People v. Hamilton CA5

Opinion

Filed 9/9/26 P. v. Hamilton CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, F088978 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BF193990B) v. KEITH HAMILTON, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R. Brehmer, Judge. Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and Matthew A. Kearny, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- A jury convicted defendant Keith Hamilton of second degree murder and accessory after the fact in the March 2023 fatal shooting of victim Christopher Pudwill. Hamilton raises a single issue on appeal: whether the trial evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aiding and abetting the shooter’s life-endangering act resulting in Pudwill’s death. Because the record contains substantial evidence from which a rational jury could find Hamilton possessed the requisite intent and performed sufficient acts to aid and abet Pudwill’s death, we affirm the judgment. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In mid-August 2024, the Kern County District Attorney filed an amended information charging Hamilton with three felonies: first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);1 count 1); conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 2); and being an accessory after the fact (§ 32; count 5).2 The district attorney also charged an aggravating factor under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) for each count. A jury trial began in the same month, concluding with a verdict in early September 2024. The jury acquitted Hamilton of conspiracy to commit murder (count 2) and first degree murder (count 1) but found him guilty of second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree murder (count 1) and of being an accessory after the fact (count 5). The trial court found the alleged aggravating factor to be true. On November 20, 2024, the trial court imposed a total sentence of 15 years to life for second degree murder and a concurrent middle term of two years for the accessory conviction. Hamilton filed a notice of appeal the same day.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Two other individuals besides Hamilton were also charged in the amended information, including Ira Kindle, Jr.

2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Shortly before 1:00 a.m. on March 18, 2023, a Bakersfield police officer heard gunshots near a gas station and a market at the corners of Q Street and 34th Street and went to investigate. When the officer arrived, he saw Pudwill lying in the street with a gunshot wound to the chest. The gunshot wound was fatal. Police investigators placed Hamilton, Frank Lewis, and Ira Kindle, Jr., at the scene through surveillance camera footage. Three cameras, one facing the gas station that monitored the market parking lot, and two atop the gas station looking across Q Street toward the market, captured the shooting of Pudwill at approximately 12:50 a.m., and other activity in the area between 11:23 p.m. and 12:52 a.m. Video Footage3 The surveillance footage displayed the actions of Hamilton, Lewis, and Kindle before and after the shooting. Based on the surveillance footage, Kindle, Hamilton, and Hamilton’s friend “Christian” were interacting and drinking in the market parking lot. Lewis arrived in a black sedan and greeted Kindle shortly before midnight. As the sedan pulled away, Lewis greeted Hamilton with an extended handshake. The two spoke momentarily before Lewis again shook Hamilton’s hand. Throughout the footage, Hamilton, Lewis, and Kindle are shown pointing across the street to the gas station and to one another. In one sequence, Hamilton and Kindle each gesture toward the gas station while talking near the parking lot railing shortly after Christian left the group at 12:20 a.m. As Lewis and Kindle leaned against the railing, Hamilton lifted his shirt and displayed the right front side of his waistband to Lewis and Kindle.

3 All video exhibits were admitted into evidence and played as witnesses testified. Given the importance of this video evidence to the issues presented, we describe the relevant portions in uncommon detail.

3. In other footage, after Hamilton, Lewis, and Kindle return to the parking lot from the gas station, the three men are seen huddling near the curb across from the gas station, again gesturing toward each other. As they walk back toward the parking lot railing, Hamilton raised his shirt and displayed the right side of his waistband to Kindle and Lewis a second time.4 Minutes after Hamilton displayed the right side of his waistband this second time, Pudwill is seen from a different camera walking among the gas pumps and briefly interacting with patrons. Hamilton, Kindle, and Lewis can be seen together in the distance at the market looking toward the gas station. At 12:47 a.m., Hamilton, Kindle, and Lewis engage in a group hug and look toward the station. Shortly after, Kindle and Hamilton engage in a separate hug before the three again huddled near the parking lot railing. At 12:49 a.m., Kindle looked over his shoulder, pointed toward the gas station, and gestured toward Lewis and Hamilton. Less than a minute later, Pudwill can be seen emerging from the gas pumps and walking in the direction of the market as Hamilton, Lewis, and Kindle face the gas station. Lewis raised his hand and waved in Pudwill’s direction, as if trying to get his attention. Meanwhile, Kindle leaned against the market railing, facing the gas station. Hamilton then stood and turned his back to Pudwill and the station to face Kindle. Hamilton appeared to look down, reach for his waistband, and hand an item to Kindle as Lewis looked on. Lewis then began to walk away toward the gas station. Hamilton continued to stand in front of and speak directly to Kindle. As Pudwill started to cross toward the market, Lewis walked toward Pudwill but stopped short of the sidewalk.

