In re Christopher N. CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 9/8/26 In re Christopher N. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re CHRISTOPHER N., a B352256 Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. DK23704)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VICTORIA R., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephanie Davis, Judge. Affirmed. Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

****** Victoria R. (mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court implementing a permanent plan of legal guardianship for her son Christopher N. (born September 2012) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother argues the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with their duties of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) (ICWA). As set forth below, we find the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusions that DCFS conducted a thorough inquiry and ICWA does not apply. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s order.2 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Maternal grandmother Nadine R. (MGM), who was previously the legal guardian of Christopher, appealed from an order terminating her legal guardianship in 2022. We affirmed the order terminating MGM’s legal guardianship in a nonpublished opinion in case No. B325916 filed August 23, 2023. MGM’s sole argument on appeal was the juvenile court and DCFS failed to comply with their duties of inquiry and notice under ICWA. Because we addressed some of mother’s current arguments in MGM’s prior appeal, we rely on and quote 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The family In 2015, the probate court granted MGM legal guardianship over Christopher because mother was incarcerated. Christopher has special needs, having been diagnosed with cerebral palsy and autism. He is nonverbal and uses a wheelchair. Christopher’s biological father is Bobby Joe N., Jr. (father), who died in March 2022. Initial referral and petition3 In June 2017, DCFS responded to a referral that MGM smoked crack cocaine in the home in front of Christopher. MGM admitted the allegation and that she started using crack cocaine about a month prior to the referral due to the stress of caring for Christopher. MGM denied an allegation that she left the child unsupervised. On June 22, 2017, a petition on behalf of Christopher was filed pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that Christopher was at risk of serious harm as a result of MGM’s substance abuse. The petition was later amended to additionally allege MGM suffered from mental and emotional problems, had a history of engaging in physical altercations, and that mother had a long criminal history.

extensively from the nonpublished opinion in MGM’s prior appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1).) 3 The following factual and procedural summary is taken from our previous opinion in case No. B325916.

3 Attached to the petition was an ICWA-010(A) form indicating MGM reported the maternal family had no known American Indian ancestry. Detention The detention hearing was held on June 22, 2017. MGM completed a parental notification of Indian status form (ICWA- 020) and reported having no American Indian ancestry as far as she knew. MGM informed the court she had no American Indian ancestry but did not know if the child’s maternal grandfather had American Indian ancestry. The court found no reason to believe ICWA applied and ordered Christopher detained from MGM’s custody. Investigation MGM subsequently reported possible American Indian ancestry on the maternal side of the family, but she was unsure what tribe was involved. She reported American Indian ancestry in both her family and mother’s paternal family. MGM’s father, Nathaniel R. (deceased), was part of the “‘Gee chee’ (unknown spelling) tribe.” He was born in Tallulah, Louisiana. MGM also stated her mother, Lula M.F.R. is part of a tribe from Arkansas. In addition, MGM was told mother’s biological father’s family had American Indian ancestry. MGM stated mother’s paternal grandmother lived in Arizona but was unable to provide contact information. When asked about American Indian ancestry, mother reported she probably had some but was unable to further explain. Mother identified Bobby Joe N., Jr., as Christopher’s biological father and indicated there had been a DNA test. MGM said father had not had any contact with the child since his birth and had made clear that he did not wish to participate in the 4 child’s life. Father had made no effort to care for the child or meet his basic needs. DCFS contacted Lula, who stated she did not know much about the family’s American Indian ancestry because her parents kept it a secret. However, her understanding was that it was “West Indian or Blackfoot.” Lula reported her mother did not have any American Indian ancestry, but her father did. However, Lula did not know where her father was born, what year he was born, or any further information about him. Nathaniel was also allegedly American Indian, but Lula did not know what tribe, nor did she have any information about his parents or further information regarding American Indian ancestry related to Christopher. In August 2017, DCFS sent notice of child custody proceeding for Indian child (ICWA-030) forms to the Blackfeet Tribe, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The notice also mentioned maternal family’s alleged association with two tribes that are not federally recognized: the Geechee-Louisiana and West Indian tribes. The notice included mother’s, MGM’s, and Lula’s identifying information and named Bobby Joe N., Jr., as Christopher’s biological father. DCFS subsequently received green card return receipts from the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of the Interior. DCFS later received documentation from the Blackfeet Tribe indicating Christopher was not eligible for enrollment. Jurisdiction and disposition Father signed a waiver form indicating he did not want to be physically present at the jurisdictional hearing and gave up that right. He did not want counsel or to participate by video.

