In re Chris W. CA2/8

Opinion

Filed 9/8/26 In re Chris W. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re Chris W., a Person Coming B344418 (Consol. w/B348446) Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05573D) AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Morris W., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Pete R. Navarro and Dash Talbot, Commissioners. Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded with directions. Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________________ INTRODUCTION In these consolidated appeals, Morris W. (Father) challenges the juvenile court’s orders at two Welfare and Institutions Code section 3641 review hearings (1) denying Father’s request for custody of his son, Chris W., and (2) terminating jurisdiction and granting sole physical custody of the child to his mother. On appeal, Father argues the juvenile court should have placed Chris in his custody at a February 2025 review hearing, and should have granted joint physical custody to both parents when it terminated jurisdiction at a July 2025 review hearing. Father also asserts the juvenile court’s written exit orders conflict with its oral ruling regarding visitation. We conclude Father’s appeal from the February 2025 order denying his request for custody is moot. We further conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the July 2025 custody and visitation exit orders, but the visitation order contains a clerical error that requires correction. We accordingly dismiss Father’s appeal from the February 2025 order, affirm the July 2025 custody and visitation exits orders, and remand the matter to the juvenile court to correct the visitation exit order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. Child welfare history Father and Tania J. (Mother) are the parents of Chris, a boy born in September 2014. Mother also has an older child, Aryanna J., who is not a subject of this appeal. At all relevant times, Mother resided in Los Angeles County, and Father resided in the greater Chicago area in Illinois. In 2022, the juvenile court 1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 asserted dependency jurisdiction over Chris based on Mother’s physical abuse of Aryanna, mental health issues, and unsanitary home, in addition to the history of domestic violence between Mother and Father. In August 2023, the court terminated jurisdiction with a custody exit order granting Mother sole legal and physical custody of Chris, and granting Father unmonitored visitation consisting of virtual contact at least one day per week and in-person day visits twice per month in Los Angeles County. 2. Section 300 petition On March 11, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a section 300 petition for Chris. Among other counts, the petition alleged that Mother had a limited ability to provide Chris with appropriate care and supervision due to the child’s behavioral, mental, and emotional problems. As described by Mother, Chris often engaged in violent and aggressive conduct toward her and Aryanna, had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder, and had been placed on involuntary psychiatric holds on several recent occasions. While Father had limited contact with Chris, he blamed Mother for the child’s behavioral problems and believed that Chris did not need medication to treat his issues. In a May 2024 interview with DCFS, Chris was asked about his interactions with Father. The social worker observed that the child had difficulty talking about his relationship with Father and took deep breaths when the subject was raised. Chris stated that he did not have a lot of in-person contact with Father, but that Father sometimes yelled at him during their virtual calls. He also disclosed that Father instructed him not to take his prescribed medication and instead “pretend to take it and spit 3 it out.” Chris further expressed that he did not want any overnight visits with Father. When asked if there was anything else he wanted to share, Chris replied, “I am tired of this. This whole thing with my dad is a custody battle. I’m safe here with my mom. This is a war and it doesn’t have to be.” At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held on June 11, 2024, the juvenile court sustained the count in the petition pertaining to Mother’s limited ability to provide Chris with appropriate care and supervision. The court declared Chris a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (b), and ordered that the child remain placed with Mother under the supervision of DCFS. The court granted Father the same visitation rights that he received when jurisdiction was terminated in the prior case. Over the next several months, Father did not maintain regular contact with Chris or participate in DCFS’s meetings about the child. At an interim hearing held in December 2024, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to facilitate an in-person visit between Chris and Father during an upcoming weekend when Father would be in Los Angeles County. Prior to the visit, Chris stated that he wanted to visit Father for one day only, and that Father was “always trying to turn him against [Mother].” After the visit, Father told the social worker that he believed Chris did not have any mental health issues, that Mother put the child on medication to control him, and that he had come to Los Angeles to “take [Chris] back with him since [M]other left the child.” 