People v. Salazar CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 9/3/26 P. v. Salazar CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E086312 v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI18002640)

JEFFREY LEDEZMA SALAZAR, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Debra Harris, Judge. Affirmed with directions.

Justine Eva Li Villanueva, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Heather M.

Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 Jeffery Ledezma Salazar was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) The victims were his two daughters, S.S. and C.S.

Roughly six years later, the court ordered Salazar to pay $1,000,000 in restitution to each victim. The court also held a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75. On appeal, Salazar argues that section 1172.75 did not authorize the court to order victim restitution and that the restitution order is not supported by sufficient evidence. He also argues that the court erred by failing to recalculate his custody credits as part of the resentencing.

We remand for the court to recalculate Salazar’s custody credits, but we otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Salazar’s convictions and sentencing In April 2019, Salazar pled no contest to two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14. He also admitted that he had one prior strike and that he had served a prior prison term for possession of a firearm by a felon. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 29800, subd. (a)(1); former § 667.5, subd. (b).)

The parties stipulated that the felony complaint and the police reports provided a factual basis for Salazar’s plea. According to the police reports, Salazar groped the victims’

breasts and buttocks, rubbed their genitals, forced them to undress in front of him, “inspect[ed]” their naked bodies, and digitally penetrated them. One of the victims also reported that Salazar made her rub his penis, penetrated her with his penis, and raped her.

2 The probation department mailed victim restitution letters to the victims’ mother and left voicemails for her, but she did not respond. The probation report recommended that the court enter a “‘to be determined’” order as to victim restitution.

In May 2019, the victims’ mother appeared at Salazar’s sentencing hearing and made a victim impact statement. One of the victims (C.S.) also appeared, but she did not make a statement. The mother stated she and Salazar divorced when the victims were two and three years old. The victims then visited him every other weekend and on holidays. Salazar began abusing them when they were around six years old. He abused them for roughly eight years, until they decided to stop visiting. The victims feared him and did not disclose the abuse until Salazar went to prison for possession of a firearm.

S.S. had graduated from high school and would start college soon, but she struggled to get out of bed every day. The pain of the abuse made her sick and tired and “robbed her of her energy.” She could not sleep, and she did not like to be touched or hugged. She had seen numerous counselors and suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder. C.S. also had trouble sleeping and suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder as well as anxiety and panic attacks. She had been taking Prozac for the last year and had been admitted to the hospital “for observation on suicide watch.” She struggled with negative self-talk and heard “awful things stuck on repeat in her head.” Her mother found her curled up on the floor screaming, “please don’t hurt me, don’t hurt me.”

3 Pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, the court sentenced Salazar to a total of 11 years in state prison, including one year for the prior prison term enhancement. The court retained jurisdiction over victim restitution under section 1202.46.

II. Salazar’s resentencing and the victim restitution order Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended section 667.5 “by limiting the prior prison term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent offenses.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380.) Any enhancements imposed under the former version of section 667.5, subdivision (b), except for those imposed for sexually violent offenses, are “legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Section 1172.75 authorizes the court to resentence a defendant currently serving a term that includes an invalidated enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)-(c).)

As a result of those changes in the law, the court received notice from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that Salazar was serving a term for a judgment that included a legally invalid enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) In December 2023, the court recalled Salazar’s sentence, struck the prior prison term enhancement, and continued the matter for a further resentencing hearing. The court prepared a first amended abstract of judgment reflecting a reduced sentence of 10 years.

Salazar filed a resentencing brief asking the court to dismiss his prior strike under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The People filed a brief opposing Salazar’s request and asking the court to order victim restitution under section 4 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F). The People requested $1,000,000 for each victim. Their brief included the police reports that formed the factual basis for Salazar’s plea and written victim impact statements from C.S. and the victims’ mother. In his reply brief, Salazar argued that the court could not rely on the hearsay statements in the police reports and victim impact statements, so the People’s request for victim restitution was not supported by sufficient evidence.

At the resentencing hearing in June 2025, the court denied Salazar’s request to dismiss the prior strike. The victims’ mother and C.S. then read their victim impact statements. The mother reiterated much of the information in her 2019 victim impact statement. According to the mother, C.S. suffered from anxiety, panic attacks, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder. C.S. continued to take Prozac and had trouble with sleeping, low energy, concentration, and self-esteem. She had also recently been diagnosed with Graves’ disease, which the mother attributed to the abuse. C.S.’s counseling, psychiatric appointments, and medication helped “a little,” but the damage caused by Salazar was “deep.” The victims’ mother also described S.S.’s condition, noting that S.S. suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and bipolar disorder. S.S. had seen “numerous counselors and taken numerous supplements and oils” in an effort “to find some peace from the haunting memories of her everlasting fear.”

