Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHARLES SAMMS, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03486-H-JLB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 COSTCO WHOLESALE AND REMAND CORPORATION; and DOES 1-20, 15 inclusive, [Doc. No. 4.] 16 Defendants. 17 18 On August 10, 2026, Plaintiff Charles Samms filed a motion for leave to file a first 19 amended complaint and a motion for remand. (Doc. No. 4.) To date, Defendant Costco 20 Wholesale Corporation (“COSTCO”) has not filed its response. On September 2, 2026, 21 the Court took this matter under submission. (Doc. No. 5.) For the reasons below, the 22 Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint and motion to 23 remand. 24 Background 25 Plaintiff is a resident of San Diego County, California. (Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 1.) 26 Defendant COSTCO is a Washington corporation authorized to do business in San Diego 27 County, California. (Id. ¶ 2; Doc. No. 4-1 at 2.) Defendant COSTCO owns, controls, and 28 maintains the Costco Wholesale Corporation located at 12155 Tech Center Dr. #775b, 1 Poway, CA 92064 (“Subject Premises”). (Doc. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 2, 9, 12.) 2 On October 5, 2024, while walking through the warehouse of the Subject Premises, 3 Plaintiff slipped on water that had accumulated on the floor. (Id. ¶ 7.) The water had 4 accumulated from dripping pipes that hung from the ceiling and ran perpendicular over the 5 aisle. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant COSTCO was aware that water was dripping 6 from the pipes but failed to exercise reasonable care. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 16.) 7 Plaintiff suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of the incident, including 8 an injury to his lower back. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff has undergone and continues to undergo 9 treatment and care for the injuries he suffered. (Id.) Despite the treatment received, 10 Plaintiff has and will continue to endure physical, mental, and emotional pain and 11 suffering. (Id.) 12 On February 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, 13 County of San Diego against Defendant COSTCO, alleging that his injuries were the direct 14 and proximate result of Defendant COSTCO’s negligence and the unsafe conditions 15 created and allowed by Defendant COSTCO in its warehouse. (Id. ¶¶ 10-23.) On March 16 2, 2026, Plaintiff served Defendant COSTCO with written discovery requests, seeking the 17 identity of the refrigeration company responsible for maintaining the refrigerant piping that 18 ran over the aisle in which Plaintiff slipped and fell. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 2, 4.) On May 8, 19 2026, after several extensions, Defendant COSTCO provided responses, identifying CTS 20 Mechanical Inc. (“CTS”) as the refrigeration company responsible for the piping that ran 21 over the aisle in which Plaintiff slipped and fell. (Id.) On June 10, 2026, Defendant 22 COSTCO removed the action to United States District Court for the Southern District of 23 California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1, 24 Notice of Removal.) 25 By the present motion, Plaintiff moves for leave to file a first amended complaint to 26 add CTS as a defendant. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 1.) CTS is a California corporation with its 27 principal place of business in California. (Id. at 2.) At the time the original Complaint was 28 filed, Plaintiff did not know the identity of the entity responsible for maintaining the 1 refrigeration system and piping at the Subject Premises. (Id.) Because CTS is a California 2 citizen, Plaintiff moves to remand the action back to the Superior Court of California, 3 County of San Diego for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 4.) 4 Discussion 5 I. Legal Standard 6 A. Motion for Leave to Amend 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15(a)(2) provides that leave to amend 8 “shall be freely given when justice so requires”, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and is applied 9 with “extreme liberality.” See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 10 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). However, after a case has been removed, a proposed amendment to 11 join a diversity-destroying defendant is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Newcombe v. 12 Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying § 1447(e) in 13 a motion to remand where the plaintiff sought to add a defendant that would defeat 14 diversity). 15 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) states, “[i]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional 16 defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny 17 joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). 18 In exercising this broad discretion, the Court may consider the following six factors: (1) 19 whether the party sought to be joined is needed for just adjudication and would be joined 20 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the statute of limitations would 21 preclude an original action against the new defendants in state court; (3) whether there has 22 been unexplained delay in requesting joinder; (4) whether joinder is intended solely to 23 defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) whether the claims against the new defendant appear valid; 24 and (6) whether the denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. 25 v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 26 2000) (citations omitted); see also Palestini v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 193 F.R.D. 654, 658 27 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 28 1 B. Motion to Remand 2 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. United States v. Mark, 530 F.3d 3 799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. 4 Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function 5 remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. 6 v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). A case is removable only if 7 it could have been originally filed in federal court. Chicago v. Int’l Coll. Of Surgeons, 522 8 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). 9 Removal is proper when a case originally filed in state court presents a federal 10 question or where there is diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). 11 “Traditional diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship and an amount 12 in controversy greater than $75,000.” Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 13 849 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). Courts strictly construe the removal 14 statute against removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer 15 Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). Further, “[a] defendant seeking removal 16 has the burden to establish that removal is proper.” Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans 17 Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). “Any doubt about the right of removal 18 requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 19 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 Although remand is discretionary following a post-removal amendment which 21 eliminates the federal claim upon which the court's federal question jurisdiction was 22 based, see Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991), remand is 23 mandatory where a post-removal amendment eliminates the court's diversity jurisdiction. 24 “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 25 jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. Analysis 2 The Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand as a motion to permit joinder of 3 CTS pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). The Court considers each of the above-identified 4 factors in turn. 5 A. Extent to Which CTS is Needed for Adjudication 6 Plaintiff maintains that adding CTS as a defendant is needed for the just adjudication 7 of the case because CTS is a required party whose identity was unknown at the time the 8 complaint was filed. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 5.) 9 Rule 19(a) requires the joinder of a person where that person's absence would 10 preclude the grant of “complete relief among existing parties”, may “impair or impede the 11 person's ability to protect the interest”, or “leave an existing party subject to a substantial 12 risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 19(a). While courts use the standard set under Rule 19 to determine whether to permit 14 joinder, an “amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for joinder under 15 [Rule] 19.” IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011-12. The standard for 16 joinder under section 1447(e) “is met when failure to join will lead to separate and 17 redundant actions.” Id. at 1011 (citing CP Nat'l Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 928 18 F.2d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 1991)). But “[c]ourts disallow joinder of non-diverse defendants 19 where those defendants are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would not 20 prevent complete relief.” Id. at 1012 (citation omitted). 21 Here, the complaint alleges claims of negligence and premises liability against 22 COSTCO and DOES, who have a duty to maintain and repair piping within Subject 23 Premises. (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. ¶¶ 14-17, 20-23.) Plaintiff claims “CTS is the 24 maintenance contractor responsible for the refrigeration system and associated piping that 25 produced the condensation and resulting water accumulation on the floor,” a role that “goes 26 to the core of liability in this case.” (Doc. No. 4-1 at 5.) The complaint claims that 27 Defendants, such as CTS, had a duty to “repair the pipes leaking from above the dog food 28 aisle” and “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that water 1 dripping from the pipes that hung from the ceiling and ran perpendicularly over the dog 2 food aisle onto the floor posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury suffered 3 by Plaintiff.” (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16, 21, 22.) Further, it complains that 4 Defendants breached said duties by “failing to repair the equipment leaking from the 5 ceiling”, “failing to repair the pipes leaking from above the dog food aisle”, and “creating 6 and/or failing to mitigate the dangerous condition within COSTCO which le[]d to 7 Plaintiff’s injuries.” (Id. ¶¶ 15, 21.) Plaintiff notes, absent joinder, it would be forced to 8 file a separate state court action against CTS, creating a substantial risk of duplicative 9 litigation. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 5.) 10 Thus, this first factor supports the joinder of CTS because CTS is not tangentially 11 related to the cause of action but directly related as CTS may be liable for the alleged 12 negligence in failing to keep Subject Premises in safe condition. Further, the failure to join 13 CTS would lead to separate and redundant actions. 14 B. Statute of Limitations 15 “Generally, if a statute of limitations does not bar a plaintiff from filing suit in state 16 court, a federal court may be less inclined to permit joinder of a non-diverse defendant 17 because the plaintiff could still theoretically seek relief from state court.” Yang v. 18 Swissport USA, Inc., No. C 09–03823 SI, 2010 WL 2680800, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 19 2010). “But where ... a plaintiff would be required to litigate essentially duplicative federal 20 and state lawsuits arising out of the same facts, the interest in conserving judicial resources 21 and the risk of inconsistent results weighs in favor of allowing joinder.” See id. (citing 22 IBC Aviation Servs., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012). 23 The statute of limitations for personal injury actions due to negligence in California 24 is two years. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. This means Plaintiff will soon be 25 foreclosed from pursuing a negligence action against CTS pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. P. § 26 335.1 because the two-year statute of limitations for bringing such a claim will lapse on 27 October 5, 2026. Because the claim against CTS may soon be barred by the statute of 28 limitations and Plaintiff would be required to litigate essentially duplicative federal and 1 state lawsuits arising out of the same facts, the Court finds this factor supports joinder of 2 CTS. 3 C. Timeliness 4 When determining whether to allow amendment to add a nondiverse party, courts 5 consider whether the amendment was attempted in a timely fashion. See Lopez v. General 6 Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1983)). 