5 On August 22, 2017, mother signed an ICWA-020 form indicating she might have Cherokee Indian ancestry. The juvenile court’s minute order noted mother was present in custody but was not brought into court due to court congestion. Mother later wrote to DCFS and stated she would be paroled in January 2018 and wanted to attend court after, but not before, her release. The juvenile court rescheduled the jurisdictional hearing. At the March 13, 2018 hearing, the court noted that in a last minute information for the court, DCFS reported mother was institutionalized at Patton State Hospital. She was sent there from prison rather than being released.4 The court proceeded to the adjudication given that the petition had been filed in August 2017 and the court was required to give substantial weight to the minor’s need for prompt resolution of the matter. The juvenile court sustained an amended version of the petition based on MGM’s substance abuse and mother’s criminal history. The matter was continued for disposition. On May 29, 2018, the juvenile court declared Christopher a dependent child and removed him from MGM’s custody. MGM and mother were provided reunification services, but father was denied such services. The court found there was no reason to 4 The dependency investigator received a telephone call from mother on February 6, 2018, stating mother was being held against her will at Patton State Hospital, and she was sent there from prison instead of being released. The investigator noted that during the February 6, 2018 conversation, “Mother was jumping from unrelated topic to topic and wasn’t able to have a fully cohesive conversation.”

6 know Christopher was an Indian child and that ICWA did not apply. Reunification period DCFS interviewed mother at Patton State Hospital in June 2018. Mother was delusional and appeared confused about reality. She reported false information, such as she owned a home in Victorville, California and worked at Patton State Hospital prior to her incarceration. Mother reported she had many children besides Christopher and provided the names of the children. DCFS was not aware mother had any children other than Christopher. Mother reported speaking to Christopher on the phone and being able to understand the child even though he was nonverbal. DCFS was unable to obtain information about mother’s mental health from the hospital due to privacy concerns, but the hospital social worker indicated she would try to obtain mother’s consent to release her treatment information to DCFS. In July 2018, mother became agitated and had difficulty understanding Christopher’s diagnosis. Mother maintained the child was walking and talking when in her care. She appeared confused about reality. She requested DNA testing be done for mother and MGM as she suspected the child was not hers. Mother said she did not want to participate in services and would follow up with the necessary people once released from the hospital. On November 27, 2018, the juvenile court terminated family reunification services for mother but continued them for MGM.

