Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SIRIACO PIOQUINTO ALONSO, Case No.: 26-CV-3484 JLS (BJW)

12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden, Otay (ECF No. 1) Mesa Detention Center, 15 Respondent. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Siriaco Pioquinto Alonso’s Petition for a Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is 20 Respondent’s Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Ret.,” ECF No. 5). Petitioner 21 did not file a traverse. See generally Docket. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 22 DENIES the Petition. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner has been living in the United States since 1993. Pet. at 7. He alleges that 25 he has been detained by the United States Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration 26 and Customs Enforcement division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since October 14, 27 2025. Id. at 8. On April 6, 2026, DHS instituted removal proceedings against Petitioner 28 1 in which the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered him removed to Mexico. Id., Ex. B. That 2 order is currently on appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Ret. at 1. 3 Petitioner filed a previous habeas petition asking this Court to issue an order 4 providing him a bond hearing. See Pioquinto Alonso v. Warden, No. 26-CV-1599 JLS 5 (BJW) (S.D. Cal). This Court granted that petition (id. at ECF No. 10), and the IJ held a 6 bond hearing on April 14, 2026, ECF No. 8-1 at 1 (“Transcript”). The IJ denied Petitioner’s 7 bond, finding that he posed a danger to the community based on two DUI convictions in 8 2011 and 2024, respectively, and a DUI arrest in late 2025. Id. at 6. The IJ explained that 9 the recent DUI arrest is what “tipped the scale” in favor of denying bond. Id. 10 Petitioner then brought the instant petition. See generally Pet. In it, he alleges that 11 his bond hearing was inadequate and that he has been in detention for an unreasonable 12 length of time. Id. at 7. 13 DISCUSSION 14 Petitioner argues that the IJ failed to comply with the Court’s Order by holding an 15 inadequate bond hearing. Pet. at 7. Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Petition should be 16 denied because he “fails to plead sufficient information for the Court to adjudicate his 17 claim.” Ret. at 3. Although the Court disagrees with Respondent that the Petition is 18 insufficient, the Court finds that the Petition should be denied for failure to exhaust 19 administrative remedies. 20 I. Exhaustion 21 “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required.” Acevedo-Carranza v. 22 Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2004). While 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically 23 require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus,” the 24 Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available 25 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez 26 v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by, Fernandez- 27 Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). Prudential exhaustion may be required if: “(1) 28 agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and 1 reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate 2 bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the 3 agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Puga v. 4 Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 5 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). 6 “A noncitizen facing immigration proceedings is required to exhaust his 7 administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before seeking habeas review of an 8 Immigration Judge’s adverse bond determination.” Sharma v. Archambrault, 26-CV-513 9 BAS (SBC), 2026 WL 381611, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2026) (citing Leonardo v. 10 Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust 11 administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition 12 without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted [their] 13 remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160. “[A] court may 14 waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are inadequate or 15 not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable 16 injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’” Hernandez v. 17 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 18 (9th Cir. 2004)). 19 The Court finds that the proper avenue for Petitioner’s grievance with his bond 20 denial is to appeal to the BIA. Petitioner has the burden to demonstrate that waiver of the 21 prudential exhaustion requirement is appropriate through at least one of the Laing factors. 22 See Ortiz v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-4127-GPC (MMP), 2026 WL 2392381, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 23 Aug. 17, 2026) (citing Ortega-Rangel v. Sessions, 313 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 24 2018)). Here, Petitioner has failed to “present[] evidence unique to him . . . [that] supports 25 a finding that his continued detention pending . . . BIA appeal of the IJ’s bond denial 26 decision would risk continued irreparable harm.” W.T.