7 Here, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of San 8 Diego against Defendant COSTCO on February 9, 2026. (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl.) On 9 March 2, 2026, Plaintiff served Defendant COSTCO with written discovery requests, 10 seeking the identity of the refrigeration company responsible for maintaining the 11 refrigerant piping that ran over the aisle in which Plaintiff slipped and fell. (Doc. No. 4-1 12 at 2, 4.) On May 8, 2026, after several extensions, Defendant COSTCO provided 13 responses, identifying CTS Mechanical Inc. (“CTS”) as the refrigeration company 14 responsible for the piping that ran over the aisle in which Plaintiff slipped and fell. (Id.) 15 On June 10, 2026, Defendant COSTCO removed the action to United States District Court 16 for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on the basis of diversity 17 jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal.) No substantive proceedings have occurred 18 in federal court, and the case was removed before the initial Case Management 19 Conference. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 4.) On August 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave 20 to file a first amended complaint and a motion for remand. 21 The Court finds no undue delay as Plaintiff appears to have promptly sought leave 22 to amend when he learned of the proposed defendants’ role. Plaintiff acted diligently in 23 seeking amendment, and Defendant does not oppose. This factor supports allowing the 24 amendment. 25 D. Motive Behind Joinder 26 Courts examine the motive of a plaintiff in seeking the joinder of an additional, non- 27 diverse defendant. Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th 28 Cir. 1980). The joinder of non-diverse defendants for the sole purpose of divesting a 1 federal court of diversity jurisdiction is improper. IBC Aviation Servs., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 2 1012. 3 Here, Plaintiff has provided facially legitimate grounds for amendment, and the 4 Court finds nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff has an improper motive in seeking 5 to add CTS. Plaintiff asserts that he made efforts to obtain the identity of the refrigeration 6 company “long before the removal paperwork was served”. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 4.) While the 7 timing of Plaintiff's amendment indicates that adding CTS as a defendant to destroy 8 diversity may have been a motive, the legitimacy of Plaintiff's claim against CTS indicates 9 that it was not the primary motive. COSTCO does not contend otherwise. Because 10 Plaintiff's proposed amendments contain specific allegations supporting viable causes of 11 action against CTS, the Court finds no bad faith in Plaintiff seeking to add this defendant, 12 nor would amendment be futile. 13 E. Apparent Validity of Plaintiff’s Claim Against CTS 14 In analyzing joinder of CTS, the Court must determine “whether the claim[s] sought 15 to be added seem[] meritorious.” IBC Aviation Servs., 125 F.Supp.2d at 1012. Plaintiff 16 seeks to allege claims against CTS for negligence and premises liability. (Doc. No. 3-3, 17 Proposed FAC.) Under California law, the elements of a negligence claim are: “(1) 18 defendant's obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of 19 others against unreasonable risks (duty); (2) failure to conform to that standard (breach of 20 duty); (3) a reasonably close connection between the defendant's conduct and resulting 21 injuries (proximate cause); and (4) actual loss (damages).” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 22 554, 572 (9th Cir. 2009). “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability 23 claim are the same.” Kesner v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 5th 1132, 1158 (2016). 24 Plaintiff alleges that Costco and CTS had a duty to keep the premises safe, knew or 25 should have known, in the exercise of reasonable care, that parts of the store were in an 26 unsafe condition, and breached their duty to keep the premises safe, causing him injury. 27 (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. ¶¶ 11-23; Doc. No. 3-3, Proposed FAC ¶¶ 11-15.) Plaintiff alleges 28 that CTS, as the maintenance contractor responsible for the refrigeration system and 1 associated piping that produced the condensation and resulting water accumulation on the 2 floor, is the primary actor responsible for the dangerous condition at issue. (Doc. No. 4-1 3 at 5.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged a valid claim and this factor supports joinder of 4 CTS. 5 F. Prejudice to Plaintiff. 6 Plaintiff asserts denial of joinder would cause significant prejudice because pursuing 7 parallel litigation in state court against CTS while simultaneously litigating against 8 COSTCO in federal court would result in unnecessary expenditure of resources. (Doc. No. 9 4-1 at 5.) Defendant does not disagree. Courts have found significant prejudice where 10 claims against proposed non-diverse defendants are so intimately connected to those 11 against an original defendant that denial of joinder would force a plaintiff to choose 12 whether to pursue redundant litigation in another forum at the risk of inconsistent results 13 or forego valid claims against the non-diverse defendants. See IBC Aviation Servs., 125 14 F.Supp.2d at 1013. The Court finds that these circumstances are present here, and that 15 Plaintiff would be prejudiced by the denial of joinder. 16 On balance, the relevant factors weigh in favor of permitting joinder. The issues 17 arising out of Plaintiff’s claims against CTS are identical to those against COSTCO, and 18 joinder would conserve judicial resources and avoid the risk of inconsistent results in 19 different forums. Plaintiff’s motion to amend was not unreasonably delayed or untimely. 20 In addition, Plaintiff’s negligence claims against CTS appear meritorious and there is no 21 evidence of improper motive. Thus, the Court exercises its discretion to permit joinder of 22 CTS pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Because joinder divests the Court of diversity 23 jurisdiction, the Court grants the Motion to Remand. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / Conclusion 2 For the reasons above, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. (Doc No. 4.) 3 || With the addition of CTS, a non-diverse defendant, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this 4 Accordingly, the Court orders this action to be remanded to San Diego County 5 || Superior Court, where it was originally filed. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 | DATED: September 3, 2026 | | | ul. |. | | 8 9 MARILYN ¥. HUFF, Distric ge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28