Holly Hill Investments v. Flaherty CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/4/26 Holly Hill Investments v. Flaherty CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

HOLLY HILL INVESTMENTS, B336900 LLC, (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 19SMCV02002) v.

VINCE FLAHERTY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, H. Jay Ford, III, Judge. Affirmed. Vince Flaherty, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. McKenna Brink Signorotti and Dominic V. Signorotti for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________ Defendant and appellant Vincent Flaherty, individually and as trustee of the KHG Trust, appeals from a judgment quieting title to property in favor of plaintiff and respondent Holly Hill Investments, LLC. On appeal, Flaherty makes several contentions that are based on challenging the validity of a foreclosure sale and trustee’s deed of sale. We conclude the findings made in connection with Holly Hill’s prior unlawful detainer action established the validity of the trustee’s deed of sale and Holly Hill’s status as a bona fide purchaser, precluding Flaherty from relitigating the issues in this case. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Easement Creation and Property Purchase In 1988, John and Elizabeth Roberts, as trustees of the Roberts Family Trust (the Roberts), owned 17470 Tramonto Drive in Pacific Palisades, which is the property at issue in this matter. The legal description describes the property as a portion of Block C. At that time, adjacent property 17474 Tramonto Drive in Pacific Palisades was owned by Alfred and Winifred Wilkes. The legal description was Lot 1, Block 19, Tract 8923 (Lot 1). In December 1988, the Robertses granted the Wilkeses “a four[-]foot[-]wide easement for sanitary sewer purposes only” over 17470 Tramonto Drive that would run with the land. The easement was recorded.

2 In April 1989, the Robertses granted the Wilkeses a second easement “for sanitary sewer and sewer maintenance purposes.” The Wilkeses and their successors in interest agreed to accept responsibility for the maintenance costs of the private sewer line, restore the landscaping to the same general condition, and maintain the area as open space for a yard, garden, or landscaping. Any other use of the area was prohibited. This easement was also recorded. In September 1989, the Wilkeses, individually and as trustees of a family trust, granted four parcels to Flaherty, including Lot 1 and the four-foot-wide easement for sewer purposes. The deed was recorded in December 1989. In May 1995, the Robertses executed a grant deed transferring title to 17470 Tramonto Drive to Flaherty, as a single man. The deed was recorded in September 1995. In March 2005, Villa Tramonto LLC was formed for real estate investment and development, managed by Scott Kime. In 2006, Flaherty obtained a loan from Countrywide Home Loans in the amount of $6 million, which was secured by a deed of trust recorded against 17470 Tramonto Drive. In March 2009, Kime filed a certificate of cancellation of Villa Tramonto LLC with California’s Secretary of State.

B. Foreclosure and Sale to Holly Hill In 2011, a notice of default and election to sell was recorded based on the deed of trust on 17470 Tramonto Drive. The notice stated Recontrust Company, N.A., was acting as an agent of the beneficiary of the deed of trust.

3 On June 15, 2012, Recontrust recorded a notice of trustee’s sale for 17470 Tramonto Drive. A non-judicial foreclosure sale was held on July 23, 2012. Title to the property was granted through a trustee’s deed upon sale to U.S. Bank, National Association (US Bank), successor trustee to Bank of America, N.A., successor by merger to Lasalle Bank, N.A., as trustee to the holders of Zuni Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-OA1, Mortgage Loan Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OAI (the Zuni Trust Certificates). In August 2012, Recontrust recorded a notice of corporate assignment of the deed of trust from Bank of America, N.A., as successor trustee to the holders of the Zuni Trust Certificates, to US Bank, as successor trustee to the holders of the Zuni Trust Certificates. The same day, Recontrust recorded the trustee’s deed upon sale to US Bank, as successor trustee. In October 2012, Flaherty filed a complaint against several defendants, including US Bank (the US Bank action; Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. SC118787), alleging claims arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. In the third amended complaint filed in April 2015, Flaherty sought to quiet title to 17470 Tramonto Drive based on alleged defects in the foreclosure proceedings. On July 22, 2016, a judgment of dismissal was entered in favor of several defendants, including US Bank and Bank of America. Flaherty did not file an appeal from the judgment of dismissal in favor of US Bank. On October 5, 2017, Holly Hill purchased 17470 Tramonto Drive from US Bank, as successor trustee to the holders of the Zuni Trust Certificates, and the property was transferred to Holly Hill through a recorded grant deed.

