In re M.A. CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/9/26 In re M.A. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin)

In re M.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C105842 Law. (Super. Ct. No. SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES STK-JD-DP-2024-0000113) AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.W., Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant A.W. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s supplemental dispositional order following this court’s previous opinion reversing the bypass of mother’s reunification services and directing the juvenile court to conduct “further proceedings consistent with th[e] opinion including the provision of reunification services.” (In re M.A. (Dec. 17, 2025, C103159) [nonpub. opn.] (M.A.).) Mother complains (1) the juvenile court’s orders on remand exceeded the scope of the remand order and (2) she received inadequate notice of the nature of the March 4, 2026 hearing. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Given the limited issues in this appeal, we will not recount the facts and procedural history set out at length in this court’s previous opinion. (M.A., supra, 1 C103159.) It is sufficient to note that mother lost custody of infant I.H. in 2018 because of injuries sustained from repeated, intentional abuse incurred over time, including over 20 broken ribs and at least one broken leg. (Ibid.) Mother was convicted of child endangerment and failed to reunify with I.H., who was adopted by a relative. (Ibid.) Mother tested positive for cannabis at M.A.’s premature birth in 2024, and the juvenile court took jurisdiction over her due to concerns surrounding mother’s drug use, as well as the danger presented by unresolved issues from I.H.’s case. (M.A., supra, C103159.) Mother diligently participated in services, despite the recommendation of the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency) to bypass her for reunification. (Ibid.) Mother presented evidence of her progress and participation in services at a contested disposition hearing, but the juvenile court formally removed M.A. and bypassed mother for reunification. (Ibid.) Mother appealed, and on December 17, 2025, another panel of this court upheld the removal order but reversed the juvenile court’s order bypassing mother for reunification services. (M.A., supra, C103159.) The disposition from this unpublished opinion stated, “We reverse the juvenile court’s order bypassing mother’s reunification services pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code,1] section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion including the provision of reunification services. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.” (M.A., supra, C103159.) A copy of this opinion was received by the juvenile court on December 17, 2025, and transmitted to the parties. On June 17, 2025, during the pendency of mother’s prior appeal, father’s reunification services were terminated, and the matter was set for a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. The section 366.26 hearing was ultimately 1 Undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 continued in light of this court’s previous appellate opinion, and the juvenile court set a hearing for March 4, 2026, “for [r]eview; [a]ppellate [i]ssue.” Notice of this hearing was sent to mother and her counsel on January 21, 2026. On February 25, 2026, the Agency filed an Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; § 224.2) compliance report and the next day the Agency filed a second supplemental disposition report, which was served by mail the same day on mother and her counsel. These reports stated the next hearing on March 4, 2026, was for disposition and was needed in light of the reversal. The second supplemental disposition report stated mother recently moved back to California and was regularly visiting M.A. twice weekly. The report also detailed the recommended reunification services developed in consultation with mother, including a dependency drug court assessment, individual counseling, and parenting classes. The Agency recommended maintaining M.A.’s current placement with her two other siblings during the provision of reunification services. The Agency attached proposed findings and orders. On March 3, 3026, the juvenile court received and filed the remittitur associated with this court’s December 17, 2025 opinion. At the March 4, 2026 hearing, the juvenile court first determined M.A. was not an Indian child. The parties then submitted on the second supplemental disposition report, and the juvenile court ordered the recommended reunification services. The court also adopted the remaining findings and orders recommended in the second supplemental disposition report. Finally, the court granted the Agency discretion for unsupervised, community, and overnight visits with mother. Mother did not object that any of the orders entered exceeded the scope of the juvenile court’s authority on remand or complain that she received insufficient notice of the purpose of the hearing. Mother appeals.

