People v. Davis CA6

Opinion

Filed 9/3/26 P. v. Davis CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H053872 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BB624073)

v.

MICHAEL PAUL DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

In November 2006, defendant Michael Paul Davis committed an armed robbery at a bowling alley and shot the bowling alley’s manager. Davis pleaded guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1) and second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 2). He admitted personally discharging a firearm during the commission of each offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) (firearm enhancements) and inflicting great bodily injury during the commission of each offense (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) (great bodily injury enhancements). Davis admitted he had two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)) (strike priors) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) (serious felony priors). He 1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. also admitted he had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, former subdivision (b) (prison priors). The trial court sentenced Davis to an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 132 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 22 years. In May 2025, Davis filed a petition to recall and resentence pursuant to section 1172.75 (section 1172.75 petition). The trial court recalled Davis’s sentence and resentenced him. The court did not impose the now invalid enhancements for the prison priors. In addition, on count 2, the court dismissed the firearm enhancement and serious felony priors and stayed the punishment on the great bodily injury enhancement. On count 1, the court struck the punishment for the great bodily injury enhancement but declined to dismiss the firearm enhancement and the serious felony priors. The court denied Davis’s People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) motion to dismiss his strike priors. The court sentenced Davis to an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 92 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 10 years. On appeal, Davis challenges the trial court’s decision not to dismiss the firearm enhancement and the serious felony priors on count 1. He contends the court abused its discretion by relying on a legally erroneous basis for its decision. In the alternative, Davis argues his counsel provided ineffective assistance. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.

2 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A. Facts On the morning of November 18, 2006, Palo Alto police officers responded to a report of an armed robbery with shots fired at Palo Alto Bowl. A Palo Alto Bowl employee, V.K.,3 was present when Davis entered the accounting office at the bowling alley. Davis robbed V.K. at gunpoint. As Davis was leaving, H.K., the bowling alley manager, entered the office. Davis ordered H.K. to move out of the way, H.K. took one step, and Davis shot H.K. in the neck. Davis fled. Davis was then 25 years old. On November 30, 2006, officers apprehended Davis after a 12-hour stand-off. He denied committing the offenses and told officers he evaded police because of a parole violation.4 Davis later admitted to committing the robbery and shooting H.K. B. Procedural Background 1. Charges, Plea, and Original Sentence In 2007, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a first amended felony complaint (complaint) charging Davis with attempted murder (§§ 187, 664; count 1), and second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 2). As to both counts, the complaint alleged firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and great bodily injury enhancements (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The complaint also alleged Davis had been convicted of two strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12) for residential burglary (§ 460, subd.

2 We take these facts from the probation reports prepared for Davis’s original sentencing and his section 1172.75 resentencing. 3 We refer to the victims by their initials to protect their privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) 4 Davis had absconded from parole supervision within two months of his July 2006 release from state prison. 3 (a)) and criminal threats (§ 422) and had also been convicted of two serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)). The complaint further alleged that Davis had incurred three prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On March 9, 2007, Davis pleaded guilty to both counts and admitted all allegations stated in the complaint. The trial court accepted Davis’s pleas and admissions. On May 10, 2007, the trial court sentenced Davis to an aggregate prison sentence of 132 years to life, consecutive to 22 years. On count 1, the court sentenced Davis to 68 years to life, consecutive to 11 years. On count 2, the court sentenced him to 64 years to life, consecutive to 11 years, with the sentence to run consecutively to the sentence on count 1. 2. Prior Criminal History In 2001, Davis was, on separate occasions, convicted of (1) evading a peace officer and multiple counts of auto theft and sentenced to two years in prison; (2) possession of methamphetamine after he failed deferred entry of judgment; and (3) first degree burglary (his first strike prior) and sentenced to four years in prison. With respect to the first degree burglary, Davis entered the residence of a man with whom he had been living and who had sexually abused Davis and stole multiple items. In 2004, Davis was placed on formal probation for domestic violence, which resulted in a parole violation. In 2005, approximately two weeks after Davis was released from serving his parole violation, he was arrested for making criminal threats (his second strike prior) and sentenced to 32 months in state prison, which included a parole violation. Davis had physically assaulted his girlfriend, leaving visible injuries to her face and arms, and had threatened to kill her if 4 she reported the assault to his parole officer. Davis was also convicted of one count of misdemeanor domestic violence. In July 2006, approximately four months before committing the current offenses, Davis was released on parole. By approximately two months later, he had absconded and was considered a parolee at large. The probation officer reported that Davis’s parole violation included “mixed conduct: absconding, failure to complete a domestic violence program[,] and association with prohibited persons.” Between 2000 and 2004, Davis also incurred misdemeanor convictions for multiple counts of being under the influence of methamphetamine and one count of criminal threats. 3. Conduct While Incarcerated While incarcerated on the instant offenses, Davis completed various courses pertaining to, inter alia, survivors of child sexual abuse, conflict resolution, and anger management, as well as job-related training. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) staff filed reports praising Davis’s performance on job assignments. In 2011 (also while in custody for the instant offenses), Davis was convicted of attempted murder for stabbing a fellow inmate and sentenced to 27 years to life, consecutive to his sentence for the current offenses. Davis and another inmate had repeatedly stabbed the victim in the neck and back with manufactured weapons. Davis asserted he stabbed the victim because the victim was a sex offender. In 2012, Davis was again accused of attempted murder, by stabbing, of a fellow inmate. Davis stabbed the victim in the neck by making continuous slashing motions with a manufactured weapon. The charge was dismissed in 2016 because the victim would not cooperate with the prosecution.