3. Section 387 petition On December 17, 2024, DCFS filed a section 387 petition based on allegations that Mother refused to pick up Chris from the hospital and was unable to provide the child with appropriate 4 care and supervision due to his mental health issues. At a detention hearing held the following day, Chris was detained from Mother and placed in foster care. Over the next month, Chris was again hospitalized due to physically aggressive and threatening behavior while in foster care. He was diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder and depression, and his medications were adjusted. In January 2025, DCFS separately interviewed Mother, Father, and Chris. Mother explained that she did not pick up Chris from the hospital because she believed he needed a psychiatric evaluation and monitoring before he could safely return home. However, Mother wanted Chris in her care and understood that he needed services. Father reported that his visitation rights were not being respected, and that he wanted DCFS to start a process to place Chris in his physical custody. Chris indicated that he had a good relationship with Mother and wanted to return to her home. Chris did not want to talk about his relationship with Father and appeared upset when asked about Father. On January 22, 2025, DCFS filed a section 385 application requesting that the juvenile court change its prior detention order and release Chris to Mother. In response, the court ordered that Chris be released to Mother pending the adjudication of the section 387 petition. Prior to the adjudication hearing, DCFS also recommended that the court dismiss the section 387 petition and grant Mother additional family maintenance services to assist with Chris’s transition back into Mother’s care. On January 28, 2025, Father filed a petition under sections 385 and 388 requesting the release of Chris to his custody, or in the alternative, overnight visits or unmonitored day visits with the child. On January 29, 2025, the juvenile court 5 granted Father’s request for unmonitored day visits, but not his request for custody. 4. February 5, 2025 review hearing On February 5, 2025, the juvenile court held an adjudication hearing on the section 387 petition and a review hearing under section 364. The court dismissed the section 387 petition without prejudice. The court found that continued jurisdiction over Chris was necessary and granted Mother additional family maintenance services. The court also set a further status review hearing in three months. During the February 5, 2025 hearing, Father’s counsel asked the court to grant Father “full custody” of Chris, or in the alternative, to issue a “home of parents order” that would allow Father “to exercise some form of custody.” Counsel for Chris, counsel for DCFS, and counsel for Mother each objected to Father’s request. Chris’s counsel explained: “Chris never lived with his father. He … wants to visit with his father in California. He doesn’t want to even have overnight visits with [F]ather at this point. So that would be removing Chris from his entire life in California.” Chris’s counsel also noted that there were “recent issues with [F]ather … advising Chris not to take his medication,” and that when Chris visited Father in the past, “those visits did not go well.” After hearing the argument, the court denied Father’s request, but ordered DCFS to assess Father’s circumstances in the event that Chris needed to be removed from Mother in the future. On February 19, 2025, Father filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s February 5, 2025 order denying his request for custody.

6 5. July 1, 2025 review hearing In a status review report filed in May 2025, DCFS updated the family’s circumstances. Chris was hospitalized for a one- month period between February and March 2025, and following his discharge, the child continued to reside with Mother while receiving services for his mental health issues. Since his most recent hospitalization, Chris had been compliant with his prescribed medication and demonstrated improved behavior. In February 2025, DCFS asked Chris if he wanted to live with Father. The child replied that he wanted to live with Mother and not with Father, though he was willing to have phone calls with Father once he was discharged from the hospital. However, following his discharge in March 2025, Chris repeatedly told the social worker that he did not want in-person or phone visits with Father, and that he knew he could call Father whenever he wanted. During this period of supervision, DCFS made multiple attempts to contact Father to assess his circumstances and to arrange for him to attend a child and family team meeting regarding Chris. However, Father was not responsive to these efforts. In addition, Chris’s Wraparound service team reported that Father was verbally aggressive during a phone call with one team member and sent an inappropriate video to another team member. The staff at the hospital where Chris was receiving psychiatric care also reported that Father appeared to be inebriated on two occasions. Chris’s psychiatrist further noted that “there were ‘concerns with [Father] not respecting boundaries involving Chris[’s] care,’ ” and that Father needed to “abandon his ‘antagonistic approach’ for the betterment of Chris’[s] mental health.”

7 In its report, DCFS stated that Mother complied with the court’s orders and continued to make progress in addressing Chris’s behavioral issues. DCFS recommended the juvenile court terminate jurisdiction over Chris and grant joint legal custody to both parents, sole physical custody to Mother, and unmonitored visits to Father. On July 1, 2025, the juvenile court held a review hearing for Chris under section 364. In addition to admitting DCFS’s reports, the court heard testimony from Father. According to his testimony, Father wanted joint legal custody of Chris so that he could be informed about child’s medical and behavioral issues. He also wanted joint physical custody because he believed “no kid should be absent from neither parent,” and he had been unable to have regular in-person visits with Chris since the start of the case. Father stated that he had no issues with Chris primarily residing with Mother as long as the child was safe. However, Father believed Mother should not have tie-breaking authority because the family would not be in dependency court if Mother “did it the right way.” Father also testified that, if the court did not grant him joint physical custody, he wanted overnight visits and daily phone calls. In their argument to the court, all parties agreed that jurisdiction over Chris should be terminated. While Father sought joint legal and physical custody, Mother asked the court to grant her sole custody and to not allow Father overnight visits. Counsel for Chris and counsel for DCFS asked the court to grant sole physical custody to Mother and joint legal custody to both parents. Chris’s counsel noted that the child did not want increased contact with Father but instead wanted the same visitation schedule that preceded court involvement.