4 On December 20, 2017, Holly Hill filed a verified complaint for unlawful detainer against Flaherty, his former wife Loriann Hart, and their adult son Michael Flaherty (Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action; Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. SC128569). The property at issue in the unlawful detainer action was 17470 Tramonto Drive. Flaherty filed a verified answer to Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer complaint alleging that Holly Hill did not hold valid title to 17470 Tramonto Drive. He alleged that the property was not properly sold under the power of sale in the deed of trust, the foreclosure sale was defective and wrongful, US Bank did not acquire valid title, and as a result, Holly Hill was not a bona fide purchaser for value who received valid title to the property. Holly Hill filed a motion for summary adjudication of its cause of action for unlawful detainer.

C. Unlawful Detainer Action, and Deeds Recorded Outside Chain of Title In January 2018, Flaherty recorded a quitclaim deed on 17470 Tramonto Drive, purportedly executed by the Robertses in October 1998, quitclaiming an easement to Flaherty as a single man for slope and access purposes and another easement for access, construction, and use of a pool and pool house for the benefit of Lot 1. After a hearing on March 26, 2018, in Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action, the trial court granted summary judgment based on Holly Hill’s representation that it was pursuing possession only and would not seek monetary damages. The trial court found Holly Hill had proven by admissible evidence that the 5 property was sold to it in accordance with Civil Code section 2924 under the power of sale in the deed of trust, and title under the sale was duly perfected. Holly Hill was a bona fide purchaser insulated from Flaherty’s claims in the US Bank action. In addition, the US Bank action had been fully adjudicated on the merits, dismissed with prejudice, and the subsequent appeal was dismissed. The final judgment on the merits in the US Bank action precluded the parties from raising issues that were, or could have been, raised in the prior action. In addition, even if the above did not resolve the issue, Flaherty’s affirmative defenses were barred by the statute of limitations. Claims involving a non-judicial foreclosure were subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Judgment was entered that day in favor of Holly Hill and against Flaherty, Hart, and their son, ordering that Holly Hill was entitled to possession of 17470 Tramonto Drive. Flaherty filed an appeal from the judgment in the unlawful detainer action in favor of Holly Hill. On April 19, 2018, a second deed was recorded against 17470 Tramonto Drive purporting to quitclaim title from Villa Tramonto LLC to Clair Howell, as successor trustee of KHG Trust. This deed purported to be signed by James Courtade, as the managing member of Villa Tramonto LLC, dated September 1, 2017, and notarized on April 19, 2018. On June 27, 2018, Flaherty filed an ex parte application in the US Bank action to substitute Holly Hill for a Doe defendant with respect to causes of action for rescission, to set aside the trustee’s sale, and to quiet title to the Roberts property. The application was denied. On June 4, 2018, in Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action, the trial court denied Flaherty’s motion under Code of Civil 6 Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), for relief from the summary judgment entered in favor of Holly Hill. In October 2018, Flaherty recorded a deed granting 17470 Tramonto Drive to Howell, as successor trustee of the KHG Trust. The document was purportedly executed on September 29, 1995. In November 2018, Flaherty recorded an “easement deed” against the property, in which Flaherty, as successor trustee of the KHG Trust, purported to grant Hart, as a single woman, an easement over 17470 Tramonto Drive for access, construction, and use of a pool and pool house. The document purported to have been executed by Flaherty on August 29, 2017, but was notarized on October 31, 2018. The same day, Flaherty filed an “easement deed” against the property in which Flaherty, as a single man, granted Hart the same easement over 17470 Tramonto Drive for access, construction, and use of a pool and pool house. In July 2019, Flaherty again recorded the October 1998 quitclaim deed from the Roberts to Flaherty.