5 Davis committed additional rules violations, including two that were classified as serious (for fighting in 2019, and for possession of a cellular phone in 2022). In late April 2025, Davis was accused of coordinating the introduction and distribution of controlled substances into the California Medical Facility (where Davis was then housed) “on numerous occasions” and “had ‘circumvented institutional security on multiple occasions.’ ” The CDCR reported that Davis “poses [a]n immediate threat to the safety and security” of the facility and transferred him to segregated housing. The matter was pending when Davis filed his petition for recall and resentencing. 4. Resentencing On May 19, 2025, Davis filed a section 1172.75 petition. Davis requested that the trial court grant his Romero motion and dismiss one of his strike priors, strike the punishment for one of the two firearm enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), impose a lesser gun enhancement,5 and impose a concurrent sentence on count 2. He also requested that the court strike his serious felony priors. Davis asserted he had experienced a traumatic childhood that involved sexual abuse, physical abuse, drug abuse, and neglect. He argued both his youth at the time of commission of the strike priors and the childhood trauma he experienced were mitigating factors supporting dismissal of one of the strike priors. Davis acknowledged his conviction for attempted murder of a fellow inmate, his assault of a fellow inmate, and rules violations while incarcerated, but he highlighted his completion of rehabilitation programs, 5 Davis suggested that the trial court impose a sentence under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) (carrying a term of 10 years) or section 12022.5, subdivision (a) (carrying a term of 3, 4, or 10 years). 6 commendations for his work ethic and behavior on his job assignments, and the support of his family and friends as mitigating factors. Davis quoted section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3) in setting out the relevant postconviction factors the trial court should consider when sentencing him, including “ ‘evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence.’ ” He also asserted “[t]he parole suitability hearing process remains an extremely high hurdle for lifers,” with even “seemingly strong candidates” being denied and the Governor and the parole board having authority to review any decision to grant parole. The district attorney’s resentencing brief requested that the trial court strike the now legally invalid prison priors but otherwise impose the same sentence. On November 18, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing, recalled Davis’s sentence, and resentenced him. The trial court stated it had “thoroughly reviewed all of the papers that ha[d] been filed in this case, all the attachments.” The court accepted as true Davis’s assertions of childhood trauma. Nevertheless, the court found that Davis’s record, “both before the conviction in this case, as well as after, is replete with acts of significant violence that cause[d] the court great concern about the safety of the public where he would be released at this time.” The trial court stated it had considered Davis’s efforts while incarcerated as well as “the factors under the Williams case[6] and its progeny.” The court denied Davis’s Romero motion, stating, “given the conduct of [] Davis, not only in th[is] case, but also with his priors, and the subsequent conduct that has occurred in prison, including the conviction for 6 People v. Williams (2018) 17 Cal.4th 148.

7 attempted murder that occurred while incarcerated, the court cannot, in good conscience, find that [] Davis falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.” The trial court sentenced Davis to an aggregate sentence of 92 years to life consecutive to 10 years, comprised of consecutive terms of 42 years to life on count 1, 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) on count 1, 10 years for the two serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)) on to count 1, and 25 years to life on count 2. On count 1, the court struck the punishment for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) under section 1385, subdivision (b). On count 2, the court imposed and stayed the punishment on the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) under section 12022.53, subdivision (f), struck the punishment on the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) under section 1385, subdivision (b)(1), and struck the two serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)) under section 1385, subdivision (b)(1). Although the court did not expressly address the prison priors during the hearing, the sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment state that they no longer apply by operation of law. Davis’s counsel did not object during the resentencing hearing to the trial court’s findings or articulation of Davis’s sentence. II. DISCUSSION Davis contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss the firearm enhancement on count 1 and dismiss the serious felony priors. Davis asserts the court committed legal error in failing “to consider [the] danger to public safety on ‘the date on which the defendant would be released under the revised sentence.’ ” (Quoting People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 229 (Gonzalez).) Davis asserts he was prejudiced by this error because, given that under the revised sentence he would not be 8 eligible for parole before his 113th birthday, “the record does not clearly indicate that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion if it had understood the proper scope of its discretion.”7 A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides for the recall and resentencing of defendants with certain invalid sentencing enhancements. It states that any sentence enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, is legally invalid (with an exception not applicable here). (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute further provides that resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) When resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, trial courts are directed to “apply ‘the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and . . . any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 849.) Senate Bill 81, effective January 1, 2022, added subdivision (c) to section 1385 (section 1385(c)) which affords trial courts added discretion to strike sentence enhancements under certain circumstances. (See People v. 7 If this court were to find this claim forfeited, Davis alternatively contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the trial court was required to consider Davis’s request for resentencing “using ‘ “a forward-looking inquiry” ’ ” into Davis’s dangerousness at the time of release under the revised sentence. Because we consider the merits of Davis’s argument, we do not reach his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 9 Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242–243.) Section 1385(c)(1) provides, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” “In exercising its discretion under [subdivision (c)], the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in [the subparagraphs to subdivision (c)(2)] are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Id., subd. (c)(2); see also People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239–240.) We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision not to strike a sentence enhancement under section 1385. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza); Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.) “The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential. When, ‘ “as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “It is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more of [the defendant’s] prior convictions.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Myers).)