5 In her own statement, C.S. said that she had spent the last decade in therapy talking about her father’s abuse, adding that “it never gets easier.” Salazar criticized C.S.

and S.S. often. He called C.S. weak and “a dramatic crybaby,” and he told S.S. that she was “too headstrong.” He was also physically violent with them. The first violent incident occurred because he was angry with C.S. for failing to find his car keys. He “got in [her] face,” told her to “stop acting like a fucking moron,” and shoved her into the fireplace.

As for the sexual abuse, C.S. saw Salazar naked at a very young age. He talked to C.S. and S.S. in “graphic detail” about sex, and he stripped them naked and talked to them about their bodies. One day when C.S. and Salazar were alone, he “burst into [her]

bedroom angry,” got on top of her, and raped her. Salazar cried and begged for her forgiveness the next day, but he soon returned to being a “narcissistic, cold, angry and unstoppable psychopath.” He claimed that “it didn’t matter because God had already forgiven him.” C.S. still sometimes experienced a “suffocating feeling,” like Salazar was on top of her and she could not force him away. Salazar used religion to “terrorize” C.S.

and S.S. He took them to church and forced them to copy “endless bible verses in order to learn from [their] mistakes.” According to him, they did nearly everything wrong. But when he “beat, molest[ed], and attempt[ed] to destroy” the girls, he said that he was “saved” and that God had forgiven all his sins. C.S. noted that she had shared “only a sliver of what” she and S.S. had endured. She concluded: “It has been a very long journey, dragging ourselves out of hell ....”

6 After hearing the victim impact statements, the court ordered Salazar to pay $2,000,000 in victim restitution, consisting of $1,000,000 for each victim. The court observed that it had considered Salazar’s inability to pay that amount and explained:

“But not to grant the million dollars each would be a disservice to the victims. It is in recognition of their life, the trauma that they had to go through to this point, and probably would have to go through for the rest of their lives.” The court prepared a second amended abstract of judgment reflecting the victim restitution order.

DISCUSSION

I. Victim restitution Salazar argues that section 1172.75 did not authorize the court to order restitution at the resentencing hearing. In the alternative, he argues that the amount of the restitution order is not supported by sufficient evidence. The arguments lack merit.

Under the California Constitution, “all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd.

(b)(13)(A).) Additionally, the court “shall” order restitution “from the convicted wrongdoer in every case” in which the victim suffers a loss, “regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed.” (Id., subd. (b)(13)(B).) The People cannot waive, bargain away, or otherwise limit a victim’s constitutional right to restitution. (People v. Pierce (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1337.)

7 Subdivision (f) of section 1202.4 implements the constitutional guarantee of victim restitution. (People v. McCune (2024) 16 Cal.5th 980, 989.) The statute provides that “the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) “If the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court.” (Ibid.) “The court then ‘shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until such time as the losses may be determined.’” (McCune, at p. 985, quoting § 1202.46.) The statutory scheme places no “limitation on the permissible reasons that may prevent fixing the amount of restitution”

at the original sentencing hearing. (People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966, 971 (Bufford).) Nor does the statutory scheme “prohibit a victim, the district attorney, or a court on its own motion from requesting correction, at any time, of a sentence when the sentence is invalid due to the omission of a restitution order.” (§ 1202.46.)

A restitution order shall “fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.”

(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) Victims shall also be reimbursed for “[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for felony violations of Section 288, 288.5, or 288.7.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).) No fixed standard exists for quantifying 8 noneconomic losses. (People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 795, 803, 805 (Lehman).) “The distinguishing feature of noneconomic restitution is that such injuries are very difficult to quantify.” (People v. Gomez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 111, 118 (Gomez).) Moreover, “section 1202.4 does not require any particular kind of proof to establish a victim’s losses.” (Lehman, at p. 803.) There must be “some evidence of the impact of the crime on the particular victim,” but the “evidentiary bar is a low one.”

(Gomez, at pp. 119-120.) The court may base a restitution order for noneconomic losses on victim impact statements or statements in a probation report. (Lehman, at p. 803.)

Sworn testimony, affidavits, and expert declarations are not required. (Ibid.)

We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion. (Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 801.) With respect to noneconomic losses specifically, there need be only a rational factual basis for the amount of restitution. (Ibid.) We affirm so long as the amount “does not, at first blush, shock the conscience or suggest passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.” (People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415, 436 (Smith).)

Salazar first argues that section 1172.75 did not authorize the court to order victim restitution at the resentencing hearing. The argument fails to show that the trial court erred, because sections 1202.4 and 1202.46 authorized the court to order victim restitution, regardless of section 1172.75. At Salazar’s original sentencing, the court cited section 1202.46 and reserved jurisdiction over victim restitution. Salazar thus was 9 on notice that the court would determine the amount of victim restitution later. Salazar cites no authority for the proposition that the court could not consider victim restitution when it also considered his resentencing. We are aware of none.

