In re G.P. CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 9/8/26 In re G.P. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re G.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E086849

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2500250)

v. OPINION C.C., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed in part, remanded with directions.

Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

1 Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

C.C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders as to her 10-year-old son G.P.1 Mother contends that the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over G.P. and his removal from her care are not supported by substantial evidence. Mother also argues a conditional reversal of the jurisdictional and dispositional orders are required because the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry imposed by state statutory provisions implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C.

§ 1901 et seq.) (ICWA).2 We conclude there was substantial evidence supporting the jurisdiction and disposition orders, and affirm the orders and judgment, but order vacated the finding that ICWA does not apply and remand for further proceedings.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The family came to the attention of DPSS on May 30, 2025, after an immediate response referral was received from law enforcement. Mother was under the influence of 1 J.P. (Father) is not a party to this appeal.

2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

2 a central nervous system stimulant and Father had weapons in the house. There was no electricity, food, water, and the family was in the process of being evicted. The parents were arrested and taken to jail.

The social worker spoke with law enforcement who said they conducted a welfare check due to a “mentally disturbed” patient (Mother) who was also a suspect in a theft earlier that day. Law enforcement had been to the home on multiple occasions due to domestic disturbances between the parents and between Mother and her neighbors. Law enforcement stated Mother became erratic and irate as they approached her and that she had rapid speech and did not make sense as she spoke. Law enforcement believed mother was under the influence of a central nervous stimulant such as methamphetamine.

When law enforcement entered the family home, G.P. began to try and clean up the home by covering up some of the animal waste in the home. The social worker observed photographs of the home which showed it cluttered with the kitchen sink overflowing with dirty dishes, the oven and stove appearing inoperable with items placed on top of them, and a propane tank inside the refrigerator. A photo showed a small glass pipe with black residue next to a plastic cup which had a small amount of a white powdery substance inside, on a table in the living area, accessible to G.P. Law enforcement also noticed a foul odor and flies throughout the home.

G.P. said his family has two dogs and 12 puppies, but he said his home is not always in that present condition. He believed his parents “smoke” and use a “bong” and that Mother “might” drink alcohol, but he denied knowing what they smoked or what 3 alcohol looked like. He denied witnessing the parents act odd or aggressive, and said he felt safe in the home and noted that all their relatives lived out of state. G.P. was placed in protective custody.

On May 31, 2025, the social worker interviewed Father at jail. Father said he and Mother were in an “on again and off again” relationship, denied domestic violence, but admitted Mother was previously arrested for domestic violence against him. Father claimed that he had stopped using methamphetamines, but that he smoked marijuana. He denied being aware of the conditions of the home and denied knowing that animal waste was in the home. He stated normally the home was very clean. He denied knowing if Mother was using methamphetamines. When the social worker informed Father about the paraphernalia and suspected methamphetamine found in the home, Father said that he was “sure it was just a little bit,” and then said he did not know if Mother was using methamphetamine. Father agreed to participate in a drug test after his release from jail, but denied needing any services. He provided the phone number of a paternal aunt who he would like to be considered for placement as well as another paternal aunt.

The social worker also interviewed Mother at jail. She denied domestic violence with Father but admitted to a physical altercation with Father in 2020 and being arrested in 2020 for domestic violence. Mother was diagnosed with ADHD and was not in any services. She denied exhibiting bizarre behaviors on May 30, 2025, and also denied being under the influence of a controlled substance. She admitted to drinking alcohol earlier in the day, and said that she was likely intoxicated from the alcohol. She claimed 4 that she spoke loud and fast normally. Mother denied using methamphetamine and denied that any methamphetamine was found in the home. She also denied a pipe was found in the home and suggested the white powder was planted by law enforcement. She admitted to using methamphetamines “recreationally” with friends at parties, but not recently. She could not say when the last time she used methamphetamines.

As to the condition of her home, Mother stated she had working utilities. She said her electrical sockets were not working, so she connected hers to a neighbor’s outlets.

She claimed her home had working water in the home and denied that there was any animal feces in the home or on G.P.’s bed. She claimed the animal feces were “planted”

in the home. Mother also said there was plenty of food inside the home. She agreed to submit to a drug test upon her release. She then “admitted she may test positive for amphetamines as she took an Adderall, she received from a friend 4 or 5 days prior.”

Mother was willing to participate in any services necessary and that the parents would clean their home. Mother’s relatives lived in Oregon and the maternal grandmother would be willing to care for the child in Oregon, but the maternal grandmother had a significant criminal history.

On May 31, 2025, both parents denied Native American ancestry.

The parents had prior child welfare history for emotional abuse and general neglect in 2020 and 2018. The general neglect allegation in 2020 was substantiated against Mother.

5 On June 1, 2025, DPSS tried to contact a paternal aunt at the number provided by the parents, however, a man answered and said it was the wrong number. DPSS also attempted to contact the other paternal aunt, but there was no answer. DPSS left a voicemail message for the paternal aunt.

