People v. Bryant CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 9/8/26 P. v. Bryant CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B349770

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24CJCF06862) v.

SHYOLA MIESHA BRYANT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed. Travis Daily, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Keller and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant and appellant Shyola Miesha Bryant (defendant) appeals from the denial of her request for pretrial mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1001.36. Defendant contends the court abused its discretion and its “public safety finding lacks substantial evidence.” Because the record discloses no error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND I. Statement of facts Defendant and 64-year-old Angela Bennett were neighbors for five years. For the three years leading up to the instant offense, defendant and Bennett had verbal altercations. During that time, the court granted Bennett a restraining order, but law enforcement representatives were never able to serve defendant with the order. On October 30, 2024, defendant and Bennett had another verbal confrontation, during which defendant repeatedly called Bennett a “snitch ass b-i-t-c-h.” During that incident, defendant called the police about Bennett. However, according to Bennett, defendant had stolen a plant from Bennett’s yard and destroyed it because “[defendant] said it was in her way.” The police responded, but Bennett did not speak to them. The next day, defendant again referred to Bennett as a “snitch ass b-i-t-c-h,” which led Bennett to call the police. When Bennett went outside her home to retrieve a package, she was attacked by defendant. Bennett was stabbed six times and, as a result, suffered a pierced lung, had to undergo surgery, and remained in the hospital for six days.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 II. Procedural background On December 3, 2024, an information was filed against defendant alleging one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1). It was further alleged defendant caused great bodily injury upon the victim within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12). On July 7, 2025, defendant filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion pursuant to sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. Defendant pled no contest to count 1 and admitted the great bodily injury allegation. The court dismissed the strike allegation and sentenced defendant to a total term of five years, comprised of the low term of two years in count 1 and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal and request for a certificate of probable cause regarding her denial of pretrial diversion. The trial court granted defendant’s request. III. Defendant’s diversion motion In support of defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion, defendant included a forensic health assessment conducted by licensed psychologist Megan Johnson, Ph.D., and a letter confirming defendant’s “successful[] screen[ing]” at Prototypes’s second chance women’s reentry substance use residential program. In her assessment, Dr. Johnson reported defendant “met the qualification criteria for Mental Health Diversion.” Dr. Johnson diagnosed defendant with intermittent explosive disorder, unspecified trauma and stressor related disorder, and 3 cannabis use disorder. It was reported that defendant “has used cannabis daily” in an effort “[t]o manage [her] surprising and seemingly uncontrollable impulsive rages.” Dr. Johnson opined, “While some historical and clinical factors, such as previous incarceration, suggest some risk for violence, [defendant] exhibits protective factors, such as strong motivation to keep her daughter, which ultimately place her at a low to moderate risk for violence and recidivism.” Factors contributing to defendant’s moderate risk include her history of violence, young age at the time of her first violence-related arrest, substance abuse, early maladjustment, and impulsivity. The doctor noted defendant’s “negative attitudes” and stress as high risk factors. On July 28, 2025, the court heard defendant’s motion. At the start of the hearing the court noted its concern regarding defendant’s conduct. Defense counsel said she “obviously underst[oo]d that is the biggest concern in this case,” but explained the three-year history of verbal disputes between defendant and the victim. Counsel argued this was a “completely isolated incident” “related to the tensions” between the two neighbors and because defendant is no longer in that home, she would no longer be near the victim. Counsel argued defendant has no other “sort of actual violence on her record,” and the prior strike is “from more than a decade ago.” Counsel pointed to the mental health assessment wherein defendant was found to pose a “low to medium risk for any sort of violence.” Counsel explained defendant has a young daughter with developmental challenges and, as a result, she “has a lot to live for” and “is committed to addressing any sort of mental health issues, so that she can be present.” Counsel highlighted defendant’s difficult upbringing “in a really horrible, unstable 4 household in foster care where she was abused.” As a result, counsel argued defendant is not “at risk of committing a super strike.” The People opposed diversion and pointed to the particularly violent conduct in this case, the vulnerability of the 64-year-old victim, and the nature of her injuries. The People also directed the court’s attention to defendant’s history of violent conduct. In 2013, defendant was convicted of robbery. During that incident, she punched a 57-year-old shop owner in the face, causing that victim to fall and injure her right shoulder. Defendant was placed on probation for three years. In 2014, defendant violated her probation and was sentenced to six years in prison. Defendant’s mental health assessment did not include a detailed discussion of her criminal history. However, it did note, in 2019, defendant was “restrained … from her uncle after a physical altercation when she was unable to visit her daughter.” The court denied defendant’s motion for diversion because, based on the severity of the current offense and her previous crimes of violence, it was “not satisfied that the defendant [would] not commit a super strike in the future.” In other words, diversion was denied because the court found defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety pursuant to section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4). The court did not discuss any other reasons for the denial. As such, we determine the court found defendant satisfied the eligibility criteria listed in section 1001.36, subdivision (b) and the first three suitability criteria listed in section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(1)-(3). Because the statute requires all four factors in subdivision (c) be met in order to be 5 found suitable, failure to satisfy one requirement can be determinative.

