Thanh Thuong Pham v. Jeremy Casey, Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Center; Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Todd Blanche, Attorney General; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Jesus Rocha, Acting Field Officer
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Barry T. Moskowitz (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a detainee claiming that the revocation of his conditional parole violated the Administrative Procedures Act and the Fifth Amendment. The court granted the petition and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner from custody.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Grant of petition for writ of habeas corpus“The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED and the writ is ISSUED.” | agree with court The court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine that the petitioner's liberty interest outweighed the government's enforcement interest. It found that the government failed to provide notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation of conditional parole, and did not assert any changed circumstances, danger, or flight risk to justify continued detention. This follows the logic of Niz-Chavez v. Garland and the court's own prior decisions in Tulyakov and Zamudio Rangel. |
Order for immediate release“The Respondents shall immediately release Pham from custody on any preexisting conditions.” | agree with court This is the standard remedy for a granted habeas petition where the detention is found to be unlawful. The condition of release on 'preexisting conditions' is consistent with the finding that the original conditional parole was valid but the revocation was procedurally defective. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise but relies on well-established Supreme Court precedent (Niz-Chavez, Mathews) and consistent district court precedent. It correctly identifies the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard as the core due process violation. It does not explicitly address the APA claim, but the due process finding is sufficient to grant the writ. The reliance on its own prior unpublished decisions is permissible in the district court context.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THANH THUONG PHAM, Case No.: 3:26-cv-04478-BTM-BJW 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING AMENDED 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 15 JEREMY CASEY, Warden, Imperial [ECF NO. 5] Regional Detention Center; 16 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of 17 the Department of Homeland Security; TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General; 18 TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, 19 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and JESUS ROCHA, Acting Field Officer 20 Director, San Diego Field Office, 21 Respondents. 22 23 24 25 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 Thanh Thuong Pham petitioned the Court for the writ of habeas corpus on August 2 5, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) He claims in his amended petition that the Respondents violated 3 the Administrative Procedures Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by 4 revoking his parole without notice and opportunity to be heard. (ECF No. 5 (“Am. Pet.”), 5 at 3–8.) The Respondents concede that Pham is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 6 acknowledge that Pham was previously released from immigration custody on conditional 7 parole. 8 The Court analyzed the same issue in Tulyakov v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-01695, 2026 9 WL 981218 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026) and Zamudio Rangel v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-01505, 10 2026 WL 1075244 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2026). The Court adopts its previous decisions and 11 applies them here. The Court finds that Pham was granted conditional parole after Border 12 Patrol detained him upon entry and then released him into the country. (ECF No. 5-1, ¶ 2.) 13 An ankle monitor was placed on Pham, which he wore for approximately six days. (Id. 14 ¶ 3.) Pham used an app on his phone to check in with enforcement officials and he would 15 occasionally get called in for check-ins. (Id. ¶ 3.) See J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, 2025 WL 16 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025) (“A person on conditional parole is usually 17 released on their own recognizance subject to certain conditions such as reporting 18 requirements.”) The Court also finds that, in light of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, 19 Pham’s liberty interest and the procedural protections afforded that interest outweigh the 20 Respondents’ enforcement interest. See 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 21 The Respondents violated Pham’s due process rights by “detaining [him] without 22 justification.” Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. 2025); cf. 23 Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021). ICE here did not give Pham notice of 24 any reason for his detention or an opportunity to rebut it. Moreover, the Respondents do 25 not contend that any changed circumstances warranted Pham’s re-detention or that Pham 26 is a danger to the community or a flight risk. Thus, the writ must issue to release him from 27 custody. 28 // 1 The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED and the writ is ISSUED. The 2 || Respondents shall immediately release Pham from custody on any preexisting conditions. 3 || The parties shall file a joint statement as to the satisfaction of the writ by September 8, 4 ||2026 at 5 p.m. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the writ. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 7, 2026 Til Juorh Honorable Barry Ted Mosko 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 □ □□