On June 3, 2025, a petition was filed on behalf of the child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provisions for support) due to drug paraphernalia and controlled substances accessible to the child found in the home, Mother being found under the influence of a controlled substance, the deplorable conditions of the home, the parents unresolved history of abusing drugs, Father being found in possession of drug paraphernalia, and the parents arrest.

At the June 4, 2025, detention hearing, the parents’ counsel requested a continuance because the parents were not present. The juvenile court made temporary detention findings against both parents.

On June 5, 2025, Father filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020)

form indicating he had no Native American ancestry.

At the continued detention hearing on June 5, 2025, the parents were present in custody with their counsel. At that time, the juvenile court asked Father if he had any Native American ancestry and Father said he did not. The court also asked Mother if she had Native American ancestry and Mother said “no.” The court found Father to be the 3 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

6 presumed father of G.P. and that ICWA did not apply. G.P. was formally detained from his parents. The court ordered supervised visitation for the parents twice per week upon their release from custody and the parents were ordered to drug test prior to visitation.

On June 10, 2025, DPSS made telephone contact with the maternal grandmother who stated she would like to be considered for placement. However, both parents expressed concerns about placement with the maternal grandmother as she was a felon.

DPSS recommended that the court find true the allegations in the petition, that G.P. be declared a dependent of the court, and that family reunification services be offered to the parents. DPSS noted that ICWA did not apply. On June 11, 2025, Mother again denied Native American ancestry, and on June 17, 2025, Father again denied Native American ancestry.

On June 18, 2025, DPSS interviewed G.P. G.P. noted his home was in a bad state when police completed a welfare check at his home and that his mother was “a little bit drunk.” He denied there was a foul smell, but confirmed there were flees. He said his father sometimes drank alcohol and had seen him drunk. He noted his parents drank alcohol at home, “but not that bad.”

DPSS also interviewed Mother. Mother claimed the glass apparatus found in the home had the residue of ash from marijuana. She also stated that that family home was not deplorable and that there were no feces in the home. She claimed she was under the influence of alcohol at the time of her arrest and denied using controlled substances. She had never sought treatment. She did not consider her alcohol use a problem, as she drank 7 twice a week if she could afford it. She had completed a 52-week domestic violence program and parenting classes following her 2020 conviction for domestic violence. She nonetheless denied any form of domestic violence in the home. Mother noted she had a strained relationship with her mother who had not seen G.P. in years. DPSS was denied permission to interview Father as to the allegations. On June 17, 2025, Father said his father passed away a few years ago and his mother resided in a senior facility.

G.P.’s last doctor visit was in 2023. G.P. could not recall the last time he visited a doctor or dentist. His caregiver said the child was adjusting well to the home and that he slept well at night.

On June 18, 2025, DPSS attempted to contact the maternal grandmother again, but her phone was turned off. On June 19, 2025, the maternal grandmother provided her information to DPSS and a resource family application was submitted for her to be evaluated for placement. The parents remained incarcerated.

DPSS attached the police report of the May 30, 2025, incident to its jurisdiction report. Law enforcement responded to a call regarding a mentally disturbed person who was possibly under the influence of drugs. The officer identified Mother based on prior contacts with her. Mother was barefoot at the front gate of her trailer park arguing with employees and seemed agitated. Mother claimed she and her son were “living in squalor” inside her trailer and they did not have any power in her trailer. A staff member claimed Mother was going door to door yelling at other patrons. The officer asked Mother to place her hands behind her back, pending the theft investigation, but Mother 8 refused. The officer observed Mother “was unable to control her motor functions to her hands and she continued to involuntarily open and close her hands and thumbs.” In addition, Mother’s pupils “looked constricted indicating to [the officer] she could be under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant.” Law enforcement found two outstanding “Dangerous Drug” warrants for Father out of San Bernardino County. Father was seated near the main entrance and smoking a “THC pen.” The officer met with G.P.

inside the family residence to check if there were any indications of child endangerment or abuse based on how Mother was behaving. Once the officer entered the interior of the trailer, the officer could smell a strong odor of feces emanating from the trailer and observed a large number of flies swarming inside the residence. The kitchen sink was clogged and had several old moldy dishes in it and the refrigerator was unplugged and had a large propane tank inside it. G.P. told the officer that the room was a mess and they were not expecting people to come inside there. G.P. indicated he did not have any food and denied having eaten. He claimed his mother had spent her food stamps allocation.

G.P.’s clothing had several stains on it, indicating that it had not been cleaned in a while.

The officer suspected the child was being neglected of basic needs. The officer walked the interior of the residence and observed dog feces on the floor and dog vomit on the child’s bed. Next to the vomit, the officer observed what looked like an old shrimp covered in flies on top of the soiled foam mattress where the child indicated he slept. The officer observed the main restroom had urine and feces in it and appeared to be clogged.

9 When the officer inquired of Father about the food situation, Father walked back into the residence to show the officer the food they had. He opened a small freezer and showed the officer “a stick of frozen meat.” The officer also observed “a large pack of ‘Natural Ice’ beer inside the refrigerator.” The officer expressed concern over the well- being of the child and suspected Mother was under the influence of a narcotic. Father began to make excuses, claiming he did not know what was going on. Father denied he used any drugs “right now.” Father had several knives, razor blades, marijuana, and a small marijuana pipe on his person.

