Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HUILONG ZHENG, Case No.: 26-cv-4445-RSH-AHG 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING AMENDED 13 v. PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS 14 WARDEN, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 On July 17, 2026, petitioner Huilong Zheng, originally proceeding pro se, filed a 19 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District of 20 California. ECF No. 1. The petition was subsequently transferred to this District. ECF No. 21 10. On August 18, 2026, Petitioner filed an amended petition. ECF No. 20. For the reasons 22 below, the Court denies Petitioner’s amended petition. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 A. First Petition 25 Petitioner has previously sought habeas relief in this District. See Zheng v. The 26 United States of America, No. 26-cv-1563-RSH-AHG (S.D. Cal.) (“the Prior Action”). In 27 that case, the Court granted the petition and directed the respondents “to arrange a bond 28 hearing for petitioner before an immigration court within seven (7) days of this order, at 1 which the government bears the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, 2 that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or poses a danger.” Case No. 26-cv-1563, ECF No. 3 9 at 1. 4 Petitioner was subsequently scheduled for a bond hearing on April 15, 2026, but 5 withdrew his request through counsel. Case No. 26-cv-1563, ECF No. 13-1. Petitioner was 6 then scheduled for another bond hearing before a different immigration judge on May 4, 7 2026, but again withdrew his request through counsel. Case No. 26-cv-1563, ECF No. 13- 8 2. On May 12, 2026, Petitioner requested a bond hearing pro se. The immigration judge 9 appeared to not have been informed of the Court’s April 7, 2026 order and denied bond on 10 the ground that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention. Case No. 26-cv-1563, ECF 11 No. 13-3. 12 On May 27, 2026, Petitioner moved to reopen the Prior Action and enforce the 13 Court’s judgment. Case No. 26-cv-1563, ECF No. 11. On June 17, 2026, before the Court 14 ruled on this motion, Petitioner received a second bond hearing. The immigration judge 15 found that the government had established by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner 16 presented a risk of flight and therefore denied bond. Case No. 26-cv-1563, ECF No. 15-1 17 at 1. On June 29, 2026, Petitioner filed a reply in support of his motion to enforce, 18 characterizing the immigration judge’s ruling as one based on mandatory detention, while 19 also acknowledging and challenging the immigration judge’s flight risk determination. 20 Case No. 26-cv-1563, ECF No. 16 at 18. 21 On July 8, 2026, the Court denied the motion to enforce, concluding that the 22 immigration judge had applied the clear and convincing evidence standard and made an 23 individualized finding that Petitioner posed a flight risk. Case No. 26-cv-1563, ECF No. 24 17 at 2–3. The Court therefore determined that Petitioner had received the bond hearing 25 required by its April 7, 2026 order. Id. at 3. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Second Petition 2 On July 17, 2026, Petitioner, then proceeding pro se, filed a second petition for a 3 writ of habeas corpus, this time in the Eastern District of California, challenging his 4 continued detention. ECF No. 1. On July 24, 2026, the Eastern District appointed counsel 5 for Petitioner. ECF No. 7. The action was subsequently transferred to this District. ECF 6 Nos. 9, 10. On August 18, 2026, Petitioner, through counsel, filed the operative amended 7 petition. ECF No. 20. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 10 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 11 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A prisoner bears the 12 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 13 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 14 III. ANALYSIS 15 A. The Prior Action 16 Petitioner characterizes his amended petition in this case as seeking enforcement of 17 the Court’s April 7, 2026 order requiring a bond hearing in the Prior Action. See ECF No. 18 20 at 2, 9. But the Court has already considered and rejected Petitioner’s contention that 19 the June 17, 2026 bond hearing failed to comply with that order. Case No. 26-cv-1563, 20 ECF No. 17. As discussed above, in its July 8, 2026 order in the Prior Action, the Court 21 concluded that the immigration judge had applied the clear and convincing evidence 22 standard and determined based on evidence that Petitioner presented a flight risk. Id. at 3. 23 The Amended Petition neither acknowledges that ruling nor directly addresses its 24 reasoning. Therefore, to the extent Petitioner again contends that the Immigration Judge’s 25 June 17, 2026 hearing failed to comply with the Court’s April 7, 2026 order, the Court 26 rejects that contention for the reasons stated in its prior order. 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Prudential Exhaustion 2 Petitioner’s remaining claims challenge the immigration judge’s bond determination 3 itself. These claims are unexhausted. The Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, 4 that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before 5 seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), 6 abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A 7 court may require prudential exhaustion when: 8 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate 9 a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 10 administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow 11 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 12 13 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 14 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative 15 remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or 16 stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is 17 excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, “a 18 court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are 19 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, 20 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’” 21 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 22 2004)). 23 Here, Petitioner does not dispute Respondents’ representation that he has not 24 appealed the immigration judge’s bond decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals 25 (“BIA”). See ECF Nos. 22 at 3; 23. Instead, Petitioner argues an appeal is not required 26 before seeking enforcement of a court order. ECF No. 20 at 9. But Petitioner already sought 27 enforcement in the Prior Action, which the Court denied. His remaining contentions—that 28 the immigration judge misapplied the burden of proof and otherwise committed errors 1 || during the bond hearing—amount to a challenge of the bond determination itself. ECF No. 2 ||20 at 5-8. The Ninth Circuit has applied the exhaustion doctrine to circumstances similar 3 ||to those presented here—where a noncitizen seeks review, through a habeas proceeding, 4 ||of an immigration judge’s denial of bond. See Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the 5 || petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s adverse bond determination before appealing 6 the BIA. This short cut was improper. Leonardo should have exhausted administrative 7 remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s 8 || decision.”). Consistent with Leonardo, the Court declines to consider those claims before 9 || the BIA has had an opportunity to address them. 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, the amended petition is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is 12 || directed to close the case. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. L 7 C / ‘ 14 || Dated: September 1, 2026 15 Hon. Robert S. Huie 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28