7 For the 18-month review hearing, DCFS reported father’s whereabouts were unknown and that mother remained in custody at Patton State Hospital. ICWA proceedings as to father On January 28, 2019, father made his first appearance in juvenile court and was appointed counsel. Father filed a statement regarding parentage (JV-505) and an ICWA-020 form indicating he might have American Indian ancestry with an unknown tribe on his father’s maternal side. Father’s paternal grandmother was no longer living. Father provided the name of an aunt, Jeanette C., who lived in Florida, but he did not have her telephone number. Father stated he could try to get in touch with her via Facebook. The court informed father that DCFS would be asking him to try to get in touch with her. The court found it had no reason to believe that ICWA applied but ordered DCFS to investigate father’s possible Indian heritage. On March 7, 2019, father confirmed he might have American Indian ancestry to DCFS. Father provided contact information for his niece, Ana, as she had more information regarding paternal aunt Jeanette C. Ana told the social worker she would provide the information in a week. The social worker asked father if he would assist and provide the information sooner. The social worker asked a second time for Jeanette C.’s contact information, and in its March 13, 2019 report, DCFS indicated it had not heard from father or Ana regarding the issue of American Indian heritage. At the March 13, 2019 hearing, DCFS informed the court it had reached out to father but he was nonresponsive. As father was present in court, he stated he had “no idea what tribe or what my background is.” Father said had been trying to contact 8 his aunt or obtain contact information for DCFS. The court ordered father to do his best to contact Jeanette C. The court found no reason to believe that ICWA applied but ordered DCFS to continue to investigate. Further proceedings On March 13, 2019, the juvenile court terminated family reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for the child. For the initial section 366.26 hearing scheduled for July 10, 2019, DCFS again sent ICWA-030 notice forms to the Blackfeet tribe. The notice identified father as also associated with the Blackfeet tribe and included the name of paternal aunt, Jeanette C., noting that her current address, former address, and date and place of birth were unknown. The Blackfeet tribe responded that based on its enrollment records, the child did not fall under the provisions of ICWA. On November 5, 2019, DCFS was contacted by the child’s paternal half sibling, S.N., who reported father had suffered a massive stroke and brain aneurism and was hospitalized. Father was immobile and was being provided 24-hour medical and nursing care. On June 29, 2021, the juvenile court reinstated family reunification services for MGM pursuant to section 388 and took the section 366.26 hearing off calendar. On March 8, 2022, the juvenile court again terminated MGM’s reunification services. In March 2022, DCFS was informed father had passed away and obtained father’s death certificate. At a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing on July 1, 2022, DCFS asked to continue the matter for 90 days for 9 adoption assessment. The juvenile court granted the request and ordered DCFS to provide “an ICWA update report” and “to inquire of all known maternal and paternal relatives as well as any relatives for the legal guardian with respect to any Indian heritage and provide that information to the court.” At the continued section 366.26 permanency planning hearing on October 3, 2022, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to “make inquiry and interview of all known paternal and maternal relatives as to ICWA and provide an update in the next report.” Permanency planning was continued to January 31, 2023. In December 2022, DCFS petitioned the juvenile court to terminate MGM’s legal guardianship over Christopher. On December 13, 2022, the juvenile court granted DCFS’s section 388 petition and terminated MGM’s legal guardianship over Christopher. The court found the child’s visits with MGM detrimental to him and ordered no visits occur. On December 13, 2022, MGM filed a notice of appeal. On August 23 2023, this court affirmed the juvenile court’s order.5 Mother remained hospitalized at Patton State Hospital and had no visits with the child throughout the case. Permanency planning In March 2023, DCFS reported Christopher had been in the home of his current caregiver since July 2017. The caregiver initially planned to adopt Christopher but MGM’s verbally aggressive and threatening behavior was taking a toll on her family. The caregiver was willing to provide Christopher with permanency through a plan of legal guardianship.

5 This ends the portion of this section taken from our previous opinion in Case No. B325916.

10 On September 7, 2023, DCFS provided an update regarding ICWA. On August 21, 2023, DCFS contacted mother and inquired about American Indian ancestry. Mother denied any such ancestry and denied having any contact information for father’s family. On August 21, 2023, DCFS contacted MGM to inquire as to American Indian heritage. MGM stated there was none that she knew of. MGM said maternal great-grandfather, who was deceased, did have American Indian ancestry although she did not know the name of the tribe. MGM had no contact information for Christopher’s paternal family. On August 21, 2023, DCFS contacted maternal great-aunt to inquire as to American Indian ancestry. The maternal great- aunt said, “[I]t is possible but I do not have any confirmation that we are Indian. That would require ancestry research because my dad passed. My dad’s brother and my dad’s sister also passed so no one is left to ask.” The maternal great-aunt said while the maternal great-grandfather possibly had American Indian heritage, the maternal great-aunt did not know the name of the ancestor who was American Indian and did not know the name of the tribe. The maternal great-aunt further stated the maternal great-grandfather’s relatives were all deceased and no one was left to interview regarding the family’s ancestry. The maternal great-aunt did not know how to contact the family’s paternal relatives. DCFS further reported that on August 21, 2023, the dependency investigator searched case notes and reports to locate paternal relatives’ contact information in order to make ICWA inquiries, but paternal relative information was not located; therefore, no further inquiries of the paternal family could be made.