When the officer attempted to speak with Mother about her residence and the officer’s concerns for her child’s well-being, Mother began to argue with the officer, claiming if there was beer in the refrigerator, she would be drinking it. She denied being under the influence of drugs. Mother appeared to be jovial about the allegations made.

During the field sobriety tests, the officer noted Mother had a large amount of white paste on her tongue. Based on the officer’s knowledge, experience and training, a common symptom of methamphetamine use is its overall impact of saliva production and poor oral hygiene. Following his investigation, Mother was placed under arrest. Father was placed under arrest for the possession of a concealed knife. Father admitted to “it not being ok for [G.P.] to be living in those conditions claiming, “No it needs to be cleaned up.”

On June 26, 2025, the parents, who were in custody, set the jurisdictional hearing for contest. The court authorized telephone contact with the child at one time per week supervised.

10 On July 30, 2025, at the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the parents were present with their counsel. DPSS submitted on its reports and recommendations.

Counsel for mother called Mother to testify. Mother testified that she was outside the general store of the trailer park when she was arrested on May 30, 2025. She claimed that law enforcement did not recover any illicit drugs on her property to her knowledge and a social worker did not come to her house to inspect her property. She denied using methamphetamine. She claimed she was tested the night she was arrested and twice since then during the voluntary random drug screening and tested negative each time.

She was willing to continue to drug test if her child was placed in her custody and to participate in services. The social worker had attempted to coordinate an inspection of her house recently, but Mother said no, because it was her son’s birthday. Mother stated she had 12 dogs, because she was poor and that some of the dogs had been euthanized.

She believed her home was perfectly fine. She had regular visits with her son and had not missed any visits. She believed her son missed her. Mother said she was willing to take an alcohol test as well and claimed she did a screening for an alcohol issue from Riverside County and was told she did need services for alcohol.

On cross-examination by DPSS’s counsel, Mother testified that she was currently at the same address when the case began. She was likely to be evicted from her trailer park as she was not paying her rent. On the day of her arrest, she was drinking, claiming the stress of the financials was a trigger for her to “be a little bit more emotional that day than regularly.” The trailer park will have to take her to court to evict her. She noted she 11 owed back rent and thought she was being arrested for arguing with a neighbor. She claimed she was under the influence of alcohol at the time of her arrest. She denied she was so inebriated that she did not understand what was happening at the time. She disagreed that she was belligerent toward the officers. She believed she did not exhibit any reason for the police to think she was under the influence of methamphetamine.

Mother stated that she would test positive for amphetamines, because she took Adderall about four or five days prior. Mother did not have a valid prescription for Adderall and did not know if there are amphetamines in the Adderall medication she took. She denied making the statement that she used methamphetamine recreationally with friends. She also claimed she did not currently smoke marijuana.

On cross-examination by the child’s counsel, Mother testified that the child was inside the home by himself at the time of mother’s arrest. G.P. did not like the dog that Mother had given him and that he was embarrassed by the condition of the home.

Mother claimed the glass pipe with black residue was from marijuana and did not know what the plastic cup with the small amount of white powdery substance inside was.

Mother said the officer placed the paraphernalia on the table accessible to the child as it was actually in a cupboard. She used to smoke marijuana. She believed G.P. heard about the bong smoking from conversations the parents had.

On cross-examination by Father’s counsel, Mother testified that her home was not in a deplorable condition when she left it and that the refrigerator was operable, but she used two smaller mini fridges instead. She claimed G.P. ate hours before the officers 12 arrived. She stated there were 14 dogs and 12 puppies that lived inside and outside their trailer. Father lived in the trailer, but the parents were going through some stuff and saw each other every day. She asserted that the trailer was normally kept clean without dog feces, the toilets were not clogged, and that the glass pipe found belonged to Mother. She was not charged with possession of methamphetamine.

On examination by the juvenile court, Mother testified that her criminal case was still pending and her next court date was August 4, 2025. She stated she was arrested for misdemeanor under the influence of a controlled substance, had not been smoking marijuana since her arrest, and that she smoked marijuana five days prior to her recent arrest. She acknowledged that she was not in a substance abuse program. She claimed she was told in her drug screening that she did not need any other services, besides random drug testing. She did not know what the white powdery substance was and speculated it could be milk.

Following argument by the parties, the juvenile court found DPSS was allowed to rely on law enforcement statements and police reports as part of the Evidence Code.4 The court found it concerning that Mother was taking Adderall without a prescription and noted Mother was recently testing negative since her arrest and release from custody.

The court did not believe returning the child to the parents’ custody was appropriate at that time. The court found DPSS had conducted an adequate investigation of Native 4 Mother’s counsel argued the police report was hearsay and that Mother was being punished because she had low income. Mother’s and Father’s counsels asked the court to dismiss the petition.

