Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AMAH MBACHAM INNOCENT, Case No.: 26-cv-4815-RSH-BJW 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 13 v. FOR HABEAS CORPUS 14 WARDEN, Imperial Regional Adult [ECF No. 2] Detention Facility, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 On May 1, 2026, petitioner Amah Mbacham Innocent, proceeding pro se, filed a 19 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”) and a 20 motion for a temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 1, 2. For the reasons set forth below, 21 the Court denies the petition. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner has previously sought habeas relief in this District. See Innocent v. Casey, 24 No. 26-cv-2700-RSH-BJW (S.D. Cal.) (“the Prior Action”). In the Prior Action, Petitioner 25 contended that his immigration detention without a bond hearing during the pendency of 26 his removal proceedings had become unduly prolonged in violation of the Due Process 27 Clause. Case No. 26-cv-2700, ECF No. 1 at 7–8. Petitioner sought immediate release or, 28 alternatively, a bond hearing at which the government would bear the burden of proving 1 by clear and convincing evidence that he posed a danger to the community or a risk of 2 flight. Id. at 8. On June 4, 2026, the respondents in that action filed a return conceding that 3 the Court should order the requested bond hearing. Case No. 26-cv-2700, ECF No. 10 at 4 1–2. The Court subsequently granted the petition and directed the government “to arrange 5 a bond hearing for petitioner . . . before an immigration court within fourteen (14) days of 6 this order, at which the government bears the burden of establishing by clear and 7 convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” 8 Case No. 26-cv-2700, ECF No. 11 at 2. 9 On July 21, 2026, an immigration judge held the ordered bond hearing and denied 10 bond. ECF Nos. 1 at 12; 1-8 at 6, 19. On July 24, 2026, Petitioner executed a notice of 11 appeal of the bond determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. at 19– 12 20. Based on the record, this appeal remains pending. ECF No. 1 at 19. Petitioner filed the 13 instant § 2241 petition on August 24, 2026. See ECF No. 1. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 16 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 17 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A prisoner bears the 18 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 19 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 20 III. ANALYSIS 21 In the instant Petition, Petitioner contends he does not seek the relitigate the Prior 22 Action. ECF No. 1 at 3. Petitioner also argues that he is not requesting that the Court review 23 the immigration judge’s bond determination. Id. at 9, 18. Instead, Petitioner frames the 24 petition as presenting the question of whether, in light of the denial of bond and the ensuing 25 period of detention, the post-order record now establishes an adequate constitutional basis 26 for his release. Id. at 17–19. 27 /// 28 /// 1 Respondents contend that Petitioner received constitutionally adequate process 2 through his bond hearing. ECF No. 7 at 1–2 (citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 3 1189 (9th Cir. 2022)). Respondents further contend that any challenge to the immigration 4 judge’s bond determination is premature because Petitioner’s administrative appeal 5 remains pending before the BIA. Id. at 2–5. 6 The Court agrees with Respondents. Here, Petitioner does not dispute that he 7 received the bond hearing ordered in the Prior Action. Rather, he contends that, on the 8 present record, his continued detention has become unconstitutional and that he is now 9 entitled to release. The Petition relies principally on two grounds: (1) the additional passage 10 of time; and (2) individualized circumstances, including Petitioner’s lack of criminal 11 history, sponsor and family support, and medical condition. See ECF No. 1 at 17–22. 12 To the extent Petitioner’s claim rests on duration alone, Petitioner’s claim is 13 foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Diaz. In Rodriguez, petitioner 14 similarly argued that his “liberty interest increases over time as he remains detained.” 53 15 F.4th at 1212. The Ninth Circuit rejected his claim, holding that “duration alone cannot 16 sustain a due process challenge by a detainee who has been afforded the process 17 contemplated by § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations.” Id. (internal quotation marks 18 omitted). To the extent Petitioner asks the Court to conclude, based on his lack of criminal 19 history, sponsor and family support, and medical condition that his continued detention is 20 unwarranted, the Petition challenges the immigration judge’s bond determination in 21 substance, if not in form. Any such challenge is unexhausted. 22 The Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 23 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro- 24 Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by 25 Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A court may require prudential 26 exhaustion when: 27 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate 28 a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the 1 requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow 2 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for 3 judicial review. 4 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 5 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative 6 remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or 7 stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is 8 excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). A court may excuse 9 prudential exhaustion, however, “if administrative remedies are inadequate or not 10 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury 11 will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 The Ninth Circuit has applied these principles in analogous circumstances, where a 14 noncitizen seeks habeas review of an immigration judge’s adverse bond determination. See 15 Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s 16 adverse bond determination before appealing to the BIA. This short cut was improper. 17 Leonardo should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before 18 asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s decision.”). Notwithstanding Petitioner’s 19 characterization, his claim appears, in substance, to be a challenge to the immigration 20 judge’s adverse bond determination. Consistent with Leonardo, the Court declines to 21 consider this challenge before the BIA has had an opportunity to address it. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the amended petition is DENIED. In light of this 3 || disposition, the Court DENIES as moot Plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining 4 ||order. The hearing currently scheduled for September 16, 2026 is VACATED. The Clerk 5 || of Court is directed to close the case. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: September 8, 2026 ‘ 9 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28