10 However, while deferential, the abuse of discretion standard “ ‘ “is not empty.” [Citation.] “[I]t asks in substance whether the ruling in question ‘falls outside the bounds of reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant facts.” ’ ” (People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 858.) “Thus, the trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision ‘on impermissible factors [citation] or on an incorrect legal standard.’ ” (Ibid.; Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.) “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) B. Analysis In contending the trial court abused its discretion, Davis focuses on the trial court’s remark during the resentencing hearing that it had “ ‘great concern about the safety of the public where [Davis] would be released at this time.’ ” Relying on Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 215, Davis asserts the trial court erred because it did not conduct a “ ‘ “forward-looking” ’ ” inquiry into whether reducing the enhancement and dismissing the serious felony priors would endanger public safety. In Gonzalez, the defendant argued the trial court committed error by “focusing on whether [Gonzalez] ‘presently’ and ‘currently’ endangered public safety rather than assessing whether, looking forward, public safety would be endangered due to an earlier release from prison (i.e., in 50 years to life rather than in 75 years to life) if the enhancement was dismissed.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.) The Court of Appeal determined that “the trial court erred because it considered only whether Gonzalez currently posed a danger to the public when assessing if a dismissal of the firearm enhancement would ‘endanger public safety.’ ” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 230, italics added.)

11 The trial court had “specifically explained, ‘I think presently [Gonzalez] does represent a danger to society, and for that reason . . . I do think it is appropriate for the [c]ourt to impose an additional 25 years to life for the gun use enhancement.’ ” (Id. at p. 231.) Because the trial court in Gonzalez relied on that single factor for its decision, and “gave no indication of how it would rule if it did not limit its inquiry to Gonzalez’s current dangerousness” (ibid., italics added), the reviewing court concluded that the trial court’s error was prejudicial. (Id. at p. 232.) The trial court’s comments at the sentencing hearing do not demonstrate that it interpreted section 1385(c) in the manner rejected by the appellate court in Gonzalez. We agree with the Attorney General that, in contrast to the facts of Gonzalez, the court considered Davis’s criminal, parole, and incarceration history, as well as his current offenses. Although Davis contends “a trial court’s failure to consider future dangerousness abuses its discretion regardless of other facts and circumstances considered” (citing Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 223; People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063), the trial court’s remarks do not indicate that it expressly limited its analysis to Davis’s current dangerousness or failed to consider Davis’s dangerousness at the time of possible release. (Cf. Gonzalez, at p. 224.) Without such an affirmative showing, Davis’s claim of error fails. (See People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637; Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.) Therefore, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred in its application of section 1385(c). Even if the trial court failed to properly consider Davis’s possible dangerousness at the time of his eventual release if he were sentenced to a lesser term, we would find any error harmless. The Gonzalez court stated, “it 12 is conceivable that, if the trial court holds a new sentencing hearing in which it does not limit its inquiry to [the defendant]’s current dangerousness, it will decide to exercise its discretion under section [1385(c)(2)] in a different manner.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 231.) On this record, we decide there is no likelihood the court would have exercised its discretion differently. We reject Davis’s assertion the trial court committed prejudicial error under section 1385(c). C. Errors in the Resentencing Minute Order and Abstract of Judgment In reviewing the instant appellate record, we have identified errors in the resentencing minute order and abstract of judgment not raised by either Davis or the Attorney General. Specifically, the attachment to the November 18, 2025 minute order and the abstract of judgment (dated November 18, 2025) both state that the trial court struck the punishment for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 2. In addition, the minute order states that the court struck that punishment pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (b). In fact, the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that the court imposed and stayed the punishment on the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) under section 12022.53, subdivision (f). In section No. 2 of the abstract of judgment, the trial court should have entered an “S” in the fifth column for “time imposed or ‘S’ for stayed” for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 2. (Some capitalization omitted.) In the attachment to the November 18, 2025 minute order, the trial court should have entered “3 years pun stayed purs PC 12022.53(f)” in the sixth column for “yrs/styd/strkn” for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 2. (Some capitalization omitted.)

13 We direct the trial court to correct the clerical errors in section No. 2 of the abstract of judgment and in the attachment to the November 18, 2025 minute order. (See People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89.) III. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to revise row 3, column five of section No. 2 to state “S” and to amend the attachment to the November 18, 2025 minute order to revise row five, column six to state “3 years pun stayed purs PC 12022.53(f).” The trial court clerk is directed to forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

14 ______________________________________ Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________ Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________ Adams, J.

H053872 People v. Davis