People v. George CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/2/26 P. v. George CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C103168 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24FE005093) v. TAVON ANTHONY GEORGE, Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Tavon Anthony George appeals the trial court’s denial of his application for pretrial mental health diversion. He contends the court abused its discretion by denying diversion because its finding that he is ineligible for diversion is not supported by substantial evidence. We agree. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to reconsider defendant’s application for mental health diversion. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On March 24, 2024, Sacramento County Sheriff’s deputies arrested defendant after a short chase on a stolen dirt bike ended with defendant crashing into an elementary school fence. The prosecution filed four charges against defendant: (1) evading an officer, (2) unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, (3) possession of a stolen vehicle, and 1 (4) misdemeanor willful obstruction of a peace officer. The prosecution also alleged defendant had two prior strike convictions for robbery. Defendant filed an application for mental health diversion under Penal Code1 section 1001.36. Included in defendant’s application was a report from a crisis assessment completed a few months after his arrest. The therapist who conducted the assessment diagnosed defendant with bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, along with “opioid, cocaine, and alcohol” use disorders. The therapist also noted in the report that defendant “was likely experiencing mental health problems when [he was] arrested.” The prosecution opposed defendant’s application, arguing defendant was ineligible for diversion because clear and convincing evidence established defendant’s mental health disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of the offenses. The prosecution also argued the trial court should exercise its residual discretion to deny diversion because granting diversion to defendant would not meet the underlying goals of the statute. At the hearing on defendant’s application, defense counsel argued defendant’s diagnoses “affect his judgment and cognitive abilities to make good judgment calls.” Counsel also argued defendant did not take the bike for personal gain. Defendant bought the bike, and the situation “comes down to poor judgment.” Counsel explained, “The only logical conclusion could be that [defendant] put himself in the situation because he was dealing with untreated diagnoses of not only bipolar but opioid and cocaine and alcohol use that’s fairly severe.” The recommended treatment plan included a narcotics/opioid treatment program along with “treatment for his underlying bipolar disorder.”

1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

2 When defense counsel began arguing that the pursuit was only one to two minutes long, the trial court interrupted, stating, “I’ll save you that. In terms of -- I don’t think it to be an unreasonable risk to public safety as narrowly defined in the particular evading.” Counsel concluded by stating that what happened to defendant could happen to anyone. “[Defendant] got hooked on prescription pills because he had -- after suffering in a very serious car accident and that -- which has led him to methamphetamine use. [¶] He obviously comes from family that is providing very dense character letters[,] which indicates that he has that support. He just now needs the structure for being able to treat two very serious diagnoses as a dual diagnosis together in treatment.” In response, the prosecution argued the statutory presumption that defendant’s mental health disorders were a significant factor in his commission of the offenses was overcome by clear and convincing evidence. As evidence, the prosecution highlighted defendant’s prior conviction eight years earlier for possession of a stolen vehicle. The prosecution also pointed to the circumstances of the offense, noting that when officers tried to initiate the stop, “defendant look[ed] over his shoulder and acknowledge[d] that he s[aw] these officers and then t[ook] off running.” The prosecution stated, “[T]his is behavior that is just simply attempting to further his criminality specifically.” The prosecution was “not convinced that … defendant’s mental health diagnoses were playing a part.” The prosecution continued: “What the [prosecution] see[s] by way of a history of [defendant’s] behavior is somebody who is acting on behalf of themselves, who is choosing to engage in criminal conduct for their own personal gain. [¶] … [T]hat’s why we believe nexus is overcome.” The trial court denied diversion. The court explained: “[Defendant] was held to answer on the theft of the motorcycle and possession of the known stolen vehicle. So, starting there then, in terms of his -- [¶] … [¶] motivation to evade the officers, he was on parole at the time of riding this motorcycle. And the [c]ourt believes that his choice to evade the officers -- albeit short given that he had struck a fence at the elementary school 3 -- was not the function of his underlying diagnoses but instead kind of good old‑fashioned trying to get away from the cops. Because he knew he would be in violation of his parole and, also, that he had gone to state prison previously for similar conduct back in 2016. So, for those reasons, the [c]ourt denies the application.” Following the denial of the application, the prosecution amended the information, dismissing two charges—possession of a stolen vehicle and willful obstruction of a peace officer—and adding a prior conviction allegation for possessing a stolen vehicle and two aggravating sentencing factors. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3), (4).) A jury found defendant guilty on the two remaining counts, evading a police officer and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. In a court trial, the trial court found true the prior strike conviction allegations, the prior possession of a stolen vehicle conviction, and one aggravating sentencing factor. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years four months. Defendant appeals. DISCUSSION On appeal, defendant contends substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that he is ineligible for mental health diversion. Specifically, the court did not consider the statutory presumption that defendant’s mental health condition was a significant factor in the commission of the offense, and the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption with clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s mental health disorders did not contribute to causing the incident. The trial court therefore committed “reversible error” by denying his petition. The People contend substantial evidence supports the trial “court’s finding that [defendant’s] mental disorders were not a motivating factor in his crimes.” (Boldface omitted.) According to the People, “the court properly made a factual finding adverse to [defendant]” that is “entitled to deference on appeal.” Defendant has the better argument.

