Allyson Q. v. John Q. CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 9/3/26 Allyson Q. v. John Q. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ALLYSON Q., Plaintiff and Appellant, E085617 v. (Super.Ct.No. FLRI1400009)

JOHN Q., OPINION Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sharunne Foster, Judge.

Affirmed.

Allyson Q., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance by Defendant and Respondent.

Allyson Q. appeals from a domestic violence restraining order protecting John Q.

(Allyson’s former husband), their two minor children, and John’s wife. Allyson argues that the restraining order is not supported by sufficient evidence. She also argues that the trial court abused its discretion or violated her due process rights by making certain 1 evidentiary rulings, prohibiting opening statements and closing arguments, and sustaining sua sponte objections. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Allyson and John have a son born in 2010 and a daughter born in 2011. Allyson petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage in January 2014, and the court entered a judgment of dissolution that year.

In March 2024, the court entered an order giving John temporary physical and legal custody of the children. The court also ordered no visitation for Allyson, and it specifically prohibited Allyson from picking up the children from school. The court found that there was a risk that Allyson would take the children without permission, because she had violated or threatened to violate custody or visitation orders, she had a history of failing to cooperate with John in parenting the children, and she had a criminal record.

John filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order in May 2024. He requested protection from Allyson for himself, their children, and his wife. John’s declaration in support of the request described incidents in February 2024 and April 2024. In February, Allyson threatened John and his wife during a custody exchange at John’s home. Allyson violently banged on a window of the home, threatened to hit John, and screamed profanities at John and his wife. Allyson also told John’s wife that Allyson was going to “‘end’” her and that Allyson was “‘always’” watching her, and Allyson said: “‘I suggest you get back in your house or you won’t like what comes next.’”

2 (Italics omitted.) The children were in the car while all of that was happening and were afraid to get out. John called the sheriff’s department, and Allyson remained outside the house screaming profanities until officers arrived. In April, Allyson violated the order prohibiting her from picking up the children at school. After she collected them from school, John contacted the sheriff’s department for assistance. Officers were able to find and safely return the children to John’s custody. A few days later, Allyson began sending harassing emails to John’s wife and making threats on the social media page for his wife’s business.

The hearing on John’s request for a restraining order took place across four days from September 2024 to February 2025. The court heard testimony from John, John’s wife, the two children, the children’s paternal grandmother, and Allyson. The court also admitted a number of exhibits, including written communications between Allyson and John and between Allyson and John’s wife. In addition, the court reviewed a video recording of the events during the custody exchange in February 2024.

The court concluded that John had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Allyson had engaged in past acts of abuse. In particular, the court cited Allyson’s emails and other written messages to John and his wife, describing some messages as harassing and others as having “threatening undertones.” The court also observed: “I heard what your children said. I was concerned and did not continue asking the children questions because some of the testimony provided was contrary to what I watched in the video. I didn’t know it was memory, I don’t know if they were told to say different things, but it 3 was contrary to some of my observations in the video. They indicated you were not yelling. Clearly, you were.”

The court granted John’s request and entered a four-year restraining order protecting John, his wife, and the children from Allyson. The restraining order included custody and visitation terms. The court gave John sole legal and physical custody of the children and ordered four-hour weekly visits with Allyson, supervised by a professional monitor.

DISCUSSION

Allyson argues that the restraining order was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the court violated her due process rights or abused its discretion in various respects. The arguments lack merit.

Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), the court “may issue an order ‘to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved’ upon ‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’” (Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 782.) Abuse includes molesting, stalking, threatening, harassing, or disturbing the peace of a person, as well as placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury. (Fam. Code, §§ 6203, subd. (a)(3), (a)(4), 6320, subd. (a).)

We review the court’s issuance of a domestic violence restraining order for abuse of discretion, and we review the court’s underlying factual findings for substantial 4 evidence. (In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) We presume the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s factual findings.

(In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887.) An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order “must cite the evidence in the record supporting the [order] and explain why such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law.”

(Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) The appellant may forfeit a substantial evidence challenge by citing only the evidence supporting their position or by failing to set forth all of the material evidence in the record. (Pilliod v. Monsanto Co.

(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 591, 621, overruled on another ground by Monsanto Co. v. Durnell (2026) 609 U.S. __, 146 S.Ct. 2001.) And when the appellant fails to set forth a fair and adequate statement of the evidence, we need not undertake an independent examination of the record to determine its sufficiency. (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007)

150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409.)

Similar principles apply to any type of challenge on appeal. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating, “on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286- 287; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) We need not “scour the record unguided” to find evidence supporting the appellant’s arguments. (City of Santa Maria, 5 at p. 287.) In addition, we “disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he [or she] wants us to adopt.” (Ibid.) All of those principles apply with equal force to self-represented litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)

Allyson forfeited her substantial evidence challenge to the restraining order. She contends that the record “contains no credible proof of harassment or violence” and that the testimony of the children and the children’s paternal grandmother “negate[d]” John’s claims. Allyson cites (1) her children’s testimony about the February 2024 incident and (2) the paternal grandmother’s testimony that she had never seen any fights or arguments between Allyson and John or seen Allyson yell or scream at the children. But Allyson fails to discuss all of the material evidence in the record. She does not adequately discuss John’s declaration in support of his request, his testimony, his wife’s testimony, the many exhibits, or the video of the February 2024 incident. We presume that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the court’s factual findings, and Allyson fails to show otherwise.

Allyson also argues that the court violated her right to due process by denying her the opportunity to make an opening statement and a closing argument. As to opening statements, the court asked both parties if they would waive them, and Allyson replied, “Sure. That’s fine.” As to closing argument, Allyson does not cite anything in the record showing that she asked to make a closing argument but was prohibited from doing so.

6 She therefore waived any claim of error with respect to opening statements and failed to preserve any claim of error with respect to closing arguments. (Baxter v. State Teachers’

Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340, 378; K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 948-949.)

Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that the court erred, Allyson fails to argue that she was prejudiced by the absence of an opening statement or a closing argument.

(Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [the appellant bears the burden of making a developed prejudice argument].)

Allyson’s remaining arguments concern evidentiary rulings. She contends that the court violated her right to due process and abused its discretion by sustaining sua sponte objections; excluding “neutral witnesses” and “impeachment and corroborating”

testimony of the children, the children’s paternal grandmother, and the children’s maternal grandfather; excluding other evidence, such as text messages, videos, visitation reports, and declarations; and admitting the “speculative” testimony of John’s wife.

The evidentiary arguments are forfeited. Most of Allyson’s assertions are conclusory and not supported by record citations, and we need not search the record to develop the arguments for her. For instance, she does not explain what messages, videos, visitation reports, and declarations she offered, nor does she explain the basis for the court’s purported rulings excluding them. Allyson also does not identify what part of the testimony of John’s wife was speculative, and Allyson does not claim to have objected to the testimony on that basis. In addition, she does not identify what sua sponte objections 7 she is challenging or whether she challenged them in the trial court. In any event, the court “may prevent improper questions or exclude inadmissible matter on the judge’s own motion without any objection by counsel.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (6th ed. 2023)

Exclusion on Court’s Own Motion, § 416, p. 509.)

Allyson does quote part of the record in which the court limited her examination of the paternal grandmother, because the court determined that the line of questioning was irrelevant and would necessitate undue consumption of time. (Evid. Code, § 352.)

She also cites the point in the record in which she made an offer of proof concerning the maternal grandfather’s testimony, which the court excluded on the ground that it would be irrelevant. In both instances, Allyson does not support her claims of error with any cogent legal analysis or pertinent legal authority. That is, she does not explain why the court’s determinations—that the proffered testimony was irrelevant or would unduly consume time—were erroneous. Again, we need not develop the arguments for her.

For all of these reasons, Allyson fails to show that the court erred by entering the restraining order.

DISPOSITION

The domestic violence restraining order is affirmed. John shall recover his costs of appeal, if any. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS MENETREZ J.

8 We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

MILLER J.