Salazar also asserts that the court erred because “the factual predicates and evidence supporting” the People’s request for victim restitution existed at the time of his original sentencing, so the victims’ losses were ascertainable then. It is true that the victims’ mother made a statement at the original sentencing. But the court had not heard from C.S. or S.S. at that point, and neither the victims nor the People had requested a particular amount for noneconomic losses. Those circumstances were sufficient to defer fixing victim restitution for the noneconomic losses caused by Salazar’s conduct.

(Bufford, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 971 [rejecting the argument that the People were “capable of ascertaining an amount of restitution at an earlier time,” so they had a duty to seek restitution earlier and to “place the burden upon the defendant to oppose it rather than wait”].)

Salazar further argues that even if the court was authorized to order restitution, the amount of the order is not supported by sufficient evidence. But there was a rational factual basis supporting the order for $1,000,000 to each victim. The court had the police reports that provided the factual basis for Salazar’s plea, the victim impact statement from C.S., and the victim impact statement from the mother concerning the effects on both girls. (See Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 120 [“Statements and testimony may 10 be presented to the court or probation officer by the victim’s parents, a treating physician or therapist, or others with personal knowledge of the impact on the victim”].) C.S.’s description of the sexual abuse was consistent with the statements in the police reports.

She described in particular how Salazar raped her. And according to C.S. and the mother, both girls had suffered extensive and ongoing psychological and emotional harm, including anxiety, panic attacks, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, obsessive- compulsive disorder, and bipolar disorder. They both had therapy, and C.S. had been admitted to the hospital on “suicide watch.” S.S. struggled to get out of bed every day, and she did not like to be touched or hugged. Both girls had trouble sleeping. C.S.

likened their “very long journey” to “dragging [themselves] out of hell.”

Moreover, the amount of restitution does not shock the conscience or suggest passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the court. Indeed, $1,000,000 per victim is consistent with other restitution orders for noneconomic losses caused by sexual abuse.

(Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 420, 436, 440 [affirming a restitution order for $750,000 in noneconomic losses caused by a stepfather’s sexual abuse]; Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 802-804, 806 [affirming a restitution order for $900,000 for noneconomic losses caused by a grandfather’s sexual abuse].) The court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that $1,000,000 was appropriate to compensate the victims for “the trauma that they had to go through to [that] point, and probably would have to go through for the rest of their lives.”

11 Salazar relies primarily on two cases to support his argument, Gomez and People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140 (Valenti). Both cases are distinguishable. In Gomez, the prosecutor read a brief statement by the victim that described the defendant as a “‘setback,’” but the statement contained no description of the impact of the defendant’s crimes. (Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 118.) The victim also claimed that he was not a victim at all, referring to himself instead as a “‘survivor’” who would “‘continue to strive’” to reach his goals. (Id. at p. 114.) The Gomez court concluded that there was no evidence of the impact on the victim, “and the trial court relied exclusively on its experience and common sense regarding similar incidents in awarding restitution.” (Id.

at p. 119.) In light of that “bare record,” the trial court abused its discretion by ordering victim restitution. (Id. at pp. 118-119.)

The evidence of impact in Valenti was similarly insufficient. According to the statements of the victims’ parents, one victim felt “betrayed and embarrassed” and would “‘suffer ramifications,’” but the parent did not provide any more details. (Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.) Another victim was “‘doing fine,’” and a third victim was “‘excellent.’” (Id. at pp. 1182-1183.) There was no other evidence of an impact on the victims of the defendant’s sexual abuse. (Id. at p. 1182.) Under those circumstances, the Valenti court held that there was no rational factual basis for the restitution order. (Id. at pp. 1183-1184.)

12 This case is unlike Gomez and Valenti. The court did not rely exclusively on its experience or common sense, and the record contains detailed statements by C.S. and her mother regarding the extensive emotional and psychological harm suffered by the victims.

For all these reasons, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Salazar to pay $1,000,000 in restitution to each victim.

II. Custody credits Salazar argues that the court erred by failing to recalculate his custody credits as part of his resentencing. The People concede that the court must update Salazar’s custody credits, and we agree.

If the court modifies a defendant’s sentence, then the court must recalculate the number of days that the defendant has already spent in custody and award those recalculated credits in the new abstract of judgment. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Ca1.4th 20, 29, 37, 41; § 2900.1 [“Where a defendant has served any portion of [their]

sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence [they] may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts”].)

The court failed to update Salazar’s custody credits after his resentencing hearing in June 2025. Salazar waived his presentence custody credits as part of his plea agreement, so the original abstract of judgment shows zero days of custody credit. The 13 second amended abstract of judgment still shows zero days of custody credit.

Accordingly, we remand for the court to recalculate his custody credits.

DISPOSITION

The trial court is directed to (1) prepare a corrected resentencing minute order reflecting Salazar’s custody credits at the time of his resentencing, and (2) prepare a corrected abstract of judgment reflecting those credits. The court shall forward that corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

FIELDS J.