4 I Legal Standards The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to “authorize trial courts to grant ‘pretrial [mental health] diversion’ to defendants diagnosed with qualifying mental disorders.” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 677.) To be eligible for mental health diversion, a defendant must meet two requirements. (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 400 (Lacour).) One, the defendant must have been diagnosed within the past five years with a mental disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (Lacour, at p. 400; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) And two, the defendant’s mental disorder must be a significant factor in the commission of the offense. (Lacour, at p. 400; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) “Among the express purposes of the [diversion] program is to ‘[i]ncrease[] diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.’ ” (Siam v. Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 80, quoting § 1001.35, subd. (a).) Under section 1001.36, subdivision (b), “[t]he court must ‘find a causal connection “unless there is clear and convincing evidence that [the mental disorder] was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” ’ ” (People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 490, italics added, quoting Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.) “[E]ligibility no longer turned on findings to the court’s ‘satisfaction.’ ” (Sarmiento, at p. 891.) The statute “requires the court to ‘find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor’ ” unless “ ‘clear and convincing evidence’ ” demonstrates otherwise. (People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 52.) And it is the prosecution’s burden to provide clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption. (Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.)

5 Once a defendant meets the eligibility requirements, the trial court must then determine whether a defendant is suitable for diversion using the four criteria outlined in section 1001.36, subdivision (c): (1) A qualified mental health expert has determined the defendant’s symptoms would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the defendant has consented to diversion and waived the right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant has agreed to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion, and (4) the court has determined “the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety … if treated in the community.” (See Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 400-401.) We review a trial court’s ruling on an application for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.) A court abuses its discretion when it applies “the wrong legal standard [citations] or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.) “By definition, ‘substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere speculation.” (People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851.) In reviewing a trial court’s “finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before [us] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the [disputed] fact was true.” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.) More specifically, in this context, we must determine “whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that [the defendant’s] mental disorder ‘was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.’ ” (Id. at p. 402, italics added.) To answer that question, we review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party “and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 401-402.)

