gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-02557 · 2026-09-04 · Unknown

Tata Patricia Ching Wokiefiuwe v. Christopher Larose, et al.

Proceeding
original
Outcome
other — § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), placed in
Area
civil
Panel
Benjamin J. Cheeks (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:18Z · confidence high

The court considered a habeas petition by an immigration detainee arguing that her ten-month detention without a bond hearing violated due process. The court granted the petition, ordering the government to provide a bond hearing by September 18, 2026, and enjoining the transfer of the petitioner prior to that hearing.

What the court decidedThe model
The court rejected the argument that it lacked jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to hear the due process claim regarding prolonged detention.
“Accordingly, § 1252(g) does not divest the Court of jurisdiction.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the narrow construction of § 1252(g) as established by the Ninth Circuit, distinguishing between challenges to the removal process itself and collateral constitutional claims regarding the conditions of detention.
The court granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that the petitioner's detention had become unconstitutionally prolonged.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”
agree with court
The court applied the multi-factor test for prolonged detention (length, future duration, and delays) and found that the ten-month duration, combined with the uncertainty of the BIA appeal, weighed in favor of the petitioner. This aligns with the prevailing district court consensus cited in the order.
The court ordered the respondents to provide a bond hearing by a specific date and enjoined the transfer of the petitioner.
“Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a constitutional adequate bond hearing /no later than September 18, 2026. Respondents are enjoined from transferring Petitioner before a bond hearing takes place.”
agree with court
The relief ordered is consistent with the remedy typically granted in these habeas proceedings, which is to compel a hearing rather than to order immediate release, allowing the government to justify detention.

The order itself: sound — The order is well-reasoned and cites appropriate binding and persuasive authority to support its jurisdictional and merits determinations. It correctly distinguishes between the removal order and the collateral detention claim.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TATA PATRICIA CHING Case No.: 26-cv-2557-BJC-SBC WOKIEFIUWE, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART Petitioner, PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 13 CORPUS v. 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Tata Patricia Ching Wokiefiuwe’s Amended 18 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 10. Petitioner 19 asserts her continued detention exceeds statutory authority and violates the due process 20 clause of the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1. Petitioner requests that this Court 21 assume jurisdiction over the matter, grant the Petition and order Respondents to release her 22 from custody or schedule an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cameroon. On October 17, 2025, Petitioner was 25 detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection while attempting to enter the United 26 States. At that time, she did not have any valid entry documents to enter the United States 27 and was not then admitted or paroled into the United States. She was determined to be 28 1 inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), placed in expedited removal 2 proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and taken into Immigration and Customs 3 Enforcement (ICE) custody. 4 After receiving a positive credible fear determination by an asylum officer pursuant 5 to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (NTA). The filing 6 of the NTA initiated removal proceedings, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, against Petitioner. 7 On January 30, 2026, an immigration judge granted the Department of Homeland 8 Security’s (DHS) motion to pretermit Petitioner’s application for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 9 1158, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and relief under the Convention 10 Against Torture. and ordered Petitioner removed to Uganda. ECF No. 11, Exhibit 3. On 11 February 12, 2026, Petitioner timely filed an appeal of the IJs removal order to the Board 12 of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which remains pending. Petitioner has remained in ICE 13 custody since her entry into the United States. 14 On April 8, 2026, Petitioner filed her first habeas petition. Wokiefiuwe v. Richmond, 15 26-cv-02231-RSH-SBC, ECF No. 1. On April 10, 2026, this Court dismissed Petitioner’s 16 petition, holding that at the time she filed the petition, she had been detained less than five 17 months, therefore she had “not established unconstitutionally prolonged detention” See id., 18 ECF No. 2 at 2. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 21 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 22 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 23 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 24 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 25 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 26 § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 27 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 28 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 1 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 A. Jurisdiction 4 Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) 5 because Petitioner’s claim arises from the decision to commence removal proceedings. 6 ECF No. 11 at 5. The Court disagrees. 7 Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 8 claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 9 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any 10 alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” 11 as to apply “only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision 12 or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” 13 Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, 2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 14 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 15 487 (1999)). Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely 16 because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) 17 does not bar due process claims. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) 18 (finding that the petitioners’ objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but 19 rather “to enforce their constitutional rights to due process in the context of those 20 proceedings”). 21 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings 22 or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. Instead, Petitioner is challenging her 23 prolonged detention without a bond hearing. Petitioner is enforcing her “constitutional 24 rights to due process in the context of the removal proceedings—not the legitimacy of the 25 removal proceedings or any removal order.” Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2180-DMS- 26 MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). Accordingly, § 1252(g) does not 27 divest the Court of jurisdiction. 28 // 1 B. Merits 2 “Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have provided guidance regarding 3 the point at which an immigration detainee’s prolonged mandatory detention becomes 4 unconstitutional.” Amado v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 25CV2687-LL(DDL), 2025 5 WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). However, “[n]early all district courts that 6 have considered [the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention] agree that 7 prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, 8 will—at some point—violate the right to due process.” Singh v. Barr, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1005 9 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (cleaned up) (collecting 10 cases). To determine whether continued mandatory detention without a bond hearing has 11 become unreasonable, “the Court will look to the total length of detention to date, the likely 12 duration of future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the 13 petitioner and the government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 14 2022). 15 First, Petitioner has been detained since October 17, 2025, a period of ten months. 16 Under the circumstances of the present case, the length of detention without a bond hearing 17 weighs in favor of Petitioner. See Hoyos Amado, 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (“Courts have 18 found detention over seven months without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it 19 is unreasonable.”) (collecting cases); Tonoyan v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00815-SKO 20 (HC), 2025 WL 3013684, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2025) (“Petitioner has been detained 21 approximately 11 months. This period ... qualifies as prolonged.”); Gao, 2025 WL 22 2770633, at *5 (“The Court finds that Petitioner's detention for over 10 months without a 23 bond hearing, in the context of the specific circumstances described above, has become 24 unreasonable and violates due process.”); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. 25 Cal. 2022) (“Petitioner has been in immigration detention ... approximately one year. 26 District court have found shorter lengths of detention ... without a bond hearing to be 27 unreasonable.”) (collecting cases). 28 Next, Petitioner has an appeal to the BIA pending which makes it uncertain, at best, 1 ||how long her detention will last. See Masood v. Barr, No. 19-CV-07623-JD, 2020 WL 2 95633, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) (noting that the “government cannot predict with any 3 || degree of confidence when the BIA appeal will be resolved’’). Therefore, this factor weighs 4 favor of Petitioner. Finally, neither the government nor Petitioner appear to have caused 5 || delays in the removal proceedings, making this factor neutral. 6 In sum, the circumstances here weigh in favor of Petitioner’s right to a prompt and 7 || individualized bond hearing at which Respondents must justify her continued detention by 8 ||a showing of clear and convincing evidence that she would likely flee or pose a danger to 9 || the community if released. 10 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the petition for a writ of habeas 12 ||corpus. Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a constitutional adequate bond hearing 13 |/no later than September 18, 2026. Respondents are enjoined from transferring Petitioner 14 || before a bond hearing takes place. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: September 4, 2026 17 19 20 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28