In re Skyler G. CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/3/26 In re Skyler G. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re SKYLER G. et al., B351578 Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County _____________________________ Super. Ct. No. LOS ANGELES COUNTY 24CCJP01315AB) DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BENJAMIN G., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.

1 Lori N. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian A. Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

****** In this dependency appeal, Benjamin G. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. Specifically, he challenges the court’s implicit finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.)1 did not apply. Because this finding is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Facts A. The family Father and So.G. (mother) have two children—Skyler G. (born 2012) and Ariel G. (born 2016). Mother passed away in 2023. B. Actions giving rise to dependency jurisdiction In 2024, father began leaving the children with relatives and others, without providing any way for the caregivers to contact father. He also refused to enroll the children in school or provide them with medical care 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 II. Procedural Background A. Initiation of dependency jurisdiction On April 29, 2024, the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over Skyler and Ariel because (1) father “[o]n prior occasions” “made an inappropriate plan for the children’s care and supervision” by leaving them “in the care of unrelated adults and the maternal aunt, Oseta T[.], without making a plan for the children’s ongoing care and supervision,” and (2) father “failed to provide the children with the basic necessities of life including food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment.” The petition further alleged that father’s conduct “endangers the children’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental and endangering home environment, and places the children at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger,” thereby warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300. B. Exertion of dependency jurisdiction, removal, and reunification efforts On June 5, 2024, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing at which it amended the first allegation to include father’s failure to “provide the children with the basic necessities of life,” sustained that allegation, and dismissed the second allegation as duplicative. The court removed the children from father’s custody, placed the children in the home of the maternal aunt Oseta, and ordered the Department to provide father reunification services. From June 5, 2024 through June 25, 2025, the Department provided father with reunification services; the court terminated 3 those services upon finding that father had made no progress with his case plan. The court set a permanency planning hearing. On January 6, 2026, the juvenile court held the permanency planning hearing, rejected father’s request to apply the parental benefit exception, and terminated father’s parental rights over both children. C. Efforts to ascertain whether the children fall under ICWA, and juvenile court’s ultimate ICWA finding Prior to filing its petition, the Department spoke with father, the children, the maternal aunt, and the children’s school counselor about whether the children might be Indian children. All denied any such possibility. At the initial hearing in this case on April 30, 2024, father submitted an ICWA-020 form indicating that he was “or m[ight] be a member of . . . a federally recognized Indian tribe.”2 Father’s lawyer reiterated that father was “claiming Native American ancestry” but was unable to “name the specific tribe.” The court ordered the Department to “investigate and see if there are some other paternal relatives who can shed light on the issue.” Prior to the six-month review hearing (that is, prior to November 2024), the Department reinterviewed the children, the maternal aunt and father about the children’s Indian heritage. The children and maternal aunt denied any heritage. But father for the first time reported that (1) “his cousin” told him that “[f]ather’s maternal grandfather’s parents [that is, the children’s great-great-grandparents] were from the Yavapai Tribe in 2 Mother’s family reported that mother was Samoan and had no Indian heritage. Father does not argue that the children have any Indian heritage through mother.

4 Arizona,” but father did not know their names, and (2) father’s maternal grandfather’s name was Leo G. (with two possible spellings of Leo’s last name). The Department sent notices to the three Yavapai Tribes—namely, the Yavapai Nation, the Yavapai- Apache Nation, and the Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe. Those notices included the children’s full names and birthdates; mother’s full name, last address, and birth and death dates; father’s full name, current address, birthdate and possible affiliation with a Yavapai tribe; and Leo G.’s full name (with both possible spellings) listed as “Father’s Biological Grandfather.” The last two tribes responded that the children were not Indian children; the Yavapai Nation did not respond. The Department also reviewed a 2013 referral it had received regarding father, which listed three parental relatives—a then-deceased paternal grandmother, a paternal step-grandfather who had no blood relation to father and for whom the Department had no contact information; and a paternal aunt, Laura T., with a “562” area code number and who had never responded to the Department’s efforts to contact her. Prior to the 12-month review hearing (that is, prior to June 2025), the Department reinterviewed the children, the maternal aunt, and father; this time, all three denied any Indian heritage. In a September 2025 report, the Department relayed that it had asked father about the children’s Indian heritage again. This time, father stated that he “can’t think straight” and then denied any Indian heritage, but added, “it isn’t like it will change anything.” At an October 22, 2025 hearing, the Department asked for a continuance of the permanency planning hearing. At that hearing, the juvenile court asked the Department if they had 5 identified any paternal relatives. The Department replied that father did not “name” any paternal relatives, but “provided the possibility of Yaqui lineage; however, the Department did notice the Yaqui tribe, and the Yaqui tribe responded that the children were not eligible.” (Although the transcript reports “Yaqui,” the context confirms that the Department’s lawyer misspoke or the reporter misheard—because father’s report and the Department’s notice both pertained to the Yavapai tribe.)3 The juvenile court then directly asked father for the names of any relatives, and father provided the name of his sister Laura (the same paternal aunt from the 2013 referral) and provided a “323” number. The court ordered the Department to “follow up on that.” In a December 2025 report, the Department reported that it had spoken with paternal aunt Laura. She indicated that the children’s paternal great grandfather was born in Jerome, Arizona, but that she “d[idn’t] think” her family was affiliated with any tribe and that she had “no information.” At the permanency planning hearing on January 6, 2026, the court found that the Department had “conducted a reasonable and diligent inquiry” into the children’s Indian heritage and found no reason to know that ICWA applied. D. Appeal Father timely filed this appeal. DISCUSSION Father argues that we must conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights because the trial court erred in implicitly finding that ICWA’s mandate had been met.