6 II The Trial Court’s Order Denying Mental Health Diversion Lacked Substantial Evidence Defendant’s mental health diagnosis created a presumption that his mental health disorders were a significant factor in the commission of the offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) Beyond the presumption, the evidence before the trial court included the opinion of the therapist who diagnosed defendant that he “was likely experiencing mental health problems when [he was] arrested.” Because defendant’s mental health diagnosis gave rise to the statutory presumption that his mental health condition was a significant factor in the commission of the offense, the court was required to find that his mental health disorders were a significant factor and find him eligible for diversion, unless there was clear and convincing evidence that his mental health disorders were not a causal, motivating, or contributing factor in the offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2); Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.) The People argue the trial court met this burden and ask us to adopt the reasoning in People v. Sacco (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 229. There, the defendant was charged with numerous financial crimes that took years to coordinate and execute. (Id. at p. 232.) The symptoms associated with the defendant’s diagnoses of anxiety and depression included “forgetfulness, poor concentration, and impaired mental functioning.” (Id. at p. 241.) The offenses, which the defendant committed alone, reflected “years of coordinated planning and execution.” (Id. at pp. 240, 241.) The trial court also noted the psychologist’s report relied nearly entirely on facts pertaining to the defendant’s background and not to the circumstances of his crimes when determining whether the defendant’s mental health condition contributed to the commission of the offenses. (Id. at p. 237.) Accordingly, the trial court denied diversion. (Ibid.) The appellate court affirmed, concluding “[the defendant]’s criminal behavior did not reflect the mental health symptoms [the psychologist] described” in her report. (Id. at 7 p. 241.) Given the psychologist’s lack of knowledge regarding the facts of the defendant’s crimes and that the defendant’s mental health symptoms were not reflected in his offenses, the appellate court concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the defendant’s mental health diagnoses were not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor in the alleged offenses. (Ibid.) Sacco is distinguishable. In denying diversion, the court here stated defendant’s mental health diagnoses were not a significant factor because defendant evaded officers during the pursuit, had been held to answer on the charges the prosecution filed against him, was on parole at the time of the offense, and “had gone to state prison previously for similar conduct back in 2016.” The court “believe[d]” defendant’s “choice to evade the officers … was not the function of his underlying diagnoses but instead kind of good old‑fashioned trying to get away from the cops. Because he knew he would be in violation of his parole.” Missing from the court’s explanation for its finding is “authority for the proposition that a person suffering from bipolar disorder or [posttraumatic stress disorder would] not attempt to avoid apprehension.” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) “ ‘ “ ‘A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than … a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.) Moreover, “ ‘ “ ‘[a] reasonable inference … may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court’s speculation about defendant’s motivation for committing the offense is not evidence “ ‘from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable’ ” that defendant’s mental health disorders were not a causal, motivating, or contributing factor in the offense. (Lacour, at pp. 401-402.) At bottom, the record is devoid of any evidence, clear and convincing or otherwise, to overcome the statutory presumption that defendant’s mental health 8 disorders were a significant factor in his commission of the current offense. (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) Nothing before the trial court showed defendant “was not suffering symptoms” when he committed the offense “or that [his] mental health disorders were not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor in the commission of the [offense].” (Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.) If anything, the record contained affirmative evidence indicating defendant “was likely experiencing mental health problems when arrested.” Even if the trial court did not credit the therapist’s opinion, as we held in Lacour, “the absence of evidence proving that [the defendant]’s mental disorder was a factor in the commission of the offense[] is not substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and convincing evidence that [the defendant’s] mental disorder was not a factor in the commission of the offense[].” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) As we also held, “By finding that the statutory presumption had been overcome by the mere absence of evidence demonstrating that [the defendant’s] mental illness was a factor in the alleged offenses, the court effectively shifted the burden to [the defendant] to affirmatively prove that his mental disorder[s] contributed to the offense[].” (Ibid.) That is not the showing required under the statute. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) Considering the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude the record “lacks substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that [defendant’s] mental disorder[s] ‘[were] not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to … defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.’ ” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) Because the court’s finding that defendant is ineligible is not supported by substantial evidence, the court abused its discretion by denying diversion on that basis. (Id. at p. 404; People v. Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)

9 We consequently reverse the trial court’s finding on defendant’s eligibility for mental health diversion and remand for it to perform the remainder of the mental health diversion analysis. DISPOSITION We reverse the judgment and remand for the trial court to reconsider defendant’s mental health diversion application consistent with this opinion.

/s/ ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/ HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.