D. Quiet Title Action Filed On November 14, 2019, Holly Hill filed the complaint in the present action to quiet title to 17470 Tramonto Drive under California’s Quiet Title Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.101, et seq.) against Flaherty, individually and as successor trustee of the KHG Trust, Howell, as successor trustee of the KHG Trust, and Hart (Holly Hill’s quiet title action). Holly Hill learned Matthew James Courtade may have succeeded Howell as successor trustee 7 of the KHG Trust. Defaults were entered as to all of the defendants and Courtade. Holly Hill requested a court judgment finding the six deeds that Flaherty caused to be recorded against 17470 Tramonto Drive after the deed transferring title to Holly Hill were void, and quieting title to the property against all adverse interests, including the defendants and Courtade. In the complaint, Holly Hill initially also sought a finding that the 1988 and 1989 sewer easements were extinguished by merger when Flaherty held title to both the dominant and servient tenements, but ultimately, Holly Hill withdrew claims with respect to the 1988 and 1989 sewer easements. Holly Hill requested the trial court take judicial notice of several recorded documents. On February 8, 2021, Flaherty’s appeal from Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer judgment was dismissed.

E. Motion to Set Aside Default In January 2022, Flaherty filed a motion in the instant quiet title action to set aside his default under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473.5, 473, subdivision (d), and 587. Flaherty argued that the substituted service was defective; no attempt was made to serve him at his correct home, business, or mailing addresses; he was not served by acknowledgement and receipt; he was not personally served; and proofs of service and requests for entry of default were not sent to home, business, or mailing addresses. He attached his declaration stating that his personal mailing address was 17472 Tramonto Drive. In March 2022, the trial court denied Flaherty’s motion to set aside his default. The court found the motion was untimely 8 as to relief sought under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). The court noted the proof of service executed by Holly Hill’s attorney Bruce Cornelius showed personal service of the summons and complaint on Flaherty on December 11, 2019, at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The proof of service raised a rebuttable presumption of proper personal service. Flaherty’s declaration failed to rebut the presumption. Flaherty stated that he was never personally served but failed to offer any facts to rebut counsel’s assertion that Flaherty was at Stanley Mosk Courthouse on the date and time of service. Flaherty testified that he wasn’t sure if he was at the courthouse then, which was insufficient to refute Cornelius’s declaration. Flaherty’s claim that Cornelius’s declaration was false was not persuasive. In addition, the court stated Flaherty admitted 17474 Tramonto Drive was his personal mailing address, so Flaherty failed to rebut presumption of proper service. The court denied the request for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, because Flaherty had actual notice of the claims asserted against him by December 11, 2019, when he was personally served. As to Code of Civil Procedure section 587, Flaherty argued the request for entry of default was not mailed to him before entry of default, but Flaherty did not deny that the address on the declaration was correct, and he admitted 17474 Tramonto Drive was his mailing address. In addition, with respect to extrinsic fraud or mistake, the court found Flaherty knew the action was pending no later than his attendance at a case management hearing on October 28, 2020, but he waited until January 25, 2022, to file a motion to set aside the default, and accordingly failed to establish diligence.

9 F. Evidentiary Hearing and Judgment In April 2022, Flaherty filed a trial brief and exhibits in the instant quiet title action. Flaherty argued that Holly Hill did not receive good title because there was no valid foreclosure, trustee’s sale, or deed upon sale, and Holly Hill could not extinguish the easements through the doctrine of merger. Holly Hill filed a reply arguing the validity of the 2012 foreclosure sale had already been conclusively resolved in prior judicial proceedings. Flaherty’s challenges to the 2012 foreclosure sale and the trustee’s deed upon sale were barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. The deeds recorded after the sale to Holly Hill should be removed, and judgment entered in favor of Holly Hill as a bona fide purchaser for value. On July 26, 2022, Flaherty filed a “superseding amended” trial brief and exhibits, continuing to argue that Holly Hill did not have good title and the recorded deeds were valid. At a hearing on July 28, 2022, the trial court concluded an evidentiary hearing was required to adjudicate Holly Hill’s quiet title action under Code of Civil Procedure section 764.010. Defaulted defendant Flaherty had the right to appear and present admissible evidence at the hearing. The court made several orders to facilitate the presentation of admissible evidence but also warned that it could not consider inadmissible evidence. In September 2022, Flaherty filed an extensive request for judicial notice. Flaherty also filed an “updated trial brief in support of the motion for an order” declaring the deed that granted the property to Holly Hill invalid. He also filed a declaration authenticating his exhibits.