13 American ancestry and that ICWA did not apply. By a preponderance of the evidence, the court found true allegations b-1, b-2, b-3 and b-4 in the petition, declared G.P. a dependent of the court, and provided the parents with reunification services and supervised visitations. Physical custody was removed from the parents under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). A six-month status review hearing was set.

On September 5, 2025, Mother filed a notice of appeal.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdictional Findings Mother argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings against her. Specifically, she asserts none of the required elements, such as neglectful conduct, causation or current risk, was established with respect to the allegations against her that G.P. was at a substantial risk of harm due to her purported dirty home or unresolved substance abuse issues.

“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 (R.T.); see In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.); In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 14 Cal.App.4th 438, 450-451.) “ ‘The parent has the burden on appeal of showing there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 412 (L.B.).) We uphold the juvenile court’s findings unless they are “ ‘ “so lacking in evidentiary support as to render them unreasonable.” ’ ” (Jamieson v. City Council of the City of Carpinteria (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 755, 763.)

The primary purpose of a dependency proceeding is to protect the child. (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. . . The child shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).) The department bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the parent’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the child;

(2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious 15 physical harm or illness. (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601 (Cole L.); Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 967.) The statute permits jurisdiction under this subdivision “only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(3).) Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing ‘ “subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.” ’ ” (L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 411.)

Nevertheless, “the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child [citation]. The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’ ” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216 (Christopher R.), disapproved on another ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18.) To do so, the department “must establish a nexus between the parent’s past conduct and the current risk of harm.” (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775.)

Here, the b-1 allegation as found true stated: “On May 30, 2025, law enforcement conducted a welfare check of the family home, which yielded a small glass pipe with black residue next to a plastic cup with small amount of white powdery substance inside, all within reach of the child. Additionally, the home was found in deplorable conditions 16 and the mother was found to be under the influence of a controlled substance and the father was found to be in possession of drug paraphernalia. Subsequently, the mother and father were arrested, which resulted in the child being left without a caretaker.” There is substantial evidence to support the b-1 allegation.

On May 30, 2025, law enforcement found Mother erratic and irate. In addition, she had rapid speech and did not make sense when she spoke with the officers. Law enforcement believed Mother was under the influence of a central nervous stimulant, such as methamphetamine, and both parents were arrested. The social worker observed photographs of the home which showed it in a deplorable condition, cluttered with the kitchen sink overflowing with dirty dishes, the oven and stove appearing inoperable with items placed on top of them, and a propane tank in the refrigerator without adequate provisions for the child. Furthermore, a small glass pipe with black residue next to a plastic cup which had a small amount of a white powdery substance inside, was found on a table in the living area, accessible to G.P. The social worker asked Father about the paraphernalia and the methamphetamine found in the home, and Father said that he was “sure it was just a little bit.”

Mother initially denied a pipe was found in the home and suggested the white powder was planted by law enforcement. Later, she claimed the pipe was for marijuana use and the white powder was milk. Mother also claimed the animal feces were “planted” in the home by law enforcement, although G.P. and Father both acknowledged the deplorable conditions of the home. Mother admitted using methamphetamines 17 “recreationally” with friends at parties. Although she does not have a prescription for Adderall, she also “admitted she may test positive for amphetamines as she took an Adderall, she received from a friend 4 of 5 days prior.” The officer observed Mother “was unable to control her motor functions to her hands and she continued to involuntarily open and close her hands and thumbs.” Moreover, Mother’s pupils “looked constricted indicating to [the officer] she could be under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant.” Based on DPSS’s and law enforcement investigations, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s true finding on allegation b-1.

The b-2 allegation as found true here stated: “The parents neglect the health and safety of the child in that the home was found to be in deplorable conditions, with animal feces on the floor and animal waste on [G.P.]’s bedding, a foul odor and flies throughout the home, cluttered kitchen sink overflowing with dirty dishes and inoperable appliances.

Further, the fridge was empty and there was no food observed in the home.” Mother argues that substantial evidence failed to support this finding because DPSS failed to establish a current substantial risk of serious physical harm at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. Similarly, she contends that substantial evidence failed to support the jurisdictional finding involving Father, because the condition of the family home was not an ongoing or chronic condition and the home did not pose a current risk at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.

There is sufficient evidence to support the b-2 allegation. On May 30, 2025, law enforcement observed the home in a deplorable condition, noting a strong odor of feces 18 emanating from the residence, a large number of flies swarming inside, the kitchen sink clogged with moldy dishes, the refrigerator unplugged, the toilet clogged with urine and feces, dog feces on the floor and dog vomit on G.P.’s bed. In addition, the home had no electricity, food, water, and the family was in the process of being evicted. Upon law enforcement entering the family home, G.P. began to try and clean up the home by covering up some of the animal waste in the home. There were also drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the home, accessible to G.P. G.P. said his parents smoke and use a bong. Mother, however, denied the allegations in its entirety, despite G.P. stating his home was in a bad state when police completed a welfare check. G.P. also said his mother was “a little bit drunk.” Mother complained to staff that she and her son were “living in squalor” inside her trailer and did not have any power in her trailer. Father admitted to “it not being ok for [G.P.] to be living in those conditions.” By the time of the jurisdictional hearing, there was no evidence that the home had been cleaned up.