8 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Chris pending the receipt of a custody and visitation order that granted joint legal custody to both parents, sole physical custody to Mother, and unmonitored visits to Father. With respect to visitation, the court initially stated that Father would have “two overnight visits a month” with each visit being “one night” in duration. However, the court later stated that it was going to “amend its prior order” regarding the duration of the visits, and “make that two consecutive nights of overnight visits” with the parents having discretion to extend those visits. The court also ordered that Father was allowed one 30-minute phone call with Chris per week. On July 7, 2025, the juvenile court signed the exit order and terminated jurisdiction over Chris. With respect to Father’s overnight visitation, the written custody order stated that “Father is authorized to have unmonitored visitation a minimum of two times per month for two consecutive overnights, within Los Angeles County.” However, the attached visitation order provided that “Father is authorized to have unmonitored visitation a minimum of one time per month for two consecutive overnights, within Los Angeles County.” On August 21, 2025, Father filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s July 7, 2025 custody and visitation orders. DISCUSSION 1. Father’s appeal from the February 5, 2025 order denying his request for physical custody In his first appeal, Father challenges the juvenile court’s order at the February 5, 2025 review hearing denying Father’s request for sole physical custody of Chris, or in the alternative, a home of parents placement order. We conclude Father’s first 9 appeal has been rendered moot by the juvenile court’s subsequent custody and visitation exit orders. “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) A reviewing court must “ ‘ “decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 276.) Even where a case is moot, the court has discretion to reach the merits if the challenged order “ ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 285.) Here, Father’s appeal from the denial of custody request at the February 5, 2025 review hearing is moot because the juvenile court’s July 7, 2025 exit orders superseded any interim custody and visitation orders. Accordingly, “reversing an earlier order on custody and/or visitation could not deliver the desired relief— namely, a change in custody and/or visitation. Even after such reversal, the more recent custody and visitation terms contained in the exit order would govern.” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 666–667; see also Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1165 [juvenile court’s “exit order ‘determining custody of, or visitation with, the child’ ” is “ ‘a final judgment and shall remain in effect after [the juvenile court’s] jurisdiction is terminated’ ”].) Father also has filed an appeal from the juvenile court’s exit orders, and we address the merits of this second appeal below. However, Father has not shown how the earlier denial of his request to have Chris placed with him prejudiced him with 10 respect to the subsequent exit orders, nor has he demonstrated how an interim ruling regarding custody or visitation could adversely impact him in any future dependency proceedings. Because we cannot provide effective relief from an order that is no longer in effect, Father’s challenge to the February 5, 2025 denial of his custody request is moot. 2. Father’s appeal from the July 7, 2025 exit orders granting Mother sole physical custody In his second appeal, Father contends the juvenile court erred in issuing its custody and visitation exit orders because the court should have granted Father joint physical custody of Chris rather than unmonitored visitation. Father also claims the court’s written exit order regarding visitation conflicts with its oral ruling at the July 1, 2025 review hearing. We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting Mother sole physical custody of Chris in its exit orders, but the written visitation order contains a clerical error that requires correction. 2.1. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting sole physical custody to Mother When terminating jurisdiction over a dependent child, section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue “an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” (Id., subd. (a).) Section 362.4 further provides that the order “shall continue until modified or terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court,” and directs that the order be filed in a pending family court proceeding (id., subd. (b)) or, if there is none, as part of a new family court file (id., subd. (c)). When the juvenile court issues a custody or visitation order under section 362.4, “[t]he order shall not be modified” in a family court proceeding “unless the court finds that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court 11 issued the order and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d).) In making a custody or visitation order under section 362.4 (commonly referred to as an “exit order”), the court’s “ ‘focus and primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) The juvenile court is not restrained by any preferences or presumptions that ordinarily apply in family court. (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268.) We review a juvenile court’s exit order for abuse of discretion. (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.) In this case, the juvenile court acted well within its discretion in issuing exit orders for Chris that granted sole physical custody to Mother and unmonitored visitation to Father. At the start of these dependency proceedings in March 2024, Father did not have