DISCUSSION I. Applicable law and standard of review A “court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion … if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A defendant is “suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.) Section 1170.18 defines an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as “an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).) Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) provides a list of serious or violent felonies, which, among others, includes “[a]ny homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive” and “[a]ny serious or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV) & (VIII).) Section 1001.36 does not require trial courts to provide a statement of reasons when deciding whether to grant a 6 defendant’s request for pretrial diversion. “[W]here a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or order.” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114–1115 (Stowell).) “Ultimately, … diversion under section 1001.36 is discretionary, not mandatory, even if all the requirements are met.” (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080 (Gerson).) “We review the trial court’s ultimate decision whether to grant the request, after considering its findings as to each of the relevant criteria, for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 121 (Brown).) “‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’” (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) “The abuse of discretion standard ‘involves abundant deference’ to the court’s ruling.” (People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 243.) II. The trial court was not required to prioritize the opinions of the mental health expert over other factors Defendant alleges the trial court abused its discretion by “plac[ing] heavy weight on the present offense and prior history of [defendant] (which includes a 2004 sustained juvenile petition for robbery, as well as 2012[2] adult conviction for robbery), while insufficiently weighing or explaining its rejection of Dr. Johnson’s 2 It appears this offense was committed in 2012 and conviction occurred in 2013.

7 uncontradicted expert opinion and treatment plan.” Defendant also alleges the trial court abused its discretion by denying diversion “without adequate engagement with the statutory factors, the expert’s evaluation, the proffered treatment plan, or the governing public safety standard.” We disagree. The trial court is not required to prioritize the expert’s opinion over other factors or provide a statement about its consideration of each of the aforementioned factors. When deciding whether to grant diversion, the court “must consider” defendant’s suitability and in doing so, determine whether defendant has met “all of the [suitability] criteria,” including whether defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) When determining whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the trial court “may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4), italics added.) “Ordinarily, the word ‘may’ connotes a discretionary or permissive act; the word ‘shall’ connotes a mandatory or directory duty. This distinction is particularly acute when both words are used in the same statute” or, as here, the same subdivision.3 (Woodbury v. Brown-Dempsey (2003) 108 3 Section 1001.36, subdivision (a) states “the court may, in its discretion, … grant pretrial diversion.” Section 1001.36, subdivision (c) states “the court must consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.” Then, in subdivision (c)(4) of the same section, it states, when determining whether the defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, “[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district 8 Cal.App.4th 421, 433; see also People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 869 [same].) “[T]he trier of fact generally may reject even uncontradicted testimony, whether by lay or expert witnesses, so long as the rejection is not arbitrary.” (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) Moreover, as noted, section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4) explicitly gives the court the discretion to determine what it relies upon in making its public safety finding. Here, the court explicitly stated its concern regarding defendant’s criminal history and the conduct of the instant offense and apparently gave those circumstances greater weight than the expert’s opinion or defendant’s treatment plan. Doing so was not arbitrary. The court is also not required to provide a statement of reasons when weighing “the opinions of … a qualified mental health expert” or “defendant’s treatment plan.” (See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Because the statute does not require a statement of reasons, the reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for prioritizing other risk factors over the expert opinion. This is true even if “the record is silent.” (Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1114–1115.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to rely heavily on the expert opinion or defendant’s treatment plan, or by placing more weight on defendant’s past and present conduct, without further explanation.

attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant's violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (Italics added.)

9 III. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s dangerousness finding Defendant contends the trial court’s “public safety finding lacks substantial evidence.” We disagree. In order to be suitable for pretrial diversion, defendant must “not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) In People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred in finding “Moine was likely to commit a super-strike offense.” (Id. at p. 451.) There, Moine had four misdemeanor convictions, the pending charges were nonviolent felonies (criminal threats), the court saw fit to “release Moine into the community on bond for a period of over two years,” and two psychiatrists found “he posed a low risk for future assault.” (Ibid., italics added.) Defendant’s case is not like Moine’s. First, defendant sustained a robbery petition as a juvenile in 2004 and was convicted of robbery in 2013. Robbery is a violent felony. (See § 667.5, subd. (c)(9).) Second, defendant violated her grant of probation for the 2013 robbery “when she picked up a new case in 2014” and was sentenced to state prison for six years. Third, defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the instant offense and was “exceedingly lucky that she did not kill this victim.” Specifically, “[defendant] did not just threaten or intimidate the victim in this case—[s]he invoked extreme physical violence against a vulnerable victim in response to a relatively minor altercation.” (Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 124 [comparing the violent actions of Brown to threatening behavior of Moine].) In the instant offense and the 2013 robbery, the victims were vulnerable and both sustained injuries. In 2019, 10 defendant had a physical altercation with her uncle prompting her uncle to obtain a restraining order. Fourth, unlike Moine, during the pendency of these proceedings, defendant remained in custody with bail set at $110,000 because the court found “that no less restrictive condition … of release w[ould] reasonably assure the safety of the public or victim.” Fifth, while two psychiatrists in Moine both opined that he posed a low risk of future violence, here, only one psychiatrist offered an opinion that placed defendant at a “low to moderate risk” for violence. Defendant’s characterization of the offense as an “isolated incident” is belied by the record. Defendant and Bennett had been in conflict for three years, a conflict sufficiently serious that a court granted Bennett a restraining order against defendant. The day before the stabbing, defendant stole and destroyed Bennett’s plant because “it was in her way.” And, as noted, in 2019, defendant was restrained from her uncle following a separate physical altercation. This history of escalating conflict, along with defendant’s criminal record, undermines any characterization of the offense as an isolated departure from otherwise nonviolent conduct. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is supported by substantial evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for pretrial diversion.

DISPOSITION The court’s denial of defendant’s request for pretrial diversion is affirmed.

11 CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GOORVITCH, J.