gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-04557 · 2026-09-02 · Unknown

Themo Souop Clodette Edurze v. Christopher Larose, et al.

Proceeding
original
Outcome
other — Sammartino United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Area
civil
Panel
Janis L. Sammartino (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:19Z · confidence high

The court considered a habeas petition filed by an immigration detainee challenging her detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231. The court denied the petition without prejudice, finding the claim unripe because the six-month presumptive period for post-removal detention had not yet expired, and denied the associated motions as moot.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
“Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the ripeness doctrine as established in *Zadvydas v. Davis* and *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*. The order of removal became administratively final on May 26, 2026. Under *Zadvydas*, a six-month period of post-removal detention is presumptively reasonable. As the petition was filed on or before September 2, 2026, the six-month period (ending November 26, 2026) had not passed. Therefore, the claim was unripe. The court also correctly noted that even if ripe, the petitioner failed to meet her burden because the government had secured a travel document and flight, demonstrating a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Denial of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order as Moot
“DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2)”
agree with court
The TRO was likely sought to prevent removal or transfer. Since the underlying habeas petition was denied without prejudice on the merits (ripeness), and the government indicated it could effectuate removal immediately, the specific relief sought in the TRO is no longer the operative issue or is subsumed by the denial of the petition. Denying as moot is a standard procedural disposition when the underlying claim is resolved or the circumstances change.
Denial of Ex Parte Motion to Vacate Order to Show Cause and Lift Stay of Transfer as Moot
“DENIES AS MOOT ... Respondents’ Ex Parte Motion to Vacate Order to Show Cause and Lift Stay of Transfer (ECF No. 6)”
agree with court
Similar to the TRO, this motion was likely related to the stay of transfer imposed while the habeas petition was pending. With the petition denied without prejudice and the case closed, the stay is no longer necessary or the motion is moot because the litigation has concluded.

The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standard for post-removal detention under *Zadvydas* and *Johnson*. It accurately calculates the start date of the removal period based on the administrative finality of the removal order. It correctly applies the ripeness doctrine, noting that the six-month presumptive period had not yet passed at the time of the ruling. It also provides an alternative holding that the petitioner failed to meet her burden even if the claim were ripe, citing the government's success in securing a travel document and flight. The reasoning is complete and supported by the cited authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 THEMO SOUOP CLODETTE EDURZE, Case No.: 26-CV-4557 JLS (SBC)

11 Petitioner, ORDER (1) DENYING PETITION 12 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 13 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, et al., (2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 14 Respondents. FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, AND 15 16 (3) DENYING AS MOOT EX PARTE MOTION TO VACATE ORDER TO 17 SHOW CAUSE AND LIFT STAY OF 18 TRANSFER 19 (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 6) 20 21 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Themo Souop Clodette Edurze’s Petition for 22 Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1) and Motion for 23 Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO,” ECF No. 2). Also before the Court is Respondents’ 24 Return in Opposition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 5) and Ex Parte Motion to Vacate Order to Show 25 Cause and Lift Stay of Transfer (ECF No. 6). Petitioner did not file a traverse. See 26 generally Docket. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition 27 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary 28 Restraining Order and Respondents’ Ex Parte Motion to Vacate Order to Show Cause. 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cameroon and is currently detained at the Otay 3 Mesa Detention Center. Ret. at 2. On May 21, 2026, Petitioner entered the United States 4 at or near San Ysidro, California, without inspection. Id. Petitioner was determined to be 5 inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(i)(I) and was issued a Notice and Order of 6 Expedited Removal. Id. Since Petitioner’s arrest, she has been mandatorily detained 7 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Id. Petitioner received a credible fear interview, which 8 resulted in a negative determination. Id. On May 26, 2026, an immigration judge affirmed 9 the asylum officer’s negative credible fear determination. Id. Respondents have secured 10 a travel document and flight to effectuate Petitioner’s removal to Cameroon and have 11 indicated their ability to do so once the Court lifts its order enjoining transfer out of the 12 district. Id. (citing ECF No. 3). 13 LEGAL STANDARD 14 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 15 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 16 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 17 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 18 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 19 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 20 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 21 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 22 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 23 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 24 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 25 2018) (citations omitted). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 DISCUSSION 2 When an alien is denied asylum and ordered removed, they must be detained for 3 ninety days pending the government’s efforts to secure their removal to a third country. 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” 5 § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the removal period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal- 6 period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from 7 the United States” and “does not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 8 678, 689 (2001). A six-month period of post-removal detention constitutes a 9 “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period 10 passes, the petitioner has the burden to “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no 11 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If petitioner 12 satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts to the Government to rebut that showing. Id. 13 “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-removal confinement 14 grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to 15 shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is 16 no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. In that case, the alien’s release may be 17 conditioned on any of the various forms of conditioned release. Id. at 700. 18 Of importance here is when the “removal period” begins. “[T]he removal period 19 begins when an alien is ‘ordered removed,’ and the removal order becomes 20 ‘administratively final.’” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534 (2021). 21 Section 1231(a)(1)(B) states that: The removal period begins on the latest of the following: 22 (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively 23 final. (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court 24 orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s 25 final order. (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an 26 immigration process), the date the alien is released from 27 detention or confinement. 28 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). 1 “[W]here an alien seeks release prior to the expiration of the presumptive six-month 2 period, [her] claims are unripe for federal review.” Waraich v. Ashcroft, No. CVF051036, 3 2005 WL 2671406, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2005) (citing Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 4 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002)); see also Ali v. Barlow, 446 F. Supp. 2d 604, 609 (E.D. Va. 5 Aug. 28, 2006) (finding petitioner’s habeas petition premature when the six-month period 6 had not passed). Here, Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final on May 7 26, 2026, because that is when the immigration judge entered a final order of removal. See, 8 e.g., Aaron H. v. Chestnut, 26-CV-1232-TLN-SCR, 2026 WL 1398910, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 9 May 19, 2026) (“Petitioner’s order of removal became final after the immigration judge’s 10 order affirming USCIS’s negative fear determination.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim will 11 become ripe for review by November 26, 2026—six months after May 26, 2026—making 12 the current Petition premature. 13 Even if Petitioner’s claim was ripe, the Court is not persuaded that Petitioner has 14 met her burden of demonstrating that there is good reason to believe that there is no 15 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Trinh v. Homan, 16 466 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (stating that the Zadvydas court did not 17 preclude a noncitizen from challenging their detention before the end of the six-month 18 period, but nonetheless finding petitioners had not satisfied their initial burden). 19 Respondents indicate that they have secured a travel document and flight and are able to 20 immediately effectuate Petitioner’s removal to Cameroon once the instant Petition is 21 resolved. Ret. at 2; cf. Conchas-Valdez v. Casey, No. 25-CV-02469-DMS-JLB, 2025 WL 22 2884822, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2025) (satisfying petitioner’s burden where petitioner 23 repeatedly requested updates and was ignored, petitioner was denied by three countries, 24 respondents failed to name any other countries the Government was working with, and 25 petitioner was told that his assigned officers had not done anything on his case for several 26 months). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Therefore, because the six-month period of presumptive reasonableness has not 2 || passed, Petitioner’s claim is not ripe for review, and even if it were ripe, Petitioner has not 3 her initial burden. 4 CONCLUSION 5 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 6 || Corpus (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s 7 ||Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) and Respondents’ Ex Parte Motion 8 ||to Vacate Order to Show Cause and Lift Stay of Transfer (ECF No. 6). As this concludes 9 || the litigation in this matter, the Clerk of the Court SHALL close the file. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 I Dated: September 1, 2026 12 psi L. Lo memaitice- 13 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28