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-2428-RAJ- 27 BAT, 2026 WL 262583, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2026); cf. Singh v. LaRose, No. 26- 28 CV-1425 JLS (GC), 2026 WL 1387428, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2026) (waiving the 1 exhaustion requirement where the petitioner demonstrated irreparable harm unique to him 2 and not inherent in the delay for BIA appeals). The Court also finds that a waiver of 3 exhaustion under these facts would encourage others to bypass the BIA and directly appeal 4 from the IJ to the district court. See Aden v. Nielsen, No. C18-1441 RSL, 2019 WL 5 5802013, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019) (“[R]elaxation of the exhaustion requirement 6 would likely encourage other detainees to bypass the BIA and directly appeal their no-bond 7 determinations from the IJ to federal district court.”). 8 The Court follows other courts in this District and declines to waive the exhaustion 9 requirement. Because Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the 10 present challenge is improper. See Ortiz, 2026 WL 2392381, at *5 (declining to waive 11 exhaustion because the petitioner did not “demonstrate[] that the court should waive 12 exhaustion based on the Laing factors”); Gomes v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-03160 RBM 13 (DDL), 2026 WL 1990774, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2025) (declining to waive exhaustion 14 on the same grounds). 15 II. Due Process Challenge 16 Even if the Court were to waive exhaustion, the Court is not persuaded that the IJ 17 failed to provide Petitioner with an adequate bond hearing. Courts review an IJ’s finding 18 of danger to the community for an abuse of discretion. Osaretin v. LaRose, No. 26-CV- 19 1508 JES (AHG), 2026 WL 2033135, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). “‘[A]buse of 20 discretion’ review does not involve ‘reweigh[ing] evidence’ but rather determining 21 whether the IJ ‘applied the correct legal standard.’” Loba L.M. v. Andrews, No. 25-CV- 22 611-JLT (SAB), 2026 WL 710307, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2026) (quoting Martinez v. 23 Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2024)). “Thus, ‘the Court must decide whether the IJ 24 relied upon proof that—as a matter of law—could not establish’ the conclusion drawn.” 25 Perez Velasquez v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-1759 GPC (DDL), 2026 WL 1042479, at *5 (S.D. 26 Cal. Apr. 16, 2026) (quoting Kharis v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-4800 JST, 2018 WL 5809432, 27 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018)) (cleaned up). The IJ may consider the following factors in 28 making discretionary bond determinations: 1 (1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the alien’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s 2 family ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the 3 alien to reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4) the alien’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of 4 appearance in court; (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the 5 extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of other offenses; (7) the alien’s history of 6 immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to flee 7 prosecution or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s manner of entry to the United States. 8 9 Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (first citing Matter of Saelee, 22 I&N 10 Dec. 1258 (BIA 2000); then citing Matter of Drysdale, 20 I&N Dec. 815, 817 (BIA 1994); 11 and then citing Matter of Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 488 (BIA 1987)). The IJ has “broad 12 discretion” in weighing these factors, “as long as the decision is reasonable.” Id. “Though 13 what constitutes dangerousness is malleable and involves agency discretion,” it is “still a 14 legal standard so long as federal courts can assess whether an IJ correctly applied the 15 statutory standard to a given set of facts.” Martinez, 124 F.4th at 783 (cleaned up). 16 Here, the Court finds that the IJ did just that. The IJ walked through Petitioner’s 17 history of alcohol use, particularly his two DUI convictions and a subsequent DUI arrest 18 just last year. Transcript at 6. The IJ then concluded that Petitioner posed a danger to the 19 community, explaining that the recency of the third incident is what moved the needle. Id. 20 The IJ noted that, despite attending numerous Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, Petitioner 21 “went out and drove under the influence again.” Id. The IJ thus provided a “concrete and 22 specific reason[] for why he reached his decision.” Osaretin, 2026 WL 2033135, at *3 23 (denying challenge to an IJ’s determination that the petitioner was a danger to the 24 community). And, on habeas review, this Court cannot “‘second-guess[] the immigration 25 judge’s weighing of the evidence’ or consider sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. 26 (quoting Loba L.M., 2026 WL 710307, at *8). 27 / / / 28 / / / I CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of 3 || Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE. As this concludes the litigation 4 this matter, the Clerk SHALL CLOSE the file. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: September 3, 2026 8 on. Janis L. Sammartino 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28