gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-04928 · 2026-09-08 · Unknown

Shahzad Mohammadi v. Christopher J. Larose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; Daniel A. Brightman, Field Office Director, San Diego Field Office, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Dave Venturella, Acting Director, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security; Todd Blanche, Attorney General, in their official capacities

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Kobayashi Leslie E. Kobayashi (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:18Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a habeas petition by an Afghan national detained by ICE after being released on his own recognizance, finding that his re-detention without notice or individualized justification violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The court ordered the petitioner's immediate release, enjoined re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing, and denied the request for attorney's fees without prejudice.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Respondents' request to dismiss the Petition as moot
“This Court therefore denies Respondents’ request to dismiss the Petition as moot and turns to Petitioner’s due process claim.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit standard that the party asserting mootness bears a heavy burden to show no effective relief remains. Because the petitioner alleged a past constitutional violation (unlawful re-detention) for which a future bond hearing does not provide a remedy, the case was not moot. The court's reliance on *S. Or. Barter Fair* and *Wild Wilderness* is appropriate for this procedural posture.
Grant of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order for Immediate Release
“The Petition is GRANTED insofar as Respondents ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions that existed immediately prior to Petitioner’s detention on August 22, 2026 and to return Petitioner’s belongings immediately upon his release.”
agree with court
The court found a violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because the petitioner, who had a protected liberty interest in his release on his own recognizance, was re-detained without notice or an individualized reason. Relying on *Zadvydas v. Davis* and *Noori v. LaRose*, the court determined that the lack of pre-deprivation process constituted a constitutional violation that could only be remedied by immediate release, as a subsequent bond hearing would not cure the past deprivation of liberty.
Injunction against re-detention without pre-deprivation hearing
“Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from: re-detaining Petitioner unless Respondents demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that Petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community that his physical custody is legally justified”
agree with court
The court imposed a specific procedural requirement (pre-deprivation hearing with clear and convincing evidence) to protect the petitioner's liberty interest going forward. This is a standard equitable remedy to prevent future constitutional violations, consistent with the due process analysis applied to the initial re-detention.
Denial of request for attorney's fees and costs without prejudice
“The Petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.”
agree with court
The court deferred the fee request, allowing the petitioner to file a formal application within 30 days of judgment. This is a standard procedural step to ensure fees are calculated based on the final outcome and reasonable hours worked.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly distinguishes the statutory basis for detention from the constitutional due process requirements for revoking release. It properly applies the heavy burden for mootness and relies on binding Ninth Circuit precedent and persuasive district court authority (*Noori*) to find a due process violation. The remedy of immediate release is consistent with the finding that the violation has already occurred and cannot be cured by a future bond hearing.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3

4 SHAHZAD MOHAMMADI, Case No.: 3:26-cv-04928-LEK-GC Petitioner, 6 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION 7 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 8 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden, AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 9 Otay Mesa Detention Center; DANIEL A. WITHIN THREE DAYS AND 10 BRIGHTMAN, Field Office Director, San COMPLAINT FOR Diego Field Office, United States DECLARATORY RELIEF 11 Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

