Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Erica BRASWELL, Case No.: 25-cv-0323-AGS-GC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER STRIKING SUMMONS 5 v. (ECF 5 & 6), DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 6 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., DISMISS AS MOOT (ECF 11), 7 Defendants. DISMISSING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 8 (ECF 7), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 MOTION FOR SERVICE OF SUMMONS (ECF 8), AND DENYING 10 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 11 PRODUCTION OF RECORDS (ECF 9) 12 13 This Court must untangle this case’s somewhat snarled procedural history. The 14 initial twist is that, after unrepresented plaintiff Erica Braswell submitted an amended 15 complaint, a summons was improperly issued and returned before this Court could conduct 16 the required screening of that complaint. (See ECF 5, 6); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). More 17 twists: Braswell then filed a second amended complaint and two additional motions (see 18 ECF 7–9), while the defense moved to dismiss the first amended complaint (see ECF 11). 19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Summons and Amended Complaints 21 First, the Court strikes from the record the improperly issued summons (see ECF 5; 22 ECF 6.) Next issue: Which amended complaint—the first or second—is the operative 23 pleading? Typically, a “party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later 24 than 21 days after serving it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). Otherwise, “a party may amend 25 its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This Court explicitly authorized the filing of the first amended complaint. 27 (See ECF 3, at 2.) As to the second amended complaint, however, the defense never 28 consented (see ECF 17, at 2), and Braswell never sought this Court’s leave to amend again. 1 Normally, these deficiencies would doom that later amended pleading, but the Court 2 will allow this latest amendment. Courts “should freely give leave [to amend complaints] 3 when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Braswell is proceeding without an 4 attorney; she filed the second amended complaint the day after the now-stricken summons 5 was executed on her first amended complaint; and the defense responded to the first 6 amended complaint weeks after the filing of both amended complaints. (See ECF 4; ECF 7; 7 ECF 11.) In addition to those equities, the defense has suffered little prejudice, as many of 8 its arguments for dismissal apply equally to both amended documents. The Court therefore 9 grants leave to file the second amended complaint, which supersedes the first amended 10 complaint. Thus, the defense’s motion to dismiss the now-defunct first amended complaint 11 is denied as moot. 12 B. Screening 13 Finally, the Court must screen the operative pleading: the second amended 14 complaint. Dismissal is required if, among other things, the indigent plaintiff’s complaint 15 “fails to state a claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Braswell alleges that the City of 16 San Diego, the San Diego Police Department, and various law-enforcement officials 17 infringed her civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF 7, at 1.) Specifically, 18 she claims that defendants engaged in “unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, child 19 endangerment, and racially discriminatory treatment.” (Id.) 20 1. Unlawful Arrest and False Imprisonment 21 The unlawful-arrest and false-imprisonment claims rise and fall together: “Under 22 California law, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts.” Watts 23 v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001). The key issue is probable cause. 24 “Absent probable cause, a warrantless arrest is illegal.” United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 25 427 F.3d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 2005). “Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the 26 circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that 27 there was a fair probability that the suspect had committed a crime.” Id. (cleaned up). 28 According to Braswell, “SDPD officers entered Plaintiff’s home at night without 1 probable cause, handcuffed her immediately, and refused to explain the charges—telling 2 her only that she had ‘violated a court order.’” (ECF 7, at 1.) This “arrest was based solely 3 on the uncorroborated word of a white accuser . . . whose prior false reports were well- 4 documented.” (Id. at 2.) A “prudent person” would not have concluded that Braswell 5 “committed a crime” based only on this uncorroborated call. See Ortiz-Hernandez 427 F.3d 6 at 573. An “anonymous tip” alone generally will not support probable cause unless 7 “significant details of the tip [are] corroborated,” Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 8 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1991), and a “known liar”—like the tip’s source here—“is less worthy 9 of belief than an individual about whom nothing is known,” United States v. Hall, 113 F.3d 10 157, 159 (9th Cir. 1997). 