10 Holly Hill filed a supplemental brief regarding res judicata. Holly Hill requested judicial notice of several supporting documents, including the dockets in several court actions. Holly Hill also filed a supplemental brief concerning the priority of Holly Hill’s claims over the alleged deeds and easement. In addition, Holly Hill filed a supplemental brief stating that if physical sewer lines were located in the sewer easements, Holly Hill would not seek to extinguish the sewer easements. An evidentiary hearing was held over several dates beginning on November 30, 2022, at which Flaherty appeared and presented evidence. Holly Hill filed objections to Flaherty’s evidence and witnesses. The trial court bifurcated Flaherty’s defense based on wrongful foreclosure. On December 11, 2023, the trial court entered judgment quieting title to 17470 Tramonto Drive in favor of Holly Hill. The court found Flaherty had a reasonable opportunity to present evidence during the hearing, so denied Flaherty’s request to present additional evidence. The court sustained Holly Hill’s objections to Flaherty’s evidence that challenged the validity of Holly Hill’s predecessor’s acquisition of title through non-judicial foreclosure sale. In addition, Flaherty offered no admissible evidence showing the legal description of the property stated in the grant deed to Holly Hill was not accurate, or that the boundaries described in the deed and testified to by Holly Hill’s expert were not accurate. Flaherty failed to submit any admissible survey showing the boundaries were other than described in the grant deed to Holly Hill, or how the contested deed and easements had priority over Holly Hill’s grant deed. Flaherty’s request for further cross-examination of Holly Hill’s witnesses was not reasonable. The court also sustained Holly 11 Hill’s objections to Flaherty’s exhibits that had not been otherwise addressed during the hearing. Among other findings, the court found Flaherty’s claims that the 2012 foreclosure was wrongful were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Flaherty had raised identical claims and issues in prior cases and in opposition to the instant quiet title action, some of the prior cases resulted in final judgments on the merits, and Flaherty was a party to all of the cases. Flaherty filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Entry of Default In appellants’ briefs on appeal, Flaherty raises contentions about the presumption of service and “clerk default judgments” that are not coherent. We conclude Flaherty’s contentions about service and default judgments have been waived. “Every argument presented by an appellant must be supported by both coherent argument and pertinent legal authority.” (Kaufman v. Goldman (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 734, 743 (Kaufman).) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) “If either is not provided, the appellate court may treat the issue as waived. [Citation.]” (Kaufman, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 743.) “[C]onclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)

12 We cannot determine whether Flaherty’s factual representations are supported by evidence in the record because the vast majority do not properly cite to the clerk’s transcript or the reporter’s transcript, in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [any reference in an appellate brief to matter in the record must be supported by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where that matter may be found]). Moreover, “ ‘[a] party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular finding must summarize the evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it is insufficient. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Where a party presents only facts and inferences favorable to his or her position, ‘the contention that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence may be deemed waived.’ ” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738, italics added.) “We need not address points in appellate briefs that are unsupported by adequate factual or legal analysis.” (Placer County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Nevada County Local Agency Formation Com. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 793, 814.) In this case, Flaherty filed a motion to set aside his default under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473.5, 473, subdivision (d), and 585. The trial court denied the motion because, among other findings, Flaherty was personally served with the complaint and aware of the case long before he filed the motion to set aside the default. Due to the nature of the quiet title action, however, the court did not enter a default judgment. Instead, the court held an evidentiary hearing and allowed Flaherty to file a trial brief and present relevant, admissible evidence. In appellant’s briefs on appeal, he does not set forth the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment in accordance with the standard of 13 review, nor does he explain how the trial court erred with respect to the order denying the motion to set aside his default through legal authority and reasoned analysis. We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Instead, Flaherty refers to “clerk default judgments,” which are not at issue or reviewable in this appeal, and makes other factual statements without proper citations to the appellate record. Any contention about service and the order denying the motion to set aside Flaherty’s default has been waived.