Moreover, Mother admitted at the jurisdictional hearing that the parents were still facing eviction proceedings.

These circumstances were sufficient to warrant an inference that there is a “substantial risk” the child will suffer “serious physical harm” as a result of Mother’s failure to “adequately supervise or protect the child,” or “the willful or negligent failure”

“to adequately supervise or protect the child,” or “to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment,” or by Mother’s inability “to provide regular care for the child due to” her substance abuse issues. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)

19 Mother argues that In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572 (Roger S.) requires a different result. There, the evidence presented against the mother at a jurisdictional hearing showed that her son rarely attended his school classes; the school was unable to contact his mother (id. at p. 575.); at school, his clothing stank (id. at p. 574); his mother had failed to wash his clothes and provide him with soap and a toothbrush (id. at p. 580);

she had an old 10-year-history of drug use (id. at p. 578) and might have been currently using (id. at p. 580); she had refused to drug test and cooperate with social workers (id. at pp. 576, 579); she had told a social worker to go ahead and take her son (id. at pp. 575, 579); she was unemployed (id. at p. 580); she had frequent phone-number changes (id. at p. 577); and she had old child-abuse referrals (id. at pp. 577-578). The Court of Appeal reversed the jurisdictional order, concluding the evidence did not “show a nexus between these circumstances and a substantial risk of physical harm or illness to Roger.” (Id. at p. 583.)

The difference here is that Mother’s negligence or willful conduct did put G.P. in harm’s way. In Roger S., the child smelled bad, was dirty, and had poor school performance, but there was no evidence of a risk of substantial harm to him. In other words, there was nothing comparable to the incidents of leaving the nine-year-old child unattended in a deplorable home found with drug and drug paraphernalia accessible to the child to establish a nexus between the negligent parenting and physical harm. Here, there was. Further, Mother was found by law enforcement to be inebriated, out of control, under the influence of a controlled substances, and had left the child alone with 20 inadequate provisions or supervision. Mother admitted to drinking alcohol earlier in the day, and that she was likely intoxicated from the alcohol. She denied using methamphetamine, but later admitted she would test positive for amphetamines.

Mother also argues that a dirty home did not justify the true finding of allegation b-2, citing In re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 996 (Paul E.). Paul E. involved a messy house and minor hazardous conditions such as “a propeller protruding from a boat located outside the house, a lamp socket with a short, and a small child’s plastic wading pool in the backyard filled with dirty water.” (Id. at p. 1000.) Indeed, the Paul E. court characterized the hazards as “trivial to the point of being pretextual.” (Id. at p. 1005.) In Paul E., the initial disposition did not remove the child from the parents’ home and the social worker filed a supplemental petition to have the children removed because of the parents’ purported lack of progress and failure to comply with the case plan. (Id. at pp. 999-1000.) The Paul E. court held that chronic messiness alone, apart from unsanitary conditions, could not support removal. (Id. at p. 1005.)

In contrast, here, there was no initial determination that G.P. could safely remain in the home and his removal was not based solely on the condition of the home. More significantly, unlike the situation in Paul E., the unsafe conditions of Mother’s home were not limited to messiness, dirtiness, and minor hazards. The police report noted a strong odor of feces emanating from the residence, a large number of flies swarming inside, the kitchen sink clogged with moldy dishes, the refrigerator unplugged, the toilet clogged with urine and feces, dog feces on the floor and dog vomit on G.P.’s bed. Here, 21 no credible evidence suggested that the parents had meaningfully corrected the unsanitary and filthy conditions. The home was not just messy and dirty; it was unsanitary and hazardous. Mother’s arguments otherwise are unpersuasive or at most go to the weight of the evidence, which we do not reweigh on appeal. (See R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633;

I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

Furthermore, the hazards in the parents’ home were not limited to messiness and unsanitary conditions. The police report indicated that the officers found Mother under the influence of a stimulant, her behavior was erratic, Father was found in possession of drug paraphrenia and a concealed weapon, and the home was found with drug paraphernalia and drug residue inside a cup accessible to the child.

The b-3 allegation as found true here stated: “The mother has an unresolved history of abusing controlled substances, including but not limited to alcohol and methamphetamine, while providing care to the child. Further, the mother minimizes the significance of her drug use.” Mother contends this allegation is built on speculation and unsupported inference. We disagree.

Mother acknowledged she was inebriated and under the influence of alcohol on the day of her arrest. She also disclosed that she would test positive for amphetamines, because she took Adderall without a valid prescription. G.P. said his mother was “a little bit drunk.” Mother also admitted that she uses methamphetamine recreationally with friends and could not remember the last time she last used the drug. Law enforcement officers found Mother inebriated and acting erratically. They believed Mother was under 22 the influence of a central nervous stimulant, such as methamphetamine, on the day of her arrest. The officer observed Mother “was unable to control her motor functions to her hands and she continued to involuntarily open and close her hands and thumbs.” Her pupils “looked constricted indicating to [the officer] she could be under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant.” Law enforcement found drug residue and drug paraphernalia in the family home accessible to G.P.

