock v. City of Antioch (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 407, 419-421 [issue preclusion only bars determination of issue in subsequent action if party is in privity with party in prior action, which requires “a close examination of the circumstances of each case” and satisfaction of due process requirements].) In sum, we are faced with a record that is inadequate to properly review the trial court’s order denying mandatory 8 intervention and, to the extent Ronald argues intervention was necessary to absolve himself of hypothetical future liability, his argument is meritless. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. The LLC is entitled to costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

KUMAR, J. We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

 Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.