12 DAVE VENTURELLA, Acting Director, United States Immigration and Customs 13 Enforcement; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, 14 Secretary of Homeland Security; TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, in their 15 official capacities, 16 Respondents. 17 18 Before this Court is Petitioner Shahzad Mohammadi’s (“Petitioner”) Petition 19 for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and Order to Show Cause 20 Within Three Days and Complaint for Declaratory Relief (“Petition”), filed on 21 August 28, 2026. [Dkt. no. 1.] The respondents, identified in the Petition as 22 Christopher J. LaRose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; Daniel A. Brightman, 23 Field Office Director, San Diego Field Office, United States Immigration and Customs 24 Enforcement (“ICE”); Dave Venturella, Acting Director, ICE; Markwayne Mullin, 25 Secretary of Homeland Security; and Todd Blanche, Attorney General, in their official 26 capacities (“Respondents”), filed a response to the Petition (“Response”) on September 3, 27 1 2026. [Dkt. no. 4.] Petitioner filed a reply in support of the Petition (“Reply”) on 2 September 4, 2026. [Dkt. no. 5.] Although the Petition requests a hearing on the Petition, 3 [Petition at pg. 16,] this Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary. 4 BACKGROUND 5 Petitioner, a twenty-three-year-old native of Afghanistan, entered the United 6 States on August 29, 2023. Petitioner was initially taken into immigration custody, but he 7 was later released on his own recognizance. See id. at ¶¶ 20, 22-23. Petitioner has applied 8 for asylum and Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and has complied with all requirements 9 associated with those applications. See id. at ¶ 26. Petitioner began working in San Diego 10 after he received a work permit, and he had no issues until he was arrested by ICE 11 officers on August 22, 2026 while working a delivery job. See id. at ¶¶ 26, 28-29. The 12 arresting officers did not provide Petitioner with an explanation of either the alleged 13 change in circumstances that warranted the arrest or any other basis for the arrest. During 14 processing, an ICE officer told Petitioner that a judge had rejected his asylum application, 15 but Petitioner states that was false. See id. at ¶¶ 29-30. 16 Petitioner was initially detained at a border patrol station, and then 17 transferred to a secondary location. On August 26, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to the 18 Otay Mesa Detention Center, in San Diego, California, where he remained through the 19 filing of the Petition. See id. at ¶¶ 6-7. 20 Petitioner’s primary argument is that his re-detention violates his due 21 process rights. [Id. at pgs. 13-15.] Petitioner also argues that ICE’s decision to re-detain 22 him violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). [Id. at pgs. 15-16.] Petitioner 23 seeks, inter alia, immediate release. See id. at pg. 16. 24 Respondents acknowledge that, “[o]n July 30, 2026, the Ninth Circuit [Court 25 of Appeals] held and clarified that unadmitted aliens present in the interior of the United 26 States are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and not subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225.” Response at 1; 27 see also Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2026) (holding 28 1 that noncitizens “present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the 2 United States are subject to the detention regime of § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A)”). 3 Respondents therefore admit that “Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. 4 § 1226(a).” [Response at 1.] Respondents argue the Petition is moot because Petitioner 5 could have requested a Section 1226(a) bond hearing before an immigration judge, and 6 because, at the request of the United States Department of Homeland Security, a bond 7 hearing has been scheduled for September 9, 2026. See id. at 2. Respondents also argue 8 Petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies before the immigration judge and by 9 appealing any unfavorable outcome to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See id. at 3. 10 Respondents therefore argue the Petition should be denied, or this case should be stayed 11 pending the outcome of the September 9, 2026 bond hearing. See id. 12 Petitioner points out that Respondents failed to address his argument that he 13 had a protected liberty interest in his release on his own recognizance, and his August 22, 14 2026 re-detention violated his due process rights. [Reply at 1-2.] Petitioner argues the 15 only appropriate remedy for the due process violation is immediate release. [Id. at 4-5.] 16 DISCUSSION 17 There is no dispute that the discretionary detention procedures of 18 Section 1226(a) govern Petitioner’s detention. See Response at 1. However, the issue of 19 the proper statutory detention authority is distinct from the issue of whether Petitioner 20 was provided with the process required by the United States Constitution before he was 21 re-detained pursuant to the statutory authority. As to Respondents’ argument that the 22 scheduled bond hearing renders the Petition moot, see Response at 2, this Court notes: 23 “The party asserting mootness bears the burden of establishing that there is no effective relief remaining that the court could 24 provide.” S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty., 372 F.3d 1128, 1134 25 (9th Cir. 2004). “That burden is always ‘heavy,’ as a case is not moot where any effective relief may be granted[.]” Wild Wilderness v. 26 Allen, 871 F.3d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Forest Guardians v. 27 Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 2006)). . . . 28 1 Castaneda v. Lyons, Case No. 1:26-cv-01866-JLT-SAB-HC, 2026 WL 1623336, at *2 2 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2026) (some alterations in Castaneda).1 The mere fact that a bond 3 hearing has been scheduled is insufficient to carry Respondents’ heavy burden to 4 establish that the Petition is moot. This Court therefore denies Respondents’ request to 5 dismiss the Petition as moot and turns to Petitioner’s due process claim. 