4 Detective Phillip Richardi testified about Hamilton admitting to carrying a gun and small holster in his waistband that night. Richardi confirmed it is common for individuals to hide and carry a gun in the waistband of their pants. Richardi further testified the two instances where Hamilton displayed the right side of his waistband to Lewis and Kindle were consistent with Hamilton flashing the gun he was carrying.

4. Hamilton started walking away from Kindle as Kindle moved from the rail, turned his back to Pudwill, put his head down, and started walking backwards with an item in his hand. Hamilton stopped a short distance from Kindle. He turned back to watch and wait for Kindle. Hamilton and Kindle appeared to speak briefly before Hamilton waved his arm toward the gas station as Pudwill crossed toward the market. Kindle then took a few steps, turned around to squarely face Pudwill, took a shooting stance, and fired at Pudwill. When Kindle fired, Lewis was to the right front, while Hamilton was to the right and slightly behind Kindle. Lewis flinched, apparently startled, but Hamilton appeared unphased by the shooting. Hamilton observed the shooting as he stood a few feet from Kindle. Not even when Kindle and Lewis gathered behind Hamilton, after Kindle finished shooting, did Hamilton appear to divert his attention from Pudwill—until Pudwill took a few steps toward the gas station and collapsed in the street. Kindle then walked away north of the market toward 34th Street, followed by Hamilton; Lewis walked away to the south of the market. Ambulances and law enforcement arrived about two minutes later. Hamilton’s Detention About 12 hours after the shooting, officers took Hamilton into custody. He was found talking with friends in his apartment parking lot. One of the friends threw an item while attempting to flee from officers. Investigators recovered the item and determined it to be the gun Kindle used to kill Pudwill. Officers also found a magazine fitting the gun in Hamilton’s closet. Hamilton’s Statement to Investigators5 Hamilton gave investigators a statement about the events surrounding the shooting. Hamilton explained he had planned to meet, have dinner, and talk with 5 Hamilton’s recorded statement to investigators was played for the jury.

5. Christian the evening of the shooting. Christian was scared because he was asked by Kindle to carry Kindle’s gun. Hamilton offered to hold the gun, find Kindle, and explain to Kindle he had the gun. Hamilton carried the gun in a small holster in his waistband from his apartment to the market. Hamilton and Christian met Kindle, who asked Hamilton, “ ‘You’ve got my s[***], too, huh?’ ” Once Hamilton confirmed he had Kindle’s gun, Hamilton and Christian followed Kindle’s instructions and went to the market where they began to talk and drink.6 Lewis eventually arrived at the market. Lewis reportedly announced he “ran the east side” and threatened to kill Hamilton for saying, “ ‘What’s up?’ ” Hamilton was afraid and believed he was going to die. Hamilton knew Kindle as a bully who had beaten Hamilton and forced him to carry Kindle’s drugs. He did not fear Kindle as much as he feared Lewis, who Hamilton said knew where he lived. Hamilton reported Lewis and Kindle noticed Pudwill across the street and began talking about Pudwill. Kindle disliked Pudwill. He claimed Pudwill was a racist who might have tried to kill him in the past. Kindle and Lewis wanted Pudwill shot. At first Hamilton said Kindle told him to shoot Pudwill, but then Hamilton said Lewis might have told him to shoot Pudwill.7 Hamilton did not know Pudwill and did not want to shoot him. Lewis started “really talking s[***]” and bullying Hamilton and Kindle. After Lewis told Kindle he was still the same “ ‘little b[****]’ ” he had known as a kid, Kindle 6 Hamilton’s statements during questioning were fragmented and unclear. To the extent our description is inaccurate, it does not change the outcome of this appeal. 7 Because Hamilton is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the verdict and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Barrera (2026) 19 Cal.5th 919, 943.) Given Hamilton initially and firmly recounted Kindle’s telling him to shoot Pudwill, and the uncertainty of his statement about Lewis making the request to shoot Pudwill, we view the record as showing Kindle telling Hamilton to shoot Pudwill. (Ibid.)