3 DISCUSSION Mother challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders on two grounds: (1) The court’s findings and orders on remand exceeded the scope of this court’s remand order; and (2) she received inadequate notice of the nature of the March 4, 2026 hearing. Because mother failed to object on either basis in the juvenile court, these issues were not preserved for appeal. (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 976, 984.) “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the [juvenile] court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the juvenile court’s attention so they can be corrected. (S.B., at p. 1293.) A second purpose is to create a record that permits review of the juvenile court’s ruling to determine if it was erroneous. (In re A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) The forfeiture rule has been applied to claims of defective notice in dependency proceedings. (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 689 [absence of notice of jurisdictional hearing in violation of the mother’s due process rights was forfeited on appeal where the mother appeared with counsel at subsequent hearings and failed to raise the issue]; Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149 [the mother’s failure to object to proceeding with dispositional hearing waived defective notice claim on appeal].) Nonetheless, “application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic,” and we retain discretion to review mother’s claims. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) Exercising our discretion to do so here (ibid.), we conclude mother has not demonstrated error. I The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Jurisdiction On Remand “When an appellate court’s reversal is accompanied by directions requiring specific proceedings on remand, those directions are binding on the [juvenile] court and 4 must be followed.” (In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434-1435.) “Where the directions to the [juvenile] court are ambiguous, they are interpreted in accordance with the views, reasoning, and holdings expressed in the opinion as a whole.” (Id. at p. 1435.) Moreover, the successive juvenile court proceedings must take into account the current circumstances and developments that have transpired while the appeal was pending. (In re Ryan K. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 591, 597.) As such, the juvenile court retains authority to enter orders in the best interests of the child. (Id. at pp. 597-599.) Mother asserts the juvenile court findings exceeded the court’s remand authority as defined by this court’s remittitur. She posits the court’s remand jurisdiction was limited only to the provision of reunification services given our affirmance of the original jurisdiction and disposition orders. The plain language from the disposition in our prior opinion does not support her position. The disposition stated, “We reverse the juvenile court’s order bypassing mother’s reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion including the provision of reunification services. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.” (M.A., supra, C103159.) This disposition expressly contemplated further proceedings that included but were not limited to reunification services. The only limit was that the juvenile court conduct “proceedings consistent with th[e] opinion.” (Ibid.) Mother has not shown inconsistent juvenile court action, and accordingly, this claim is without merit. II Mother Has Not Shown Her Due Process Rights Were Violated We also reject mother’s contention that she received inadequate notice of the nature of the March 4, 2026 hearing, specifically, that she was not informed the March hearing would be a full disposition hearing. We understand this claim to invoke her right to due process.

5 “In juvenile dependency, ‘[d]ue process includes the right to be heard, adduce testimony from witnesses, and to cross-examine and confront witnesses’ [citation]; specifically, due process ‘focuses on [a parent’s] right to notice and the right to be heard’ before a child is removed from [the parent’s] care.” (In re A.V. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 949, 957.) Here, on January 21, 2026, the juvenile court sent mother a notice advising her of a “[r]eview” hearing scheduled for March 4, 2026. On February 26, 2026, the Agency’s second supplemental disposition report identifying March 4, 2026, as a “disposition” hearing was served by mail on mother as well as her counsel. As set out, ante, this report noted a new disposition was required in light of the reversal and made a number of recommendations, including proposed disposition findings and orders. There is no evidence in the record showing that mother and her counsel did not receive this report prior to the March 4, 2026 hearing. Thereafter, mother appeared with her counsel at the March 4, 2026 hearing, submitted on the recommended reunification services, and requested unsupervised visitation—all without raising any complaint or concern regarding notice. Had mother needed additional time to review the second supplemental disposition report and associated recommended findings and orders, it was incumbent upon her to say so. Under these circumstances, mother has not shown her notice was inadequate or that she was deprived of an opportunity to heard. (In re A.V., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 957.) Finally, we note mother’s failure to show she was prejudiced in any way by the alleged deficient notice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Accordingly, this claim is without merit.

6 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/ MESIWALA, J.

/s/ WISEMAN, J. * * Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.