any custodial rights with respect to Chris. Rather, Mother, who resided in Los Angeles with the child, had sole physical and legal custody, and Father, who lived in Chicago, had limited visitation rights. Over the course of the case, Father had occasional in-person visits and phone calls with Chris, but he did not maintain contact with the child consistently. In addition, when Father did have contact with Chris early in the case, he directed the child not to take his prescribed psychotropic medication. Father also repeatedly declined to attend meetings to address Chris’s serious behavioral issues because he did not believe the child needed mental health services or medication. Further, Chris’s Wraparound service team as well as the staff at the hospital where the child was being treated reported to DCFS that Father engaged in inappropriate conduct to staff when contacting those providers about Chris. The child’s treating 12 psychiatrist likewise raised concerns about Father’s conduct, noting that Father needed to “abandon his ‘antagonistic approach’ for the betterment of Chris’[s] mental health.” Moreover, throughout the dependency proceedings, Chris expressed that he did not want to live with Father or even have increased visitation with him. (See In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432 [while not determinative, child’s testimony that she wanted to live with her mother “constitutes powerful demonstrative evidence that it would be in her best interest to allow her to do so”].) When DCFS interviewed Chris in May 2024, the child had difficulty discussing his relationship with Father, but was clear that he did not want any overnight visits with Father. In December 2024, after the juvenile court granted Father’s request for a weekend visit, Chris told DCFS that he wanted to limit the visit to one day only, and that Father was “always trying to turn him against [Mother].” In February 2025, when Chris was again hospitalized, he indicated that he wanted to live with Mother and to have phone calls with Father once he was discharged. However, after his discharge from the hospital in March 2025, Chris repeatedly stated that he did not want in-person or phone visits with Father, and he would call Father if he changed his mind. At the July 1, 2025 review hearing, Chris’s counsel reiterated that the child was opposed to any change in custody or visitation, noting that Chris “wants to remain with his mother,” and he “wants contact with his dad twice a month as it was before.” Based on the totality of this record, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that Chris’s best interests would be served by maintaining the current custody arrangement where Mother would have sole physical custody of the child and Father 13 would have unmonitored visitation. The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in issuing the custody and visitation exit orders. 2.2. The juvenile court’s visitation exit order contains a clerical error requiring correction Father contends, and DCFS concedes, that the juvenile court’s July 7, 2025 exit order regarding visitation conflicts with its oral ruling at the July 1, 2025 review hearing, and that the oral ruling should control. We agree. Our Supreme Court has prescribed the following approach for resolving conflicts between a clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts: “ ‘[W]hen … the record is in conflict it will be harmonized if possible; but where this is not possible that part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation]. Therefore whether the recitals in the clerk’s minutes should prevail as against contrary statements in the reporter’s transcript, must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.’ ” (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599; accord, People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 552, fn. 6; People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 226.) At the July 1, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Father’s unmonitored in-person visits with Chris would consist of “two overnight visits a month” for “two consecutive nights.” The court made this order in response to Father’s request for two consecutive weekend nights so that he could plan certain activities with Chris such as camping and fishing. The court’s July 7, 2025 written custody order accurately reflects this oral ruling, and states that “Father is authorized to have unmonitored visitation a minimum of two times per month for two consecutive overnights, within Los Angeles County” (italics added). However, the attached visitation order provides that “Father is authorized 14 to have unmonitored visitation a minimum of one time per month for two consecutive overnights, within Los Angeles County” (italics added). Under these circumstances, the juvenile court’s oral ruling is entitled to greater credence, as it appears that the reference to “one time per month” on the written visitation order was the result of a clerical error. The visitation exit order accordingly must be corrected to state that “Father is authorized to have unmonitored visitation a minimum of two times per month for two consecutive overnights, within Los Angeles County.” The juvenile court is directed to make this correction to the visitation exit order on remand. (See In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 800 [remanding matter to juvenile court to “correct the exit order so it is consistent with the oral order regarding visitation”].) DISPOSITION Father’s appeal from the juvenile court’s February 5, 2025 order is dismissed. The juvenile court’s July 7, 2025 custody and visitation exit orders are affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for correction of the visitation exit order.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.