Despite the overwhelming evidence that Mother was abusing methamphetamine and alcohol, Mother continues to deny any substance abuse issues or issues with alcohol.

She denied exhibiting unusual behavior at the time of her arrest. She denied drug use.

She stated law enforcement planted the drug paraphernalia, the drugs and animal feces in her home. Mother insisted she did not have substance abuse issues and did not need services to address this issue but continued to minimize the significance of her drug and alcohol use. On this record, it is reasonable to infer Mother’s unresolved substance issues would continue. Given Mother’s denial and apparent lack of insight, the court reasonably could have concluded her substance abuse issues were likely to continue into the future.

(See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 (Gabriel K.) [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”]; In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 (D.B.)

[“Realizing conduct needs improvement is a first step to improvement.”].)

The record also contains ample evidence that Mother’s unresolved issues rendered her unable to provide G.P. with regular care and supervision. G.P. had no adequate food in the home and was left unsupervised. Mother’s neglect also extended to the child’s 23 healthcare needs, something the child was undoubtedly too young to handle on his own.

He had not seen a dentist or doctor since 2023.

On this record, and considering all the circumstances, the juvenile court reasonably could have found Mother’s unresolved substance abuse prevented her from providing the child with regular care and supervision. The court also reasonably could have found the deplorable, hazardous conditions in the home and Mother’s lack of care and supervision placed the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm.

Accordingly, the court properly took jurisdiction over the child under section 300, subdivision (b).

Mother contends “[t]he record contained no evidence of ongoing illicit substance use by Mother or that any substance use rendered her unable to protect G.P. There was no evidence that Mother was a current user of methamphetamines at all, much less in a manner that impaired her ability to supervise or protect G.P..” It is true that there is no evidence that Mother’s unresolved issues caused the child to suffer significant physical harm in the past. However, a juvenile court need not wait to take jurisdiction until a child is seriously abused or injured. (Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1215- 1216.) It is enough that Mother’s lack of care and supervision placed the child at serious risk of such harm. (See Ibid.; Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)

Mother also points to the fact that no toxicology report was presented showing her use of methamphetamine by DPSS and her repeated denials of drug use. However, those 24 arguments are unpersuasive or go to the weight of the evidence, which we do not reweigh on appeal. (See R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633; I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

Mother cites to In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315 (B.D.) to support her position. The mother in B.D. once took pain medication (“norco,” or hydrocodone and acetaminophen) that had not been prescribed for her before giving birth to an infant who was found to have the drug in his system when born. (Id. at 318-319.) The juvenile court sustained a dependency petition alleging the child was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm from the mother’s substance abuse. (Id. at 323.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that even assuming there was evidence that mother abused opiate pain medication, there was no substantial evidence that the abuse caused serious physical harm to her son or put him at substantial risk of suffering the same. (Id. at 325, 329-330.) In so holding, the court emphasized “the drugs in [the mother’s] system, and that showed up in [her son’s] meconium, were prescription drugs, not categorically illegal narcotics.” (Id. at 326.) The B.D. court additionally noted the mother was forthcoming about taking the “norco” pill for back pain before the child’s birth (id. at 319, 331), there was no evidence that the child “was premature, underweight, or unhealthy in any way”

(id. at 326), there was “no evidence that mother was impaired when caring for the children” (to the contrary, the mother was attentive to the child at birth, was caring for him appropriately, and “[n]either the nurse nor the hospital social worker expressed any concerns about [the] mother’s ability to care for [the child]”) (id. at 330), and there was 25 “no evidence that [the] mother had a prior child welfare history related to substance abuse or inadequate care of the children” (id. at 330-331).

This case is distinguishable from B.D. Here, the abused substances in question are methamphetamine, not prescription medication. Unlike the mother in B.D., Mother here was far from being fully forthcoming about her use of illegal substances or issues with drugs and alcohol. She repeatedly denied drug use and claimed she did not need services for her alcohol and drug use. Furthermore, here, unlike in B.D., Mother had a prior substantiated child welfare history for general neglect of the child. In addition, the child here was found alone in the family trailer without proper supervision and with drugs and drug paraphernalia within his reach.

Mother’s reliance on David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768 (David B.) also does not compel a contrary result. In David B., the juvenile court found at the 18-month review hearing that a dependent should not be returned to the parent’s care even though the parent had done “virtually everything [the agency] requested of him, and then some.” (Id. at p. 772.) The juvenile court’s finding of detriment stemmed from evidence of another adult living in the parent’s residence, the parent’s frequent consultation with the foster parent and social worker regarding the child’s care, and the court’s belief that the parent was “simply unprepared” for the child’s return. (Id. at pp. 790-794.) On appeal, the David B. court concluded this evidence was insufficient to establish detriment. (Id. at p. 798.) The court clarified that, in evaluating detriment, the juvenile court should consider the parent’s “grasp of the important parenting concepts— 26 things such as a child’s need for security, adequate nutrition and shelter, freedom from violence, proper sanitation, healthcare, and education.” (Id. at p. 790.)