3 The juvenile court repeated this misnomer at the January 6, 2026 hearing.

6 ICWA was enacted “out of concern that ‘an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies,’” and “aims to keep Indian children connected to Indian families.” (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S. 255, 265.) To that end, under ICWA and the corresponding statutes the California Legislature enacted to implement it (§§ 224-224.7), a juvenile court and the Department have duties aimed at assessing whether a child in a dependency action is an “Indian child” (§§ 224.2, 224.3). An “Indian child” is a child who (1) is “a member of an Indian tribe,” or (2) “is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (b) [adopting federal law definition].) By its terms, this definition turns ‘“on the child’s political affiliation with a federally recognized Indian Tribe,’” not “necessarily” “the child’s race, ancestry, or ‘blood quantum.’” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 882, disapproved on other grounds by In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18 (Dezi C.).) The Department and the juvenile court have three duties under ICWA. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052; see generally Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-1134.) -- Duty of initial inquiry. The initial “duty” of the Department and the court is “to inquire whether [a] child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).) The Department discharges this duty by “asking” family members “whether th[e] child is or may be an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (b).) This includes inquiring of not only the child’s parents, but also others, including but not limited to “extended family members.” (Ibid.) For its part, the juvenile court is required, “at the first 7 appearance” in a dependency case, to “ask each party to the proceeding” “whether they know or have reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (c).) -- Duty of further inquiry. The second duty is the duty of the Department or the juvenile court to “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This duty is triggered if the Department or court “has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” (ibid.), and, once triggered, obligates the Department to conduct a more thorough investigation and to undertake “‘meaningful effort’” through further interviews aimed at gathering information, through contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State Department of Social Services for assistance, and through contacting the relevant Indian tribe(s) (id., subd. (e)(2); In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 743-744; In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566-567). The Department or court “has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” if the Department or court “has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe,” including information “indicat[ing]” but not “establish[ing]” the existence of any of the six circumstances satisfying the “reason to know” a child is an Indian child, detailed next. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) -- Duty to notify the pertinent tribe(s). The third duty is to notify the relevant Indian tribe(s). (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) This duty is triggered if the Department or the court “knows or has reason to know . . . that an Indian child is involved” based on the inquiries performed under the second duty. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) The Department or juvenile court has “reason to know a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian 8 child” in one of six statutorily defined circumstances—namely, when (1) “[a] person having an interest in the child . . . informs the court that the child is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)); (2) “[a]ny participant in the proceeding . . . informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child” (id., subd. (d)(3)); (3) “[t]he child . . . gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child” (id., subd. (d)(4)); (4) the child or the parents reside, or are domiciled, “on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village” (id., subd. (d)(2)); (5) “the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court” (id., subd. (d)(5)); or (6) “either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe” (id., subd. (d)(6)). In assessing whether ICWA has been violated, we review any questions of law de novo but review the court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134 [factual finding that ICWA does not apply is “‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence’”]; id. at p. 1144 [noting that such review is “deferential”].) Because father does not assert that the Department or juvenile court had a duty to formally notify any tribes (the third duty), and because father’s report of possible Yavapai heritage was sufficient to create a “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” and thus to trigger the duty of further inquiry, we focus on whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implicit finding that the Department complied with its duty of further inquiry. Substantial evidence supports the finding that the Department and the juvenile court satisfied ICWA’s duty of further inquiry because they made a meaningful effort to 9 determine whether Skyler and Ariel are Indian children within the meaning of ICWA. The Department started by asking father and the available maternal relatives (including the maternal aunt) if the children had any potential Indian ancestry. When mother’s relatives indicated that mother had no such ancestry but father indicated that he might have a tie to a Yavapai tribe, the Department chased down that lead by contacting the three federally recognized Yavapai tribes setting out the pertinent available information about the children, father, and Leo G. (the relative with the closest ties to a tribe). After the Department reported to the juvenile court that the tribes had either indicated there was no tie or not responded, the court asked father if he had any other living relatives. When father named his sister Laura, and provided