11 On September 7, 2023, the juvenile court appointed Christopher’s caretaker as his legal guardian. On April 5, 2024, the juvenile court denied mother’s section 388 petition seeking liberalized visitation.6 On October 30, 2024, Christopher’s legal guardian denied Christopher had any American Indian heritage. On February 21, 2025, the social worker attempted to contact mother to inquire about American Indian ancestry but received no response. On February 21 and August 20, 2025, the legal guardian denied Christopher had any American Indian ancestry. On August 20, 2025, mother denied Christopher had any American Indian ancestry. On January 15, 2026, the juvenile court again made orders appointing the child’s caregiver as his legal guardian and terminated jurisdiction.7 On January 29, 2026, mother filed a notice of appeal from the court’s orders of January 15, 2026.

DISCUSSION I. Applicable law and standard of review ICWA and related California statutes reflect the Legislature’s intent “to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards 6 Mother filed a notice of appeal, but her counsel filed a no issue brief, and the appeal was dismissed as abandoned. 7 The juvenile court had to refile guardianship paperwork to address a funding issue.

12 for the removal of Indian children from their families.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706, fn. 3.) An Indian child is defined as any unmarried person under the age of 18 who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b).) “The juvenile court and DCFS have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 … may be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.’” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) “This continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (Ibid.) “The duty to inquire begins for a county when first contacted regarding a child, including, but not limited to, asking a party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be an Indian child, and upon a county department’s first contact with the child or the child’s family, including extended family members ….” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) Under California law, the child welfare department’s initial duty of inquiry includes, but is not limited to, “asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) The term “‘extended family member’” is “defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, 13 shall be a person who has reached 18 years of age and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).) The juvenile court must also inquire at each participant’s first appearance in court whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) In addition, the juvenile court must instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child. (Ibid.) If the “initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (e), italics added.) [I]f that further inquiry results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3 apply. (See § 224.2, subd. (c) [court is obligated to inquire at the first appearance whether anyone ‘knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child’]; id., subd. (d) [defining circumstances that establish a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child]; § 224.3 [ICWA notice is required if there is a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child as defined under § 224.2, subd. (d)].)” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052 (D.S.).) “[R]eason to believe” means the court or agency “has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) Further inquiry includes, but is not limited to, interviewing the parents and extended family members to gather additional family 14 information; contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services for assistance; and contacting the tribes the child might be affiliated with and anyone else that might have information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) The duty to provide formal ICWA notice is only required when the juvenile court has reason to know the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (f).) A court has “reason to know” the child is an Indian child if any of the following applies: a person having an interest in the child informs the court that the child is an Indian child; the residence or domicile of the child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation; a participant in the proceeding informs the court it has discovered information indicating the child is an Indian child; the court is informed the child has been a ward of a tribal court; or the court is informed either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (d).) “The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not apply is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1134 (Dezi C.).) “Some courts apply a straightforward substantial evidence test when reviewing the juvenile court’s conclusion that ICWA does not apply. [Citation.] ‘By contrast, other courts have used a hybrid standard, reviewing for substantial evidence whether there is reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and reviewing a finding of due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse of 15 discretion.’” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)8 In Dezi C. our Supreme Court noted, however, that “‘the juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is “a quintessentially discretionary function” [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review ….’” (Id. at p. 1141.) “‘“On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.”’” (Ibid.) II. The trial court did not err in finding ICWA inapplicable Mother makes two arguments on appeal. First, mother argues DCFS failed to make initial inquiry of all known extended family members. Further, mother argues DCFS failed to satisfy its duty of further inquiry by failing to contact the Cherokee tribes. We discuss each argument below and conclude no error occurred. A. Initial inquiry of extended family members The record shows a thorough inquiry by DCFS and the juvenile court of family members on both sides of Christopher’s family. Mother names four extended family members who were known to DCFS who were apparently not questioned regarding Christopher’s possible American Indian heritage: Christopher’s half sister, maternal uncle, paternal aunt and paternal uncle. We address each family member below and conclude these 8 The Dezi C. court expressly declined to resolve this disagreement. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.)