6. demanded Hamilton surrender Kindle’s gun, saying, among other things, “ ‘Give me my f[******] piece.’ ” Lewis also threatened Hamilton would be “smoked right now” if he did not give Kindle the gun. Hamilton thought Kindle was trying to intimidate him by asking for the gun and he feared he would be shot. He did not think Kindle would shoot anyone else. Still, after Hamilton gave Kindle the gun, Kindle “out of nowhere” shot Pudwill. Hamilton was in shock. He believed Kindle was shooting at him. Only after seeing others running did Hamilton realize he had not been shot. He then started running. Hamilton ran toward his apartment complex. Before he made it to his door, Kindle came out of the shadows and handed the murder weapon to Hamilton, saying, “ ‘[h]ere.’ ” Surprised, Hamilton grabbed the gun. He initially threw the gun in the dirt, but he later recovered it and put it in the trunk of his car. Hamilton assumed the friend who fled from police had removed the gun from Hamilton’s unlocked car. DISCUSSION I. Parties’ Arguments Hamilton avers the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for aiding and abetting Pudwill’s murder. He asserts his conduct—handing the gun to Kindle—aided in the resulting homicide but not in Kindle’s committing the life-endangering act. Hamilton argues there is no evidence he assisted in or encouraged by words or conduct Kindle’s use of the gun to shoot Pudwill. Because he did not encourage or assist Kindle in the actual shooting of Pudwill, and at most only facilitated the result of Kindle’s ability to shoot Pudwill, Hamilton argues he cannot be convicted of second degree murder. The People argue substantial evidence supports Hamilton’s conviction. Hamilton supplied the gun to Kindle just before the shooting occurred. The People also contend Hamilton’s conduct before and after the shooting as shown in the videos admitted at trial, his presence at the shooting, and his statements to the police regarding conversations 7. about shooting Pudwill are sufficient to show he aided and abetted in the shooting of Pudwill. II. Legal Standards A. Sufficiency of the Evidence The test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Chhuon and Pan (2026) 19 Cal.5th 1018, 1064 (Chhuon and Pan). If a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, appellate courts review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 316–317; People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 819–820 (Oyler).) Reviewing courts must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821; People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 470 (Alvarez).) Conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the judgment. (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 646.) Substantial evidence may be contradicted or uncontradicted (People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 138), include erroneously admitted evidence (notwithstanding the error of the evidence’s admission) (People v. Cardenas, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 821), and include both circumstantial evidence and all the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence (Bertsch and Hronis, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 317). Further, determining a witness’s credibility, and resolving conflicts and inconsistencies in testimony are the exclusive province of the trier of fact. (See Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 827.) As such, reviewing courts do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility. (Oyler, at p. 820.)

8. The power of reviewing courts to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether any substantial evidence supports the conviction. (People v. Bassett, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 138; People v. Ghipriel (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 828, 832.) Provided the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the conviction may not be reversed simply because the circumstances also may reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. (Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 820.) A conviction will be upheld even if there is also substantial evidence contrary to the conviction. (People v. Helzer, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 646.) B. Aiding and Abetting Liability for Murder 1. Murder “Murder” is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) “Malice” may be either express, when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away life, or implied, when there is no considerable provocation or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. (§ 188, subd. (a).) Implied malice requires both that the defendant performs an act that involves a high degree of probability of death (the actus reas) and that the defendant deliberately performed the act with a conscious disregard for life, knowing the act endangers the life of another (the mens rea). (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 600.) As relevant here, second degree murder is “an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, but without the premeditation or deliberation required for first degree murder.” (Ibid.) 2. Direct Aiding and Abetting Aiding and abetting liability is “ ‘ “ ‘based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 968.) Therefore, aider and abettor liability requires proof of: “ ‘ “(a) the direct perpetrator’s actus rea—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the direct 9. perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 969–970.) As relevant to this case, “ ‘ “to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act.” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 311; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991 (Reyes).) Specifically, an aider and abettor “must [in some way] aid [the perpetrator] in the commission of a life-endangering act, with ‘ “knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the [life-endangering] act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the [life-endangering] act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.” ’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463; see Reyes, at pp. 991–992.) Our Supreme Court has recently emphasized “it is the fatal act, not any underlying crime, that an aider and abettor of second degree murder must aid or abet.” (People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 655; see also Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.) Whether a defendant has aided and abetted the crime of another is ordinarily a question of fact. (Chhuon and Pan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1065; People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 (Nguyen).) III. Analysis No one questions whether Kindle engaged in a life-endangering act, shooting at Pudwill, and committed a crime, murder, by fatally shooting Pudwill. The dispute here centers on Hamilton’s intent and conduct relative to Kindle. Among the factors the trier of fact may consider in making an aiding and abetting determination are the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, companionship with the perpetrator, and the defendant’s conduct before and after the offense. (Chhuon and Pan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1065; Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)