11 Against this legal backdrop, and at this stage of the proceedings, Braswell 12 sufficiently alleges that the officers lacked probable cause and thus committed an unlawful 13 arrest and false imprisonment. According to the second amended complaint, interpreted in 14 the light most favorable to this unrepresented plaintiff, the officers falsely told Braswell 15 that she had “violated a court order,” when in fact they arrested her—without probable 16 cause and without a warrant—solely on the uncorroborated word of a known liar. These 17 allegations clear the “low threshold for proceeding past the screening stage.” See Wilhelm 18 v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). 19 2. Child Endangerment 20 Braswell’s “child endangerment” claim is more problematic. The allegations—that 21 defendants left her daughter “alone and unprotected overnight” when arresting Braswell 22 (see ECF 7, at 1)—are chilling. Yet Braswell has identified no legal basis for a child- 23 endangerment cause of action under California law, and this Court has found none. Child 24 endangerment is a crime, see Cal. Pen. Code 273a, but “criminal provisions” “provide no 25 basis for civil liability,” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). And it is 26 not immediately evident what other valid cause of action plaintiff might have meant to 27 bring. So, the child-endangerment claim must be dismissed, but the Court grants leave to 28 amend to better clarify the allegations or the cause of action. 1 3. Racially Discriminatory Treatment 2 Finally, Braswell brings an equal-protection cause of action for “racially 3 discriminatory treatment.” (ECF 7, at 1.) To prevail on such a claim, she must show that 4 (1) the defendants’ “enforcement had a discriminatory effect” and (2) “the police were 5 motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Rosenbaum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 484 6 F.3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 Braswell sufficiently pleads a “discriminatory effect,” which merely requires 8 allegations “that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted.” Id. at 1153 (cleaned 9 up). Based solely on the word of an unreliable “white accuser,” defendants allegedly 10 arrested Braswell, who is “a Black mother.” (ECF 7, at 1–2.) Yet when the racial roles were 11 reversed—and Braswell leveled well-founded charges against that same “white accuser”— 12 defendants “refused” to “press charges.” (Id.) 13 Her case falters on the next step, however. “To show discriminatory purpose,” 14 Braswell “must establish that “the decision-maker selected or reaffirmed a particular course 15 of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 16 identifiable group.” Id. (cleaned up). She offers no allegations from which the Court could 17 infer such an improper purpose. The racial-discrimination claim is thus dismissed, but with 18 leave to amend. 19 C. Other Motions 20 Braswell also moved for service of summons and production of records. (ECF 8; 21 ECF 9.) Because the Court is granting leave to amend some of her claims, the summons 22 request is denied. If she amends or otherwise proceeds with a surviving claim, then the 23 Court will direct the Clerk to issue the appropriate summons package. 24 As to the records-production motion, that request is essentially a discovery motion— 25 which is premature at this stage. Braswell sets forth no basis for diverging from the usual 26 course of action, which provides for a discovery period only after the pleading stage. 27 CONCLUSION 28 The Court thus rules as follows: 1 1. The prematurely issued summons is STRICKEN. 2 2. Braswell’s second amended complaint controls, so the motion to dismiss her first 3 amended complaint is DENIED as moot. 4 3. Braswell’s claims for child endangerment and racially discriminatory treatment 5 are DISMISSED with leave to amend. Any amended complaint is due 6 October 9, 2026. The amended complaint must be complete by 7 itself without reference to any prior complaint. Defendants not named and any 8 claim not re-alleged in an amended complaint will be considered 9 waived. Because the amended complaint would be Braswell’s third amended 10 complaint, any claims made in that complaint that do not survive screening will 11 likely be dismissed without leave to amend. 12 4. Ifshe does not amend her complaint by that date, the Clerk must issue a summons 13 package for the surviving claim. 14 || Dated: September 3, 2026 16 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 7 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28