16 apparent omissions do not undermine the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS conducted a sufficient initial inquiry in this matter. Christopher’s paternal half sister, S.N., came forward in late 2020 asking to be an option for permanency for Christopher. She had not met the child before. Upon interviewing S.N., DCFS determined there were barriers to consider concerning placement of Christopher with S.N. There is no indication in the interview report that S.N. was asked about possible American Indian ancestry. By 2022 it appears S.N. was no longer considering being a caregiver for Christopher. In a last-minute information for the court filed September 15, 2022, DCFS reported: “At this time, there are no other relatives who are visiting with Christopher. Maternal-Uncle, who MGM reported was interested in caring for the child, Adult half-sister, [S.N.], who also reported an interest in caring for the child does not call or visit with the child. No other relatives have been in contact with [DCFS] about visits with Christopher.” We decline to find the initial inquiry deficient based on DCFS’s apparent failure to ask Christopher’s paternal half sister about possible American Indian ancestry. In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53 is applicable. In C.L., mother argued the juvenile court erred in finding DCFS’s ICWA inquiry adequate because the record did not reflect the agency asked a maternal uncle about the children’s possible Indian ancestry. (Id. at p. 67.) The C.L. court disagreed, in part because “DCFS … made inquiries of all available extended family members in the older generations,” a strategy which addressed “the realities of generational loss of information that may have prevented the parents from having accurate information about their potential Native American ancestry.” (Id. at p. 70.) The C.L. court noted there was no 17 indication the maternal uncle would have more information than his own mother, the maternal grandmother, as to whether the children may be Indian children. (Ibid.; see also In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 802 [“The court also reasonably could find mother’s sister (maternal aunt) would not have had any more information about the family’s potential Indian ancestry than their own mother (maternal grandmother) had.”].) Similarly, here, there is no reason to believe Christopher’s half sister would have more information than their own father. Father knew no specifics of his possible American Indian ancestry and was unable to provide information suggesting Christopher was an Indian child. There is no reason to believe Christopher’s half sister would have more information than father. In addition, DCFS’s last known contact with the paternal half sister was May 2021. DCFS reported despite searching the record for contact information for the paternal relatives in August 2023, it was unable to conduct further inquiries of paternal relatives. We assume the juvenile court credited DCFS’s later reported inability to contact the paternal relatives, including the half sister. (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053 [DCFS is “not required to ‘cast about’ for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads.”].) Mother next argues no inquiry took place of the maternal uncle, who was present at the initial hearing but not questioned about the family’s ancestry. Maternal uncle was present in court with MGM, who denied American Indian ancestry. Maternal uncle did not object or protest when the juvenile court found it had no reason to believe ICWA applied. In addition, as set forth in In re C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at page 70, there was no indication the maternal uncle would have more information than 18 his own mother, MGM, as to whether Christopher may be an Indian child. As to the paternal aunt and paternal uncle, father identified paternal aunt Jeanette C. in his parental notification of Indian status form in January 2019. The form did not contain contact information. The failure to contact Jeanette C. was discussed in detail in the previous nonpublished opinion in case No. B325916, where we concluded: “MGM argues DCFS ‘did not interview Jeanette C. or document its efforts to do so.’ However, the record reveals that DCFS did not have any way of contacting Jeanette C. Despite repeated attempts to obtain her contact information, neither father nor his family were able to provide it. DCFS was not required to conduct an independent investigation to locate this individual. The record shows that under the circumstances DCFS undertook the best investigation it was able, and nothing further was required.” We cited In re C.Y. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 34, 40, for the proposition that DCFS “has no duty to conduct an extensive independent investigation for information.” Thus, “[w]ithout reliable contact information, DCFS could not reasonably have been expected to interview” Jeanette C. (In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1083.) Paternal uncle was also referenced in a form father filled out in January 2019, but father did not provide contact information. Father is now deceased, and DCFS reported it had no contact information for additional paternal relatives. Under the circumstances, DCFS had no way to contact paternal uncle. As with Jeanette C., DCFS was not required to conduct an extensive independent investigation to find the paternal uncle. (In re Q.M., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083; In re C.Y., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 40.)