a current phone number, the Department followed up on that lead and talked to Laura, who indicated that there was no Indian heritage on her side of the family. Father proffers three deficiencies that he believes foreclose a finding that the Department’s further inquiry was sufficient. First, father asserts that the Department’s inquiry was deficient because the Department never asked father for the name or contact information of the “cousin” who told father that his family might have Yavapai heritage; did not ask father whether his grandfather Leo G. was living or dead (despite father being 50 years old at the time these dependency proceedings began, such that his grandfather would have been at least in his late 80s or early 90s); and did not ask father whether Leo G. (whose last name father did not know how to spell) or any other relative had information about the family’s heritage. Although the Department has a duty “on an ongoing basis [to] include in its filings a detailed description of all inquiries” it makes under 10 ICWA (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5)), we reject father’s argument. Father asks us to infer from the absence of information in the Department’s report on these topics that the Department did not ask father for more information about the cousin, or whether Leo G. was still alive, or whether father had additional relatives to contact, when an equally reasonable inference is that the Department did ask those questions and father provided no pertinent information, particularly in light of the Department’s practice of reporting detailed biographical information about relatives whenever that information was provided. To the extent father suggests that ICWA requires a transcription of all questions asked by the Department to which there is a negative or unhelpful response, we reject that suggestion. Indeed, when the court later asked father if he had any living relatives the Department could contact, father did not name the cousin or anyone else other than his sister—of whom the Department already knew. Second, father identifies what he views as two deficiencies with the notice forms that the Department sent the three Yavapai tribes. As a threshold matter, father’s argument ignores that these notices were sent—not to discharge the Department’s duty of formal notice—but rather its precursor duty of further inquiry. Where, as here, notice is sent as part of a further inquiry, more informal communication is the norm (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 290), and, indeed, all the statute requires (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C) [Department must initially contact tribes and provide them with the information each tribe identifies as necessary to ascertain membership or citizenship eligibility]; In re P.H., Jr. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 992, 997-998 [no need for additional information in notices when formal inquiry 11 duty not triggered]). The first deficiency father identifies is the Department’s failure to send notices to the BIA or the Department of Social Services, but this was unnecessary because notice to those agencies is necessary at the further inquiry stage only if assistance is needed to “identify[] the names and contact information of the tribes” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(B), italics added; In re H.M. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1184)—and here, the Department already had that information for the three Yavapai tribes it needed to contact. The second deficiency father identifies is the Department’s failure to include in the notices the information the Department possessed regarding the deceased paternal grandmother. While the information about the paternal grandmother could have been included, its omission did not render the informal notices to the tribes (or the Department’s further inquiry) deficient. The Department provided the information most directly tied to the three tribes (as father’s cousin had reported the heritage through Leo G.), and the tribes were able to make their determination without requesting any further information “identified by the tribe as [being] necessary” to make that determination. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) At the stage of the more informal duty of further inquiry, that suffices. Third and lastly, father asserts that the Department’s inquiry was deficient because it did not contact his sister, Laura, until father provided current contact information for her. We reject this assertion. Although the Department was aware of Laura’s existence (due to the 2013 referral), the Department’s prior efforts to contact Laura using a “562” number were unsuccessful. It is not until father provided a current “323” number that the Department had any way to reach her. Its failure to re-try a number that did not work before was not 12 deficient. Father relatedly asserts that the Department should have re-noticed the three Yavapai tribes after speaking with Laura to add that Leo G.’s place of birth was Jerome, Arizona. Father provides no basis to believe that this additional iota of information would have added anything to the tribes’ determination; the tribes’ failure to ask for such information indicates it would not have added anything. As our Supreme Court noted in Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141, a juvenile court has “‘“relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.”’” Absolute perfection is not required; a misstep or omission does not automatically mandate a do-over. Here, the Department repeatedly asked about Indian heritage and followed up on any and all leads. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Department’s ICWA inquiry was sufficient.

13 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s order terminating father’s parental rights is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J. HOFFSTADT I concur:

_________________________, J. KIM (D.)

14 In re S.G. B351578 BAKER, J., Concurring Although I do not subscribe to the opinion for the court’s discussion of applicable law in all its particulars, I agree the juvenile court’s order should be affirmed.

BAKER, J.