In contrast, here, Mother had not done “virtually everything” DPSS requested of her. Instead, she denied all the allegations against her, despite evidence to the contrary, and claimed she did not need substance abuse services. DPSS did not remove G.P. from Mother, because she was poor, but due to her inability to “grasp” “the important parenting concepts—things such as a child’s need for security, adequate nutrition and shelter, freedom from violence, proper sanitation, healthcare, and education.” (David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 790.) Mother did not acknowledge the issues leading to the dependency. She denied her substance and alcohol use. She denied using methamphetamine. She denied she was inebriated at the time of her arrest. She disagreed that she was belligerent toward the cops and believed she did not exhibit any reason for law enforcement to determine she was under the influence of methamphetamine. She accused law enforcement of planting drugs and animal feces in her house. She denied that her home was in a deplorable condition. While the parents were willing to complete services and promised to clean up their home, there was no evidence that they completed or even participated in all their services. The parents were still residing at the same address where the removal occurred and were facing eviction.

Based on the foregoing, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s true jurisdictional findings against Mother.

27 B. Dispositional Findings Mother argues the juvenile court erred by removing the child from her custody.

She contends there is no clear and convincing evidence that the child was in substantial danger of harm under her care, or that there were no reasonable alternatives to removal.

To remove a child from parental custody, the juvenile court must have clear and convincing evidence that there is or would be a substantial danger to the child’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if returned home, and there are no reasonable means to protect the child’s physical health without removing the child from the home. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Generally, a jurisdictional finding alone is not prima facie evidence the child cannot remain in the parent’s physical custody. (In re E.E.

(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 217-218.) In determining whether to remove the child, the court may consider the parent’s past conduct and current circumstances, as well as the parent’s response to the conditions that caused the juvenile court to intervene. (In re D.B.

(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) The parent need not be dangerous, and the child need not have suffered actual harm, before removal is appropriate. (Id. at p. 328.)

When reviewing findings that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, “the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-established principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due 28 deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”

(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996; see In re Jasmon O. (1994)

8 Cal.4th 398, 422-423.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings or orders. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)

Here, the record shows Mother has substance abuse and alcohol issues that remained unresolved as of the disposition hearing. Mother testified she was not in a substance abuse program and did not consider her issues significant. She admitted to being under the influence of alcohol at the time of her arrest, but denied the remaining allegations against her, despite evidence to the contrary. Based on their training, experience and observations, law enforcement opined Mother was under the influence of a central nervous stimulant, such as methamphetamine. Law enforcement also found Mother’s home to be in a deplorable condition and found G.P. to be in the home unsupervised. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were also found in the family residence within reach of the child. Mother initially denied that the drugs and drug paraphernalia were hers and denied that she was arrested for a drug related crime, but she later acknowledged that these allegations were true.

Mother was in denial of the issues leading to the removal of her child from parental custody. She testified at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing of not needing any substance abuse services. The juvenile court could have found Mother had yet to 29 demonstrate meaningful insight into the nature of her problems and the risks they posed to her child. For example, despite law enforcements findings and observations, Mother denied having used any illegal substance and claimed the officers had planted the drugs and animal feces in the home. Given Mother’s refusal even to acknowledge the existence and severity of her issues—let alone meaningfully address them—the juvenile court reasonably could have concluded they are likely to continue in the future. (See Gabriel K., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 197; D.B., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 622.)

The record also contains ample evidence that Mother’s substance abuse issues posed an ongoing and substantial danger to the child’s health and well-being. As we discussed above, the child was found unsupervised living in a home with deplorable conditions and without adequate food. There were also drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the home accessible to the child. Mother failed to ensure the child was adequately fed and living in safe conditions. In addition, the child had not seen a doctor or dentist since 2023.

Contrary to Mother’s claim, Mother’s drug and alcohol abuse was not a one-time incident, but an ongoing issue. The condition of the family home was so deplorable that it had no working utilities, no running water, the toilet was clogged, no food in the refrigerator, the child was hungry, there was animal vomit on the child’s bed, 14 animals were in their small trailer and feces all around. The condition of the home could not have occurred suddenly. In addition, the trailer park had been trying to evict the parents for 30 some time, and she had been arguing with her neighbors and stealing their electricity for some time.

On this record, the court reasonably could have found there was a significant risk to the child’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if returned to Mother’s custody. The court also reasonably could have found no reasonable means to protect the child absent removal. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the court’s removal orders.

Mother contends there was no need to remove the child given she consistently communicated to DPSS her desire to do whatever was necessary to reunify with G.P. She claimed that she participated in drug and alcohol screening, tested negatively, and testified that she had stopped using marijuana at the outset of the case. However, as of the disposition hearing, it had been around two months since the child had been removed from parental custody, and she had not yet demonstrated that she could maintain her sobriety or demonstrate her ability to safely parent the child. There were no indication Mother’s living conditions had improved. Rather, Mother was in the process of being evicted from her home. Nor had Mother expressed to the court or DPSS any significant insight into her substance abuse issues, or the risks they pose to her child.