10. We conclude the record contains substantial evidence, from which a rational jury could find Hamilton possessed the requisite intent and performed acts sufficient to aid and abet Kindle, to find Hamilton guilty of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Hamilton was present when Kindle shot and killed Pudwill. Hamilton admitted as much when speaking with investigators. Surveillance footage also confirms he stood a few feet from Kindle at the time of the shooting. The same footage shows Hamilton was familiar with Kindle. He and Kindle were shown socially interacting at the market for an extended period before the shooting. They even hugged each other on two separate occasions, physically displaying the level of their camaraderie. According to Hamilton, Kindle entrusted him to hold Kindle’s gun before and after the shooting. While Hamilton told officers he knew Kindle as a bully who had beaten Hamilton and forced him to carry Kindle’s drugs, jurors were free to reject his recorded words and accept his recorded actions. Most importantly Hamilton’s recorded conduct would allow reasonable jurors to conclude he intended to and did assist in Pudwill’s shooting. Hamilton’s conduct before the shooting is extremely telling. During his statement to investigators, Hamilton admitted he had the gun, took it to the market, and carried it in a holster in his waistband. The video footage shows Hamilton had the gun as he twice lifted his shirt and showed the right side of his waistband to Kindle and Lewis, and detective Richardi confirmed this conduct was consistent with Hamilton flashing the gun to Kindle and Lewis. Jurors could reasonably conclude Hamilton was showing Kindle and Lewis the gun he had brought so Kindle or Lewis could use it when needed or requested. (See Chhuon and Pan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1065; Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820; People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 273–274 (Garcia).)

11. Further, Hamilton handed the gun to Kindle after hearing Lewis and Kindle discuss shooting Pudwill. According to Hamilton, Lewis and Kindle each directed him to be the shooter. Although Hamilton resisted these efforts, he admitted giving Kindle the gun after Hamilton was threatened and after Kindle demanded the gun. Given the discussions described by Hamilton about shooting Pudwill, as well as the demand made by Kindle for the gun, the jury could have reasonably concluded Hamilton knew Kindle was demanding the gun in order to shoot Pudwill and Hamilton surrendered the gun so Kindle could do what Hamilton refused to do—shoot Pudwill. (See Chhuon and Pan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1065; Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820.) Notably, nothing in the footage suggests any disagreement among Hamilton and Kindle immediately before Kindle fired on Pudwill. Rather, after handing Kindle the gun, Hamilton continued speaking directly to Kindle, as if instructing him on the impending shooting. He casually oversaw Kindle manipulating the gun before Kindle rose and began walking backward across the lot toward Pudwill. Hamilton then paused to check on Kindle before waving Kindle forward as Pudwill approached. Jurors could reasonably view this sequence as Hamilton assisting and encouraging a shooting he had reason to know would occur. Hamilton’s waving Kindle forward could be seen as informing Kindle of the point when Pudwill was sufficiently close for Kindle to start shooting. (See Chhuon and Pan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1065; Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820; Garcia, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 273–274.) The video showed Hamilton acting calmly during and after the shooting. Hamilton did not appear surprised, he watched and waited for Pudwill to fall before moving to speak with Kindle and Lewis as they gathered behind him. After the shooting, following Kindle, Hamilton casually walked from the scene. Rational jurors could view Hamilton’s following behind Kindle as Hamilton continuing to support and align himself 12. with Kindle after the shooting. (See Chhuon and Pan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1065; Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820.) Further, Hamilton admitted accepting the gun from Kindle and trying to dispose of it after the shooting. The jury could view such conduct as Hamilton’s approval of Kindle’s actions and an attempt to avoid the consequences of the shooting for both Kindle and himself. (See Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820; Garcia, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 274 [holding that evidence of the defendant’s flight with a gun and disposal of the gun were post-shooting acts that supported aider and abettor liability].) Finally, given the discussions among Hamilton, Lewis, and Kindle about shooting Pudwill and the footage showing interactions in which Hamilton and Kindle were talking and gesturing toward the gas station, a jury could reasonably infer Hamilton, Kindle, and Lewis were all talking about Pudwill’s actual or anticipated presence at the gas station. (Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820.) Hamilton told investigators he feared for his life and out of fear and self-preservation he gave the gun to Kindle.8 However, the jury here was instructed they may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony. (CALCRIM No. 105). Jurors were free to reject Hamilton’s statements regarding fear or threats, especially given visual evidence to the contrary. (Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 820, 827.) Moreover, the videos do not clearly reveal any type of fear or trepidation by Hamilton at any point in time. Again, in the minutes before the shooting, Kindle, Lewis, and Hamilton hugged each other, and Hamilton and Kindle hugged separately.