B. Issue Preclusion Flaherty raises several contentions on appeal based on his assertion that the foreclosure sale was defective and the trustee’s deed was void, including whether the preclusion doctrine was properly applied and whether evidence related to the foreclosure sale was properly excluded. We conclude the trial court correctly found Flaherty precluded from relitigating whether the underlying foreclosure sale was defective and the trustee’s deed was valid.

1. Relevant Principles Courts often used the term “res judicata” to refer to both claim and issue preclusion, so the California Supreme Court has elected to refer more precisely to “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823−824.) Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of entire claims that were raised, or should have been raised, in a previous action involving the same parties or parties in privity with them.

14 (Ibid.) “Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.” (Ibid.) Issue preclusion, historically called collateral estoppel, prevents “the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” (Ibid.) “[A] prior judgment conclusively resolves an issue actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Ibid.) Issue preclusion “can be asserted only against a party to the first lawsuit, or one in privity with a party.” (Ibid.) “In summary, issue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at p. 825.) Finding an issue was “actually litigated” requires only “ ‘ “the opportunity to litigate . . . not whether the litigant availed himself or herself of the opportunity.” ’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 452.) “ ‘ “When an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated . . . . An issue may be submitted and determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, . . . or their equivalents, as well as on a judgment entered on a verdict. A determination may be based on a failure of pleading or of proof as well as on the sustaining of the burden of proof.” [Citations.]’ ” (Murphy v. Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 400–401 [substituted judgment ordered by probate court was issue preclusive].)

15 2. Application In this quiet title action, Flaherty took the position that Holly Hill did not hold valid title to the property because of defects related to the foreclosure proceedings and the trustee’s deed. These same issues were determined against Flaherty in Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action. In Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action, the trial court granted summary adjudication of a cause of action for possession of the property based on finding that the property was properly sold under the power of sale in the deed of trust, the title under the sale was duly perfected, and Holly Hill was a bona fide purchaser insulated from the claims asserted by Flaherty in the US Bank action. Moreover, the court found Flaherty’s prior action against US Bank was fully adjudicated on the merits, dismissed with prejudice, and the subsequent appeal was dismissed. The issues in Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action were actually litigated on the merits, not the result of a default judgment. Our conclusion that the doctrine of issue preclusion was properly applied in the quiet title action to prevent Flaherty from relitigating the validity of the trustee’s deed resolves most or all of Flaherty’s contentions on appeal. He contends privity cannot arise from a defective instrument and the trustee’s deed was void on its face, but the instrument was found to be valid in Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action. He asserts prior cases involved different parcels, different parties, and different claims, but Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action involved the same parties and the same issue concerning the validity of Holly Hill’s title to 17470 Tramonto Drive. He 16 asserts certain default judgments are void and cannot be the basis for preclusion, but the trial court’s ruling is not based on these judgments. Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action was resolved through a summary adjudication motion finding in favor of Holly Hill on the merits. Flaherty contends the quiet title judgment in this case was not a determination on the merits, but that is not relevant in the application of issue preclusion. Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action was a determination on the merits, fulfilling the requirements for issue preclusion. Flaherty contends discovery was improperly denied and evidence was improperly excluded, but he has not provided coherent argument with citations to the record showing that any discovery he sought or evidence that was excluded was relevant and admissible on an issue other than the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and the trustee’s deed, which he was precluded from relitigating.

C. Disqualification Flaherty’s contentions about judicial conflicts and disqualification are not comprehensible, and not reviewable in this appeal from the judgment, and therefore, have been waived. Section 170.1 provides specific grounds for disqualification of a trial judge for cause, including whether for any reason “[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.” (§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).) The exclusive means to obtain appellate review of a ruling concerning the disqualification of a judge is by a writ of mandate. (§ 170.3, subd. (d).) Section 170.3, subdivision (d), 17 expressly states in relevant part: “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding. The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court’s order determining the question of disqualification.” (§ 170.3, subd. (d).) Flaherty’s contentions concerning disqualification have been waived.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Holly Hill Investments, LLC is awarded costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.