Mother argues, in lieu of removal, the juvenile court could have returned the child to her care under a family maintenance plan, ordered continued random drug and alcohol testing, conducted unannounced home visits, implemented a safety plan, and required ongoing monitoring and reporting. Mother contends such an arrangement would have 31 sufficiently protected the child. However, the juvenile court reasonably could have concluded family maintenance was simply not feasible, given her repeated denials of the issues leading to removal, refusal to accept responsibility, and prior child protection history with a substantiated allegation for general neglect.

We must affirm the court’s dispositional orders unless Mother shows they lack the support of substantial evidence. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude she has not met that burden.

C. ICWA

Mother argues the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders must be conditionally reversed and the matter remanded because the juvenile court failed to ensure ICWA inquiry of the maternal grandmother of whether G.P. had any Native American ancestry. DPSS acknowledges that an inquiry did not occur with the maternal grandmother, but claims we need not vacate the finding ICWA did not apply because ICWA obligations are continuing duties.

Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation of Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement with non-Indian families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Isaiah W.).) Under California law adopted pursuant to ICWA, the juvenile court and agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see Isaiah W., at p. 9; In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566 (D.F.).)

32 “This continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 566; see In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052 (D.S.).) The first duty—that of conducting an initial inquiry—requires the agency to “ask all involved persons whether the child may be an Indian child.” (D.S., at p. 1052.) “If [the] child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to Section 306 or county probation department pursuant to Section 307,” this duty includes “asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) ICWA defines “‘extended family member’” by “the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe” or, absent such law or custom, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) [“‘extended family member’ . . . defined as provided in [§] 1903” of [ICWA]].)

When the initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or social worker “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)), the court and social worker must conduct further inquiry to “determine whether there is reason to know a child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) The department “does not discharge their duty of further inquiry until they make a ‘meaningful effort’ to locate and interview extended 33 family members and to contact [the Bureau of Indian Affairs] and the tribes.” (In re K.T.

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 744.)

Here, Mother challenges only the sufficiency of DPSS’s initial inquiry of the maternal grandmother. Because we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jurisdiction and disposition orders, as discussed in the preceding sections, “we need not disturb the juvenile court’s jurisdiction/disposition order just because the duty of initial ICWA inquiry has not yet been fully satisfied.” (In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 175 (S.H.).) As the court in S.H., supra, at pages 175, 179, concluded, there is no need to conditionally reverse or conditionally affirm the juvenile court’s erroneous order finding ICWA does not apply, because the ICWA duty of inquiry and notice will continue after this appeal and remand, regardless of the previous ICWA finding.

In S.H., the court explained, “Instead of focusing on whether the same ICWA finding would have been made absent error, we focus instead on whether the social service agency acknowledges error and we thus have reason to believe that its duty of inquiry will be satisfied. Where there is such an acknowledgement, we see no reason to set aside the jurisdiction/disposition order—even conditionally.” (S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 176.) This is because “the duty to inquire is a continuing one.

(§ 224.2, subd. (a); Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 6.) The Agency likewise has a duty ‘on an ongoing basis’ to report ‘a detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status.’ ([Cal. Rules of Court, rule] 5.481(a)(5).) The juvenile court, even after it 34 concludes that ICWA does not apply, retains the power (and duty) to reverse that determination ‘if it subsequently receives information providing reason to believe that the child is an Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.482(c)(2).)” (S.H., at p. 176.)

The S.H. court reasoned that “[t]he fact that the Agency here has acknowledged error indicates that it understands its duty to ask the maternal relatives about possible Native American ancestry. The Agency must satisfy this duty, if it has not done so already, and report its findings to the juvenile court. . . . And should the Agency learn additional information indicating a ‘reason to believe’ the minor is an Indian child, thus triggering a duty of further inquiry, it must conduct additional interviews ‘as soon as practicable.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (e) . . . .)” (S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 176-177.)

Here, DPSS acknowledges it did not inquire of the maternal grandmother and that it is aware that ICWA inquiry is a continuing duty. DPSS argues there is no need to vacate any ICWA findings because ICWA obligations are continuing duties. As the court in S.H. concluded, “It would make little sense to reverse the jurisdiction/disposition order in order to direct the Agency and the juvenile court to do something they recognize they must do anyway.” (S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.)

We agree the ICWA inquiry and notice errors here do not require reversing or vacating the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders, other than the premature finding itself that ICWA does not apply. (In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 567.) We accordingly order vacated the finding that ICWA does not 35 apply, but we otherwise affirm and direct the juvenile court on remand to order DPSS to comply with its inquiry and (if applicable) notice obligations under ICWA and related California law. (Id. at pp. 567-568.)

IV.

DISPOSITION

The finding that ICWA does not apply is ordered vacated. The juvenile court and DPSS are directed, upon remand, to comply with their ICWA inquiry and notice obligations. In all other respects, the jurisdiction and disposition findings and orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:

MILLER Acting P. J.

FIELDS J.