8 To the extent Hamilton may contend otherwise, Hamilton’s purported fear of being shot himself by either Lewis or Kindle demonstrates Hamilton understood shooting a gun at another person is a life-endangering act. Additionally, Hamilton acknowledged in his statement to investigators he had previously lost friends due to gun violence.

13. Further, no threatening behavior is apparent from Kindle or Lewis at the time Hamilton gave Kindle the gun, and there is no reason apparent from the video why Hamilton could not have simply walked away from Kindle or refused to give him the gun. Thus, the video does not suggest Hamilton gave Kindle the gun out of fear. Accordingly, the jury could view the video and Hamilton’s statements as showing the shooting of Pudwill was discussed, Hamilton knew Kindle wanted to shoot Pudwill, Hamilton gave the gun to Kindle with knowledge Kindle was about to shoot Pudwill, and Hamilton did so voluntarily and without compulsion so Kindle could shoot Pudwill. (Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820, 827.) When viewed as required under a substantial evidence challenge (Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 470; Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 819–820), the above evidence and considerations demonstrate a close relationship and association between Hamilton and Kindle. Hamilton knew Kindle before the shooting and, in the time before the shooting, they were drinking, talking, and watching the gas station across the street together. Hamilton’s association with Kindle was close enough for Hamilton to bring the gun to the market in the first place and twice display it before the shooting, and close enough for Hamilton to accept and try to dispose of the gun after Hamilton saw Kindle shoot Pudwill. By his own admission, Hamilton was aware Kindle wanted Pudwill shot for reasons dealing with race or prior violence. He gave Kindle the gun after Kindle first demanded Hamilton shoot Pudwill and then demanded Hamilton surrender the gun. Moments after giving Kindle the gun and shielding the transfer from view, Hamilton motioned toward Pudwill, which prompted Kindle into action. Based on the video footage discounting any duress or coercion, Hamilton acted voluntarily and not out of fear. In fact, Hamilton appeared at ease when he handed the gun to Kindle moments before the shooting, was at ease as he stood next to Kindle and gestured that Pudwill was close, and was at ease when he watched unphased as Kindle shot Pudwill. Hamilton’s statement, combined with the videos, shows Hamilton intended 14. for Kindle to have the gun so Kindle could shoot at Pudwill, despite the obvious danger such conduct posed to Pudwill and despite the absence of any danger posed by Kindle to Hamilton. Accordingly, the evidence confirms sufficient acts of aiding or encouragement to support Hamilton’s conviction for aiding and abetting Pudwill’s murder. The evidence shows Hamilton aided Kindle in the life-endangering act of shooting Pudwill by bringing the gun, displaying the gun’s availability, transferring the gun to Kindle while shielding the transfer from view, and pointing out when Pudwill was close. Hamilton acted with knowledge Kindle intended to shoot Pudwill, with the intent to aid Kindle in the commission of the shooting, with knowledge that shooting a gun at another is dangerous to human life, and in conscious disregard for Pudwill’s life. Therefore, substantial evidence supports Hamilton’s conviction for second degree murder as a direct aider and abettor. (See People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463; Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 991–992; see also Chhuon and Pan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1065; Garcia, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 273–274.) Hamilton relies heavily on Reyes to argue there is insufficient evidence to support aiding and abetting liability. We cannot agree. Reyes concerned an appeal from a denied petition for resentencing. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 984.) The defendant in Reyes followed fellow gang members on bicycles into rival gang territory where a member he knew was armed shot and killed the driver of a passing automobile. Reyes was later found in possession of the murder weapon. (Id. at p. 985.) Years after his second degree murder conviction, Reyes sought resentencing, specifically alleging the trial evidence did not show he committed an act that actually helped, encouraged, or facilitated the fellow gang member shooting the victim. (Id. at pp. 986–987.) The trial court found Reyes guilty of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt and denied the petition. The court reasoned that the natural and probable consequence of Reyes’s act of traveling in rival gang territory with an armed 15. fellow gang member was dangerous to human life, that Reyes knew that act was dangerous, and that he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for that danger. (Id. at p. 987.) The appellate court affirmed the trial court decision. Our Supreme Court reversed and noted the trial court had failed to recognize implied malice murder requires the aider and abettor to act with knowledge and intent as to the direct perpetrator’s life-endangering act. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.) Instead of focusing on the defendant’s mental state concerning his own actions, the court advised the trial court should have focused on the defendant’s mental state concerning the life-endangering act committed by the direct perpetrator. (Id. at pp. 991–992.) “[A]ssuming the life-endangering act was the shooting, the trial court should have asked whether Reyes knew that [the fellow gang member] intended to shoot at the victim, intended to aid him in the shooting, knew that the shooting was dangerous to life, and acted in conscious disregard for life.” (Id. at p. 992.) As directed by Reyes, our analysis has focused on Hamilton’s actions, knowledge, and intent concerning Kindle’s life-endangering act of shooting at Pudwill. Moreover, the evidence in this case supports an affirmative answer to each Reyes inquiry. First, Hamilton’s description of the conversations with Kindle and Lewis about using the gun against Pudwill—including the demand that Hamilton shoot Pudwill—supports a conclusion that Hamilton knew Kindle sought to use the gun on Pudwill. Second, Hamilton’s bringing the gun to the market, appearing to twice show the gun to Kindle, handing Kindle the gun seconds before the shooting, and gesturing to Kindle as Pudwill was crossing the street, which appeared to spur Kindle to action, are sufficient to show Hamilton intended to aid and did aid Kindle in shooting Pudwill. Third, from Hamilton’s stated fear of being shot and having lost friends to gun violence, jurors could infer he was aware that shooting at a person would be dangerous to life. Finally, because the jury could reasonably conclude from the footage of Hamilton’s interactions with Kindle and Lewis that Hamilton was not in personal danger and, knowing Kindle’s hostility toward 16. Pudwill, could have refused to surrender the gun, the fact that Hamilton gave Kindle the gun demonstrates a conscious disregard for the danger to Pudwill’s life posed by Kindle shooting the gun. Under Reyes, then, a rational trier of fact could find substantial evidence that Hamilton aided and abetted Kindle’s fatal shooting of Pudwill. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 991–992.) Hamilton contends Reyes made clear an aider and abettor must assist or encourage the perpetrator’s life-endangering act and it is not enough to assist or encourage the result of the action. Hamilton also argues simply giving Kindle the gun was not a dangerous act and he did not actually assist or encourage the shooting of Pudwill. We agree with Hamilton that Reyes made clear an aider and abettor must assist in or encourage the lethal act, as opposed to merely being present or encouraging or aiding other acts or results. (People v. Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 655; Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 987, 991–992.) However, in assessing aider and abettor liability, courts must consider the life-endangering act and the circumstances of the perpetrated crime, including the actions of the aider and abettor both before and after the perpetrated crime. (Chhuon and Pan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 1065–1066; Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1054; Garcia, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 273–274.) Hamilton’s conviction is consistent with Reyes. Here, Hamilton gave Kindle the gun seconds before the shooting. In doing so, Hamilton provided the very instrumentality that enabled Kindle to commit the life-endangering act. Moreover, substantial evidence shows Hamilton knew Kindle intended to shoot Pudwill at the time he gave Kindle the gun. Considering Kindle’s hostility toward Pudwill, his command that Hamilton shoot Pudwill, and his demand that Hamilton give him the gun as Pudwill became visible at the gas station, the conclusion that Hamilton did in fact aid or assist Kindle in the act of shooting Pudwill by alone giving Kindle the gun seconds before the shooting is inescapable.

17. If Hamilton had not given Kindle the gun, then Kindle would not have committed the life-endangering act of shooting a gun at Pudwill. Additionally, as noted above, Hamilton brought the gun to the market, showed the gun was available twice before the shooting, and pointed out to Kindle when Pudwill was close moments after he gave Kindle the gun. All of these acts aided, assisted, and encouraged the shooting of Pudwill. Therefore, there is more than enough substantial evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Hamilton aided and encouraged Kindle in the shooting of Pudwill. In sum, substantial evidence supports Hamilton’s conviction for second degree murder through aiding and abetting. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HARRELL, J. WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

FRANSON, J.

18.