19 Under the circumstances of this case, mother has failed to undermine the substantial evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court’s conclusions that DCFS complied with its inquiry obligations and ICWA is inapplicable. B. Further inquiry Mother argues numerous family members, including mother, MGM, and father, indicated the child may have American Indian heritage. These statements, mother argued, gave the juvenile court reason to believe Christopher was an Indian child. Mother argues this triggered the juvenile court’s duty of further inquiry. Such inquiry, mother argues, included the necessity of contacting the Cherokee tribes. MGM raised the identical issue in her appeal from the order terminating her legal guardianship. There, we concluded the following: “Under the circumstances of this case, it was not error for the trial court to decline to order notice to the Cherokee tribe. Mother’s statement must be considered in view of the mental health issues from which she was suffering at the time, which included delusional thoughts. While mother was scheduled to be released from prison in January 2018, she was instead involuntarily held at Patton State Hospital due to mental health concerns. Mother was unable to have a cohesive conversation. She remained delusional several months later when the social worker interviewed her at the hospital. Mother then reported she had many children, although this was known to be untrue. Mother reported speaking to Christopher on the phone and understanding him even though he was nonverbal. Mother insisted Christopher could walk and talk when he was in her custody, and sought DNA testing because she thought 20 Christopher was not her child. Mother’s discharge date from Patton State Hospital was later extended due to continued concerns about her mental health. Given mother’s delusions, the juvenile court was justified in its implied finding that mother’s statement of possible ancestry with the Cherokee tribe was unreliable. “The juvenile court’s decision is supported by the reliable testimony of mother’s relatives. MGM reported there might be American Indian ancestry on the maternal side of family, but she was unsure which tribe or tribes might be involved. MGM noted that her father, who was deceased, was part of the ‘“Gee chee” (unknown spelling) tribe.’ She also noted her mother might have ancestry with a tribe in Arkansas. MGM offered that mother’s biological father’s family might have American Indian ancestry, but she did not have the contact information for any of mother’s paternal relatives. Lula also reported she did not know much about any American Indian ancestry, as her parents kept it a secret. She understood the American Indian ancestry to be ‘West Indian or Blackfoot.’ Lula added that mother’s maternal great- grandfather may have had American Indian ancestry, but she did not know where he was born nor did she have any further information about him. She did not know which tribe might have been involved nor did she have any information about the parents of the maternal great-grandfather. “Significantly, none of mother’s other relatives mentioned Cherokee heritage in the maternal family. Only mother mentioned it. And previously, when mother was asked in June 2017 about her American Indian ancestry, she stated that she ‘probably has some because “I have a couple of my grandmas inside of my body.”’ Mother was unable to further explain any 21 ICWA-related information. Thus, her later statement that she had possible affiliation with the Cherokee tribe lacked credibility—particularly when it was made near the time she demonstrated delusional behavior and had to be institutionalized for mental health reasons. “As set forth above, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence test. (Dezi C., supra, [16 Cal.5th at p. 1134].) There was sufficient credible evidence from maternal relatives that the Cherokee tribe was not part of Christopher’s ancestry. The juvenile court was not required to credit mother’s lone indication of such heritage, viewed in light of mother’s delusional behavior and forced hospitalization. Notice to the Cherokee tribe was unnecessary under the circumstances.” Given our earlier finding that the juvenile court did not err in declining to contact the Cherokee tribe in this matter, mother’s argument is unavailing. Mother has failed to undermine the juvenile court’s determination that DCFS conducted an adequate inquiry in this case, and substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply.

DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J. We concur:

LUI, P. J. GOORVITCH, J.