6 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person 7 shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 8 amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment – from government custody, detention, or other 9 forms of physical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas 10 v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). This protection applies to 11 noncitizens as it does to United States citizens. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 12 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“[E]ven aliens shall not . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property 13 without due process of law.”). “Courts have previously found that individuals released 14 from immigration custody on bond have a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of 15 custody on bond.” Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, Case No. 25-cv-07492-RFL, 2025 WL 16 2578207, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (collecting cases). “Although in some 17 circumstances the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 18 government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 19 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 20 be revoked only if they fail to live up to the . . . conditions of release.’” Pinchi v. Noem, 21 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (some alterations in Pinchi) (brackets 22 omitted) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972)). 23 24 25 26 27 1 The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in Castaneda was adopted by the district judge. 2026 WL 1865440 (June 29, 2026). 28 1 In Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146 (S.D. Cal. 2025), this district 2 court ruled that the respondents violated the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process 3 rights when the respondents revoked the petitioner’s parole by sending a mass, generic 4 notification one morning and arresting the petitioner later that day at his immigration 5 hearing. Id. at 1155, 1166. This district court concluded that the petitioner had “a 6 protectable expectation of his due process rights in his removal proceedings and the fair 7 procedures this country guarantees. . . . Particularly, he was entitled to both notification 8 of revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an opportunity to be heard and 9 contest the determination.” Id. at 1165. The district court ordered the petitioner’s 10 immediate release. Id. at 1154.2 11 In the instant action, Petitioner received even less due process than the 12 petitioner in Noori. Petitioner received no notification or individualized reason as to why 13 his release on his own recognizance was being revoked before he was summarily re- 14 detained on August 22, 2026. See Petition at ¶¶ 28-29. Nor have Respondents explained, 15 even after they filed the Response, what circumstances have changed to warrant 16 Petitioner’s re-detention. Providing Petitioner a bond hearing would not remedy the Fifth 17 Amendment violation he has already experienced. Only release from detention can 18 accomplish that now.3 19 Petitioner has also requested that this Court award him attorney’s fees and 20 costs. See Petition at pg. 17. This Court will consider an application requesting 21 reasonable attorney’s fees and costs that is filed within thirty days of the entry of 22 23 2 The district court had previously issued a truncated order ordering the petitioner’s 24 immediate release. See Noori, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1154. The 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146 order 25 was issued to “provide[] a fuller legal analysis and legal basis for the September 26, 2025 Order.” Id. 26 27 3 This Court need not address Petitioner’s APA claims, [Petition at pgs. 15-16,] because the Petition can be resolved based on due process grounds. 28 1 ||judgment. This Court, therefore, denies Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs 2 || without prejudice. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Shahzad Mohammadi’s Petition for 5 || Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and Order to Show Cause Within 6 || Three Days and Complaint for Declaratory Relief, filed August 28, 2026, is GRANTED 7 ||IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Petition is GRANTED insofar as Respondents 8 ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions 9 || that existed immediately prior to Petitioner’s detention on August 22, 2026 and to return 10 || Petitioner’s belongings immediately upon his release. Further, Respondents are 11 |} ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from: re-detaining Petitioner unless Respondents 12 demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation hearing before a 13 ||neutral decisionmaker, that Petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community 14 that his physical custody is legally justified; and from placing Petitioner in an 15 || Alternative to Detention program and from placing an ankle monitor on Petitioner upon 16 || his release. The Petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Petitioner’s request 17 || for attorney’s fees and costs. 18 The parties are ORDERED to file a joint status report by September 15, 19 ||2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, September 8, 2026. 0 SSSR, 23 oy) /s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi 24 Leslie E. Kobayashi 25 a is Senior U.S. District Judge 26 27 28